Psychology in the Age of Confessionalisation

Psychology in the Age of Confessionalisation

A Case Study on the Interaction Between Psychology and Theology c. 1517 – c. 1640

Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. dr. Th.L.M. Engelen,
volgens besluit van het college van decanen
in het openbaar te verdedigen op vrijdag 20 november 2015
om 12.30 uur precies

door

Davide Cellamare
geboren op 20 juni 1985
te Modugno (Italië)

Promotoren:
Prof. dr. P.J.J.M. Bakker
Dr. C.H. Leijenhorst

Manuscriptcommissie:
Prof. dr. C.H. Lüthy
Dr. L. Spruit (Università degli Studi di Roma, La Sapienza)
Dr. M. Edwards (University of Cambridge, United Kingdom)

Printed by Koninklijke Wöhrmann, Zutphen
Typesetting by TAT Zetwerk, Utrecht

Contents

Acknowledgments

During the last five years I have been blessed with the opportunity of working at the Center for the History of Philosophy and Science, an ideal place to write my PhD thesis. The Center had all I needed for my work, and more importantly a group of great scholars and colleagues to whom I am most grateful.

I owe my biggest thanks to my supervisors, Paul Bakker and Cees Leijenhorst, without whose guidance this thesis could not have been possible. Since the first day of my job as a doctoral candidate, they have followed my work with great enthusiasm. They have always encouraged me to think that big ideas and projects could and should be pursued. They taught me do so with the right dose of pragmatism. If I have made some progress as a scholar during these years, much of this is thanks to them.

I cannot say how much I have benefited from the help of Hans Thijssen, Christoph Lüthy, Carla Rita Palmerino, Frederik Bakker, and Leen Spruit. Their comments on what I have written, as well as on my presentations during the seminars at the Center, brought my thesis to a much higher level. Their constant support and faith in my work were indispensable in the completion of my thesis.

I would like to mention the names of all the other colleagues whom I had the privilege to meet during the last five years: Delphine Bellis, Femke Kok, Sander de Boer, Doina Cristina Rusu, Bill Duba, Erik Dücker, Hiro Hirai, Kuni Sakamoto, Elisabeth Moreau, Adam Takahashi, Carli Coenen, Chiara Beneduce, Lyke de Vries, Elena Nicoli, and Sanne Stuur. Your daily companionship and suggestions helped me work in a wonderful environment.

I would like to thank the past and present members of the Center who shared their office with me and kindly endured my presence: Sander, Doina, and Delphine. Seeing you working so hard right next to my desk really set an example for me.

I would also like to thank all the other friends and colleagues who were so kind as to read parts of my thesis. At the very least, I would like to mention Marco Lamanna and Kuni Sakamoto. Marco, your comments on some of my papers and our long phone calls on psychology and confessionalisation truly helped me a lot. Kuni, your straightforward comments and questions on my work were so precious, and it was just beautiful to chat with someone like you who also likes my obscure sixteenth-century authors.

This thesis could not have been possible without the financial support of the interdisciplinary research programme of Radboud University, Nijmegen, entitled 'Culture, Religion and Memory'.

Whilst writing my thesis, I was so fortunate as to always feel the love of my friends, both those living near me and those who are scattered across the globe. Some of them I have always known and some of them I had the privilege to meet more recently. There are so many of you that it is just impossible to thank you all individually. But to all of you, thank you for being there.

Finally, I would like to thank my mother and my father. I could never have achieved so much without your example and unconditional support.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.0. Subject of This Thesis

Aristotle, at the very onset of his book *De anima* (*On the Soul*), introduces psychology as a discipline of the highest rank, both because of the dignity and wonderfulness of its subjects and because of its exactness. But whilst he assigns such prominence to psychology, Aristotle is more careful about its epistemological status: «to attain any knowledge about the soul is one of the most difficult things in the world».[1]

The medieval tradition of commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima* measured itself with such ambivalence between the exactness and nobility of psychology on the one hand and the actual difficulty of knowing the soul on the other.[2] As a matter of fact, knowing the soul became even more difficult over the centuries and especially after Aristotle's teaching came in contact and had to be harmonised with Christianity.

Yet, it was probably because of the very efforts to determine an orthodox Christian view about the nature and destiny of the soul that two things about it became clear. First, when the acts of the Council of Vienne (1311–1312) established that the intellective soul of man was truly and per se the form of the human body.[3] Sec-

1 Aristotle, *De anima*, in Jonathan Barnes, ed., *The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation* (Princeton 1984), I.1, 402a10.

2 On medieval discussions about the epistemic status of the science of the soil, see: Sander W. de Boer, *The Science of the Soul. The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle's* De anima, *c. 1260–c. 1360* (Leuven 2013), 92–122.

3 The acts of the Council of Vienne, which were published by John XXII, condemned as heretic anyone who denies that the intellective soul is truly and per se the form of the human body. The Latin text of the condemnation reads as follows: «Porro doctrinam omnem seu positionem, temere asserentem aut vertentem in dubium, quod substantia animae rationalis seu intellectivae vere ac per se humani corporis non sit forma, velut erroneam ac veritatis catholicae fidei inimicam praedicto sacro approbante concilio reprobamus, definientes, ut cunctis nota sit fidei sincerae veritas, ac praecludatur universis erroribus aditus, ne subintrent, quod quisquis deinceps asserere, defendere seu tenere pertinaciter praesumpserit, quod anima rationalis seu intellectiva non sit forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter, tanquam haereticus sit censendus» (Aemelius Ludwig Richter and Emil Albert Friedberg, eds., *Corpus iuris canonici* (Graz 1959), 1134). On the impact of the Council of Vienne on fourteenth-century psychology, see William Duba, "The Souls after Vienne: Francis-

ond, when the Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517) stated that the Christian doctrine of the immortality of the human soul could and should be demonstrated by means of philosophical arguments.[4]

By the beginning of the sixteenth century, then, at least two ideas about the human soul were known for a fact to Christian intellectuals: the fact that it was the form, or animating principle, of the human body; the demonstrable truth that despite being united to the body as its form, the soul could survive the body and attain eternal life. It would have been all very well, were not it for the fact that Christianity was about to change forever.

---

can Theologians' Views on the Plurality of Forms and the Plurality of Souls, ca. 1315–1330", in Paul J.J.M. Bakker, Sander W. de Boer, and Cees Leijenhorst, eds., *Psychology and the Other Disciplines. A Case of Cross-Disciplinary Interaction* (1250–1750) (Leiden 2012), 171–272.

4 The Catholic Church's statement about the immortality of the soul is contained in the 1513 papal bull "Apostolici regiminis" (by Pope Leo X), which reads as follows: «cum itaque diebus nostris (quod dolenter ferimus) zizaniae seminator, antiques humani generis hostis, nonnullos perniciosissimos errores a fidelibus simper explosos in agro Domini superseminare et augere si ausus, de natura praesertim animae rationalis, quod videlicet mortalis sit, aut unica in cunctis hominibus; et nonnulli temere philosophantes, secundum slatem philosophiam verum id esse asseverant; contra huiusmodi pestem opportune remedia adhibere cupientes, hoc sacro approbante concilio damnamus et reprobamus omnes asserentes animam intellectivam mortalem esse, aut unicam in cunctis hominibus et haec in dubium vertentes: cum illa non solum vere per se et essentialiter humani corporis forma existat, sicut in canone felicis recordationis Clementis papae V praedecessoris nostrilin generali Viennensi concilio edito continetur, verum et immortalis, et pro corporum quibus infunditur multitudine singulariter multiplicabilis et multiplicata sit. [...] Cumque verum vero minime contradicat, omnem assertionem veritatis illuminatae fidei contrariam, omnino falsam esse definimus, et ut aliter dogmatizare non liceat, districtius inhibemus: omnesque huiusmodi erroris assertionibus inhaerentes, veluti damnatissimas haereses seminantes, per omnia, ut detestabiles et abhominabiles haereticos et infidels, catholicam fidem labefactantes, vitandos et puniendos fore decernimus. Insuper omnibus et singulis philosophis in universitatibus studiorum generalium, et alibi publice legentibus, districte praecipiendo mandamus, ut cum philosophorum principia aut conclusiones, in quibus a recta fide deviare noscuntur, auditoribus suis legerint, seu explanaverint, quale hoc de animae mortalitate aut unitate, et mundi aeternitate, ac alia huiusmodi, teneantur eisdem veritatem religionis christianae omni conatu manifestam facere, et persuadendo pro posse docere, ac omni studio hiusmodi philosophorum argumenta, cum omnia solubilia existant, pro viribus excludere atque resolvere» (Norman P. Tanner and Giuseppe Alberigo, eds., *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils* (London 1990), 605–606). About the Fifth Lateran Council and its statements on the immortality of the soul, see: Daniel Price, "The Origins of Lateran V's Apostolici Regiminis", *Annuarium historiae conciliorum*, 17 (1975), 464–472; Siro Ofelli, "Il pensiero del Concilio Lateranense V sulla dimostrabilità razionale dell'immortalità dell'anima umana", *Studia Patavina*, 1 (1954), 7–40.

In 1517, Martin Luther, an Augustinian theologian teaching in the Saxon town of Wittenberg, wrote ninety-five theses that would shake the European intellectual world, with effects that are visible to our days. The ninety-five theses launched a direct attack on many central doctrines of the Roman Church. Luther's criticisms stemmed chiefly from his new idea that man was saved by faith in Christ alone (hence, not by good deeds) and that this message could only be known through the revealed Gospel of God. This conception challenged the practice of church indulgences and in fact the very legitimacy of the Roman papacy altogether.

Luther's new understanding of the Christian faith triggered the movement that we know as 'Reformation' and that, through the so-called process of 'confessionalisation', divided Western European Christianity into three main denominations: Lutheranism, Catholicism, and Calvinism. As in the early sixteenth century Luther's ideas were gaining momentum, the reformer started to channel his fierce attacks into numerous writings. In one such writing, *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation* (1520), Luther criticised, or rather ridiculed, many church doctrines. Some of the ideas Luther derided concerned the human soul:

> I nevertheless allow that the Pope may compose articles of his faith for his faithful such as that the bread and the wine are transubstantiated in the sacrament, that the divine essence neither begets nor is begotten, that the soul is the substantial form of the human body, that he himself is the emperor of the world and the king of heaven and god on earth, that the soul is immortal, and all those endless portents in the Roman dunghill of decrees.[5]

Luther's irony here is directed at the authority of the Pope and the church doctrine of the Eucharist; but Luther also mocks the official statements of the Council of Vienne and of the Fifth Lateran Council, which determined that the human soul was the form of the body and that the soul's immortality could be demonstrated philosophically.[6] But – one may very well ask – if Luther attacked such central points

---

5 Dr *Martin Luthers Werke, kritische Gesamtausgabe*, 63 vols. (Weimar 1883–1987), 7, 131.37–132.4 (henceforth: WA): «Permitto tamen, quod Papa condat articulos suae fidei et suis fidelibus, quales sunt, panem et vinum transsubstantiari in sacramento, essentiam dei nec generare nec generari, animam esse formam substantialem corporis humani, se esse imperatorem mundi et regem coeli et deum terrenum, animam esse immortalem, et omnia illa infinita portenta in Romano sterquilinio Decretorum».

6 It is important to notice that Luther did not deny that the soul was immortal, but only that this

regarding the soul, did he and those who embraced his new theology also devise a new doctrine of the soul? In the wake of Luther's criticisms, did there follow something like a Lutheran way of doing psychology? Were the soul-body relationship and the philosophical demonstrability of the soul's immortality the only two points on which a good Lutheran should part company with the Catholics who wrote about psychology? Did the process of sixteenth-century confessionalisation affect psychology and if so, how exactly? In short, what was psychology like in the age of confessionalisation?

Although these questions probably occur rather naturally to the mind of anyone who reads Luther's ironical remarks, no systematic attempt has been made so far to provide an answer to them. The present thesis aims precisely to make up for that.

The lack – or paucity, as we shall see – of scholarship about these matters is all the more surprising when one looks at the way in which historians of philosophy and science over the last few decades have looked at the relationship between religion and science in general.

In effect, ever since nineteenth-century narratives of 'the conflict between religion and science' or 'the warfare of science and religion' stopped being the dominant historiographical paradigm, historians have looked more favourably at the idea that the history of philosophy and science and the history of religion are not necessarily two mutually contrasting affairs.[7] As a consequence, historians have explored either the idea of a peaceful coexistence between the transformations of science and religion or even highlighted the positive role of religion in the development of early-modern philosophical and scientific endeavours.[8]

---

truth could be demonstrated by means of philosophical arguments. Luther rather thought that the immortality of the soul could be known only through the Christian faith. This point has been extensively demonstrated by Ittzés Gabor, *'The Breath Returns to God Who gave It'. The Doctrine of the Soul's Immortality in Sixteenth-Century German Lutheran Theology*, PhD Thesis (Harvard 2008), 27–37. On the "Unsterblichkeit der Seele aus theologischer Sicht" in Luther's work, see: Sascha Salatowsky, De Anima. *Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (Amsterdam 2006), 67–69. Scholars have also pointed out that Luther (at least during a first phase) espoused the doctrine of the 'soul's sleep'. About this see: Paul Althaus, "Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele bei Luther", *Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie* 3 (1926), 725–734.

7 The two famous descriptions of 'the conflict between religion and science' and 'the warfare of science and religion' were respectively used by John W. Draper, *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science* (New York 1875), and by Andrew D. White, *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom* (New York 1896).

8 About this point and for a list of publications that have proposed the ideas of peaceful coexistence

Now, scholars who have looked at the way in which religion and science interacted in the wake of the Protestant reform have not failed to notice that philosophy and science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could be influenced by (or could influence in their turn) the specific confessional context in which they existed. As Rivka Feldhay has observed, both in the Catholic and in the Protestant world, the key institution that channelled religious and political energy – that is, the key institution involved in sixteenth-century confessionalisation – was the university.[9] It is no wonder, then, that scholars have tried to assess the way in which specific scientific disciplines taught at the university developed in institutions of different confessional affiliations. What is surprising, instead, is that whilst this type of work has involved a wide array of disciplines – such as, metaphysics, physics, astronomy, astrology, medicine, etc. – the way in which psychology underwent multiple transformations in the age of confessionalisation has hitherto been neglected. This, despite the fact that, due to its obvious proximity to ideas of 'immortality', 'free will', 'sin', and 'grace', psychology dealt with subjects of central interest for the confessional controversies which led Western European Christianity to divide into (at least) three main groups.

In this thesis, I set out to determine the way in which psychology transformed in the age of confessionalisation, as well as the various ways in which the process of confessionalisation interacted with psychology as a scientific discipline. Broadly speaking, the present contribution may be seen as an answer to the following questions: how did psychology transform in the age of confessionalisation? Were there psychological doctrines peculiar to one specific confessional group? Which was the exact relationship between the development of psychological doctrines and the formation of confessional groups in the sixteenth century?

When I started considering these questions, I was, perhaps too ambitiously, determined to go along my work by comparing the way in which questions on the soul were handled by authors of different denominations. Before long, I was confronted with an enormous amount of (sometimes obscure) commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima* and *Parva naturalia*, some textbooks, reports of innumerable disputations held weekly at sixteenth-century German universities, polemical pamphlets, as well as correspondence between better- or less-known figures who dealt with

---

of science and religion, or the positive impact of the latter on the former, see: Rivka Feldhay, "Religion", in Kathrine Park and Lorraine Daston, eds., *The Cambridge History of Science*, 3 (Cambridge 2006), 727,728.

9 Feldhay, "Religion", 735.

psychology in the sixteenth century. In fact, I was looking at the vastness of a literary production that, in 1988, Kathrine Park and Eckhard Kessler described as rendering any attempt to reconstruct Renaissance debates tentative, fragmentary, and incomplete.[10] After more than twenty years, our knowledge of the material regarding Renaissance psychology has significantly improved; but we are still far from even having a fair estimate of the number of works that need to be taken into account when one wants to consider Renaissance psychology.

But a swerve from my initial plans was motivated not just by the immense amount of sources on the subject I had chosen, but by the very nature of sixteenth-century confessionalisation. In effect, the idea of comparing psychological disputes across different confessional groups is only possible provided that such groups existed. Surely, in a sense, they did: especially after the production of official statements of doctrines, there existed some intellectuals who recognised themselves as Lutherans, Catholics, and Calvinists. But the idea that sixteenth-century authors who looked at the soul can all be clearly catalogued according to their confessional affiliation is an illusion. This difficulty in cataloguing authors by confession may in some cases very well be blamed on a lack of sufficient information on my part. However, I think, in most cases it is due to the fact that the historical period covered by this study is one during which confessions were just forming and learned men – even those who were more clearly involved in religious controversies – were themselves not always clear about which party they belonged to.[11] Especially authors working in the years following the Peace of Augsburg (1555) could change confession during their lives, as they moved from university to university, hence across different territories within the Roman Empire. The year 1555 marked the end of armed conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in the Empire, when peace was enforced also through the principle '*cuius regio, eius religio*' ('whose region, his religion'). When Charles V accepted this principle, each state took on the religion of its prince, and so did academics who moved across different states. This makes, in some cases, the task of linking a given sixteenth-century author to a precise confessional part even harder.

In spite of all these obstacles, I had to reconsider how to go about my work, in order to achieve my aim to study the transformation of psychology in the context

10 Kathrine Park and Eckhard Kessler, "The Concept of Psychology", in Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, Jill Kraye, eds., *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* (Cambridge 1988), 453–463, 463.

11 For instance, see the case of Otto Casmann, *infra*, 'Chapter 1', 17–20 and *passim*.

of sixteenth-century confessionalisation. I have decided to do it by considering one specific tradition, or group of authors, which lends itself to the identification of some common features. Therefore, I have focused on the way psychology developed at the hand of authors who looked at the books on the soul written by Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560) – the reformer and closest ally of Martin Luther at Wittenberg – as their preferred intellectual platform to deal with psychology.

As a matter of fact, if it is true that the university was a key institution in the process of sixteenth-century confessionalisation, it appears to be a sensible choice to consider psychology as it developed at the university of Wittenberg, the very heart of the early stages of the Reformation, and at other northern European institutions, where professors of arts and medicine were inspired by the Wittenberg teaching about the soul. As Feldhay correctly observed,

> the sixteenth century saw a series of wide-ranging reforms in university education that were modelled on the changes instituted at the University of Wittenberg by Luther's collaborator and successor, Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560). Melanchthon strengthened the control of teaching masters over students and charged the university's rector with enforcing Lutheran orthodoxy. He aimed to secure simultaneously the intellectual and the moral character of graduates by imposing on them the Augsburg Confession (the Lutheran profession of faith), by emphasizing the study of scripture, the works of Augustine, and the history of church councils, and by mandating the practice of annual disputations over theses censured by the rector. Other Protestant universities implemented educational reform on the Wittenberg model and began to produce a new elite of professors, priests, and counsellors to princes, who became the principal administrators in Protestant lands.[12]

Since Philip Melanchthon did not earn his title of 'preceptor of Germany' (*praeceptor Germaniae*) by chance, I have narrowed down my enquiry into psychology in the age of confessionalisation to Melanchthon's and some of his followers' works on the soul. As the views expressed by these works are also the result of doctrinal controversies, and may in some cases be better understood in the light of the reactions they provoked, this thesis also takes into account the writings of some of Melanchthon's and his followers' opponents.

12 Feldhay, "Religion", 735.

Because in this thesis I address the categories of confessionalisation and psychology, I have thought it opportune to consider texts that were produced between two important moments for confessionalisation and for psychology. Therefore, because it addresses the age of confessionalisation, this thesis takes Luther's reform in 1517 as its starting point. But due to the fact that the present analysis deals with psychology, I have decided to limit myself to a context in which some unity in the variety of ideas about psychology can be found. I have therefore taken 1640 ca., as the end term of my work.

In effect, a number of factors are believed to have contributed to the erosion of psychology, in the sense of the Aristotelian discipline that considered the soul as a principle of life, sensation, and cognitive functions. Amongst these factors, the spreading of the mechanist philosophy and the work of René Descartes, around the 1640's, profoundly shook the foundation of hylomorphic accounts of the soul that had dominated medieval and Renaissance psychology. New philosophical and scientific ideas contributed to bringing about a radically new way of looking at the soul. Notably, they prompted seventeenth-century authors to stop considering the soul chiefly as the animating principle shared by all living creatures and to identify it instead with the human mind.[13] However dramatic, this change surely did not occur abruptly, and hylomorphic explanations of the soul lingered on well after the 1641 publication of Descartes' *Meditations on First Philosophy*.[14] Yet, given that the diffusion of the *Meditations* triggered momentous changes in the landscape of early-modern philosophy, the scope of the present study is limited to the transformation of psychology during the century that preceded the dawning of Cartesian philosophy.

1.1. Melanchthon and Some of His Contemporaries

In the years preceding the dramatic philosophical changes brought about by Descartes, very many professors of arts and medicine working in northern Europe had already started innovating the field of psychology. Several of these intellectuals thought that Philip Melanchthon's books about the soul could be taken as the frame-

13 More details about this transformation and the different accounts it received in modern scholarship may be found further in this introduction, 37–45, *passim*.

14 On this point see, Christoph Lüthy and William R. Newman, "Matter and Form: By Way of Preface", *Early Science and Medicine* 2 (1997), 215–226; Roger Ariew and Majorie Greene, "The Cartesian Destiny of Form and Matter", *Early Science and Medicine* 2 (1997), 300–325.

work within which psychological enquiries could fruitfully be pursued. Others, both Catholic and Lutherans, opposed Melanchthon's and his followers' psychologies and rather sought to pursue a study of the soul that, whilst innovative elements, remained faithful to Aristotle's *De anima* and its medieval commentaries.

Both parties produced important books about the soul, which I shall address in this thesis. However, these books and their authors are much less known than Descartes and the other great heroes of early-modern philosophy and science. For this reason, before I proceed with my exploration into psychology in the age of confessionalisation, I shall provide some information regarding the intellectual biographies of the main figures the reader will encounter along the way.

1.1.1. *Philip Melanchthon*

Among the authors I will deal with in the following chapters, Melanchthon is certainly the best known.[15] More details about his efforts of establishing Lutheran orthodoxy in Saxony and of devising a theory of man's soul coherent with his Lutheran faith will be provided throughout the present work. Here, I shall offer the reader some more general biographical information about Melanchthon, which will enable us to better understand his intellectual journey.

In 1497, Melanchthon was born in Bretten, to the armourer George Schwartzerdt and Barbara Reuter, niece of the humanist Johann Reuchlin (1455–1522). It was Reuchlin who gave Philip the erudite name 'Melanchthon', a Greek rendering of 'Schwartzerdt'.

In 1508, Melanchthon entered the Latin school in Pforzheim. As early as 1511, he obtained his bachelor of arts *in via antiqua*, from the University of Heidelberg. The following year, he matriculated at Tübingen, where he obtained his master of arts degree *in via moderna*, in 1514. At Tübingen he began his academic career by teaching some courses. At the same time, he worked as a corrector there, for the press of the humanist Thomas Anshelm (1470–1522/24), who also published some works of Reuchlin's.

---

15 The following biographical details are based mainly on the following texts: Charles H. Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries. II: Renaissance Authors* (Florence 1988); *Neue deutsche Biographie* / herausgegeben von der Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin 1953–...); Sachiko Kusukawa, ed., *Philip Melanchthon. Orations on Philosophy and Education* (Cambridge 1999); Peter Gerhard Bietenholz and Thomas Brian Deutscher, eds., *Contemporaries of Erasmus: A Biographical Register of the Renaissance and Reformation* (Toronto 1985–1987).

About Melanchthon's education we know that it included scholastic theology, whilst it was to a large extent devoted to Latin. In fact, besides the statutory courses, Melanchthon also read classical and neo-Latin poets, especially Angelo Politian. As we shall see, Politian was involved in a humanist discussion with Johannes Argyropulos, which concerned Cicero's conception of the soul as *ἐνδελέχεια*. Cicero's and Politian's views would later be accepted by Melanchthon and play a crucial role in his works about psychology.[16]

Through his teachers, Melanchthon came to appreciate Aristotle's dialectic; but he also enjoyed Rudolph Agricola's. A copy of Agricola's *Dialectica* was donated to Melanchthon by his friend, the theologian Johannes Oecolampadius (1482–1531). With him Melanchthon would attend the important Marburg Colloquy (1529), which attempted to solve Martin Luther's and Ulrich Zwingli's differences over the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist.[17]

Melanchthon's journey as an ally of Luther had begun ten years earlier, in 1518, when he was appointed to the new chair of Greek at Wittenberg. On 28 August, Melanchthon gave his inaugural lecture there, which was entitled '*De corrigendis adulescentiae studiis*' and made an extremely good impression on Luther.[18] In effect, the contents of the lecture were in consonance with the curriculum reform that had recently been set in motion at Wittenberg. Shortly after his appointment, Melanchthon would join not only the curriculum reform, but also Luther's reform of theology.

Melanchthon's adherence to Luther's movement is documented by the former's early courses. Melanchthon's Greek lectures addressed the New Testament, and when he was asked to substitute the Hebrew teacher, Melanchthon lectured on the Psalms. Soon, in 1519, Melanchthon took the degree of '*baccalaureus biblicus*', with a disputation in which he defended theses based on the Reform programme.

His role in the Lutheran reform, however, would become much clearer in 1521, when, it does not appear an exaggeration to say, he took on the leadership of the movement started by Martin Luther. On 28 January 1521, Charles V commenced the imperial Diet of Worms and summoned – through his spokesman Johannes Eck –

16 See: *infra*, 'Chapter 2', 86–106.

17 Luther's and Zwingli's disagreement on sacramental theology are analysed further in this introduction, 79.

18 The text of Melanchthon's inaugural lecture at Wittenberg is available in Robert Stupperich, ed., *Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl: Studienausgabe* (henceforth: StA), 5 vols (Gütersloh 1963), III, 29–42.

Luther to renounce or reaffirm his views. At the Diet, Luther was outlawed and went into hiding; the lot of Wittenberg and the Reform was now in Melanchthon's hands.

For Melanchthon, this meant two interwoven tasks: defining a Lutheran orthodoxy and organising Wittenberg education accordingly. The first of these tasks was accomplished by Melanchthon through the publication of the *Loci communes* (1521), the first systematic explanation of Lutheran theology, as well as through his life-long endeavour of disciplining Saxony according to his Lutheran faith.[19] In the following chapters, I shall present Melanchthon's philosophy, especially his psychology, as an integral part of these practical objectives. But Melanchthon thought that his role as an academic too should serve the enforcement of Lutheran orthodoxy. For this purpose, as I shall explain throughout the present work, Melanchthon devised a new system of education and of university rules. His educational programme was implemented not only at Wittenberg, but also at other universities in the German lands, of which Melanchthon was thus deservedly recognised as the 'preceptor'.

Interestingly enough, and despite Luther's insistence and the Elector of Saxony's offer of a supplemental pay, Melanchthon always refused to teach in the theological faculty. Melanchthon kept teaching at the faculty of arts, for two hundred florins a year. He became rector there, in the winter 1523–1524 and despite the fact that he had married Katharina Krapp in 1520. The university regulations, in fact, required that the rector be celibate.

The 1520's were enormous importance for Melanchthon career. It was indeed between 1521 and 1525 that movements of social unrest (respectively the 'Wittenberg Movement' and the 'Peasants' War') made Melanchthon look at university education as a means to enforcing social discipline in the Evangelic camp. This new understanding of his task as a university teacher is mirrored by Melanchthon's composition of an oration entitled *De discrimine Evangelii et philosophiae* (1527). In this writing, Melanchthon redefines the role of philosophy vis-à-vis the Lutheran faith. With this oration, and as I shall explain extensively further in this introduction, Melanchthon tempered Luther's initial rejection of philosophy as un ungodly type of knowledge. According to Melanchthon, Luther's understanding of the Christian faith needed to be supplemented by man's rational consideration of the natural and the social worlds.[20]

---

19 Philip Melanchthon, *Loci communes rerum theologicarum seu hypotyposes theologicae* (Wittenberg 1521), in Carolus G. Bretschneider, ed., *Corpus Reformatorum Philippi Melanthonis Opera quae supersunt Omnia* (Halle 1834–1852), 28 vols. (henceforth: CR), XXI, 81–227.

20 For a more detailed account of this oration, see further in this introduction, 64–74.

After attending the abovementioned Marburg Colloquy, as well as the Diet of Augsburg (1530), for which he composed the '*Confessio Augustana*', Melanchthon started implementing his educational plans by working on natural philosophy, first and foremost on psychology. Melanchthon is known to have begun working on the topic of the soul, as soon as 1533. The first result of this work would be his *Commentarius de anima* of 1540.

Nine years after the publication of the *Commentarius*, Melanchthon published his most comprehensive work in natural philosophy, which was entitled *Initia doctrinae physicae*. He did it amidst a very tumultuous situation. In 1546–1547 clashes between the forces of Charles V and the Lutheran Schmalkaldic league (Schmalkaldic War) concluded with a defeat for Frederick of Saxony; Wittenberg and its university fell under the rule of Frederick's cousin Maurice. In 1548, Melanchthon advised the latter to accept the 'Leipzig Interim', which entailed the possibility for Saxony to maintain Protestant doctrines under the cover of conservative rites. Melanchthon's moderate approach met with disapproval on the part of other Lutherans, as he was already enduring other doctrinal criticisms coming from Matthias Flacius Illyricus (1520–1575). Flacius believed that sin was substantial and not accidental to human nature in its post-lapsarian state. His followers – the Flacians (nowadays also known as Gnesio-Lutherans) also saw themselves as the orthodox defenders of Luther's doctrine of the Eucharist, in a controversy which eventually led to a split-up between their party and the Philippists (named after Philip Melanchthon).

Amidst all these troubles, or perhaps even because of them, Melanchthon still found the strength to convey his new Christian faith through works on natural philosophy. In 1552, he published a new and updated version of his psychology, which was entitled *Liber de anima*. As we shall see, this book had an extraordinary impact on professors of arts and medicine who worked at Wittenberg and elsewhere in sixteenth-century northern Europe.

In 1552, Melanchthon also composed the 'Saxon Confession' for the Council of Trent. However, he could not be present in Trent, as his journey was impeded by further warfare in the German territories. In 1555 he translated his *Loci communes* into German. Melanchthon devoted the last years of his academic life to historical works, whilst he kept being an active leader of the Reformation: he attended the Colloquy of Worms (1570) and helped reorganise several institutions, such as Heidelberg University (later a Calvinist stronghold), in 1557. Melanchthon died on 19 April 1560, leaving to the world an immense amount of theological, pedagogical, and philosophical writings, which would be impossible to mention here. What is most interesting to us is that his works on the soul, and particularly his *Liber de anima*

lived long after Melanchthon's death. The *Liber de anima* came out in more than sixty editions between its first appearance and the end of the sixteenth century.[21] Among the authors who followed Melanchthon's teaching about the soul some studied or worked at Wittenberg, where Melanchthon's psychology exercised its influence most directly.

1.1.2. *Wittenberg Authors: Caspar Peucer, Bruno Seidel, and Gregor Horst*

One of the authors who studied at Wittenberg in the sixteenth century was so close to Melanchthon as to call him 'father'. Caspar Peucer (born on 6 January 1525) became indeed Melanchthon's son in law in 1550, when he married the Melanchthon's daughter, Magdalena. But it is plausible think that Melanchthon had been a fatherly figure for Peucer for years, as the latter was aged only fifteen when he became a lodger at the former's house.[22]

Since then, Peucer began his studies at Wittenberg, where he studied natural sciences. In the wake of Melanchthon's 1545 reform of the university curriculum, students of natural sciences were expected to read mathematics, astronomy, medicine, Pliny's *Natural History*, Aristotle's *Ethics*, and the *Sphere* by Sacrobosco. So did Peucer too, who used the knowledge he had acquired as a student to write his first major work, in 1553: *Elementa doctrinae de circulis coelestibus et primo motu recognita et correcta*. The following year, Peucer became professor of mathematics at Wittenberg, but six years later his academic life probably touched its peak.

In 1560, not only became Peucer professor of medicine, but he was also appointed rector of Wittenberg, as Melanchthon had died during that year. His good reputation as a physician enabled him to become private physician to the Elector of Saxony, in 1570. During the sixties, Peucer wrote some medical works and kept teaching, with Tycho Brahe (1546–1601) among his students. But more importantly, he published the *Hypotheses orbium coelestium* (1568), which made Robert W. Westman look at Peucer as

21 A publication history of the *Liber de anima* in the sixteenth century is found in Gabor, *The Doctrine of the Soul's Immortality in Sixteenth-Century German Lutheran Theology*, 88–89.

22 The following biographical details are mainly based on: Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries. II: Renaissance authors*; *Neue deutsche Biographie*; Paul Mengal, *La naissance de la psychologie* (Paris 2005); Wolfram Kaiser and Arina Völker, *Ars medica Vitebergensis* (Halle 1980); Robert S. Westman, "The Melanchthon Circle, Rheticus, and the Wittenberg Interpretation of the Copernican Theory", *Isis* 66.2 (1975), 164–193; Jole Schackelford, *A Philosophical Path for Paracelsian Medicine. The Ideas, Intellectual Context, and Influence of Petrus Severinus: 1540–1602* (Copenhagen 2004).

«the man largely responsible for consolidating and institutionalising the Wittenberg interpretation» of the Copernican theory.[23]

Of great interest for the present thesis is the way in which Peucer used his position as a rector of Wittenberg University to continue the strive for orthodoxy pursued by Melanchthon. As a rector, Peucer sought to enforce his father-in-law's theological doctrines. He did so mainly by appointing only Philippists (as opposed to Flacians) to the principal chairs.

Peucer's engagement in theology was then a story of power, but of misery as well. In 1574, he was accused of crypto-Calvinism and imprisoned near Leipzig for twelve years. When he was released, in 1586, he became the private physician of the Prince of Anhalt. Before his death in 1602 (Dessau), Peucer found time to see the publication of his writing about the soul, which I shall consider in the following chapters: *De essentia, natura et ortu animi hominis commentatio*, which appeared in the collected volume *Psychologia* (1590), by the well-known Rudolph Goclenius (1547–1628).[24]

Rudolph Goclenius himself studied under another protagonist of this thesis who studied at Wittenberg and followed in the footsteps of Philip Melanchthon: Bruno Seidel.

Seidel was born in Querfurt around 1530 and matriculated in the arts faculty of Wittenberg in 1546. After that, he pursued the career of a physician. For this purpose, he attended one of the best medical courses in Europe: between 1557 and 1560, he studied at Padua and became doctor in medicine there under the great anatomist Gabriele Falloppio (1523–1562). When he returned to Germany, he first practised medicine in Arnstadt. He then moved to Erfurt in 1565 to teach physics and medicine. Seidel died there in 1590.

Seidel years as an Erfurt professor resulted in two major writings. Seidel wrote a *Physica*, which was published posthumously, with an appendix by Rudolph Goclenius, in 1596.[25] This work is divided into two books, which are respectively devoted

---

23 Westman, "The Melanchthon Circle", 178. The full title of Peucer's astronomical work is: *Hypotheses orbium coelestium, quas appellant theoricas planetarum, congruentes cum tabulis Alphonsini et Copernici, seu etiam tabulis Prutenicis, in usum scholarum publicatae* (Strasbourg 1568). According to Westman, this work nicely illustrates the 'Wittenberg interpretation' in that it ranks Copernicus' work on the same level as Ptolemy's and suggests that Copernicus' model, albeit with some minor changes, could in principle be transferred to a geostatic reference frame (see: Westman, "The Melanchthon Circle", 180).

24 For this thesis I have used the second and more complete edition of this text: Rudolph Goclenius, *Psychologia, hoc est de hominis perfectione, animo, et in primis ortu huius* (Marburg 1597).

25 Bruno Seidel, *Physica, cum supplement Rodolphi Goclenii* (Frankfurt 1596).

to *De physicae parte universale* and *De physiologiae parte propria et speciali*. The first book addresses the definition and the subject matter of physics, as well as the explanation of those principles that are common to all natural bodies ('matter', 'form', 'movement', etc.) The second book is devoted to what Seidel considers to be the issues that are customarily discussed in physics; that is, the natural bodies, simple (the sky, the stars, and the four elements) and compound. The compound bodies are either imperfect or perfect, and the latter group includes the inanimate (like stones and metals) and the animate bodies. Of the animate bodies, the highest kind consists of bodies provided with rationality, viz., human beings.[26]

To the human nature, Seidel devoted his other major work: *Commentarius de corpore animato* (1594), which also includes a preface by Rudolph Goclenius. It is this book that marks Seidel's intellectual debt to Melanchthon, who is mentioned in the full title of the *Commentarius*.[27] Seidel, in fact, meant this book to be an explanation of man's soul and body based on Aristotle's *De anima*. But in order to make Aristotle's book clearer, Seidel relied on Melanchthon's psychology. Seidel's book resembles Melanchthon's *Commentarius* and *Liber de anima* in its structure too. As I shall show throughout this thesis, Melanchthon devoted large parts of his psychology to a study of man's body, based on Galen's and Vesalius' anatomies. So did Seidel and so did another protagonist of this thesis: Gregor Horst.

In 1578, Gregor Horst was born in Torgau, to the architect Georg Horst (1534–1584) and Anna Bornitius. Gregor's uncle was Jakob Horst (1537–1600), physician at the University of Helmstedt and (as we shall see) an important influence in Gregor Horst's ideas about the soul.

Gregor Horst studied arts and medicine, first at the University of Helmstedt, in 1597; then at Wittenberg, starting 1600. He travelled to Austria and Switzerland, and became doctor of medicine in Basel (1606). After that, he returned to Germany and became professor of medicine at the University of Wittenberg. However, as early as 1608 he was appointed professor of anatomy and botany of the University of

---

26 See Seidel's own diagram of the subjects treated by his *Physica* on the following page (the diagram follows the table of contents at the beginning of Seidel's book. See: Seidel, *Physica*, 4).

27 *Commentarius didascalicus valde eruditus et perspicuus de corpore animato ac potissimum quidem de corpore et anima hominis accomodatus ad faciliorem intelligentiam librorum Aristotelis et interpretum eius, ut et P. Melanchthonis De anima, itemque Galeni, Vesalii et qui de fabrica corporis humani scripserunt.* (Hanau 1594). The *Commentarius* went through three further editions, in Frankfurt, in 1596, 1606, and 1656.

4

ORDO TOTIVS PHYSIOLOGIÆ.



LIBER

Seidel, Physica, 4.

Giessen, which had been founded the preceding year as an anti-Calvinist Lutheran stronghold.[28]

His activity there could be seen by everyone's eyes. As an anatomist, Horst performed public dissections (he was allowed a cadaver for a public anatomy in 1615); as a botanist, he directed the university botanical garden. Horst must have cared that nature could be seen, as one of his texts shows. In effect, all the authors who did psychology in the framework designed by Melanchthon included large portion of Vesalian anatomy in their works on the soul. However, only Horst among them seems to actually have followed the use of anatomical plates that to our days contributes to make Vesalius' *De humani corporis fabrica* (1543) a unique work.[29] As I shall explain more extensively in the following chapters, Horst thought his treatise *De natura humana* should be accompanied by anatomical images.[30]

Except for the preface devoted to reconciling Vesalian anatomy and Paracelsian medicine, Horst's *De natura humana* follows much of Melanchthon's psychology, in terms of both structure and contents.[31] As I shall show, this book bears witnesses to the impact that Melanchthon's *Liber de anima* still exercised among Wittenberg students in the early seventeenth century.

Horst spent the last part of his life in Marburg, where he moved in 1625 and then in Ulm, as the city's physician. In Ulm he died in 1636. His major medical work,

---

28 As Howard Hotson has explained, the University of Giessen was founded in 1607 to respond to the Calvinisation of the nearby Marburg and to welcome Lutheran professors that had been expelled from there. But Giessen also had to react to the spreading of Ramism in Marburg, Kassel, and Korbach. The result was that Giessen combined a strong Lutheran element with the adoption of Ramism in the curriculum. See: Howard Hotson, *Commonplace Learning. Ramism and its German Ramifications 1543–1630* (Oxford 2007), 95–96. On Ramism at Giessen see: Joseph S. Freedman, "The Diffusion of the Writings of Petrus Ramus in Central Europe, c. 1570–c. 1630", *Renaissance Quarterly* 46.1 (1993), 98–152, 124; Marco Lamanna, *La nascita dell'ontologia nella metafisica di Rudolph Göckel (1547–1628)* (Hildesheim 2013), 28.

29 On Vesalius' *Fabrica* and its use of anatomical illustrations, see: Sachiko Kusukawa, *Picturing the Book of Nature. Image, Text, and Argument in Sixteenth-Century Human Anatomy and Medical Botany* (Chicago 2012).

30 Gregor Horst, *De natura humana libri duo, quorum prior de corporis structura, posterior de anima tractat. Ultimo elaborati commentariis aucti figurisque nobis anatomicis aere incisis exornati. Cum praefatione de anatomia vitali et mortua pro conciliatione Spagryricorum et Galenicorum plurimum inserviente* (Wittenberg 1626).

31 The preface, entitled *De anatomia vitali et mortua*, had already been published as an independent treatise fourteen years before the *De natura humana* appeared; see: Gregor Horst, *De anatomia vitali et mortua* (Giessen 1612).

Opera medica, was published posthumously, in Nürenberg, in 1660. The following year, the book went through two further editions in the Netherlands: in Gouda and Amsterdam.

1.1.3. *Beyond Wittenberg: Otto Casmann and Rudolph Snel van Roijen*

As we have seen earlier, when looking at his life, Melanchthon was a humanist professor of classics, a natural philosopher, and a theologian. But, Melanchthon also spent a significant portion of his life dealing with pressing practical problems. In fact, he sought to convey his Lutheran faith not only through his academic work but also by travelling across the German lands, by dealing with local rulers, and by helping reorganise several universities. It was probably also thanks to his active engagement in disciplining the German territories according to Lutheran principles that his work reached many intellectuals beyond Wittenberg. In this thesis I will consider two such intellectuals, Otto Casmann and Rudolph Snel van Roijen (or Snellius), whose works on the soul bear witness to the influence of Melanchthon's psychology and mark – I shall argue – important transformations of psychology in the age of confessionalisation.[32]

Like Bruno Seidel, or even more than him, Casmann and Snellius had very close bonds with the Marburg professor Rudolph Goclenius. The latter encouraged Casmann and Snellius to work on topics regarding the soul and sponsored their works by complementing them with prefaces or appendices.

---

32 The following biographical details are mainly based on: Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries. II: Renaissance authors*; *Neue deutsche Biographie*; Paul, *La naissance de la psychologie*; Lamanna, *La nascita dell'ontologia nella metafisica di Rudolph Göckel (1547–1628)*; Uwe Kordes, "Otho Casmanns Anthropologie (1549/96). Frömmigeit, Empirie und der Ramismus", in Martin Mulsow, ed., *Spätrenaissance-Philosophie in Deutschland 1570–1650. Entwürfe zwischen Humanismus und Konfessionalisierung, okkulten Traditionen und Schulmetaphysik* (Tübingen 2009); Dietrich Mahnke, "Rektor Casmann in Stade: ein vergessener Gegner aristotelischer Philosophie und Naturwissenschaftler im 16. Jahrhundert", *Archiv für die Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft und der Technik*, 5 (1913); Sachiko Kusukawa, "Between the *De anima* and Dialectics. A Prolegomenon to Philippo-Ramism", in Paul Richard Blum, ed., Sapientiam amemus. *Humanismus und Aristotelismus in der Renaissance. Festschrift für Eckhard Kessler zum 60. Geburtstag* (Munich 1999), 127–139; Hotson, *Commonplace Learning*; Mordechai Feingold, Joseph S. Freedman, Wolfgang Rother, eds., *The Influence of Petrus Ramus* (Basel 2001); *Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek*, 10 Vols. (Leiden 1911–1937); Paul Freher, *Theatrum virorum eruditione clarorum* (Nürnberg 1688).

Goclenius had an enormous influence as the first academic who reintroduced the study of metaphysics in the Calvinist world, after it had been banned from Protestant universities during the early phases of the Reformation. Goclenius, in fact, worked at the Philipps-Universität of Marburg, the first Protestant university ever founded (1527). In Marburg, especially the Pädagogium (viz., the pre-university institution of the Philipps-Universität) had adopted a system of education based on Melanchthon's *Schulordnung* (1528), which had been enforced first by the Landgrave Philipp, *den Großmütige*, and then by his orthodox Lutheran son Ludwig IV.

Before becoming professor of physics at Marburg (1581), Goclenius had been a student there (1564). But Goclenius, after a period in Erfurt (1566–1568), also spent some time in the very heart of Melanchthon's educational reform, Wittenberg. There Goclenius studied (1568) and taught (1571–1575). When he went back to Marburg, Goclenius used his education for writing numerous works; two of them made him into a major source for later generations and attracted the attention of modern scholars: the *Isagoge in peripateticorum et scholasticorum prima philosophia* (Frankfurt 1598) and the *Lexicon philosophicum* (Frankfurt 1613).[33] In effect, the *Lexicon* includes one of the first occurrences of the term 'ontology' (*ontologia*).[34] But Goclenius' use of the term 'ontology' is also linked to his more substantial contribution to the history of metaphysics, as it surface in his *Isagoge in prima philosophia*. As is well known, Goclenius relied on medieval authors (especially Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas), as well as on the more recent metaphysical works of sixteenth-century Jesuits (viz., Francisco Suárez and Bent Perera) to give metaphysics a new disciplinary position. According to Goclenius, metaphysics was positively distinct from ontology, as the

33 Among other works, Goclenius wrote the following ones: *Adversaria: ad Exotericas aliquot Julii Caesaris Scaligeri acutissimi Philosophi Exercitationes* (Marburg 1594); *Isagoge in Organum Aristotelis* (Frankfurt 1598); *Conciliator philosophicus* (Kassel 1609).

34 The first occurrence of the term is found in the Calvinist Jakob Lorhard's *Ogdoas scholastica continens diagraphen typicam artium: Grammatices (Latinae, Grecae, Logices, Rhetorices, Astronomices, Ethices, Physices, Metaphysices, seu Ontologiae)* (St. Gallen 1606). The first occurrence of 'ontology' in Lorhard's text has been discovered in 2003 by Raul Corazzon, "Jakob Lorhard (1561–1609): The Creator of the Term "Ontologia" (1606)". See the website: www.ontology.co Thanks to more recent research by Marco Lamanna, it has become clear that Lorhard's *Ogdoas* does not present original contents, but it consists of a diagrammatic representation of Clemens Timpler's *Metaphysicae systemata methodicum* (Steinfurt 1604). See: Marco Lamanna, "Sulla prima occorrenza del termine 'Ontologia'. Una nota bibliografica", *Quaestio 6* (2006), 557–570. On the creation and first diffusion of the term ontology, see: Michaël Devaux and Marco Lamanna, "The Rise and Early History of the Term Ontology (1606–1730)", *Quaestio 9* (2009), 173–208.

latter was the general science of being *qua* being (*ens universale*), while the former dealt with the most eminent species of being (God, the intelligences, and the immaterial entities). The new articulation of metaphysics and ontology devised by Goclenius became popular in sixteenth-century *Schulmetaphysik* and then turned into a dominant paradigm through to the works of Christian Wolf and Immanuel Kant.[35]

Despite Goclenius' claim to fame lies mainly in his metaphysical work, he was also very keen on psychology. Goclenius' own contribution to the science of the soul is yet to be assessed. However, he certainly put much effort into promoting the study of topics regarding the soul. As I have already mentioned, he edited a volume entitled *Psychologia*, in 1590, in which opinions of different authors (including Caspar Peucer's) on the essence and origin of the intellective soul were collected. But Goclenius also held numerous disputations, during which his Marburg students had to address questions regarding the soul. His interest in psychology was so influential at the by then Calvinist Marburg, that the Lutheran Christoph Scheibler (1589–1653) at rival Giessen collected thirty disputations about the soul in one *Collegium Psychologicum* (Giessen 1609).[36]

Now, two among Goclenius' students, Otto Casmann and Rudolph Snellius, did not limit themselves to university disputations about the soul (like many other students of Goclenius' did); but they brought their interest in psychology further, by producing original texts on the soul. And they did so by following the teaching of Philip Melanchthon, under the patronage of Goclenius.

---

35 The most complete account of Goclenius' metaphysical work and of its impact on later authors I am aware of is: Lamanna, *La nascita dell'ontologia nella metafisica di Rudolph Göckel (1547–1628)*. On similar aspects and especially on the early history of ontology in the Calvinist context, see: Joseph S. Freedman, "The Godfather of Ontology? Clemens Timpler, "All that is intelligible", Academic Disciplines during the late 16th and early 17th Centuries, and Some Possible Ramifications for the Use of Ontology in our Time", *Quaestio 9* (2009), 3–40; Joseph S. Freedman, European *Academic Philosophy in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries: The Life, Significance, and Philosophy of Clemens Timpler (1563/4–1624)*, 2 Vols. (Hildesheim 1988). On the transmission of sixteenth-century Jesuit metaphysics (especially Suárez's) in Protestant institutions, see the seminal work of Jean-François Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique* (Paris 1990). On the historiography and on the 'baroque' nature of this transformation, see: Costantino Esposito, "Introduzione. Dalla storia della metafisica alla storia dell'ontologia", *Quaestio 9* (2009), IX–XXXI; Costantino Esposito, "Le Disputationes Metaphysicae nella critica contemporanea", in Costantino Esposito, ed., *Francisco Suárez, Disputazioni Metafisiche* (Milano 2007), 747–812.

36 For the titles of these thirty disputations, as well as those presided over by Goclenius, see: Lamanna, *La nascita dell'ontologia nella metafisica di Rudolph Göckel (1547–1628)*, 305, 306, 207.

Otto Casmann came to know Goclenius in Kessel, where the latter was the local high school teacher there. Casmann was born in 1562, in Warburg (Westphalia), to a Catholic family. However, as we shall see, his life bears witnesses to the confessional mobility that, as I pointed out earlier, characterised in many cases the intellectual biographies of academics working in the age of confessionalisation.

Although much of the documents containing Casmann's biographical details were lost in a fire in Stade (where Casmann was rector of the local Lutheran gymnasium from 1595), some information is still available. As Uwe Kordes noticed, a preface entitled *In vitam et mortem reverendi ac doctissimi D. Othonis Casmanni* is attached to one Casmann's last works, *Turpitudo*.[37] There we are told that he had a wife and three daughters, that two of his writings (unfortunately the text does not say which ones) were translated into French and English, and that several works of Casmann's were brought to Italian libraries. The same text states that Casmann was supported by the Duke of Holstein, the Landgrave of Hesse and a certain Baron Carolus Zerotinus. Besides the information found in the *In vitam et mortem Casmanni*, we know that Casmann moved from Warburg to the Crypto-Calvinist Kassel, where Goclenius helped his conversion to Protestantism "e tenebris Pontificiis".[38] Casmann then continued his studies at the then still Lutheran Marburg, starting 1581. The following year he moved to the Philippist university of Helmstedt, where he studied philosophy and theology and obtained the title of '*magister*'. Consequently, he taught logic there. Since 1591, Casmann was at the Gymnasium Illustre of Steinfurt, until he obtained a post as rector of the gymnasium in Stade, where he taught logic and natural philosophy until his death. When Casmann left Steinfurt, he was succeeded by the well-known Clemens Timpler (1563–1624).

Especially Kordes and Howard Hotson have emphasised how Casmann's production shows an anti-Aristotelian tendency (combined with a Christian understanding of the world), as well as a preference for Petrus Ramus' logic and conception of philosophy as oriented towards utility. These aspects, in fact, do seem to emerge from two of Casmann's works: *Philosophiae et christianae et verae modesta assertio* (1601) and the *Logicae rameae et melanchthonianae collatio* (1599).[39] These texts have made schol-

37 Otto Casmann, *Turpitudo omnium turpissima et nocentissima opprobrium christianorum. Exitum infidelium et laqueus carnalis securitatis incidendus describitur* (Frankfurt 1609). See Uwe Kordes, "Otho Casmanns Anthropologie (1549/96)", 196–197.

38 See: Mahnke, "Rektor Casmann", 190–191.

39 Otto Casmann, *Philosophiae et christianae et verae adversus insanos hostium eius, et nonnullorum hierophantarum morsus et calumnias modesta assertio* (Frankfurt 1601), 106: «Expultrix vitiorum

ars consider Casmann to be a ferocious anti-Aristotelian and one who was linked to the tradition of authors who tried to harmonise the teaching of Ramus and those of Melanchthon, in a synthesis that is known as Philippo-Ramism. As we will see, similar elements do surface in the work of Rudolph Snellius too.

However, in this thesis, I shall not consider Casmann and Snellius primarily as Philippo-Ramists. True, some of their texts do mention the name of Ramus, and Casmann and Snellius sometimes express their explicit intention to harmonise their works in natural philosophy and logic with some of Ramus' ideas. But it is one thing to consider these indications as a call for a case-by-case study of the specific ways in which Casmann and Snellius used Ramus' doctrines, and quite another to box these authors in the category of Philippo-Ramism.[40] In fact, attempts by scholars to determine what 'Ramism' indicates already seem to point to the fact that categories such as 'Ramist' and 'Ramism' still remain very elusive; let alone the label of 'Philippo-Ramism'.[41]

---

eorum a quibus abhorrere et abstinere vere Christianus debet, neutiquam Christiano est negligenda. Atqui philosophia vera est talium vitiorum expultrix a quibus iussu Dei omnis Christianus et abhorrere et abstinere debet. Est enim uti iam a sana philosophia exterminata et expulsa vitia optavimus, expultrix idolatrias et apotheoseos Aristotelis hominis ethnici, docti quidem ad miraculum at profani paganismorum et aliorum errorum». On page 147 of the same text, Casmann describes his idea of 'Christian physics': «Physicae Christianae fundamenta tria postulamus. Verbum sapientissimi naturae Architecti Dei, veram rationem, et non fallentem experientiam. Expurgatas cupimus futiles et inutiles subtilitates, sublatos paganismos Dei verbo contradicentes. Physica autem haec latissime patens, universum mundum conditum sibi subiiciens, agit de rebus naturalibus, id est natura, hoc est, vi et facultate a deo rebus creatis indita, praeditis. Haec autem qua generalis habet partes duas Pneumatologiam de spiritibus creatis, adeoque Angelographiam et (qua specialis) Somatologiam quae explicat corporum naturam ...». The full title of Casmann's book on Ramus' and Melanchthon's logic is: Otto Casmann, *Logicae rameae et melanchthonianae collatio et exegesis: seorsum accesserunt eodem auctore ex logicis praeceptis practicae observationes, consilia et leges ad illorum lupraxian tradendam utiles* (Hanau 1599).

40 A systematic attempt to define the role of Ramus in Casmann's and Snellius' work has been made by Kusukawa, "Between the *De anima* and Dialectics. A Prolegomenon to Philippo-Ramism".

41 'Ramism' is oftentimes linked to some or all of the following aspects: 1) anti-Aristotelianism, or the attempt to adapt Aristotle to a quicker and utility-oriented curriculum for the humanities; 2) an attempt to make logic responsive to practical needs; 3) the division of logic into two rather than into four parts, as in Aristotle's *Organon*; 4) the idea that logic was part of philosophy, as opposed to the Aristotelian conception of logic as a '*habitus instrumentalis*'; 5) the ensuing idea

I do not deny that an investigation into the role of Ramus' thought in Casmann's and Snellius' works may very well be fruitful. However, given the above-mentioned difficulty in defining 'Ramism', I shall consider Casmann's and Snellius' works on the soul mainly as a case of transmission of the ideas contained in Melanchthon's *Commentarius* and *Liber de anima*.

As far as Casmann is concerned, he addressed topics regarding the soul in his best-known book: the *Psychologia anthropologica* of 1594. As I will explain on many occasions in the following chapters, this book was conceived as the first part of the discipline Casmann called '*anthropologia*' (anthropology). Whilst Casmann thought that the *Psychologia* should address man's soul, he devoted the second part of his anthropology to an explanation of man's bodily parts. The result of this anatomical research is the *Somatotomia* or *Secunda pars anthropologiae*, published in 1569.[42] In natural philosophy, Casmann also produced a *Somatologia* (1598), which differs from the *Somatotomia*, in that the latter studies the human body, whilst the former studies the natural bodies in general, and it mainly coincides with physics.[43]

Besides the anatomy of the human body, Casmann also published a Christian work on what he called 'spiritual anatomy': *Homo novus, das ist geistliche Anatomey oder Betrachtung deß Menschen* (1606).[44] Moreover, he addressed the spiritual realm in a treatise concerning all incorporeal created beings, which was entitled *Angelographia* (1597). Other relevant books by Casmann are the *Astrologia* (1599), the *Biographia sive de vita hominis naturali* (1602), as well as the *Anti-Socinus* (1612).[45]

---

that logic – due to its ontological commitment – made metaphysics superfluous; 6) the use of dichotomies and diagrams to describe the disciplines and their mutual relationship. About Ramus' thought and it influence on later generation of arts professors, see: Walter J. Ong, *Ramus. Method and the Decay of Dialogue* (Cambridge, MA 1958); Hotson, *Commonplace Learning*; Feingold, Freedman, Rother, eds., *The Influence of Petrus Ramus* (Basel 2001).

42 Otto Casmann, *Psychologia anthropologica sive animae humanae doctrina*, Apud Guilelmum Antonium, impensis Petri Fischeri (Hanau 1594); Otto Casmann, *Secunda pars anthropologiae; hoc est, fabrica humani corporis methodice descriptiva* (Hanau 1596).

43 Otto Casmann, *Somatologia. Physica generalis seu commentationes disceptationumque physicarum syndromus problematicus. I. De naturalium corporum in genere essentia et qualitatibus physicis, tum manifestis tum occultis, quarum omnium methodicam adumbrationem in tabella exhibet versa pagina* (Frankfurt 1598).

44 Otto Casmann, *Homo novus, das ist geistliche Anatomy oder Betrachtung deß Menschen, in welcher, allein auß Gottes Wort, die Vergleichung deß naturlichen Leibs unnd seiner Glidern, mit der Seel und ihren Kräfften erklärt wird …* (Bern 1606).

45 Otto Casmann, *Angelographia seu commentationum disceptationumque physicarum prodromus problematicus de angelis seu creatis spiritibus a corporum consortio abiunctis* (Frankfurt 1597); Otto Cas-

Like Casmann, Rudolph Snellius thought that psychology and anatomy should be combined so as to understand human nature as a whole. In doing so, Snellius too followed the teaching of Philip Melanchthon. Snellius' career, like Casmann's, seems to have been fostered by Rudolph Goclenius, whom Snellius probably met when studying far from home, in Marburg.

Rudolph Snel van Roijen was born in the Dutch town of Oudewater, in 1546. As many students in his days used to do, Snellius also toured the most important European universities in order to pursue an academic career. In fact, he left Oudewater for Cologne, Wittenberg and Heidelberg, where he studied mathematics and Hebrew. As the plague spread in Heidelberg, he moved on to Marburg, where he studied from 1565. In Marburg he met Petrus Ramus (who was there between 1569 and 1570) and after meeting Ramus, he taught "*tota artium cyclopedia*" ("the complete cycle of the arts"). Among his students there also was another youth from Oudewater: Jacob Hermansz (1559/60–1609), or Arminius, future professor of theology (in 1603) at the recently founded University of Leiden (1575) and instigator of the latitudinarian current of the Dutch reformed church that carries his name.[46] Because we know that Arminius' stint in Marburg lasted from 1574 to 1575, we may reasonably think that Snellius was still at the German university at that time. In effect, whilst it is known that Snellius returned to Leiden in 1578, Snellius is reported to have travelled to Italy (where he attended medical courses in Rome and Pisa) before going back to his home country.

In Leiden, Snellius was appointed professor extraordinary of mathematics, in 1581. Among his most famous students were Descartes' first Dutch friend Isaac Beeckman (1588–1637), as well as Prince Maurice of Nassau. Prince Maurice later availed himself of Snellius' advice for the foundation of the 'Leiden Duitsche School voor Mathematiek', where courses were given in vernacular to educate army engineers.[47]

---

mann, *Astrologia, chronographia et astromanteia* (Frankfurt 1599); Otto Casmann, *Biographia sive de vita hominis naturali, quam homo vi animae suae viventis et corpus suum animantis naturaliter vivit* (Frankfurt 1602); Otto Casmann, *Anti-Socinus. Tractatus ad diiudicandum controversiam theologicam quae iam inter orthodoxos et socinianos, de corpore doctrinae christianae pene universo, agitatur apprime utilis* (Amberg 1612).

46 On Arminianism and the so-called Arminian controversy, as intertwined with the early phases of the University of Leiden, see: Christoph Lüthy, *David Gorlaeus (1591–1612). An Enigmatic Figure in the History of Philosophy and Science* (Amsterdam 2012), 104–113.

47 As Theo Verbeek pointed out, Snellius gave Beeckman a list of authors to read for his mathematical education. The list includes: Ramus, Euclid, Heron, Boethius, Ptolemy, Copernicus, Hermes Trismegistus, Clavius, Comandinus, Regiomontanus, Vitello, Stevin, Oronce Finé,

Snellius' career as a teacher did not start too easily, as only one year after his appointment his courses were the target of an official complaint issued by a group of students and submitted to the academic senate. The complaint mainly addressed the fact that Snellius had been basing his teaching on a compendium of physics by the Ramist sympathiser Cornelius Valerius.[48] The humanist students of Leiden perceived '*compendia*' like Valerius' physics as '*dispendia*', viz., a waste of time that distracted them from the study of ancient texts. The complaint – which might have been orchestrated by the anti-Ramist academic senate itself – forced Snellius to stop using Velerius' physics for his courses.[49] However, it must be noted that in 1596, Snellius' interest in Valerius' physics was all but over, as Snellius published an *In Physicam Cornelii Valerii*, to which some notes by Rudolph Goclenius, as well as Snellius' *Pneumatologia*, were attached.[50]

Although I am not sure about the extent to which the categories of 'Ramism' and 'Philippo-Ramism' are suited to grasping the nature of Snellius' work, it must be recognised that the Leiden professor used the works of Petrus Ramus and of Philip Melanchthon as some of his main sources. Not only did Snellius publish notes on Cornelius Valerius' physics, but he also produced texts in which the figure of Ramus was more clearly present: a *Commentarius in Dialectica Petri Rami* (1587), as well as the *Partitiones physicae methodi rameae legibus* (1594).[51] However, the clearest sign of Snellius' fondness for Ramus' ideas seems to be the *Snellio-Ramaeum philosophiae Syntagma* (1596). This book was meant to use Ramus' philosophy to provide knowledge about all the main fields of knowledge, starting from '*dialectica*' and climbing up to '*physica*' and '*psychologia*'.[52]

---

and Pappus. See: Theo Verbeek, "Notes on Ramism in the Netherlands", in Feingold, Freedman, Rother, eds., *The Influence of Petrus Ramus*, 39–40.

48 Cornelius Valerius, *Physicae seu de natura philosophia institutio, perspicue et breviter explicata a Cornelio Valerio* (Antwerp 1567).

49 On the role of the academic senate in helping – if not manufacturing – the Leiden student petition see: Hotson, *Commonplace Learning*, 54–55.

50 Rudolph Snellius, *In Physicam Cornelii Valerii annotationes. Ad calcem adiectae sunt notae Rudolphi Goclenii ad ipsum Physices contextum pertinentes; item Pneumatologia Snellii* (Frankfurt 1596).

51 Rudolph Snellius, *Commentarius doctissimus in Dialecticam Petri Rami, forma dialogi conscriptus, in quo artis praecepta cum exemplis analytice explicantur. Adiectae sunt ad finem utiles commonefactiones et regulae Rudolphi Goclenii de ratione disputandi* (Herborn 1587); Rudolph Snellius, *Partitiones physicae methodi rameae legibus informatae; exceptae olim ex dictantis eius ore in Schola Marpurgensi, nunc primum in lucem editae* (Hanau 1594).

52 Rudolph Snellius, *Snellio-Ramaeum philosophiae Syntagma, tomis aliquot separatis distinctum. Quibus cont., 1. Generales sincerioris philosophiae Ramaeae informationes, 2. Dialectica, 3. Rhetorica,*

To psychology Snellius devoted also the book that I shall take into consideration for this thesis. Snellius, in fact, wished to express his views about the soul in his 1596 commentary on Melanchthon's psychology: *In Phil. Melanchthonis de anima, vel potius de hominis physiologia libellum commentationes*.[53] This book also included an appendix *Theses de materiis psychologicis* written by Goclenius. As I shall point out in the following chapters, this text shows that despite his sympathies for Ramus, Snellius never abandoned Aristotle's teaching about the soul, provided that Aristotle's *De anima* be read through the lenses of Melanchthon's Christian psychology.

1.1.4. *On the Catholic Front: Franciscus Vallès and Veit Amerbach*

Not all of the authors I shall consider in this thesis followed Melanchthon's teaching on the soul. Some of the works I will look at in the following chapters were written in stark opposition to Melanchthon's works on the soul; some others were, on the contrary, the target of some of those authors who did follow Melanchthon's psychology. Yet some others were written by authors who, like Melanchthon, embraced the Lutheran faith, but who thought that their new creed did not require considering the soul as Melanchthon did.

Here I shall first provide some biographical details about two Catholic authors whose texts concerning the soul will be examined in the present work: the Spanish physician Francisco Vallès (or Vallesius) and the Ingolstadt professor of natural philosophy Veit Amerbach.[54] I shall look at the latter's work because it contained an open critique of Melanchthon's *Commentarius de anima*. At the same time, I will consider the writings of Vallesius too, for the simple reason that some of Otto Casmann's most important psychological conceptions resulted from a direct criticism of Vallesius's ideas about the soul.

---

4. *Arithmetica*, 5. *Geometria*, 6. *Sphaera, seu astronomia*, 7. *Physica*, 8. *Psychologia*, 9. *Ethica* (Frankfurt 1596).

53 *In Philippi Melanchthonis De anima, vel potius de hominis physiologia libellum commentationes* (Frankfurt 1596).

54 The following bibliographical details are mainly based on: Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries. II: Renaissance Authors*; *Neue deutsche Biographie*; José M.L. Piñero and Francisco Calero, *Las "Controversias" (1556) de Francisco Valles y la Medicina Renacentista* (Madrid 1988); Marcial Solana, *Historia de la filosofía española*, Tomo Segundo (Madrid 1941); Craig Martin, "Vallés and the Renaissance Reinterpretation of Aristotle's Meteorologica IV as a Medical Text", *Early Science and Medicine* 7,1 (2002), 1–29; Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy. The Case of Philip Melanchthon* (Cambridge, 1995).

Despite the fact that Vallesius has received very little scholarly attention, he was very popular in his days, both in Catholic Spain and in Protestant northern Europe.

Vallesius was born in Covarrubias in 1524. After obtaining his bachelor degree from the University of Alcalá in 1544, he moved to the Madre de Dios College, in order to study medicine and languages. Ten years after that he was "master of medicine and arts", and according to some sources he was appointed to the chair of medicine as early as 1557. However, it is possible that he obtained this post even earlier than 1557, as he is already mentioned as 'professor of Alcalá' in his 1556 first major work, the *Controversiarum medicarum et philosophicarum libri decem*.[55]

As an academic, Vallesius produced several commentaries on the medical works of Galen and Hippocrates. But Vallesius also wrote commentaries on Aristotle's *Physics*, on the forth book of the *Meteorologica*, as well as on the *De anima* (which unluckily he never published).[56] Yet, it was not until he quit his academic career that Vallesius was able to put forward his own medical ideas. In fact, in 1572 he left the university for the prestigious job of personal physician to King Philip II. As a physician at the royal court, Vallesius could set up and work in drug laboratories. But his new job also allowed him enough time to write his most famous work: *De Sacra Philosophia* of 1587. In this book, as its full title announces, Vallesius sets out to give an account of those passages contained in the Holy Scriptures that are relevant to natural philosophy.[57] Among the things that the Holy Scriptures teach about the physical world, Vallesius also found ideas regarding the human soul. This book seems to have been very popular with authors working in northern Europe, especially those belonging to the reformed faith. Among those who used Vallesius' *Sacra philosophia*, the following authors may be mentioned: Johann Amos Comenius (1592–1670), Johann Einrich Alsted (1588–1638), and John Wilkins (1614–1672).[58] The

55 Franciscus Vallesius, *Controversiarum medicarum et philosophicarum libri decem. Autore Francisco Vallesio Covarrubiano doctore et professore Complutensi* (Alcalá 1556).

56 Vallesius himself says to have written a commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* without ever publishing it: «tametsi cum haec scribo, commentaria in libros de anima, scripta multis ante annis, nondum sunt in lucem emissa» (Franciscus Vallesius, *De Sacra Philosophia*, sive *De iis quae in Libris Sacris physice scripta sunt*, editio sexta, Lugundi, Ioannis Antonii Huguetan, et Marc. Ant. Ravaud, 1652, 348). About Vallesius' work on Aristotle's *Meteorology IV*, see Craig Martin, "Vallés and the Renaissance Reinterpretation of Aristotle's *Meteorologica IV* as a Medical Text", 1–29.

57 Franciscus Vallesius, *De iis quae scripta sunt physice in libris sacris, sive de sacra philosophia* (Turin 1587).

58 Reference to the works of the listed authors in which Vallesius' *Sacra philosophia* is mentioned

Sacra philosophia also went through a reprint in which a work by Levinus Lemnius (1505–1568) was enclosed: *Similitudinum ac parabolarum quae in Bibliis ex herbis atque arboribus desumuntur dilucida explicati*.[59] It seems reasonable to say that Vallesius' popularity with Protestant authors is connected to the Lutherans' emphasis on the Holy Scriptures as the sole source of true knowledge as well as to the keen interest in natural theology among Reformed authors.[60]

Otto Casmann was among the several sixteenth-century Protestants who read Vallesius. As we shall see, Casmann developed important aspects of his own conception of man's soul by criticising several passages contained in Vallesius' *Sacra Philosophia*. This book, which was produced at one of the main centres of Catholicism in Europe, the court of Philip II, was used by Casmann to put forward ideas about the soul in a framework dominated by Melanchthon's psychological teaching.

Among the authors whom I will consider in the following chapters, Veit Amerbach also wrote in a context characterised by Melanchthon's *Commentarius de anima*, albeit in a sense diametrically opposite to that in which Otto Casmann devised his *Psychologia anthropologica*. For, at some point in his career, Amerbach came to consider Melanchthon's psychology as his main polemical target. In effect, in a move contrary to the curve that brought Casmann from his Catholic origins to the Protestant faith, Veit Amerbach left Wittenberg when he realised that he trusted the Roman papacy more than Luther.

Veit Amerbach was born in Wembdinden in 1503. After attending his hometown Latin school, he enrolled in the University of Ingolstadt, and then in the University of Freiburg in 1521. However, he moved to Wittenberg the following year and started his

---

may be found in Ann Blair, "Mosaic Physics and the Search for a Pious Natural Philosophy in the Late Renaissance", *Isis* 91.1 (2000), 32–58, 37, 42, 43, 50.

59 Franciscus Vallesius, *De iis quae scripta sunt physice in libris sacris sive de sacra philosophia. Liber singularis cui, propter argumenti similitudinem, adiuncti sunt duo alii: nempe Levini Lemnii De plantis sacris et Francisci Ruei De gemmis* (Paris 1592).

60 As Ann Blair has pointed out, the eighteenth-century historian Jakob Brucker listed Vallesius, together with Casmann, Alsted, Comenius and Lambert Daneau (c. 1530–1595), already among those who advocated a literalist use of the Bible. Blair refers to Brucker's *Historia critica philosophiae* (Leipzig 1743), IV, 610–611. See Blair, "Mosaic Physics", 35–36. On the relationship between natural theology and natural philosophy in the Renaissance, see: Thomas Woolford, *Natural Theology and Natural Philosophy in the Late Renaissance*, PhD thesis (Cambridge 2011). About related topics, see: John Patrick Donnelly, "Italian Influences on the Development of Calvinist Scholasticism", *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 7.1 (1976), 81–101; John Patrick Donnelly, "Calvinist Thomism", *Viator* 7 (1976), 441–455.

studies of law, theology, and philosophy under Melanchthon. There he also appears to have adhered to Melanchthon's and Luther's faith. In 1541, Luther himself sent Amerbach to the Saxon Consistory of Wittenberg to take part in the government of the church.

Yet, something seems to have gone wrong. As I shall explain in details in the following chapter of this thesis, Amerbach started to question Luther's and Melanchthon's ideas concerning justification and the Roman papacy; Amerbach, in a word, began to disagree on the core tenets of the Lutheran reform.[61]

After he obtained the degree of '*magister*' in 1529, Amerbach started teaching in the Wittenberg faculty of arts in 1530. His courses bear witness to the fact that Amerbach's differences with Melanchthon also regarded the latter's physics and doctrine of the soul, which Amerbach started to criticise during public lectures. Eventually, Amerbach's criticisms merged to form his *Quatuor libri de anima* 1542.[62] This book, which was meant as a commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*, amounted in fact to a rebuttal of Melanchthon's *Commentarius* on the soul. This was the last straw.

The situation rapidly escalated: Luther had a flyleaf affixed in Wittenberg, on which Amerbach was condemned for his views about the soul. Amerbach, on his part, was about to abandon the Lutheran faith for good. In 1543, he was welcome with his wife Elisabeth and their eleven children in his erstwhile *alma mater*, the Catholic Ingolstadt. There, Amerbach came just about in time to take the post that used to belong to Luther's and Melanchthon's fiercest enemy, Johannes Eck (1486–1543).[63] Aside from his book about the soul (which seems to be his main claim to fame), Amerbach published the *Aristotelis enuntiationum sive categoriarum enarrationes* (Basel 1545). For the rest, Amerbach spent his years in Ingolstadt giving lectures on philosophy and rhetoric, as well as writing poems. He died there in 1557.

1.1.5. *On the Lutheran Front: Jacob Schegk and Johann Ludwig Hawenreuter*

Of the Lutheran authors I will take into consideration in this thesis not everyone thought that Melanchthon's *Commentarius de anima* and *Liber de anima* indicated the only way in which the soul could be studied. For instance, Johann Ludwig Hawenreuter and Jacob Schegk combined their Lutheran faith with the idea that psychology

61 See: *infra*, 'Chapter 2', 100–104.

62 Veit Amerbach, *Quatuor libri de anima* (Strasbourg 1542).

63 On the theological controversies between Eck and Luther see further in this introduction, 61–64.

should be based on Aristotle's *De anima* and the Medieval and Renaissance commentaries on it. When compared to the intellectual biographies we have considered so far, Hawenreuter's and Schegk's lives appear to be characterised by higher institutional and confessional stability, as well as by the production of numerous Aristotelian commentaries.[64]

Jacob Degen, or Schegk, was born in Schorndorf, near Stuttgart, on 7 June 1511. He studied Latin, Greek, and Hebrew under Melanchthon's great-uncle, the humanist Johannes Reuchlin. In 1527, Schegk matriculated in the University of Tübingen, which he virtually never left, until his death, in 1587.

At Tübingen Schegk obtained his bachelor of arts degree in 1528, as well as his master of arts degree in 1530. Consequently, he studied medicine there, until 1534. In the meantime, he started teaching logic and philosophy, in 1532. Very early he was given important roles in the university, as he was the dean of the arts faculty in the years 1537/38, 1541/42, 1549/50.

In 1539, Schegk was finally *doctor medicinae* at Tübingen. However, he had to wait until 1553 to become professor of medicine there. In the meantime, he published the Latin translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias' *De mixtione* (Tübingen 1540), a *De principatu animae dialogus* (Tübingen 1542), as well as an edition of Aristotle's *De anima* in Greek, which also included excerpts from Simplicius' commentary (Basel 1544). Two years later, Schegk expressed his own ideas about the soul, in a commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*. Schegk's *In Aristotelis de anima* was published as part of the Tübingen professor's broader commentary on the eight books of Aristotle's *Physics*.[65] As I shall explain in more details in the sixth chapter of this thesis, Schegk's commentary differed both in its structure and the topics it treated from the type of works on the soul that were produced by Melanchthon and his followers.

---

64 The following biographical details are mainly based on: Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries*; Sachiko Kusukawa, "Lutheran Uses of Aristotle: a Comparison between Jacob Schegk and Philip Melanchthon", in Constance Blackwell and Sachiko Kusukawa, *Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Conversations with Aristotle* (Aldershot 1999), 169–188; Sachiko Kusukawa, "Mediation of Zabarella in Northern Europe: the Preface of Johann Ludwig Hawenreuter", in Gregorio Piaia, ed., *La presenza dell' aristotelismo padovano nella filosofia della prima modernità* (Rome 2002) 199–213; Melchior Adam, *Vitae germanorum medicorum* (Heidelberg 1620); Oscar Berger-Levrault, *Annales des professeurs des academies et universitiés alsaciennes 1523–1581* (Nancy 1892).

65 Jacob Schegk, *In octo Physicorum, sive de auditione Physica libros Aristotelis commentaria longe doctissima nunc primum im lucem edita. Eiusdem Iacobi Schegkii Commentarius in Aristotelis De anima libros tres, nunquam antea editus* (Basel 1546).

In his years as a medical professor at Tübingen, Schegk counted Andreas Planer (1546–1606) and Nicolaus Taurellus (1547–1606) among his best-known students. Taurellus called Schegk '*princeps peripateticorum*', and rightly so, judging by his prolific work as a commentator of many books of Aristotle's.[66]

Of a very different opinion was Petrus Ramus, who published a *Defensio pro Aristotele adversus Jacobus Scheccium* (Lausanne 1571). This writing was the conclusion of a bitter exchange of letters between Schegk and Ramus, which regarded the nature of logic and its relationship to the arts. In the wake of the correspondence with Ramus, Schegk published the *Hyperaspistes responsi, ad quatuor epistolas Petri Rami contra se aeditas* (Tübingen 1570), which Ramus sought to rebut in the abovementioned *Defensio*, claiming that his views were also Aristotle's.

After the polemical exchange with Ramus, little time went by before Schegk was involved in a new controversy; this time with Simone Simoni (1532–1602). The controversy – judging by Simoni's *Antischegkianorum* (1570) – concerned several themes, both philosophical (including metaphysical, logical, and physical topics) and theological. The theological part of the controversy seems to have centred on issues of Trinitarian and sacramental theology, such as the presence of three persons in the divine essence, the personal union of two natures in Christ, the exchange of attributes (*communicatio idiomatum*) between these two natures, and Christ's presence in the Eucharist.[67] Schegk replied to Simoni in several texts: *Prodromus antisimonii*

66 Taurellus' praise of Schegk as the 'princeps peripateticorum' has been noticed by Lamanna, *La nascita dell'ontologia nella metafisica di Rudolph Göckel (1547–1628)*, 27. Lamanna refers to: Nicolaus Taurellus, *Alpes Caesae, hoc est, Andr. Caesalpini Itali monstrosa et superba dogmata, discussa et excussa a Nicolao Taurello* (Frankfurt 1597), 4r. See further for a list of Schegk's commentaries on works by Aristotle.

67 Simone Simoni, *Antischegkianorum liber unus* (Basel 1570), 33–35: «tota haec confutatio duabus partibus absolvitur. In prima pro meo praecipuo munere primariaque vocatione quaecunque ad philosophiam Aristotelicam magis pertinere videbantur tractavi copiosius. […] Secunda pars diviniorem philosophiam, id est sacrosanta theologiam continet. Quoniam autem in tam coelesti disciplina novas doctrinas probabiliter inducere nefas sit, ipso etiam Platone teste, et ubique recto cognitio facilime obliquum cognoscitur ut Aristotelis dixit, idcirco de unione personali duarum naturarum in una Christi persona, de communicatione idiomatum, quae ratione unionis utrique naturaein ea persona coneniunt, de sessione Christi ad dextram patris, de tribus personis in una essentia divina subsistentibus, simpliciter omni verborum prolixitate concisa, obscuritateque sublata, sententiam integram, veram, germanam (ut puto) ex optimis quibusque scriptoribus scholastici deproimptam aperui». For details about these theological issues during the early phases of Luther's reform, see further in this introduction, 75, 77–82.

(Tübingen 1571), *Anatome responsi Simonii* (Tübingen 1573); *Antisimonius* (Tübingen 1573).

As a matter of fact, Schegk had been actively engaged in a philosophical defence of the Lutheran doctrine of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, at the behest of Duke Christoph. Schegk thus intervened in a debate that had started in 1561 and in which Jacob Andreae (1528–1590) and Johannes Brenz (1499–1570) attacked the Genevan reformer Theodor Beza's (1519–1605) symbolic interpretation of the Eucharist. The result of Schegk's contribution to the debate was a book in which he defended the real presence by means of Aristotelian logic: *De una persona et duabus naturis Christi sententia Jacob Schegkii D. medici et philosophi clarissimi, professionis Scholae Tubingensi ex fundamentis quidam Scripturae Sacrae, analysis autem philosophica et pie et erudite explicata* (Frankfurt 1565).[68]

Schegk's poor eyesight appears to have worsened around 1570, until he had to leave the university in 1577, as he had gone completely blind. Despite all this, he managed to publish several further commentaries on Aristotle's books; besides the texts I already mentioned, Schegk wrote the following ones:

- *Commentaria in IV libros Meteoron* (Basel 1550);
- *In X libros Ethicorum annotationes* (Basel 1550);
- *Explicatio Analyticorum Posteriorum* (Tübingen 1560);
- *De demonstratione libri XV in II Posteriorum Analyticorum libros* (Basel 1564);
- *Explicatio in II libros Primorum Analyticorum* (Tübingen 1565/7);
- *Commentaria in Organi partum analyticam* (Tübingen 1570);
- *Commentaria in VIII libros Topicorum Aristotelis* (Tübingen 1584).

Aside from his Aristotelian work and as he was a physician, Schegk also published medical treatises. In this thesis, I shall look at Schegk's *De plastica seminis facultate*, which was published when Schegk was already blind, in 1580.[69] Despite the fact that the *De plastica seminis facultate* is a treatise about embryology, it contains important ideas about the soul and its origins. In the following chapters I shall combine Schegk's psychological views as they are found in this text, as well as in Schegk's commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*. The consideration of Schegk's psychology will

68 See: Sachiko Kusukawa, "Lutheran Uses of Aristotle: a Comparison between Jacob Schegk and Philip Melanchthon", in Constance Blackwell and Sachiko Kusukawa, *Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Conversations with Aristotle* (Aldershot 1999), 180–181.

69 Jacob Schegk, *De plastica seminis facultate libri tres* (Strasburg 1580).

shed further light on the fact the fact that Lutheran authors who addressed topics about the soul did not necessarily look at Melanchthon's psychology as their preferred research framework. This point, in its turn, will help us better understand the relationship between psychology and Lutheran theology in the age of confessionalisation.

As we will see, Schegk's embryological treatise enjoyed a broad readership in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although Schegk is not counted among the heroes of the history of philosophy and science, he was very popular at his time. His books and his 40-year career at Tübingen attracted many Lutheran youth, who were interested in natural philosophy and medicine.

Among the ambitious young Lutherans who wanted to study under Schegk, I will take into account Johannes Ludwig Hawenreuter. His works about the soul, like Schegk's, also testifies to the way in which some Lutherans thought that Aristotle's *De anima*, more than Melanchthon's, provided the ideal platform to study the soul.

Hawenreuter was born in Strassbourg, on 1 August 1548, to the physician Sebald Hawenreuter (1508–1589). Sebald had studied at Wittenberg, where he heard lectures by Melanchthon's, between 1531 and 1535, before moving to the University of Tübingen, from which he obtained a doctorate in medicine. Finally, Sebald settled in Strasbourg as the city physician and medical teacher of the city's Academy. His son, Lohannes Ludwig became '*magister*' of philosophy in the same city, in 1574.

In Strasbourg, Hawenreuter studied under Schegk's former student Andreas Planer. Hawenreuter then began teaching physics there from 1574 and until 1578, when he became professor of logic and physics of the University of Strasbourg. At the same time, Hawenreuter went to Tübingen, apparently against his father's will.[70] In 1586, he became *doctor medicinae* there. At Tübingen he also remained for three years, as a professor of logic, physics, and medicine. He returned to Strassbourg to teach physics and metaphysics, from 1589 to 1596.[71] From 1596 he retained only the chair of physics, until his death in 1618.

---

70 Adam, *Vitae germanorum medicorum*, 443: «verum, cum unicus ipse esset filius, et familiae quasi columna, paterni animi solicitudo, quae ad omnia etiam tuta trepidare solet, ut longius eum a se dimitteret, impetrare a se non potuit».

71 Hawenreuter's teaching of metaphysics later resulted in the publication of a *Commentarius in libros Metaphysicorum VI priores* (Frankfurt 1604). Both this book and Hawenreuter's teaching are probably one of the first cases in which metaphysics was reintroduced in Lutheran institutions, after Luther had targeted it as one of the worst things that scholastic philosophy had produced, as well as an obstacle to the enforcement of Lutheran faith.

Among others, Hawenreuter published the following works:

- *Disputatio de natura et essentia ratiocinationis, ex libro I Priorum Analyticorum* (Strassbourg 1578);
- *Theses de progressione demonstrationis ex libros I Posteriorum Analyticorum* (Strassbourg 1585);
- *Theses dialecticae ex libro I sophisticarum reprehensione* (Strassbourg 1588);
- *Disputatio de natura logicae* (Strassbourg 1591);
- *Commentarii in libros VIII Physicorum* (Frankfurt 1604);
- *Commentarii in Meteorologicorum libros IV* (Frankfurt 1605).

Among his publications, Hawenreuter could also count a preface to the Basel 1594 edition of Jacopo Zabarella's popular *Opera logica*.[72] As scholars have explained, this preface was meant to tune Zabarella's logical ideas to a public of northern European authors in need of philosophical tools for their confessional controversies. As such, the preface to the *Opera logica* has been considered to be Hawenreuter's main claim to fame.[73] Despite this consideration, however, someone as important as Rudolph Goclenius saw that Hawenreuter also presented interesting ideas for what concerned psychology. For this reason, Goclenius published Hawenreuter's sentence on the origin of the soul (*Sitne animus nobis ingeneratus a Deo necne. Concluditur negate*) in his 1590 *Psychologia*, which I mentioned earlier. As a matter of fact, Hawenreuter published a *Psychologia* of his own, as early as 1591. This book was only a short collection of questions regarding the most important problems addressed by Aristotle in his *De anima*. However, Hawenreuter decided to give much more space to psychology, in his long *In Aristotelis philosophorum principis, De Animo et Parva Naturalia dictos libros* (Frankfurt 1605).

Although Hawenreuter has so far been considered only for his work in logic and for writing a preface to Zabarella's *Opera logica*, he also devoted much attention to psychology. In this thesis, I shall look at Hawenreuter's contribution to psychology in the age of confessionalisation.

---

72 Jacopo Zabarella, *Opera logica, editio tertia, pref. Ioannis Ludovici Hawenreuter* (Basel 1594).

73 Sachiko Kusukawa, "The Preface of Johann Ludwig Hawenreuter", 200. Additional information about the reception of Zabarella's work in northern Europe can be found in Ian Maclean, "Mediations of Zabarella in Northern Germany, 1586–1623", in Piaia, ed., *La presenza dell' aristotelismo padovano*, 173–198.

1.2. *Status Quaestionis* on Renaissance Psychology and Confessionalisation

Few studies have hitherto been devoted to the works on the soul written by the authors whose intellectual biographies I sketched above. Moreover, few studies have addressed specifically the interaction between psychology and theology in the age of confessionalisation.

Despite this paucity of works about psychology in the age of confessionalisation, some very valuable scholarship about this topic does of course exist. Before we venture on to our analysis of psychology in the years between Martin Luther's reform and Descartes' *Meditations*, let us look at what we already know about the subject. This will also help us better determine the scope of this thesis.

Very few scholarly works have hitherto focused specifically to the study of the interaction between psychology and the process of confessionalisation in the sixteenth century. Of course, studies about Aristotelian psychology have not failed to highlight the presence of theological, or even confessional, aspects involved in the science of the soul in the Renaissance. At the same time, cultural and intellectual histories devoted to the sixteenth-century Reformation and Counter-Reformation have touched upon themes connected to psychology (e.g., the immortality of the soul, or the freedom of man's will) in the historical process that determined the emergence of three main confessions within Western Christianity. Because the available knowledge regarding the relationship between psychology and confessionalisation has not received a systematic treatment but rather rests on scattered, if valuable, information in works devoted to the history of psychology, the present status quaestionis is arranged as follows. I shall first provide an account of some major studies about psychology in the Renaissance; after that, I shall look at the few available scholarly works that have devoted some more specific attention to the interaction between psychology and confessions in the sixteenth century.

Let us then turn to a critical overview of some the most influential accounts of psychology in the Renaissance that have been produced so far.

1.2.1. *Psychology in the Renaissance*

Whilst the link between psychology and confessions has not received enough attention, a fair number of studies, over the last two decades, has addressed several other themes and problems that appear to have characterised the science of the soul between 1350 and 1650.

Two interrelated themes seem to have drawn the attention of scholars dealing

with the *De anima* tradition in the Renaissance; those are: debates on the immortality of the human intellective soul and the disciplinary status of psychology.[74] Is the human soul incorporeal and immortal? If so, just to what extent can psychology be considered to be part of natural philosophy? Is it not rather the case that some parts of the human soul should be treated by a science, such as metaphysics, dealing with incorporeal substances? Scholars of the Renaissance have so far tended to focus on these questions, whilst at the same time recognising that not only the intellective soul, but also the vegetative power of the soul and its operations (such as digestion and reproduction), as well as the higher powers of sensation and imagination also were treated in sixteenth-century discussions on the soul.

For instance, the *Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* devoted a section to Renaissance discussions on the organic soul. In this study, Kathrine Park explains that – contrary to the case of the intellective soul – Renaissance psychology showed a broad consensus about the nature and functions of the organic soul.[75] However, Park points out that despite a substantial agreement on most issues regarding the organic soul, Renaissance authors dealing with the vegetative and sensitive souls introduced important elements of innovation. More specifically, Park argues, they started looking at the organic soul not simply as a form that was very proximate to its material instrument (viz., the body), but as something in itself material.[76] A very important medical and philosophical tradition from antiquity to the Middle Ages had looked at the organic soul as a form using a bodily substance in carrying out its operations. This substance was called spirit (*spiritus*) and identified with a subtle vapour pro-

74 Surely, these are not the only themes that scholars of Renaissance psychology have studied. Besides the ontological and methodological questions concerning the immortality of the soul and the status of psychology, scholars have for instance devoted much attention to themes concerning cognitive psychology. One important case amounts to the development (and sometimes elimination) of the doctrine of the intelligible species in the Renaissance and early-modern period. About this theme, see: Leen Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis, From Perception to Knowledge*, 2 vols. (Leiden 1995).

75 Kathrine Park, "The Organic Soul", in Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, Jill Kraye, eds., *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* (Cambridge 1988), 464–484.

76 As Dominik Perler has pointed out, a conception of the organic soul as a "material form" can already be found in the work of William Ockham. See: Dominik Perler, "What Are the Faculties of the Soul? Descartes and His Scholastic Background", in John Marenbon, ed., *Continuity and Innovation in Medieval and Modern Philosophy. Knowledge, Mind, and Language* (Croydon 2013), 27. Perler refers to Ockham's *Quodlibet* II, q. 10, Joseph C. Wey, ed., William of Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem, (= Opera Theologica 9)* (St. Bonaventure/New York, 1980), 159.

duced from the blood, which was capable of reaching every part of the body by travelling through arteries and nerves. According to Park, sixteenth-century accounts of the organic soul, especially those found in Philip Melanchthon's *Liber de anima* (1552) and Bernardino Telesio's *De rerum natura* (1586), differed from earlier psychological discussions in that they showed a tendency to conflate the organic soul with this *spiritus*, and to treat this bodily substance like a machine. Surely, Park does not fail to recognise that authors who looked at the organic soul in these terms often added that in human beings the bodily soul-*spiritus* was accompanied by a higher soul, viz., the intellective soul, which was considered to be incorporeal and immortal.[77]

Park is right in noticing that Melanchthon considered the organic soul to be very proximate to the bodily spirit and thought that each human being possessed not only this organic soul or *spiritus*, but also an incorporeal intellective soul. However, I think that, perhaps because of the limits imposed by the introductory nature of her essay, Park does not sufficiently explain the way in which Melanchthon conceived of *spiritus* and its relationship with the soul. Moreover, whilst Park's observation that the idea of machine is present in Melanchthon's study of the soul is essentially correct, her statements seem too generic. Park's remarks risk to box Melanchthon's conception of the organic soul (together with Telesio's) in the categories of 'mechanism' and 'materialism', which I find inaccurate.

In this thesis, I shall show that, at least in the case of Melanchthon, the idea that the organic soul could be treated as a machine did not correspond to a full-blown mechanist account of the soul, but was in fact harmonised with a specific type of teleology based on Galen's and Vesalius' anatomies. Melanchthon's psychology will be showed to present a conception of the organic soul in which mechanism and teleology could coexist. Moreover, I shall show that Melanchthon conceived of 'spiritus' in several (and sometimes overlapping) ways and that he thought that 'spiritus' could actually interact with God's spirit in the process of salvation. In addition to this, I shall argue that Melanchthon's move to conflate the organic soul with the bodily spirits does not stem from a materialistic conception, *pace* Park's interpretation, but rather depends on the epistemological and ontological consequences of some aspects of his theology. In effect, I shall demonstrate that the way in which Melanchthon conceived of the boundaries between philosophy and faith determined an epistemological distinction in his books about the soul, whereby some aspects of the soul could be known by man's reason, whilst some others could only be known

77 Kathrine Park, "The Organic Soul", 481–484.

by faith. Already in the context of the present introductory essay, I shall contend that such an epistemological distinction was mirrored, on an ontological level, by a division between the organic (material and machine-like) and the intellective souls, in Melanchthon's psychology.

But before getting back to Melanchthon and his twofold conception of the soul, let us resume our overview of the available scholarship about psychology in the Renaissance. It is on Renaissance explanations of the nature and workings of the intellective soul of man that most of this scholarship has focused.

In effect, for the same *Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, Eckhard Kessler wrote an extensive overview of Renaissance discussions on the intellective soul.[78] According to Kessler, the period between 1490 and 1520 was marked by two tendencies with regard to doctrines about the intellective soul. On the one hand, fifteenth- and sixteenth-century accounts of the intellective soul ensued from the alliance between Neoplatonism and the Catholic Church, which culminated in 1513, when, as I have already mentioned, the Fifth Lateran Council declared that the immortality of the intellective soul could be demonstrated philosophically. On the other hand, Kessler argues, the growing pressure coming from the Catholic Church prompted a determined reaction on the part of the Aristotelians, which led to considering natural philosophy as a legitimate way in its own right to look at the human soul. Kessler links this development not only to Alessandro Achillini (1463–152) and Agostino Nifo (1469/1470–1538), but also to the figure of Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525), and especially to the latter's 1516 treatise *De immortalitate animae*.[79]

As is well known, in this treatise Pomponazzi stated that it was impossible to show that the soul was immortal by means of philosophical arguments; whereas the full truth about the immortality of man's soul could only be grasped by means of faith.[80] Pomponazzi's views were contrasting with those defended by the Catholic Church and met with much criticism. A number of treatises were published, which

78 Eckhard Kessler, "The Intellective Soul", in Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, Jill Kraye, eds., *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* (Cambridge 1988), 485–534.

79 Eckhard Kessler, "The Intellective Soul", 494–495.

80 Pomponazzi reached this conclusion especially by arguing against Thomas Aquinas' view that the intellect does not need the body as its instrument, but only as its object. In fact, Pomponazzi argued that the intellect could be shown to be immortal only if it did not need the body either as subject or as object. But according to Pomponazzi, no activity can be found in the intellect that does not need sensory impressions to form concepts. Pietro Pomponazzi, *De immortalitate animae*, in *Pietri Pomponatii Mantuani, Tractatus acutissimi, utilllimi, et mere*

attacked Pomponazzi. For instance, Gaspare Contarini's *De immortalitate animae adversus Petrum Pomponatium* (1518), Agostino Nifo's *De immortalitate anima libellus adversus Petrum Pomponatium Mantovanum* (1518), and Bartolomeo Spina's *Tutela veritatis de immortalitate animae contra Petrum Pomponatium Mantovanum* (1519).[81] Pomponazzi reacted to the first two treatises respectively in his *Apologia* (1518) and *Defensorium* (1519). According to Kessler, the result of the polemic triggered by Pomponazzi's work did not mean a strong reaffirmation of the 1513 Lateran Council's decree on the immortality of the soul, but quite the contrary: Pomponazzi's idea that the soul's immortality could not be demonstrated by means of philosophical arguments gained the upper hand. According to Kessler, in the years following the publication of Pomponazzi's *De immortalitate animae*, «philosophy would no longer be identical with Aristotle, nor Aristotle with St Thomas and the teaching of the church; a philosopher could be a Thomist, an Aristotelian, a Platonist or anything else, provided that his philosophy was conclusive and coherent».[82] Of course, Kessler's remarks appear rather weak today. His notions of 'conclusiveness' and 'coherence' as criteria for good philosophy after Pomponazzi's work fit the picture of Renaissance philosophy available now uneasily. Moreover, scholarship of the past three decades has sufficiently showed that philosophy in the Middle Ages and before Pomponazzi formed a landscape much more varied than that of a plain correspondence between philosophical thought and Aristotle, and between Aristotle and the teachings of Thomas Aquinas and the Catholic Church.

---

peripatetici (Venice 1525), c.1., 45^{v}.: «At quamvis intellectus humanus, ut habitum est, intelligendo non fugantur quantitate, attamen, quoniam sensui coniunctus est, ex toto a materia et quantitate absolvi non potest, quum nunquam cognoscat sine phantasmate, dicente Aristotele tertio De anima: "nequaquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima". Unde sic indigens corpore ut obiecto neque simpliciter universal cognoscere potest, sed semper universale in singulari, ut unusquisque in seipso experiri potest». About Pomponazzi's treatise, see: Jean Céard, "Matérialisme et théorie de l'âme dans la pensée padouane: le *Traité de l'immortalité de l'âme* de Pomponazzi", *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger*, 171 (1981), 25–48; Vittoria Perrone Compagni, "Introduzione", in Vittoria Perrone Compagni, eds., Pietro Pomponazzi, *Trattato sull'immortalità*, (Florence 1999), V–C1; Jill Kraye, "The Immortality of the Soul in the Renaissance: Between Natural Philosophy and Theology", *Signatures*, 1 (2000), 2.1–2.24; Annalisa Cappiello, *Il problema dell'immortalità dell'anima nella Scolastica rinascimentale del sec. XVI. Tommaso De Vio Gaetano, Bartolomeo Spina, Crisostomo Javelli*, PhD Thesis (Università di Bari 2013).

81 A detailed account of the reactions to Pomponazzi's treatise is provided by Étienne Gilson, "Autour de Pomponazzi. Problématique de l'immortalité de l'âme en Italie au début du XVIe siècle", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, 28 (1961), 163–279.

82 Eckhard Kessler, "The Intellective Soul", 507.

What is more, Pomponazzi's views did not stop attracting criticism even many years after their first appearance. As Lorenzo Casini has recently pointed out, the debate triggered by Pomponazzi's *De immortalitate animae* reverberated well into the seventeenth century and throughout René Descartes' lifetime. For instance, Pomponazzi was still being targeted in 1635, when Antoine Sirmond – a Jesuit belonging to the circle of Descartes' principal correspondent Marin Mersenne – published the treatise *De immortalitate animae demonstratio physica et aristotelica adversus Pomponatium et asseclas*.[83]

It must be said that Kessler himself appears to have been aware of the fact that philosophy after Pomponazzi was not an altogether new game that could be played with no regard to Christian concerns. As a matter of fact, on the one hand, Kessler argues that Pomponazzi's philosophy appears to have paved the way for an exclusively natural-philosophical account of the intellective soul of man. On the other hand, Kessler observes that Pomponazzi's work does not appear to have marked an insuperable obstacle for those who aimed to produce a Christian philosophy of man's intellective soul. On Kessler's account, «as a consequence of the Pomponazzi affair, we can observe not only a divorce of natural philosophy from Christian philosophy, but also a rebirth of Christian philosophy in its own right. The latter was further promoted by the religious quarrels of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, resulting in two corresponding Christian philosophies».[84]

Now, according to Kessler, the partnership between natural philosophy and Christianity that had died with the work of Pomponazzi came back to life in the wake of the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation. As a consequence of this observation, Kessler tries to account for the way in which the two rivaling confessions handled issues concerning the human intellective soul. According to him, psychology in the Reformed camp was characterised by the intellectual movement of 'Protestant Aristotelianism', and this movement mainly coincided with the work of Philip Melanchthon. The latter is presented by Kessler essentially as the Lutheran reformer who reintroduced Aristotle in Protestant education, in order to make up for the lack of theoretical basis which Lutheran theology had been enduring as a consequence of Luther's well-known dismissal of scholastic philosophy. Never-

83 Lorenzo Casini, "The Renaissance Debate on the Immortality of the Soul. Pietro Pomponazzi and the Plurality of Substantial Forms", in Paul J.J.M. Bakker and Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, eds., *Mind, Cognition and Representation. The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle's De anima* (Aldershot 2007), 148.

84 Eckhard Kessler, "The Intellective Soul", 507.

theless, as Kessler correctly explains, Melanchthon's recourse to Aristotle was meant to back an essentially Christian type of philosophy, according to which – more than in the Catholic world – the philosophy of Aristotle was submitted to doctrines of faith. One case in which this new way of looking at the relationship between natural philosophy and Christian doctrine became particularly visible is indeed the definition of the soul that Melanchthon defended in his *Liber de anima* (1545[2]). In this book, Aristotle's definition of the soul as *ἐντελέχεια* was interpreted by Melanchthon in the way proposed by Cicero, viz., as *ἐνδελέχεια*, or continuous motion. In Kessler's opinion, Melanchthon's definition of the soul was consciously asserted in opposition to natural philosophy; moreover, Melanchthon's preference for Cicero was the result of his adherence to the humanist critique of scholasticism.[85]

Melanchthon's *Liber de anima* was a Christian book on the soul, because it was meant to acquire knowledge about God, by merging Luther's teaching about the soul with Aristotelian psychology, as well as with a physiology of the human body based on Galen. The result of this endeavour, Kessler correctly observes, was not a standard commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*, but a comprehensive theory of man or anthropology. Kessler points out that Melanchthon's *Liber de anima* went through forty editions and eighty commentaries in the sixteenth-century, thus becoming the standard psychology textbook for the Protestant lands.[86] Unfortunately, the section "Protestant Aristotelianism" of the *Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* focuses exclusively on Melanchthon's *Liber de anima* and does not examine the psychological tradition started by Melanchthon's work. In the present thesis, I shall try to make up for this and to look at the way in which Melanchthon's psychology impacted on his Wittenberg students, on those who followed his work elsewhere in Germany and the Low Countries, as well as on its critics.

Kessler's account of the 'rebirth' of Christian philosophy for what concerns the sixteenth-century Catholic camp is somewhat more substantial.

On Kessler's account, the main promoters of this 'rebirth' were the Jesuits, with their political and spiritual centres in Spain and Portugal. The biggest result of this 'second scholastic' is according to Kessler the publication of the *Commentaria Collegii Conimbricensis*, a collection of commentaries on Aristotle's writings, which was intended as a standard textbook for Jesuit students. The Coimbra textbook also includes the commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* by the Portuguese Emmanuel de

85 This theme has been extensively addressed in 'Chapter 2' of this thesis.

86 Eckhard Kessler, "The Intellective Soul", 516–518.

Goes.[87] De Goes' book consists of the Greek text of Aristotle's *De anima*, together with a Latin translation and a commentary corresponding to rather short explanations of the text. However, de Goes complemented this material with a set of *quaestiones* at the end of each chapter, which included some more substantial philosophical details. According to Kessler, these *quaestiones* were aimed at discussing psychological matters from a Christian point of view and such religious preoccupation resulted in the statement, at the beginning of the commentary, of the Christian point of view about the soul: the human soul was a spiritual substance created by God in each individual and informing the individual bodies. In a way different to the ideas proposed by Pomponazzi's *De immortalitate animae*, the Coimbra textbook on the soul defended that a philosophical demonstration of the soul's immortality was possible; this, to the point that editor Balthasar Alvarez enclosed a separate treatise to the book that addressed the separate soul of man and claimed that the immortality of the intellective soul could be demonstrated according to Aristotle.[88] Notwithstanding the consistency of the Coimbra commentary on the soul with the decrees of the Fifth Lateran Council, Kessler observes, Alvarez's treatises «offered the hand of reconciliation with Pomponazzi's ideas». In effect, whilst claiming that philosophy could show the immortality of the soul, Alvarez pointed out that, in this life, the human intellect might need some special illumination to recognise such truth.[89]

Similar aspects are also present in Francisco Suárez's *De anima* (1621), which was published after Suárez's death, by Alvarez himself. In fact, Kessler explains, Alvarez published this book as a supplement to Suárez's commentary on Thomas Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*, a policy which, on Kessler account, is justified by the fact that Suárez had deemed Thomas Aquinas better than Aristotle with regard to an explanation of man's intellect.[90]

---

87 On the Coimbra commentary on *De anima*, see: Mário S. de Carvalho, "Between Rome and Coimbra: a Preliminary Survey of two Early Jesuit Psychologies (Bent Perera and the Coimbra Course)", *Quaestio*, 14 (2014), 91–110.

88 Eckhard Kessler, "The Intellective Soul", 512–514.

89 Eckhard Kessler, "The Intellective Soul", 513.

90 Eckhard Kessler, "The Intellective Soul", 514–516. On Suárez's *De anima*, as well as on Suárez's own understanding of his work, in its relationship with the Scholastic and the Aristotelian traditions, see: James B. South, "Suárez, Immortality, and the Soul's Dependence on the Body", in Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund, eds., *The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez* (Oxford 2012), 121–136. In this last mentioned volume, more aspects of Suárez's psychology are considered by Cees Leijenhorst, "Suárez's on Self-Awareness", 137–153, and Marleen Rozemond, "Unity in the Multiplicity of Suárez's Soul", 154–172.

Suárez's *De anima* and the Coimbra commentary on the soul are understood by Kessler as two important testimonies to the 'rebirth' of Christian philosophy in the years following the Pomponazzi affair. Kessler seems to interpret these two key works as presenting a balanced account of the intellective soul of man, which grants natural philosophy the possibility to demonstrate the soul's immortality whilst at the same time acknowledging that theological sources – especially Thomas Aquinas – and the Christian doctrine are needed to fully recognise the notion that the soul will survive the death of the body.

To recapitulate, according to Kessler, Pomponazzi's treatise *De immortalitate animae* opened two different options for contemporary and later authors who dealt with psychology. Some of them developed their theories about the soul in the direction of a purely natural-philosophical investigation, which considered religious matters related to the soul as additional to and not as part of their psychological works. Other authors, Kessler argues, reacted to Pomponazzi by reinvigorating a type of Christian philosophy; or better still, two types of Christian philosophy. For, according to Kessler, the 're-birth' of Christian philosophy after the 'Pomponazzi affair' was characterised by the confessional split-up between Protestantism and Catholicism. For this reason, Kessler considers some of the most important cases of books about the soul produced by sixteenth-century Protestants and Catholics. Kessler addresses Melanchthon's *Liber de anima* as a representative of what he calls 'Protestant Aristotelianism'; and Suarez's and the Coimbra commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*, for what concerns the 're-birth' of Christian psychology in the Catholic world.

Now, both in the case of Melanchthon and in that of Jesuit works about the soul, Kessler succeeds in showing that Christian concerns were involved in sixteenth-century theories on the soul that were developed in the Catholic and in the Protestant worlds. However, whilst Kessler makes it quite clear why the psychologies produced by sixteenth-century Jesuit authors were Catholic ones, he does not seem to explain in which sense the Aristotelianism of Melanchthon was Protestant. In effect, Kessler shows that, on the one hand, Jesuit commentaries recognised that the immortality of the soul could only be grasp in its fullness by the Christian. On the other hand, they were typically Catholic in that they did compel with the indications of the Fifth Lateran Council: the immortality of the soul could and should be demonstrated, to the best of his abilities, by the philosopher. Much less clear is the reason why Kessler thinks of Melanchthon's as a Protestant psychology. Besides the fact that Melanchthon was obviously a Lutheran, no explanation of the denominational nature of his *Liber de anima* seems to be supplied by Kessler.

In this thesis, I shall put forward some arguments to confirm that Melanchthon's psychology was indeed Lutheran. More precisely, I shall explain that the denominational character of Melanchthon's work on the soul does not lie in the fact that his psychology was a logical consequence of theological doctrines; nor all Lutherans who dealt with the soul (including Martin Luther himself) did it in the same way as Melanchthon's. Instead, I shall argue that Melanchthon's psychology was Lutheran because Melanchthon looked at it as an integral part of his efforts to form the Lutheran orthodoxy. Moreover, I shall demonstrate that psychology in the Protestant world was not limited to Melanchthon's (as Kessler seems to imply) but developed into different traditions. As I have already said in the opening of this introduction, I shall address one of these traditions, and precisely that which looked at Melanchthon's work on the soul as its preferred model for doing psychology. Before we get there, it is worth going back to the way in which scholarship of the past few years has looked at Renaissance psychology.

For instance, Dennis Des Chene's *Life's Form* has looked at Jesuit discussions about the soul from a somewhat different, albeit not incompatible, angle from that of Kessler. Des Chene considers what he calls the 'liberal Jesuit scholastics' (Franciscus Toletus, Franciscus Suárez, Petrus Fonseca, the Coimbran authors, and Roderigo de Arriaga) as a group of authors who first and foremost looked at the soul as the principle of life in plants, animals, and human beings. Therefore, Des Chene sets out to examine sixteenth-century Aristotelian psychology in its own right, by avoiding to «hasten towards the gripping issues of the time: immortality, unity of the intellect and free will».[91] According to Des Chene, and as the title *Life's Form* suggests the *De anima* tradition is to be considered chiefly as a case in the history of biology, which addresses questions such as: what is the soul? What is the difference between living and non-living beings? What type of relationship holds between the soul and its powers? What kind of unity do soul and body achieve?

The science of the soul in the sixteenth century – Des Chene explains – formed a varied landscape in which different intellectual traditions merged. However, the study of the soul amongst Jesuit scholastics was essentially dominated by Aristotle's *De anima*. According to Des Chene, their claim to novelty lies, nonetheless, in the fact that they remoulded the commentary on *De anima* into a disputational format: the structure of Jesuit works on the soul stopped following the order of the themes about the soul as it was presented by Aristotle's *De anima*, and consisted more in

91 Dennis Des Chene, *Life's Form. Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul* (Ithaca 2000), 2.

a series of disputations that could be treated almost as separate treatises in their own right. These disputations included themes stemming from Aristotle's *De anima*, but also entirely new questions that these 'liberal Jesuits' considered relevant to the knowledge of the soul.[92]

Des Chene's book is a very careful analysis of the main questions on the soul as they are treated in sixteenth-century texts produced by Jesuit scholastics. A full account of this study is beyond the scope of this introduction; nevertheless, it is worth mentioning at least some broader ideas and conclusions put forward by Des Chene. In particular, whilst he devoted a separate book – *Spirits and Clocks* – to the development of psychology in the seventeenth century, his *Life's Form* intends to provide some background to the mechanistic revolution that was about to wipe Aristotelianism away.[93] According to Des Chene, texts on the soul produced by liberal Jesuit scholastics were widely read through to much of the seventeenth century and form the intellectual background against which the works of Descartes, Malebranche, and Gassendi should be read. More specifically, the sixteenth-century science of the soul differed from later Cartesian philosophy in that it was characterised by a unity between cognitive and vegetative powers of the soul. This unity – Des Chene concludes – is reflected by the absence of «any deep conceptual or disciplinary division between what we would now call "physiological" and "psychological" subject matters».[94] According to Des Chene, the sixteenth-century science of the soul – or the biological study of the form of life – encompassed both physiological and psychological phenomena, by tracing them back to one single subject, viz., the soul. It was precisely when these aspects went their own ways (namely, in the wake of Descartes' philosophy) that, on Des Chene's account, psychology stopped being about the life's form and became the study of man's cognitive powers.[95]

Whilst some of the conclusions reached by Des Chene's *Life Form* are by now widely accepted, some others might raise more questions. On the one hand, it seems arguably true that, as Des Chene contends, in the wake of Descartes' 1641 *Meditations on First Philosophy* and *Treatise on Man*, psychology took on a new meaning: its subject was no longer the soul as the principle of life in plants, animals, and humans, but the human mind and its cognitive functions. On the other hand, I think there

92 Dennis Des Chene, *Life's Form*, 1–9.

93 The full title of Des Chene's book on seventeenth-century psychology is: Dennis Des Chene, *Spirits and Clocks: Machine and Organism in Descartes* (Ithaca 2001).

94 Dennis Des Chene, *Life's Form*, 200.

95 Dennis Des Chene, *Life's Form*, 199–202.

is a sense in which Des Chene's view, according to which sixteenth-century psychology witnessed a complete lack of reflection about its disciplinary status, is inaccurate. Precisely because the science of the soul included, to use Des Chene's terminology, both psychological and physiological matters, many sixteenth-century authors recognised the problematic disciplinary status of psychology and sought to give the varied aspects traditionally treated by the *scientia de anima* a more precise position within the Aristotelian distribution of sciences.

In effect, they observed that the concept of 'soul' had two different meanings: the soul was both the source of life in all animated beings and the principle of intellectual activity in human beings. To make matters worse, most sixteenth-century masters of arts considered the intellectual operations of the soul to be carried out not through a corporeal organ, but to be separable from the body and incorporeal. But how could the study of these operations fall within the same discipline that studied the soul as the corporeal form responsible for life?

In an article entitled "*Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics or Something in Between*", Paul Bakker has analysed the way in which towering sixteenth-century figures answered this question.[96] Bakker points out that Renaissance questions about the disciplinary status of psychology were triggered and shaped by the diffusion of one passage found in Aristotle's *De partibus animalium*, in which Aristotle had stated the following view: the natural philosopher had to examine the soul insofar as it was conceived as the source of motion (chiefly growth and sensation), but not insofar as it accounted for intellectual activity. This passage had been hardly ever cited in medieval commentaries *De anima*. Its increased popularity in the sixteenth century is due to the fact that Simplicius mentions it in his commentary on *De anima*, which started to exercise a major influence on the science of the soul from the late fifteenth century onward.[97] Simplicius' commentary is particularly important because it adds some elements to Aristotle's exclusion of the intellectual soul from the disciplinary

96 Paul J.J.M. Bakker, "Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics or Something in Between? Agostino Nifo, Pietro Pomponazzi, and Marcantonio Genua on the Nature and Place of the Science of the Soul", in Paul J.J.M. Bakker and Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, eds., *Mind, Cognition and Representation. The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle's De anima* (Aldershot 2007), 151–177.

97 Here, I shall refer to the author of the work as Simplicius for the sake of convenience, whilst it is opportune to mention that it has been discussed whether he was the real author of the relevant commentary on *Aristotle's De anima*. The authenticity of the work has been denied by Carlos Steel, "The Author of the Commentary on the Soul", in P. Huby and Carlos Steel, transl., *Priscian, On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception with 'Simplicius', On Aristotle On the Soul 2.5–12* (London 1997), 105–140. However, the authenticity of the work has been defended by Ilsetraut

realm of natural philosophy. According to Simplicius not only was man's intellective soul beyond the scope of physics but it was in fact the business of metaphysics. As a consequence, the science of the soul belonged to two different disciplines: it was part of natural philosophy, because it looked at a corporeal form, viz., the soul as a principle of life and motion in animate beings; but it was also part of metaphysics, because it examined a substance such as the intellective soul, which was separable from the body. Although Simplicius thought that some parts of psychology belonged to physics and some other to metaphysics, he made it clear that the science of the soul considered as a whole belonged to neither of these sciences. Therefore, he concluded that psychology was an intermediary science between physics and metaphysics.

Sixteenth-century discussions about this passage in Aristotle's *De partibus animalium* and its commentary by Simplicius bear witness to the great attention paid by Renaissance authors to the nature and place of psychology. The case study proposed by Bakker considers the way in which problems connected with the disciplinary status of the science of the soul were dealt with by three influential Renaissance commentators on Aristotle's *De anima*: Agostino Nifo (1469/70–1538), Pietro Pomponazzi, and Marcantonio Genua (1462–1525).

We have already seen that Pomponazzi doubted that natural philosophy could demonstrate the immortality of the intellective soul. In his 1516 treatise *De immortalitate animae*, Pomponazzi judged that the immortality of the human soul could only be shown by the Christian faith. In his commentary on Aristotle's *De partibus animalium* of 1521/24, Pomponazzi stated that not only the lower powers of the soul (vegetative and sensitive), but also the intellect underwent change.[98] In effect, the intellect learns and forgets, hence it is in motion. Although Pomponazzi preferred to leave this problem open, he suggested that the study of the intellective soul could fall within the province of natural philosophy, the science that studies substances subject to motion. As a consequence, psychology as a whole was the business of natural

---

Hadot, "Simplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* (CAG XI): A Methodological Study", *Mnemosyne*, 55 (2002), 159–199.

98 For Pomponazzi's argument, see: Stefano Perfetti, ed., Pietro Pomponazzi, *Expositio super primo et secundo* De partibus animalium (Firenze 2004), 1. 8, 43^{60-68}. On Pomponazzi's commentary on *De partibus animalium*, see; Stefano Perfetti, "Three Different Ways of Interpreting Aristotle's *De partibus animalium*: Pietro Pomponazzi, Niccolò Leonico Tomeo and Agostino Nifo", in Carlos Steel and Guy Guldentops, eds., *Aristotle's Animals in the Middle Ages and Renaissance* (Leuven 1999), 297–316.

philosophy alone. In contrast with Pomponazzi, Nifo and Genua proposed analyses that came closer to Simplicius' view.

Bakker explains that Nifo looked at the disciplinary status of psychology in two commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*, which were published in 1498 and 1520. In both texts, Nifo appears to have conceived of the science of the soul as a middle science (*scientia media*); however, this conclusion has different connotations in the two commentaries.[99] In his 1498 text, Nifo observed that because physics was the science of motion and what is movable, it could not consider the human intellective soul, which is immaterial hence not subject to movement. Nifo concluded, on the one hand, that the science of the soul was a *scientia intermedia* split up across physics and metaphysics; on the other hand, because psychology as whole belonged neither to physics nor to metaphysics, it could form a unitary science in its own right. In his 1520 commentary, Nifo reiterated the idea that psychology was a middle science, albeit in the sense of mathematical sciences; that is, sciences that examined entities only partly bound to matter. Although the science of the soul belonged to natural philosophy, it was more similar to mathematical sciences, hence a *scientia media*.[100]

The intermediary status of psychology seems even more strongly emphasised by Genua. In his commentary *De anima* (1540s), he refers to a view put forward by Pomponazzi's *De immortalitate animae*, according to which the intellective soul cannot work without sensible images and is therefore corruptible. Nevertheless, Genua argued that natural philosophy was insufficient to grasp the human soul in its entirety. This observation was inspired by the Averroist notion of man's intellect, which led Genua to believe that the human soul involved two different aspects. Each individual man has a cogitative soul (*anima cogitativa*), which is united to the individual bodies and acquires knowledge by means of sensory images. But the

99 On Nifo's conception of psychology as a middle science, see: Edward P. Mahoney, "Agostino Nifo (ca. 1470–1538) on the *Scientia de Anima* as a 'Mathematical' or 'Middle' Science", in Reijo Työrinoja and Anja Inkeri Lehtinen, eds., *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy*. Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M.), Helsinki, 24–29 August 1987 (Helsinki 1990), III, 629–636.

100 As Bakker pointed out, the concept of '*scientia media*' seems to have been introduced by Thomas Aquinas in his Physics, to indicate three forms of applied mathematics: optics, harmony, and astronomy. See: Paul J.J.M. Bakker, "Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics or Something in Between?", 161, fn. 21. Bakker refers to Thomas Aquinas, *In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio*, edited by Mariano Maggiolo (Turin 1954), II, l. 3, 84[a-b], n. 164. On the same topic, see: Ian Mueller, "Physics and Astronomy: Aristotle's Physics II.2 193b22–194a12", *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy*, *16* (2006), 175–206.

human soul also has another aspect to it, namely the *anima intellectiva*: a unique celestial intelligence, which is present in each human being in a non-local way and assists the individual souls in their cognitive processes.

According to Genua, the Averroist view of the human soul is in complete agreement with Simplicius' conception of the nature and place of psychology: given that the intellect is partly separate from matter and partly dependent on it, both physics and metaphysics fail to grasp the soul as an intermediary being (*ens medium*). Therefore, Genua argued that psychology should form a study in its own right. He calls this study '*scientia animastica*'.

On the basis of the discussions conducted by Pomponazzi, Nifo, and Genua, Bakker notices that, although Renaissance commentators on Aristotle's *De anima* were rather unclear about the nature, place, and the unity of the science of the soul, their reflections brought about the idea of an intermediary science in its own right, which contributed to the rise of psychology as an independent discipline.[101] As Dennis Des Chene has noticed, sixteenth-century commentators did not look at psychology as a discipline that was positively different from what we would now call physiology. Nevertheless, the discussion presented by Bakker suggests that Renaissance authors were not unaware of the fact that the study of the soul involved at least two different aspects (the organic and the intellective soul), which might deserve independent treatments or were in need of a deep disciplinary reorganisation.

The task of finding a new distribution for the subjects traditionally treated by the science of the soul appears to have occupied a number of sixteenth-century authors. In his book *The Sciences of the Soul*, Fernando Vidal sheds light on the lively nature of sixteenth-century psychology as a discipline and its capacity of accommodating various approaches.[102]

Vidal's book considers Renaissance psychology as one important slice of the history of psychology. More specifically, it seeks to show that a widely accepted view, according to which psychology became a discipline only during the last third part of the nineteenth century, may be questioned. Vidal puts particular emphasis on fact that psychology – or the science of the soul – was already a discipline in the sixteenth century. As a consequence, he argues that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century psychologies inherited their subject matter from a history that saw the transformation

101 Paul J.J.M. Bakker, "Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics or Something in Between?", 177.

102 Fernando Vidal, *The Sciences of the Soul. The Early Modern origins of Psychology* (Chicago 2011). This book was originally published in French as: Fernando Vidal, *Les sciences de l'âme: XVIe–XVIIIe siècle* (Paris 2006).

of psychology from a science of living beings to a science of the human mind, which could in its turn be studied by looking at its empirical manifestations in the human body. In order to trace such transformation, Vidal sets out to analyse the history of the very term 'psychology'.

On Vidal's account, the term 'psychology' (*psychologia*) was first used in sixteenth-century diagrams on the organisation of knowledge and it started to circulate chiefly in German Protestant universities for reasons of pedagogical convenience. According to Vidal, 'psychology' was indeed only a neologism, which was not associated with any particular new way of approaching the study of the soul.[103] In Vidal's opinion, despite the fact that it did not substantially differ from earlier treatments of the soul, the field of enquiry to which 'psychology' referred may be considered a proper discipline, because it had a specific method and a specific subject matter. Psychology was classified under both physics and metaphysics, and it treated the soul united with the living body.[104]

Notwithstanding the fact that he does not consider the use of the term 'psychology' to indicate a break with the medieval *scientia de anima*, Vidal appears to grant sixteenth-century psychology some new elements. In particular, he observes an increased use of anatomical knowledge surfacing in works on the soul produced by a number of Renaissance Protestants. Vidal devotes particular attention to some of the authors I will deal with in this thesis: Philip Melanchthon, Rudolph Goclenius, Rudolph Snellius, and Otto Casmann. He observes that term 'psychology' was of common use within this tradition. What is more, Vidal considers sixteenth-century psychology as a transformation that witnesses the emergence of forms of dualism whereby the body was considered to possess a form of its own and came to occupy a preponderant role in treatises on the soul. According to Vidal, more specifically in the case of Philip Melanchthon and some of his followers, such as Johann Grün, the study of the soul was accompanied by the anatomical account of the human body. Anatomy and psychology – Vidal explains – «together formed an anthropology which was in harmony with Christian morals and a Lutheran theology of sin».[105]

---

103 Vidal, *The Sciences of the Soul*, 29–30, 46. Marco Lamanna has determined the first occurrence of the term 'psychologia' in the 1574 *Quaestiones* by the Calvinist Johannes Thomas Freig. See Marco Lamanna, "On the Early History of Psychology", *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* 38 (2010), 301.

104 Vidal, *The Sciences of the Soul*, 3–20.

105 Vidal, *The Sciences of the Soul*, 43.

To sum up, according to Vidal, from one point of view it has to be observed that many sixteenth-century texts published under the heading 'psychology' amounted to anthropologies, which described man in a more and more dualistic fashion, and which made copious use of anatomical knowledge to describe the human body. From another point of view, Vidal concludes, the term 'psychology' was rarely defined and its vague contours suggested a field of possibilities ranging from a science of the principle of all animated beings to a study of the rational soul of man alone. According to Vidal, the increased focus on the human rational soul and anthropology surfacing in sixteenth-century books on psychology became more dominant at the end of the seventeenth century, when anthropology and psychology swopped places. Because psychology was more and more the science of the human mind – as opposed to the study of the animating principle in plants, animals, and men – psychology became a branch of anthropology.[106]

As far as the present thesis is concerned, two of Vidal's suggestions will be accepted. First, sixteenth-century texts that used '*psychologia*' in their titles will not be considered as part of an altogether new project *vis-à-vis* the medieval science of the soul. In many cases, Vidal's observation that the term 'psychology' was only a lexical or stylistic novelty is correct. Second, the tradition of 'psychologies' that, as Vidal correctly noticed, placed much attention on man's body and man's nature in general was indeed a Protestant one and did try to produce anthropologies that strove to promote some essential points of Lutheran theology. However, my study will differ from Vidal's in the following two ways. First, as I hope will appear throughout the present work, the fact that the term '*psychologia*' was not *always* linked to a new way of looking at the soul is not enough to conclude that the science of the soul in the sixteenth century did not present substantial differences when compared to the way in which the soul had been considered in the Middle Ages. Whilst this point will be made clearer in the conclusions of this thesis, I can already mention the following idea: true, some Renaissance '*psychologiae*' were virtually standard commentaries on Aristotle's D*e anima*, which merely had a new fashionable title. However, many of the '*psychologiae*' taken into consideration in this thesis shall be showed to differ substantially from medieval commentaries on Aristotle's books on the soul, in their subject matter, as well as in their methods and contents, and to an extent that in my opinion must not be overlooked. Second, Vidal's link between some innovations in sixteenth-century psychology and Protestant theology will be explored in more detail. Because

106 Vidal, *The Sciences of the Soul*, 57.

the said link is in fact the very subject of this thesis, I shall show that some novelties in part of the sixteenth-century science of the soul may be shown to have a strong link to a specific version of Lutheran theology produced by Philip Melanchthon. The theological ideas proposed by Melanchthon that I shall show to be involved in a considerable portion of sixteenth-century psychology will be described in detail later in this introduction.[107]

In order to get there, it will be helpful to consider some scholarly literature that has already looked at the link between religions and psychology in the Renaissance. Let us then first summarise the most important ideas that emerged from the present *status quaestionis*.

The scholarly literature examined so far shows that Renaissance authors dealing with the soul brought about important changes. These changes regarded both the lower and the higher operations of the soul. In fact, reflection about the vegetative and sensitive powers of the soul resulted in an increased use of naturalistic and mechanist explanations of the organic soul. Especially authors such as Bernardino Telesio and Philip Melanchthon considered the soul's lower powers to be machine-like operations, which were either identical or very proximate to the body. Scholars, however, have emphasised that Renaissance authors devoted particular attention to the case of the human intellective soul and that their concerns – as epitomised by the case of Pomponazzi's *De immortalitate animae* – sprang from the difficulty of harmonising a purely natural-philosophical psychology with Christian doctrines about the soul's immortality. What is more, debates about the human soul and its immortal nature have been shown to have gained momentum in the wake of the religious quarrels of sixteenth-century Reformation and Counter-Reformation.

Despite these new elements, most scholars agree on the fact that Renaissance psychology followed in the tradition of medieval commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*, *Parva naturalia*, and *De partibus animalium*. Therefore its subject of investigation was first and foremost the soul as the principle of life in all animate beings (including plants and animals). The study of the human intellect was certainly of the utmost importance to Renaissance authors, but it was nonetheless only a special instance of their broader interest in the soul as the form of life. On this account, the *scientia de anima* between 1350 and 1650 endured the absence of a clear disciplinary distinction between issues that we would now ascribe to physiology and a study of the human mind proper. It took the replacement of Aristotelian hylomorphism with mecha-

107 See further in this introduction, 59–85.

nist physiology, as well as Descartes' work, for psychology to consider exclusively the human mind as its subject matter.

Although generally speaking this view is by now widely accepted, recent scholarship provides us with a more detailed picture of psychology during the decades preceding the transformations that were triggered by seventeenth-century mechanist philosophy. More in particular, scholars have pointed to the livelihood of Renaissance debates on the methodology and disciplinary status of psychology. It is precisely because sixteenth-century professors of arts and medicine were aware of the disciplinary ambiguity involved in the wide range of issues treated by psychology that they sought to give their study a more precise place within the distribution of sciences. In Italy and particularly at Padua, authors such as Agostino Nifo and Marcantonio Genua recognised that the science of the soul treated issues that were partly the business of physics and partly more fit for a metaphysical enquiry. For this reason they thought that psychology should be either a middle science between the natural and the metaphysical realms, or even a discipline in its own right, independent of both physics and metaphysics.

In northern Europe, notably in Protestant Germany, reflection about psychology as a discipline developed in the direction of an eclectic type of enquiry, which was capable of encompassing natural-philosophical, medical, as well as religious doctrines. Scholars have studied the origin and first diffusion of the term 'psychology' (*psychologia*) in the German Protestant context and observed that, the term 'psychology' did not indicate an entirely new science. On the other hand, the term was used in treatises about the soul that bear witness to the following important innovation. Authors working at Protestant universities in sixteenth-century northern Europe – particularly those following in the footsteps of Philip Melanchthon – devoted much attention to the human soul, or better still, to human nature, from a Christian point of view. Their efforts made psychology become part of a broader discipline: anthropology.

The literature examined in this *status quaestionis* appears to ascribe great importance to the role that specific theological doctrines played in the development of psychology in the sixteenth-century. But besides this rather predictable observation, scholars seem to imply a more interesting point: the different types of psychologies created during the Renaissance betray diverse confessional affiliations. For instance, the use of the term 'psychology' has been traced back to a specific geographical, cultural, and institutional context: German Protestant universities. Moreover, we have seen how Kessler looked at psychology after the 'Pomponazzi affair' as either characterised by a purely natural-philosophical way of looking at the soul or as bearing the

effects of the 're-birth' of Christian philosophy. On Kessler's account, this 're-birth' coincides with the needs of the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation, which resulted in «two corresponding Christian philosophies».

These suggestions notwithstanding, scholars have devoted surprisingly little attention to the systematic study of the interplay between Renaissance psychology and the process of confessionalisation. What do categories such as 'Protestant Aristotelianism' mean? Was there in fact any such a thing? Why did a certain way of doing psychology emerged in Protestant Germany? Is the very notion of 'Protestant Germany' helpful to explain determinate changes in the sixteenth-century science of the soul?

The present thesis aims to give an answer to these questions; at least, in one specific case: sixteenth-century works on the soul that in various ways followed Philip Melanchthon psychology. This task will be pursued, however, by drawing on a number of studies that have tried to look more precisely at the relationship between psychology and confessional identities in the Renaissance period, and which is worth considering.

1.2.2. *Psychology and Confessions in the Sixteenth Century*

Here, I shall provide an overview of scholarly discussions about the way in which Renaissance psychology developed in different confessional contexts. These discussions appear to have focused chiefly on the following three themes. First, on the intellectual context in which psychology allegedly became a discipline in its own right; second, on the use of anatomy in sixteenth-century works on the soul; third, on the increased attention paid by Renaissance authors to questions concerning the origin of the human soul. These three aspects of Renaissance psychology nicely illustrate the interaction between theological issues and important transformations in the sixteenth-century *scientia de anima*. For this reason, they have been given particular consideration in this thesis. In order to have a first grasp of them, it is worth looking at scholarly works that have highlighted the impact theological issues had on Renaissance debates about the disciplinary status of psychology, the use of anatomy in the science of the soul, and about discussions concerning the origin of the human soul. By doing so, we will also be able to better qualify some categories that are central in this thesis, viz., 'confessionalisation', 'confession', and 'confessional identities'.

When one looks at scholarly works that have considered the interplay between psychology and sixteenth-century confessional identities, one cannot find a more straightforward formulation of such interaction than that proposed by Paul Mengal

in his *La naissance de la psychologie*.[108] Mengal is to my knowledge the most vocal supporter of the idea that the sixteenth-century coinage of the term '*psychologia*' is an indication of the creation of a new discipline. In conclusion of his effort to study the first occurrences of the term '*psychologia*', Mengal states: «Point de départ de notre enquête, la question de la première occurrence du mot psychologie demeure ouverte mais qu'importe après tout de repérer l'inventeur du mot, pour autant qu'on puisse jamais l'identifier. Il nous paraît bien plus intéressant d'avoir pu montrer que ce mot nouveau désigne une nouvelle manière de définir la science de l'âme humaine et de ses rapports avec le corps».[109]

According to Mengal, the most interesting aspect of the history of the term 'psychology' is not so much the precise identification of its first author. What is more important is the observation that the first occurrences of the term in the Renaissance are linked to a new way of defining the science of the soul and in fact to the origin of a new science: «la psychologie est donc une science moderne car elle relève du même paradigme que l'anatomie de Vésale, la cosmologie de Copernic et de Galilée ou encore la chimie de Robert Boyle».[110]

Contrary to the conclusions reached by Fernando Vidal's *The Science of the Soul*, Mengal argues that the term 'psychology' is not merely a neologism used to indicate an already existing discipline; instead, the sixteenth-century tradition of books on the soul presents a type of novelty comparable to that of Vesalius' anatomy, the cosmologies of Copernicus and Galileo, as well as the chemistry of Robert Boyle. As the title of the book *La naissance de la psychologie* eloquently suggests, psychology is according to Mengal a modern science, which originates in the sixteenth century. But the question is: which sixteenth century exactly? Interestingly enough, Mengal traces the origin of psychology back to a specific intellectual context: «la psychologie est fille de l'humanisme renaissant et de la Réforme».[111]

According to Mengal, psychology is the product of the joint action of humanist and Protestant cultures. Humanism, Mengal explains, need not be taken in this context as the attempt to retrieve ancient knowledge in its pristine form, but as a movement pivoting on the centrality of human nature and developing in a way consistent with the religious, political, and social changes brought about by the Protestant reform. In the case of psychology, this transformation coincides with the

108 Mengal, *La naissance de la psychologie*.

109 Paul Mengal, *La naissance de la psychologie*, 353.

110 Paul Mengal, *La naissance de la psychologie*, 355.

111 Paul Mengal, *La naissance de la psychologie*, 353.

'déconstruction' of the Aristotelian idea of the soul. More particularly, according to Mengal, it coincides with the end of the Thomist hylomorphic conception that looks at the body and soul as two incomplete substances, whereby the former is made and works for the sake of the latter. In the wake of the sixteenth-century Reformation, Mengal argues, the dawning of a dualist type of anthropology marks the end of such Aristotelian-Thomist synthesis. Interestingly enough, the dualism Mengal has in mind is not Descartes', but that which surfaces in the work of Philip Melanchthon, as well as in the books written by some of his followers who worked in Marburg and Leiden.

By drawing on Galen's and Vesalius' anatomical works, Mengal argues, Melanchthon wrote a commentary on D*e anima* that ascribed to the body operations that had hitherto been assigned to the vegetative and sensitive souls. The Marburg professor Rudolph Goclenius and Rudolph Snellius of Leiden drew on Melanchthon's ideas for their psychological views. By doing so, Mengal argues, they stopped looking at human nature as a composite of matter and form and rather conceived of it as a two-dimensional entity. As a consequence of this, they re-moulded their texts on the soul into a new discipline called '*anthropologia*' (anthropology), which was in its turn divided into psychology ('*psychologia*': the science of the embodied soul) and anatomy ('*anatomia*': the science of the body).[112] On the basis of these observations, Mengal argues that this humanist-Protestant psychology was a new domain of knowledge vis-à-vis the medieval science of the soul and that it differed from the Aristotelian D*e anima* tradition in that it was essentially dualist. According to Mengal, this dualism nicely fits the intellectual context of Protestant Germany and the Low Countries. This milieu, Mengal explains, was itself marked by a kind of dualism: Germany and the Low Countries were characterised by the presence of many different confessions, a heterogeneity that was tackled by means of a distinction between church and state, as well as between the public and private spheres of human life. Interestingly enough, Mengal sees so much dualism in the psychological texts produced at the Reformed university of Leiden as to claim that Descartes very probably read them during his stay in the Low Countries. Unfortunately, Mengal does not provide textual evidence for this claim. On the contrary, he argues that

112 That Rudolph Goclenius looked at psychology in the terms described by Mengal is questionable. As Lamanna has more recently showed, Goclenius did not produce the same type of psychology as Snellius, nor did he devote substantial parts of his psychology to the anatomical consideration of the human body. See: Marco Lamanna, *La nascita dell'ontologia nella metafisica di Rudolph Göckel (1547–1628)*, 302–303.

the very attempt to find traces of the Leiden tradition on the soul in Descartes' work is vain: the allegedly dualist authors who worked at sixteenth-century Leiden were close to Jacobus Arminius (1559–1609). Arminius, who taught theology at Leiden and became the leader of the Remonstrants in Holland, was accused of pelagianism (the theological theory according to which human nature was not affected completely by the original sin). Therefore, Mengal argues, Descartes could not possibly quote his Leiden sources without risking to be associated with Arminius' undesirable theology.[113]

To sum up, Mengal looks at sixteenth-century psychology in northern Europe not simply as just another moment in the history of the Aristotelian *scientia de anima*, but as a point of rupture, albeit a gradual one: the study of the soul at sixteenth-century Marburg and Leiden followed in the footsteps of Melanchthon and his use of anatomy in order to describe the human body and certain parts of the soul. According to Mengal, the tradition of books on the soul inspired by Melanchthon's in Germany and the Low Countries coincides in fact with the origin of psychology. This discipline, Mengal concludes, is the product of the Protestant reform and is marked by forms of dualism.

In this thesis I shall confirm Mengal's idea that a new way of looking at the soul was developed by a group of Protestant authors and that their psychological works were linked to what Mengal interprets as a 'dualistic anthropology'. However, my analysis will differ from Mengal's on the following points. First, I prefer not to use terms such as 'dualistic' and 'dualism', because they either do not seem precise and informative enough, as they have been used to indicate disparate philosophical theories, or because they are normally linked to the work of Descartes.[114] The authors taken into consideration in this thesis wrote their works prior to Descartes, nor does it appear legitimate to retrospectively ascribe to their works the type of psychology that emerged in the wake of Cartesian philosophy. For this reason, I shall rather use the terms 'bipartite' or 'disjunctivist' to refer to the type of anthropology that surfaces in the works of Melanchthon and some of his followers.[115] Second, whilst

113 Paul Mengal, *La naissance de la psychologie*, 355.

114 For instance, James B. South has spoken of "Cognitive Process Dualism Principle" in the case of Fancisco Suárez's psychology. See: James B. South, "Singular and Universal in Suárez's Account of Cognition", *The Review of Metaphysics* 55.4 (2002), 796.

115 This point will occur many times in this thesis. However, a more detailed explanation of what I mean by 'disjunctivist' or 'bipartite' anthropology may be found further in this introduction, 79, and *infra*, 'Chapter 5', 152.

Mengal's effort to link new psychological ideas to the intellectual context of the Protestant Reformation is valuable, I shall narrow down the tie between such ideas and their confessional context to a more specific group of authors (in fact, to Philip Melanchthon and some of his followers). As I hope it will emerge throughout this thesis, 'Protestant Reformation' is so broad a category or to become almost useless when it comes to analysing the interplay between psychology and confessions in the sixteenth century. Not all sixteenth-century Protestants did psychology in the way described by Mengal. The crucial point is that 'Protestantism' never implied a specific way of looking at the soul. This does not mean that Protestant confessions had no influence on the Renaissance science of the soul. Quite the contrary: because confessions did play a role in the development of sixteenth-century psychology, it is desirable that scholars abandon terms such as 'Reformation' or 'Protestant', which are too vague from a confessional point of view.

Third, I shall try to demonstrate that although the type of bipartite anthropology described by Mengal was the product of a specific part of Protestant culture, it did not stay within such cultural boundaries. The idea that the science of man (or anthropology) should consider the human body (by means of anatomy) and the human mind (the task of psychology) became a commonplace beyond the boundaries of psychological texts produced at Protestant universities.

The picture of sixteenth-century psychology proposed by Mengal was quite innovative vis-à-vis the scholarship available until 2005. Mengal's observations about Melanchthon's use of anatomy, however, has received detailed attention in earlier studies, most; notably in the seminal works of Vivian Nutton and Sachiko Kusukawa. Their analyses are particularly interesting for the present thesis, because they show that Melanchthon's use of anatomy in his *De anima* had a specific Lutheran character. The case of Melanchthon's work on the soul nicely illustrates the way in which psychology could correspond to specific confessional needs.

In his article "Wittenberg Anatomy", Nutton showed that Vesalian anatomy occupied a central role in the curriculum at Wittenberg, in medicine as much as in the arts faculty. Under the auspices of Philip Melanchthon, Nutton explains, the study of anatomy at the Saxon university became an educational process in which a message that went beyond purely medical interests was transmitted from master to pupil. According to Nutton, the teaching of anatomy at Wittenberg cannot be understood in terms of the discoveries it made, for those were in fact minimal. What Wittenberg anatomy was all about was recognising God through his handiwork: the human body. But for Melanchthon and his students, anatomy also taught the workings of the soul and most importantly how the soul acted for good or evil.

Anatomy was supposed to contribute to curing the body, but more importantly it instructed the Lutheran youth about the health of the soul.[116] According to Nutton, Wittenberg anatomy was «part of a broader movement for the understanding of man's place in God's creation». This was an educational ideal that «aimed to produce Christian intellectuals, both learned and Lutherans».[117] Whilst Nutton sufficiently demonstrates that anatomy at Wittenberg was a Christian endeavour, he is less clear about the more specifically Lutheran nature of the anatomical teachings contained in Melanchthon's *De anima*. This point has been better explained by Kusukawa's study of the Wittenberg reformer, who earned the title of '*praeceptor Germaniae*'.

Kusukawa's *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy* devotes many pages to Melanchthon's works on the soul, and it is probably the best account available of Melanchthon's attempt to devise a Lutheran doctrine of the soul.[118] According to Kusukawa, although many scholars have pointed to the humanist nature of Melanchthon's educational reform, his *De anima* cannot be interpreted as a humanist work. On Kusukawa's account, what Melanchthon wrote about the soul is nothing like a philological exegesis of Aristotle's *De anima*. True, Melanchthon collates many opinions of others without ever committing himself to any position; but it is nonetheless important to observe that he takes a particular stance on very relevant issues. At the same time, Kusukawa explains, one will be equally disappointed when reading Melanchthon's *De anima* as a philosophical work. For, instead of the kind of coherence that one would expect from philosophy, it presents a mixture of teleological and dogmatic statements of theological principles. According to Kusukawa, one has to read the *Commentarius de anima* as Melanchthon himself conceived of it, namely as a Lutheran work on the soul. Whilst Kusukawa's argument will surface more clearly in several parts of this thesis, it is worth stating here at least the main reasons that led Kusukawa to assign a confessional nature to Melanchthon's work. In a way similar to Nutton, Kusukawa demonstrated that Melanchthon looked at Aristotle, Galen, and Vesalius (in fact, the main sources used in the *Commentarius*) as showing that the human body presented a teleological nature – the body was made for a purpose. Perhaps the most important purpose that Melanchthon saw in the body and human nature as a whole (body and soul) was the possession of innate notions of civic

116 Vivian Nutton, "Wittenberg Anatomy", in Ole P. Grell and Andrew Cunningham, eds., *Medicine and the Reformation* (London 1993), 11–32.

117 Vivian Nutton, "Wittenberg Anatomy", 11, 12.

118 Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy*, 75–123.

moral, hence man's capability to tell right from wrong. It is with this conception, Kusukawa argues, that the Lutheran character of Melanchthon's work lies. When Melanchthon wrote the *Commentarius de anima*, he was busy tackling movements of political unrest within the Evangelical camp: as Luther's reform neutralised the papal authority, minor Protestant groups (notably, the Anabaptists) called for civil disobedience. As a consequence, Luther's and Melanchthon's reform came under the fire of their Catholics opponents, who accused Lutheranism of violence. In order to steer clear of such accusations as well as of the claims for civil disobedience defended by the Anabaptists, Melanchthon had recourse to natural philosophy: the observation of the natural world would show the law of God, which culminated in civic morality.[119] From this perspective, the study of human nature was of paramount importance: anatomical knowledge about man's body and the study of the human soul would show the orderly structure of nature and the fact that civil obedience was amongst the innate ideas that God had bestowed upon man's soul. It is in this sense that, according to Kusukawa, Melanchthon's psychology and his use of anatomy were Lutheran: they had to provide Lutherans with knowledge of God's law. But they were also meant to defend Luther's reform by enforcing political order amongst Protestants.[120]

Sixteenth-century psychology bore witness to a very lively discussion about its disciplinary aspects. The introduction of anatomical knowledge in treatises on the soul is probably one of the most significant methodological and disciplinary innovations brought about by Renaissance authors. According to Nutton and Kusukawa, the use of anatomy in works on the soul and the religious ideas that accompanied such use were not completely new, whereas the specific way in which psychology, anatomy, and religion were linked together in the sixteenth century was certainly a novel element in the Aristotelian tradition of commentaries on the soul. For Nutton and Kusukawa, this development was characteristically Lutheran.

As a consequence of Nutton's and Kusukawa's works, the confessional aspects of sixteenth-century psychology and anatomy have received increased attention.

Andrew Cunningham's *The Anatomical Renaissance* offered what is probably the most explicit account of the link between anatomy and religious views in the Renaissance. In a chapter tellingly entitled "The Anatomical Reformation? An Enquiry", Cunningham argued for some stronger link between anatomy and the Lutheran

119 This point will be extensively treated further in this introduction, 64–74.

120 Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy*, 99–101.

world: «Thus – Cunningham argues – although the evidence is not conclusive, yet because, it shows, in my view, Vesalius' work in anatomical reform replicating precisely Luther's work in religious reform, and because the Protestant leaders themselves took up Vesalian anatomy and made it central to their philosophical teaching in the Protestant cause, it points to Vesalius being a Lutheran and as coming to a new view of the body because he was playing out his Lutheranism into his practice of anatomy».[121] After Nutton, Kusukawa, and Cunningham, other scholars have grappled with the relation between confessions and the use of anatomy in Renaissance psychological treatises. Their conclusions, however, are not always concurring with those sketched above.

The link between anatomy, psychology and Protestantism is the subject of Jürgen Helm's "Protestant and Catholic Medicine in the Sixteenth Century? The Case of Ingolstadt Anatomy". Although the title is mainly concerned with medicine, this article offers important insights in the use of anatomy made in works on the soul produced in Wittenberg and Ingolstadt. Helm's article sets out to compare the conclusions reached by Nutton, Kusukawa, and Cunningham with the use of anatomy at the Catholic university of Ingolstadt in the sixteenth century. Helm looks at the origin and institutional context of the university of Ingolstadt and importantly to the fact that the whole arts faculty was formally transferred to the Jesuit order in 1588. The importance of this observation lies in the fact that the Jesuit *Constitutiones* had established that teaching of medicine should not be performed by members of the Society of Jesus. Therefore, Helm argues, it is not surprising that anatomy found no place in the teaching on the soul given at Ingolstadt.[122]

Yet, according to Helm, the fact that anatomy did not have at Ingolstadt the same systematic place it received in the Wittenberg arts curriculum does not mean that anatomical knowledge was completely lacking at the Jesuit institution, nor that it had no religious connotations. In fact, Helm shows the case of violent anti-Protestant attacks coming from Ingolstadt, in which Luther was made responsible for the diffusion of Paracelsus' allegedly impious medicine. As a consequence of this, the Ingolstadt physician Adam Landau (died 1573) praised Galen, Hippocrates, and Vesalius as the authors of the medicine given to us by God. Their legacy had to be preserved against Paracelsus' medicine, which was – in Landau's opinion – being

121 Andrew Cunningham, *The Anatomical Renaissance. The Resurrection of the Anatomical Projects of the Ancients* (Aldershot 1997), 234–235.

122 Jürgen Helm, "Protestant and Catholic Medicine in the Sixteenth Century? The Case of Ingolstadt Anatomy", *Medical History*, 45 (2001), 83–96, 92.

defended by the Lutheran camp. Hence, according to Helm, Vesalian anatomy was not a Wittenberg monopoly, but could actually be used in an anti-Lutheran way.[123] What is more, Helm demonstrates, the very substance of Melanchthon's reading of *De anima* could be taught at Ingolstadt as well, as it emerges from the case of a certain Melchior Fleck's *De praestantia corporis humani*. This oration given at Ingolstadt in 1568 was intended to show the strength of the Jesuit university. Ironically, it included extensive passages about the divinely ordained structure of man's body that were almost literal quotations from Melanchthon's *Liber de anima* (1552). As I will show in this thesis, by the time Fleck's oration was given, the Ingolstadt teaching about the soul had followed in the footsteps of Veit Amerbach's *Quatuor libri de anima* (1542). Amerbach, who was formerly at Wittenberg, wrote this book in the wake of some differences with Melanchthon, which led him to abandon the Lutheran faith and to join the Jesuits at Ingolstadt. It is all the more amusing – as Helm points out – to see the core of Melanchthon's work being used in Fleck's oration. According to Helm, the Jesuit teachers at Ingolstadt did not consider Melanchthon's teaching about the human soul and anatomy specifically Lutheran.[124]

In a way similar to Jürgen Helm, Michael Edwards' "Body, Soul and Anatomy in Late Aristotelianism" has tried to gauge the use that different sixteenth-century religious groups made of anatomy in the study of the soul.[125] By looking at a sample of Jesuit authors (such as Francisco Suárez, Emanuel de Goes, and Roderigo de Arriaga), Edwards observed that the official restrictions issued by the Society of Jesus for what concerned the teaching of anatomy were formative rather than prescriptive: Jesuit authors in fact cited anatomical sources in their commentaries on *De anima*.[126] However, Edwards points out, their psychological works did not provide detailed anatomical descriptions of the bodily organs as Melanchthon and his Wittenberg students did.[127] Whilst Edwards' research may be used to confirm Helm's observations about the non-denominational nature of sixteenth-century uses of anatomy in the study of the soul, it does not seem to compare confessional groups (e.g. Catholics and Protestants) in the way proposed by Helm. Edwards rather focuses on smaller intellectual communities, viz., some authors belonging to the Jesuit order and some

123 Helm, "Protestant and Catholic Medicine in the Sixteenth Century?", 89–92.

124 Helm, "Protestant and Catholic Medicine in the Sixteenth Century?", 94–96.

125 Michael Edwards, "Body, Soul and Anatomy in Late Aristotelianism", in Gideon Manning, ed., *Form and Matter in Early modern Philosophy* (Leiden 2012), 33–75.

126 Edwards, "Body, Soul and Anatomy in Late Aristotelianism", 55–57.

127 Edwards, "Body, Soul and Anatomy in Late Aristotelianism", 65.

others following the teaching on the soul devised at Wittenberg, by the Lutheran Philip Melanchthon.

The study of the relationship between the use of anatomy in sixteenth-century works on the soul and the confessional contexts in which such works were produced thus appears to have received diverging accounts: scholars like Edwards and Helm have tried to soften the denominational nature of the use of anatomical knowledge in Renaissance psychological works. Authors like Cunningham, on the other hand, have emphasised the specific Lutheran character of Vesalian anatomy and its uses in the sixteenth century.

In this thesis I shall try to show that these two interpretations may be reconciled. Whilst the idea that anatomy had to be included in the study of the soul was not necessarily Lutheran, it took on a specific meaning and importance within a group of Lutheran authors, who followed in the footsteps of Philip Melanchthon. In the following chapters, I shall show that the particular use of anatomy made by Melanchthon in his works on the soul became very influential among some Protestant authors who worked between the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth. Also for this reason, the present thesis will try to provide an image of Melanchthon's and some of his followers' psychologies that differs in some way from that recently portrayed by Sascha Salatowsky. In his De Anima. *Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, Salatowsky sets out to describe the reception of Aristotelian psychology (especially as it was developed by the main ancient and medieval schools: Alexandrism, Neoplatonism, Averroism, and Thomism) in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Interestingly enough, Salatowsky's analysis starts with Luther's rejection of the philosophical demonstrability of the immortality of the human soul and with the way in which Melanchthon dealt with Luther's ideas. In a way different from Luther – Salatowsky explains – Melanchthon valued Aristotelian psychology, whilst recognising that philosophical psychology needed to be completed by a Christian understanding of the soul. According to Salatowsky, the result of Melanchthon's endeavour was a theological anthropology, a mixture of philosophy and theology, which did not result in a viable compromise between philosophy and the Christian faith. So much so, Salatowsky concludes, that Lutheran universities at the turn of the seventeenth century replaced Melanchthon's works with the psychologies produced by Spanish and Italian authors in the Renaissance.[128]

128 Sascha Salatowsky, De Anima. *Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16. und 17. Jahrhun-*

In the following chapters, I shall explain that it is true that not all Lutherans and not all Lutheran universities considered Melanchthon's their preferred way of looking at the soul. Moreover, even authors who followed Melanchthon could very well integrate material stemming from Spanish and Italian commentaries in their works about the soul. However, in this thesis, I shall show that the mixture of philosophy, anatomy, and theology found in Melanchthon's *Commentarius* and *Liber de anima* did not stop many sixteenth- and seventeenth-century authors from using these books as their favourite platform for the study of the soul. On the contrary, they thought that the blend of theology and philosophy produced by Melanchthon was the only Christian – hence, true – way of studying the soul.

If we now go back to our overview of the available literature that has devoted some effort to link specific theories about the soul to different confessional contexts, there is one last scholarly debate I find opportune to mention in this introduction. This is the case of studies about Renaissance disputes on the origin of the soul, from which some confessional aspects of sixteenth-century psychology emerge quite clearly.

As I shall show in this thesis, Renaissance authors ascribed great importance to the question whether the intellective soul of man was created directly by God in each individual, or rather only in the first created man and then propagated by means of natural reproduction. The two alternatives were respectively referred to as "creation

---

dert, 131: «Diese philosophisch-theologische Eklektik gereichte freilich beiden Disziplinen nicht zum Vorteil. Denn anders als Luther gelang es Melanchthon mit diesem Program nicht, die Differenz von Philosophie und Theologie offenzuhalten. Seine krude Vermischung beider Disziplinen, die jeden philosophischen Locus theologisiert und verchristlicht, beraubt der Philosophie die Möglichkeit, aus sich selbst heraus die Kraft für ein besonnenes und der Wahrheit dienliches Argumentieren zu entwickeln, und hindert die Theologie, das Andere ihres Glaubens in Differenz zur Philosophie deutlich zu machen. Dies ist auch der Grund, weshalb Melanchthons Psychologie zu Recht von Frank und Stiening eine ‚theologische Anthropologie' bzw. ‚theologische Psychologie' genannt worden ist. Das Werk ist nur vordergründig eine philosophische Psychologie, die sich um ein Verständnis der aristotelischen Lehre bemüht. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es aus philosophischer (und auch aus theologischer) Sicht verständlich, wenn Melanchthons Werke zu Beginn des 17. Jh.s an den lutherischen Hochschulen mehr und mehr durch andere Schriften, die dem sensus Aristotelis angemessener waren, ersetzt worden sind. Der Anlass hierfür liegt im Bekanntwerden der Lutheraner mit den Werken des spanischen und italienischen Renaissance-Aristotelismus begründet, der mit den Errungenschaften des Humanismus und einem veränderten philosophischen Interesse eine Neuinterpretation der aristotelischen Schriften unternahm. Dies ist im folgenden Kapitel aufzuzeigen».

ex nihlo" and "generation *ex traduce*". In a way different to their medieval predecessors, sixteenth-century authors assigned a systematic place to this question in their works on the soul. Interestingly enough, scholars who looked at Renaissance discussions about the origin of the soul have tended to emphasise the confessional character of the dispute between "creationists" and "traducianists".

For instance, Michael Stolberg has observed that determining the origin of the soul became a major issue of interconfessional debate, between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. More precisely, Stolberg argues, Lutherans differed from their Calvinists and Catholics contemporaries in that the former confessional group defended that the human soul was generated *ex traduce*, whereas the latter group advocated creationism. According to Stolberg, the God of traducianism was a Lutheran God and traducianism was the most immediate and radical reflection of one's Lutheran allegiance.[129] I will give more space to Stolberg argument further in this thesis. Here, it is worth mentioning that conclusions similar to his have been reached by other scholars. Amongst others, Joseph S. Freedman has argued that Renaissance discussions on the soul presented by Lutherans differed from those presented by their Catholic and Calvinist counterparts on one specific point: Lutherans stated that the souls were generated through the seed of the parents, whereas Catholic and Calvinist authors opted for the *ex nihilo* thesis.[130] A somewhat more careful interpretation of sixteenth-century debates on the origin of the soul has been recently proposed by Leen Spruit. In effect, according to Spruit, the discussion amongst Lutherans was very lively and only "as a rule" did Lutherans defend traducianism.[131]

I shall devote a specific part of this thesis to the sixteenth-century debate on the origin of the soul. In that context, I will be able to offer a different account of the confessional character of the dispute, as well as of the very notion of "confession", when it comes to understanding the relationship between Renaissance psychology and religious views. The categories of "confession" and "confessionalisation" may fruitfully be used to interpret specific aspects of psychology during the sixteenth century, insofar as they are conceived as describing processes whereby

129 Michael Stolberg, "Particles of the Soul. The Medical and Lutheran Context of Daniel Sennert's Atomism", *Medicina nei Secoli* 15/2 (2003), 189–194.

130 Joseph S. Freedman, *The Soul (anima) according to Clemens Timpler (1563/4–1624) and Some of His Central European Contemporaries*, in *Scientia et Artes*. Die Vermittlung alten und neuen Wissens in Literatur, Kunst und Musik (Wolfenbüttel 2004), 806–807.

131 Leen Spruit, *The Origin of the Soul From Antiquity to the Early Modern Era* (Lugano 2014), 81.

religious identities are formed by means of controversies rather than fixed intellectual blocks. Confessional identities are better understood as dynamics which were intertwined with psychological controversies rather than as rigid intellectual formations from which theories about the soul could be deduced. This point will be grasped better by briefly looking at the historiography of the idea of "confessionalisation".

1.3. Confessionalisation, Confession, and Confessionalism

To what extent were the innovations brought about by Renaissance psychology motivated by different confessional demands? Was anatomy used only in Lutheran treatises about the soul? Was 'traducianism' a distinctly Lutheran theory? As we have seen, these are some of the questions on which research dealing with the interaction between psychology and religion in the sixteenth century has hitherto focused. In fact, these are also some of the main themes addressed by this thesis.

As we have just seen, scholars have ascribed a specifically Lutheran nature to the adoption of anatomy in the sixteenth-century *scientia de anima*. By doing this, they have compared a specific type of intellectual production with the need for enforcing orthodoxy and social discipline within a determinate confessional context. Moreover, research has more recently compared the use of anatomy in psychology across different confessional groups in the sixteenth century, and studies are now available that trace determinate doctrines about the origin of the soul back to the specific doctrinal demands of the different Christian denominations. Interestingly enough, all these questions appear to involve – more or less implicitly – the categories of 'confession' and 'confessionalisation'. But what does it mean when we say that a certain psychological theory interacted with the strife on the part of some religious men to discipline a social group? Or what do we imply when we say, for instance, that 'traducianism' was the Lutheran way of looking at the origin of the human soul? In order to assess the current research about the interplay between psychology and confessions in the sixteenth century, it is opportune to briefly sketch the way in which historians have conceived of the categories of 'confessionalisation' and 'confession'.

'Confessionalisation' is English for *Konfessionalisierung*, which is in fact a category that since the 1970's has been adopted to interpret German history, in the wake of the Protestant reform. Three conferences promoted by the Verein für Reformationsgeschichte made 'confessionalisation' gain widespread popularity in the field

of Reformation history.[132] However, no univocal idea of 'confessionalisation' appears to be available. What seems to be shared by the various versions of the concept of confessionalisation is the idea that certain sixteenth-century political and territorial formations developed as a consequence of particular religious transformations.

As Susan R. Boettcher pointed out, 'confessionalisation' has been used, in a restricted sense, by Anton Schindling to interpret the later German Reformation (1555–1649). In this sense, 'confessionalisation' stands for the doctrinal and political consolidation of the three Christian denominations in Germany, as connected with the development of the territorial state.[133] In a broader sense, Heinz Schilling and Wolfgang Reinhard have used the idea of 'confessionalisation' to describe a process involving post-Reformation Europe in its entirety. This process amounted to an alliance between church and state that facilitated political centralisation, as opposed to local privileges.[134] As far as our discussion is concerned, the most interesting aspect of both uses of the idea of 'confessionalisation' is the following: the historical processes that have been described by means of the term are all linked to the issuing of confessional statements and church ordinances. In effect, 'confessional groups' are, roughly speaking, aggregates of people who adhere to an explicit statement of doctrine, or '*confessio*' (confession). The main statements of doctrine for the three Western Christian denominations were the following ones: the Confession of Augsburg (1530) and the Book of Concord (1580), for Lutheranism; the Helvetic Confessions (1536, 1566), the Zurich Consensus (1549), and the Canons of Dordrecht (1619), for the Reformed Calvinist confession; the Tridentine Profession of Faith (1564), for Catholicism.

When one compares these definitions of 'confessionalisation' and 'confession' to the available research on the confessional aspects of sixteenth-century psychol-

---

132 The results of these conferences are published in: Hans-Christoph Rublack, ed., *Die lutherische Konfessionalisierung in Deutschland* (Gütersloh 1992); Wolfgang Reinhard, ed., *Die katholische Konfessionalisierung* (Gütersloh 1995); Heinz Schilling, ed., *Die Reformierte Konfessionalisierung in Deutschland* (Gütersloh 1986).

133 See Susan R. Boettcher, "Confessionalization: Reformation, Religion, Absolutism, and Modernity", *History Compass* 2 (2004), 1. For Schindling's research on confessionalisation, see: Anton Schindling, ed., *Die Territorien des Reichs im Zeitalter der Reformation und Konfessionalisierung*, 7 vols. (Münster 1089–1997).

134 For Schilling and Reinhard research on confessionalisation, see: Heinz Schilling, "Confessional Europe: Bureaucrats, La Bonne Police, Civilizations", in *Handbook of European History 1400–1600: Late Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation*, 2 vols. (Leiden 1995), II, 641–681; Wolfgang Reinhard, "Reformation, Counter-Reformation, and the Early Modern State. A Reassessment", *The Catholic Historical Review* 75,3 (1989), 383–404.

ogy, the following point can be made. Scholars who have linked particular aspects of Renaissance psychology to determinate confessional groups only very seldom look at confessions in the way I just sketched. True, virtually none of the works mentioned in the previous section of this introduction explicitly uses the categories of 'confessionalisation' and 'confession'. This can perhaps explain why scholars such as Eckhard Kessler and Paul Mengal do not seem to be worried about official statements of doctrine. Yet, how are we to understand Kessler's observation that in the wake of the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Reformation (the age of the 're-birth' of Christian psychology), the science of the soul gave rise to two Christian philosophies? Or, what exactly does Paul Mengal mean when he argues that psychology as a discipline is the fruit of the Protestant Reformation and that the 'dualist' tendencies surfacing in sixteenth-century psychology reflected the dualism between church and state that characterised post-Reformation Germany and the Low Countries?

What does 'Lutheran' stand for when Michael Stolberg states that to hold traducianism in the Renaissance debates about the origin of the soul was the most immediate and radical reflection of one's Lutheran allegiance?

To the best of my knowledge, traducianism was not part of the Lutheran statements of doctrine, or at least Stolberg never seems to show that the thesis *ex traduce* was implied by official statements of the Lutheran church. In a way similar to Stolberg, Kessler and Mengal also link certain transformations in the Renaissance *De anima* tradition to confessional differences, without making reference to the confessional statements through which Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Catholicism became internally coherent and mutually exclusive doctrines.

The lack of references to official confessional statements does not diminish the importance of the scholarly studies that addressed the interplay between psychology and religious views in the sixteenth century. Traducianism was indeed quite widespread amongst Lutherans; Catholics and Protestants did philosophy in ways that differed in many respects from each other, and a new way of doing psychology was indeed produced at the hand of authors affiliated to Protestant institutions. But if all this is true, one must well recognise that the confessional nature ascribed to certain psychological views in the sixteenth-century cannot be taken in the sense of a rigid relationship between confessional statements and psychological doctrines.

Especially during the first half of the sixteenth century, when confessional identities were not yet well defined, there never was something like a Lutheran psychology. There was instead, I argue, much interplay between Lutheran, Calvinist, and Catholic views and debates about the soul. Which kind of interplay exactly?

In his book *Social Discipline in the Reformation*, Ronnie Po-chia Hsia made a distinction between 'confessionalisation' and 'confessionalism' that may help us better define the relationship between sixteenth-century psychology and the transformation of Western Christianity into a confessionalised landscape. According to Hsia, 'confessionalisation' refers to the «process by which the consolidation of the early modern state, the imposition of social discipline, and the formation of confessional churches transformed society». Hsia defines 'confessionalism' as the interrelated process that amounted to «the formation of religious ideologies and institutions in Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Catholicism. The concept denotes the articulation of belief systems (in "confessional texts"), the recruitment and character of various professional clerical bodies, the constitution and operations of church institutions, and systems of rituals».[135]

I propose to consider this idea of 'confessionalism' as a fruitful category to interpret the relationship between sixteenth-century psychology and the religious views held by Lutherans, Calvinists, and Catholics in that age. Because it treated the soul, psychology handled subjects that were immediately relevant to Christian theology. The science of the soul had to do with the origin and place of man in the created world, with man's will and sinful nature, as well as with the possibility for man's corrupted nature to be redeemed through the Christian God. Now, since these theological issues were of paramount importance in the articulation of beliefs and institutions on the part of Lutherans, Calvinists, and Catholics, psychology was part and parcel of what Hsia described by the term 'confessionalism'.

Given these premises, this thesis shall not considered psychology in the age of confessionalisation as a type of intellectual production that can be derived from confessional statements. Instead, this thesis shall look at sixteenth-century psychology as an important part of the process by which confessional identities formed. True, some of the views about the soul that the reader will encounter by reading this thesis did respond to specific theological views, which were held by determinate confessional groups. More often, however, the texts on the soul that I will consider in the present work contributed to the formation of those groups. And they did so in a number of different ways. I have already mentioned Kusukawa's analysis of Melanchthon's works on the soul as an intellectual endeavour finalised to enforce discipline within the Lutheran camp. Melanchthon's psychology of course

135 Ronnie Po-chia Hsia, *Social Discipline in the Reformation: Central Europe 1550–1750* (London 1989), 4, 5.

responded to the most important theological views defended by Luther, but at the same time, it also contributed to create a Lutheran idea of the nature of man and his place in society. But psychology did not always contribute to the formation of confessional identities in such a clearly identifiable way. Sometimes, as I hope to show in this thesis, certain views about the soul became characteristic of a religious group for the simple reason that authors affiliated to another confession rejected them as unorthodox or as belonging to their religious rivals.

1.4. Lutheran Theology: A Conceptual Toolkit

The interaction between theological, philosophical, and scientific ideas presented in this thesis is not necessarily one of dependence of psychological doctrines upon confessional statements. As I have argued, in many cases, psychological doctrines were an integral part (rather than a consequence) of the intellectual process by which confessional statements were produced. Yet, independently of the particular configurations that the relationship between psychology and theology acquired in the historical context I have considered, a number of theological tenets appear to surface in many parts of the present work. This is due to the simple reason that, as I hope to show, some theological ideas were tightly interwoven with the way in which the authors I have taken into exam looked at the soul. The present section of this introduction is devoted to a short explanation of the main theological notions that the reader will encounter in the following parts of this work.

This thesis, in fact, will consider a number of texts produced by Protestant authors in the sixteenth century. More precisely, it will looked at a group of authors who found in Philip Melanchthon's *Commentarius de anima* and *Liber de anima* their preferred texts for dealing with topics about the soul. Because they worked in the footsteps of one of the main leaders of the movement that triggered the Protestant reform, Philip Melanchthon, their texts can only be adequately understood when read against the background of the latter's theological thought. For this reason, I will now look at some theological tenets that were central in Melanchthon's theology and that appear to have been intimately connected with the way in which he and some of his followers looked at the soul. I will take into account the following five ideas:

1) the idea that the subject of divine grace is not simply man's soul but the entirety of the human nature; that is, both the soul and the body;
2) the difference between God's Law and Gospel;

3) the impossibility for man's fallen intellect to fathom the essence of the human soul in its immaterial and immortal state;
4) the very central Lutheran principle according to which man is justified only by faith (*sola fide*) in the Christian God;
5) the personal union of two natures in Christ.[136]

Before treating these five items, it must be said that of course they do not represent the entirety of the enormous theological endeavour started by Martin Luther and developed by his Wittenberg collaborator Philip Melanchthon.[137] Yet, they are the

136 Of these five items the first three have been extensively treated by Kusukawa, in her book *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy*. Instead, the fourth and the fifth items seem to be absent from Kusukawa's work and in general less familiar to scholars dealing with the psychology of Melanchthon and his followers.

137 Here follows a list of some of the most relevant studies available about early Reformation theology, as well as about Luther's and Melanchthon's theologies. General studies about early Reformation: Michael Beyer and Günter Wartenberg, eds., *Humanismus und Wittenberger Reformation. Festgabe anlässlich des 500. Geburtstages des Praeceptor Germaniae Philipp Melanchthon am 16. Februar 1997* (Leipzig 1996); Irene Dingel and Günther Wartenberg, eds., *Die Theologische Fakultät Wittenberg 1502–1602* (Leipzig 2002); Robert Kolb, *Bound Choice, Election, and Wittenberg Theological Method: From Martin Luther to the Formula of Concord* (Grand Rapids 2005); Robert Kolb, *Lutheran Ecclesiastical Culture, 1550–1675* (Leiden 2008); Steven E. Ozment, *The Age of Reform 1250–1550. An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe* (New Heaven 1980). Studies on Martin Luther: Martin Brecht, *Martin Luther. Sein Weg zur Reformation 1483–1521* (Stuttgart 1981); Robert Kolb, Irene Dingel, and L'ubomir Batka, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Martin Luther's Theology* (Oxford 2014); Bernhard Lohse, *Martin Luther's Theology. Its Historical and Systematic Development* (Minneapolis 1999); Alister E. McGrath, *Luther's Theology of the Cross. Martin Luther's Theological Breakthrough* (Oxford 1985); Heiko Augustinus Oberman, *Luther: Man between God and the Devil* (New Heaven 1989); Johannes Schilling and Bernd Moeller, *Luther-Rezeption: Kirchenhistorische Aufsätze zur Reformationsgeschichte (Arbaiten Zur Religionspaedagogik)* (Göttingen 2001); Johann Anselm Steiger, *Fünf Zentralthemen der Theologie Luthers und seiner Erben: Communicatio, Figura, Imago, Maria, Exempla* (Leiden 2002); David Curtis Steinmetz, *Luther and Staupitz: An Essay in the Intellectual Origins of the Protestant Reformation* (Durham 1980); David M. Whitford, *Luther. A Guide for the Perplexed* (London 2011). Studies on Philip Melanchthon: Oswald Bayer, "Freedom? The Anthropological Concepts in Luther and Melanchthon Compared", *Harvard Theological Review 91* (1998), 373–387; Euan Cameron, "Philipp Melanchthon: Image and Substance." *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 48 (1997), 705–722; Irene Dingel and Armin Kohnle, *Philipp Melanchthon: Lehrer Deutschlands, Reformator Europas* (Leipzig 2011); Günter Frank and Felid Mundt, eds., *Der Philosoph Melanchthon* (Berlin 2012); Lowell Green, "Melanchthon's Relation to Scholasticism", in Carl R. Trueman

ideas that seem to me more evidently connected with the way in which Melanchthon and some of his followers treated the soul. In the first part of this section, I shall consider Luther's and Melanchthon's conceptions of the subject of divine grace, of the difference between law and Gospel, and of the limits of man's natural understanding. After that, I will examine Luther's and Melanchthon's less well-known ideas on justification and Christology. I will show that they are intertwined with each other and that they are very relevant when it comes to understanding important transformations in sixteenth-century psychology.

Let us turn, then, to a brief overview of the five mentioned theological notions which will recur in the five case studies composing this thesis. These notions are not separate stories in their own right, but they imply each other in a way that really points to Luther's and Melanchthon's intention to devise a new theological system. In the case of Melanchthon, this system included philosophy, or better still a specific way of doing philosophy and a specific way of considering the human soul.

1.4.1. *Flesh and Spirit: The Subject of Grace*

One of Luther's ideas appears to be particularly important when it comes to understanding the way in which he and Melanchthon looked at man's nature and place in the world. When Melanchthon started working on psychology, Luther had stressed that being a human creature was about having a soul as much as about having a body. But this seemingly innocuous statement was intended by Luther (and later by Melanchthon) in one specific sense that had very important consequences for the transformation of psychology at the hand of Melanchthon's students and followers. According to Luther and Melanchthon, man's possession of a body and a soul could only be understood from a Christian point of view.

By the end of the thirties of the sixteenth century, Luther had already put forward his anthropological views on several occasions, most notably in two texts: the Dis-

---

and R.S. Clark, eds., *Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment* (Carlisle 1999), 273–288; Gregory B. Graybill, *Evangelical Free Will: Philipp Melanchthon's Doctrinal Journey on the Origins of Faith* (Oxford 2010); Wolfgang Matz, *Der befreite Mensch. Die Willenslehre in der Theologie Philipp Melanchthons* (Göttingen 2001); Barbara Pitkin, "The Protestant Zeno: Calvin and the Development of Melanchthon's Anthropology", *The Journal of Religion* 84.3 (2004), 345–378; Heinz Scheible, *Melanchthon. Eine Biographie* (Munich 1977); Timothy J. Wengert, *Human Freedom, Christian Righteousness: Philip Melanchthon's Exegetical Dispute with Erasmus of Rotterdam* (New York 1998). Timothy J. Wengert and Patrick Graham, *Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560) and the Commentary* (Sheffield 1997).

putatio de homine (1536) and the *Resolutiones lutherianae super propositionibus suis Lipsiae disputatis* (1519), which was part of a theological controversy (known as the "Leipzig Disputation") between Luther and one of his main Catholic opponents: the Ingolstadt professor Iohannes Eck.

In the *Disputatio de homine*, Luther states forty propositions, in which he compares the type of knowledge about man that can be reached by the human intellect with the understanding of anthropology provided by Christian theology. According to Luther, the best that the first mode of knowledge can reach is an understanding of man in his mortal life:

> 1. Philosophy, [which is] human wisdom, defines man as a rational, sensitive, and corporeal animal. 2. And now it is not necessary to discuss whether or not man is appropriately named an animal. 3. But this has to be known, that this definition of his life defines only the mortal man.[138]

According to Luther, philosophical anthropology boils down to Aristotle's definition of man as a corporeal and corruptible being; that is, a definition that recognises man's specificity in his possession of a rational soul. Luther, on his part, allows that man's reason is something good and divine, which discovers and governs the arts of medicine, law, ethics, and all that concerns happiness in this life. Yet he believes that man cannot adequately know himself as a rational being, insofar as he does not consider himself in his creaturliness.[139] But what does this mean exactly?

According to Luther, only the second of the abovementioned modes of knowledge, theology, is capable of providing a true anthropology; that is, a definition of man as God's creature:

---

138 Martin Luther, *Disputatio de homine* (1536), in WA, 39, I, 175: «1. Philosophia, sapientia humana, definit hominem esse animal rationale, sensitivum, corporeum. 2. Neque disputare nunc necesse est an proprie vel improprie homo vocetur animal. 3. Sed hoc sciendum est, quod haec definitio tantum mortalem et huius vitae hominem definit».

139 «4. Et sane verum est quod ratio omnium rerum res et caput, et praeceteris rebus huius vitae optimum et divinum quiddam sit. 5. Quae est inventrix and gubernatrix omnium artium medicinarum, iurium, et quiquid in hac vita sapientiae, potentiae, virtutis et gloriae ab hominibus possidetur. [...] 11. Si comparetur Philosophia seu ratio ipsa ad theologiam, apparebit nos de homine paene nihil scire. [...] 17. Nec spes est, hominem in hac praecipuae parte ses posse cognoscere quid sit, donec in fonte ipso, qui Deus est sese viderit» (WA 39, I, 175, 176).

> 20. Theology, however, due to the fullness of its wisdom, defines man entirely and perfectly. 21. Namely, [theology asserts] that man is a creature of God, consisting of flesh and a living soul, created in the beginning in God's image without sin, so that it may generate, rule over things, and never die. 22. Yet, after Adam's fall it [the creature of God] is subject to the power of the devil, to sin, to death, and to whatever insuperable and eternal plague of its powers. 23. And it will not be liberated or granted eternal life if not by the son of God, Jesus Christ (if it believes in him).[140]

Contrary to (Aristotle's) philosophy, which only describes man as a mortal being, theology can explain human nature in its entirety, namely, as God's creature. To be a creature of God means for Luther that man is the subject of sin, as well as of salvation through faith in Christ. More precisely, Luther explains that the subject of sin and salvation is a being consisting not only of a rational soul but also of flesh. It is the entirety of man (body and soul) that defines man in his fallen state and as redeemable.

Almost twenty years before writing his 1536 *Disputatio de homine*, Luther had made it clear that man – when considered as the subject of divine grace – could not be conceived only as a rational being, but had to be understood as a combination of flesh (*caro*) and spirit (*spiritus*). In 1519, Luther was involved in a theological controversy with the Ingolstadt professor Johannes Eck, which concerned church indulgencies and the authority of the Pope. Eck first attacked Luther's views on those topics in his *Obelisci* (1518). Luther's colleague Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt (1486–1541) felt that Eck's attacks were directed to him as well. Karlstadt therefore reacted by publishing the *Apologeticae Conclusiones* (1518), in which Eck was attacked by name, the Scriptures were defended as the sole theological authority, and human will was stated to be passive towards grace and to be incapable of doing good. The exchange of attacks called for a dispute, which Eck wanted to take place in Leipzig. For the Leipzig Disputation, Eck prepared twelve theses against Luther. The latter's written reply was published in June 1519 and was entitled *Resolutiones lutherianae super proposition-*

140 «20. Theologia vero de plenitudine sapientiae suae hominem totum et perfectum definit. 21. Scilicet, quod homo est creatura Dei carne et anima spirante constans, ab initio ad imaginem Dei facta sine peccato, ut generaret et rebus dominaretur, nec unquam moreretur. 22. Post lapsum vero Adae subiecta potestati Diaboli, peccato et morti, utroque malo suis viribus insuperabili, et aeterno. 23. Nec nisi per Filium Dei Christum Ihesum liberanda (si credat in eum) et vitae aeternitate donanda» (WA 39, I 176).

ibus suis Lipsiae disputatis. Amongst other things, this document contains a statement that is particularly important for the present discussion.

In the *Conclusio II* of the *Resolutiones*, Luther argues against those who affirm that man's good deeds or baptism can revoke man's sinful nature.[141] In connection with this argumentation, Luther is particularly critical of a view he ascribes to his opponents (Eck and his Ingolstadt colleagues), according to which the subject of divine grace is the human soul alone:

> The cause of the error is that they make only the soul and its most noble part the subject of grace; then, that they divide the flesh and the spirit metaphysically, as though they were two substances, when rather the whole man is flesh and spirit; [man is] as much spirit as when he loves the law of God, and as much flesh as when he hates the law of God.[142]

According to Luther, it is an error to take the body and the soul apart from each other, as if they were ontologically different substances. Man's sinful nature indeed affects the body as much as the soul; therefore, also man's salvation by faith in Christ has to affect the entirety of man. When one looks at man from a Christian point of view – as we have seen above, the only point of view from which Luther believes man's nature can be described – one has to account for the subject of divine grace, which in Luther's opinion is the soul and the body together.

Sachiko Kusukawa pointed out that Luther's claim played out in a very important way in Melanchthon's works about the soul. According to Kusukawa, Melanchthon's *Commentarius* and *Liber de anima* were books about the Christian (Lutheran) soul. For this reason they treated both the soul and the body, or the whole human nature, in the light of Luther's teaching. As a consequence of this, Melanchthon's psychology differed from most of his contemporary Aristotelian accounts of the soul in that it did not address the soul or the animated body, but rather took the nature of man as its own subject matter.[143]

---

141 «CONCLUSIO II. In bono peccare hominem et peccatum veniale non natura sua sed Dei misericordia solum esse tale aut in puero post baptismum peccatum remanens negare, hoc est Paulum et Christum semel conculcare» (WA, 2, 410).

142 «Causa erroris est quod subiectum gratiae dant solam animam eiusque nobiliorem partem; deinde, quod carnem et spiritum distinguunt metaphysice tanquam duas substantias, cum totus homo sit spiritus et caro, tantum spiritus quantum diligit legem Dei, tantum caro quantum odit legem Dei» (WA, 2, 415).

143 Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy*, 89.

In this thesis, I shall confirm Kusukawa's observation concerning the influence that Luther's teaching about the subject of divine grace had on Melanchthon's books on the soul. However, I shall add something to this observation: the claim that psychology should be about the entirety of human nature (rather than about the soul alone) exceeded Luther's and Melanchthon's works and it became popular with many of Melanchthon's students and followers. Even more importantly, I shall try to explain that whilst Melanchthon and his followers thought that the science of the soul should be about the entirety of the Christian man (flesh and spirit), their anthropologies differed from Luther's on one specific point: they addressed both the flesh and the spirit of man and yet tended to treat them as two different substances.

This point will be made several times in this thesis and I will return to it in my conclusions. For the moment, suffice it to know that, from one point of view, Melanchthon and many of his followers accepted Luther's idea that man could not be understood merely as a rational animal, but that he was (and that psychology had to study him as) an indissoluble union of flesh and spirit. From another point of view, they tended to look at this union as indissoluble indeed, and yet as one that obtained between two different substances.

In my opinion, this difference between Luther on the one hand and Melanchthon and his followers on the other has to be understood in the light of another point on which Luther's and Melanchthon's theologies differ from each other: their respective views of the difference between God's law and Gospel, to which we now turn.

1.4.2. *Law, Gospel, and the Boundaries of Human Reason*

As we are about to see, according to both Luther and Melanchthon, God had bestowed two words upon mankind: the Gospel and the law. For both Protestant reformers the two words of God had to do with what man knew about the world and himself and they were to be interpreted in the light of the central principle of Luther's theology: after Adam's fall man was not able to reach his salvation without God's grace. Salvation indeed could not be gained by means of good works. On the contrary, good works were only possible through God's grace, which had to be received by faith in Christ alone (*sola fide*).

As is well known, Luther's principle of salvation by faith alone had an enormous impact on the way in which he, and then Melanchthon, started to look at scholastic philosophy. According to Luther, the divine promise of grace and salvation was given to man through Jesus Christ and revealed in the Gospel. And only through grace could man comply with God's law (the Ten Commandments). Luther's emphasis on

God's Gospel and on salvation by faith alone gave rise to a vigorous criticism of the existing system of university learning. In fact, at Wittenberg, university education had traditionally been conceived as preparation for the theology Luther was trying to debunk: the theology of the Church, which in Luther's eyes failed to understand the notion of salvation by faith alone.

Yet, before long, Melanchthon had to find a compromise between Luther's firm rejection of scholastic philosophy and pressing political problems, which in Melanchthon's opinion called for a new use of philosophy. As Kusukawa has shown, the difference between Luther and Melanchthon clearly surfaces in the way in which they interpreted the apostle Paul's words in *Colossians* 2.8: "See to it that no one deceives you by philosophy".[144]

According to Luther, Paul had to be understood as saying that philosophy was to be abandoned, for it was deceiving and not from Christ. Because philosophy was traditionally taught as instrumental in knowing divine matters, Luther started to look at it as a hindrance to establishing a theology based solely on the Gospel. Melanchthon would initially follow suit.

In fact, very soon upon joining Wittenberg as a lecturer in Greek, in 1518, Melanchthon embraced Luther's theology and his campaign against scholastic philosophy. In 1521, Melanchthon's endorsement of Luther's views resulted in the first systematic explanation of Lutheran theology: the *Loci communes rerum theologicarum seu hypotyposes theologicae*. Over the next few years, however, Melanchthon would put forward a fresh understanding of Luther's *sola fide* doctrine as well as of his notions of law and Gospel. I will return to Melanchthon's interpretation of justification *sola fide* in the next section of this introduction; for the moment let us focus on the way in which he looked at the difference between law and Gospel.

Melanchthon's understanding of the two words of God is interwoven with a positive reassessment of philosophy in the context of Lutheran education. This point surfaces most eloquently in a 1527 oration – *De discrimine Evangelii et philosophiae* – in which Melanchthon reinterpreted *Colossians* 2.8 as follows:

> When Paul says: "See to it that no one deceives you by philosophy", he does not condemn philosophy but [its] abuse; just as, when one says: "take care not to be trapped by wine", he does not disparage wine but [its] abuse.[145]

144 Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy*, 27–74.

145 CR, XII, 689: «Cum Paulus ait, videte ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam, non improbat

In a way different from Luther, Melanchthon no longer looked at philosophy as something intrinsically bad. To Melanchthon's mind, only the abuse of philosophy was deleterious. But what caused Melanchthon to mitigate his (and Luther's) initial rejection of philosophy? What did he exactly mean by 'abuse', or what were the boundaries he assigned to man's natural understanding of the world?

Upon the Diet of Worms (1521), Melanchthon took the lead of the Reformation, which at that time chiefly meant the task of devising a system of education consistent with Luther's message about the Gospel. Melanchthon's plans, however, had to take a new direction, as he was faced with pressing political issues, first of all with what is known as the 'Wittenberg Movement', which took place in 1521.

The 'Wittenberg Movement' originated when Luther's ideas became interpreted as the legitimisation for social unrest, armed riots, and iconoclasm. The movement gained momentum especially when Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt and the Augustinian Gabriel Zwilling (1487–1558) urged the youth to abandon the university and called, amongst other things, for the abolishment of the Mass and the abandonment of begging.[146] Melanchthon reacted to the 'Wittenberg Movement' by implementing new regulations at the university of Wittenberg, including injunctions against riots and the possession of arms on the part of the students. But it was after a new period of political disorder that Melanchthon started to look at the university arts faculty and at the teaching of philosophy in a way that would remould his understanding of Luther's teaching about law and Gospel for good. As we shall see, Melanchthon's fresh conception of the difference between the two words of God would impact in a very decisive manner on his and his followers' way of looking at nature and man.

The second wave of social disorder Melanchthon had to tackle took place in the aftermath of the well-known 'Peasants' War' of 1524–1525. The war began when groups of peasants and farmers across the German-speaking part of Europe started

---

philosophiam sed abusum, ut si quis dicat, cave ne vino decipiaris, is non vituperat vinum sed abusum». English translation in Sachiko Kusukawa, ed., *Philip Melanchthon. Orations*, 23–25.

146 About the Wittenberg Movement, see: Nikolaus Müller, *Die Wittenberger Bewegung, 1521 und 1522. Die Vorgänge in und um Wittenberg während Luthers Wartburgaufenthalt* (Leipzig 1911); Kaarlo Arffman, *The Lutheran Reform of Poor Relief: A Historical and Legal Viewpoint*, in Virpi Mäkinen, ed., *Lutheran Reform and the Law* (Leiden 2006). English translations of some reports – including Melanchthon's – of the University of Wittenberg regarding the movement in Wittenberg are found in: Carter Lindeberg, ed., *The European Reformations Sourcebook* (Oxford 2000), 59–61.

seeking for more freedom and equality through civil disobedience.[147] As some of them interpreted Luther's theology in the sense of a rhetoric against the established Catholic religious and political hierarchies, they used Luther's message as ideological backing for their revolts. The peasants were indeed joined by some figures belonging to the Lutheran clergy, most notably by Thomas Müntzer (1489–1525), who had professed radical views, such as the destruction of the Godless and the abolition of infant baptism. However, Luther soon condemned the revolts by publishing his *Wider die Mordischen und Reubischen Rotten der Bawren.*[148]

The war did not last too long and in 1525 the aristocracy gained the upper hand. The peasants lost their cause and hundreds of them were murdered. Yet, the Peasants' War left its mark on Thuringia, where chaos was still present. It was with the residual chaos in this territory that Melanchthon had to wrestle, and this task would become of paramount importance for his theological and philosophical thought.

As the result of a visitation of Thuringia on the parts of representatives of the university of Wittenberg, Melanchthon was shocked by the poor quality of pastors' training, as well as by the practice of adult baptism. Melanchthon linked the situation in Thuringia to the figures of Karlstadt and Müntzer and came to consider civil disobedience and the practice of adult baptism to be one and the same phenomenon. In 1527, Melanchthon renamed the 'fanatics' of Thuringia 'Anabaptists'.[149]

Melanchthon's will to react became even more intense after 1530, when Johannes Eck linked both his name and that of Luther to those of Karlstadt and Müntzer. Eck, in fact, published a document consisting of 404 articles, in which Luther and

147 The peasants and farmers were not the only ones who expressed grievances; also burghers, guildsmen and miners participated in a movement that rebelled against the oppressive powers that held the unprivileged in a condition of scarce political freedom and economic rights. About this and for a detailed explanation of the exact claims put forward by those involved in the Peasants' War, see: Steven Ozment, *The Age of Reform 1250–1550. An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe* (Yale 1980), 272–289.

148 On Thomas Müntzer's theology and on the theological differences between him and Luther, see: Abrahm Friesen and Hans-Jürgen Goeritz, *Thomas Müntzer* (Darmstadt 1978). On Müntzer and the Peasants' War, see: George Huntston Williams, *The Radical Reformation* (Philadelphia 1975), 38–84; Janos Bak, *The German Peasant War of 1525* (London 1976).

149 See: Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy*, 63. On the Thuringia visitation and more in general on the role of visitations in the pedagogy of Lutheran Reformation, see: Gerald Strauss, *Luther's House of Learning. Indoctrination of the Young in the German Reformation* (Baltimore 1978), 249–267.

Melanchthon were blamed for having instigated the seditions that had taken place in Germany.[150] It became then indispensible for Melanchthon to clearly dissociate his and Luther's reform from the Anabaptist movement and to restore civil obedience in the Evangelical camp.

Now – this is the most interesting point for our discussion – Melanchthon was quite sure that the practices of civil disobedience and adult baptism largely depended on the arbitrariness with which Luther's *sola fide* message was being interpreted by some. More specifically, he ascribed the Anabaptists' wrong way of doing theology to the state of neglect in which the teaching of the arts had fallen at their hand.[151] As a consequence of this conviction, Melanchthon thought that the teaching of the arts should play a major role in his efforts to explain the Evangelical faith and its commitment to political order. It was at this stage that Melanchthon thought that enforcing social discipline in the Lutheran camp could not be possible without some use of philosophy. But which type of use of philosophy exactly?

In the abovementioned oration *De discrimine Evangelii et philosophiae*, Melanchthon had already provided a very clear answer to this question:

> Paul is speaking of the kind of abuse that is most harmful in the Church, namely when Scripture is received as though it taught nothing other than a knowledge of human reason. [...] Philosophy contains the art of rhetoric, physiology and precepts on civic morals. This teaching is a good creation of God, and the principal amongst all natural gifts. And it is a thing that is necessary in this corporeal and civic life, such as food, drink, or such as public laws, etc. Moral philosophy is the very law of God on civic morals. [...] The

150 Johannes Eck, *Articulos 404 partim ad disputations Lipsicam, Baden et Bernem attinentes, partim vero ex scriptis pacem ecclesiae parturbantium extractos, coram divo Caesare Carolo V* (Ingolstadt 1530).

151 In his 1531 oration *De ordine discendi*, Melanchthon eloquently linked Müntzer and the Anabaptist to some disregard of the arts knowledge «Si quis propter admirationem doctrinae religionis iubeat e vita tollere omnia iura atque institute civitatum, omnia vincula domesticate vitae, none hunc omnes sani homines vi atque armis cohercendum esse iudicarent? Et videmus his annis quosdam *ἀνοσίως θεολογοῦντας* dementos huiusmodi fanaticis opinionibus, erroris sui poenas dare. Meministis enim Monetarium [Müntzer] et Abnabaptistas, et hoc genus alia portenta. Ad hunc modum iudicate insanire eos qui chorum et concertum artium perturbant, neglectis et contemptis inferioribus artibus. Quare sicut de literam elementis cogitantes, totum ἄλφα καὶ βῆτα necessarium esse ad sermonem ducitis, ita disciplinas omnes quae in scholis traduntur, extimabitis ad vitam esse necessarias» (CR XI, 212; English translation of this oration in Kusukawa, ed., *Philip Melanchthon. Orations*, 3–8).

> Gospel is not a philosophy or a law, but it is the forgiveness of sins and the promise of reconciliation and eternal life for the sake of Christ, and human reason by itself cannot apprehend any of these things. [...] Just as astronomy is the knowledge of the heavenly motions, which are arranged by God, so moral philosophy is the knowledge of the works, that is, of the causes and effects that God has arranged in the mind of man.[152]

In this very rich passage, Melanchthon emphasises the importance of civic rules and makes room for philosophy in the context of Lutheran theology. He does so by interpreting Paul's words not as a straightforward rejection of philosophy but rather as drawing the boundary between a legitimate and an illegitimate use of philosophy.

According to Paul, Melanchthon argues, it was illegitimate to look at philosophy as though philosophy and the Scriptures were essentially only two different manners of teaching the same thing. The content of the Scriptures, instead, was radically different from the content of philosophy, and the latter was altogether incapable of obtaining the type of knowledge found in the Scriptures. Philosophy (or human reason), according to Melanchthon, was an entirely legitimate endeavour, insofar as it dealt with a completely different subject from that taught by theology. Whilst the Gospel indeed was knowledge of man's salvation and eternal life for the sake of Christ, philosophy could only teach rhetoric, physics (what Melanchthon calls 'physiology'), and morals.[153]

On the one hand, Melanchthon ascribed to philosophy more or less the same type of knowledge that Luther had assigned to human reason in his 1536 *Disputatio*

---

152 English translation in: Kusukawa, ed., *Philip Melanchthon. Orations*, 23, 24. Latin in CR XII, 689, 690: «Loquitur autem Paulus de illo abusu qui maxime nocet in Ecclesia, vidilicet cum ita accipitur scriptura quasi nihil aliud doceat, nisi rationis humanae doctrinam. [...] Philosophia continet artes dicendi, physiologiam et praecepta de civibus moribus. Haec doctrina est bona creatura Dei, et inter omnia naturalia dona praecipuum. Et est res in hac vita corporali ac civili necessaria, sicut cibus, potus, sicut publicae leges et caetera. Philosophia de moribus est ipsa lex Dei de civilibus moribus. [...] Evangelium non est philosophia aut lex, sed est remissio peccatorum et promissio reconciliationis et vitae aeternae propter Christum, de quibus rebus nihil potest ratio per se suspicari. [...] Sicut astronomia est cognitio motuum coelestium, qui divinitus ordinati sunt, ita philosophia moralis est cognitio operum videlicet causarum et effectuum, quos Deus ordinavit in mente hominis».

153 On the sixteenth-century usage of the term '*physiologia*' to indicate physics or the study '*de natura*', see: Vidal, *The Science of the Soul*, 26.

de homine. Human reason, according to Luther, could obtain knowledge of medicine, law, and morals (to these three domains of knowledge Melanchthon adds rhetoric).[154] On the other hand, Melanchthon differs from Luther in that he now looks at philosophy as mirroring the divinely arranged order of nature. For Luther, philosophy had to be banned for it was not from Christ. For Melanchthon, philosophy, and especially knowledge of civic morals were the very law of God. So much so, that Melanchthon came to look at moral philosophy as a type of innate knowledge arranged by God in man's mind.

This point is of particular importance for the present discussion, for the following reasons. First, by looking at philosophy as the law of God, Melanchthon is essentially saying that civil obedience is not only necessary but even a direct command of God. Second, Melanchthon's assimilation of philosophy and the law of God implies a new place for philosophy – including psychology – in the context of Lutheran universities (first and foremost Wittenberg). Philosophy was neither a preparation for the study of theology (as Melanchthon's Catholic contemporaries claimed), nor an idle human product (as Luther had vigorously affirmed). Philosophy was rather to be taught as the law of God: the way in which God had arranged the natural and the civic worlds.

And yet, these two worlds needed God's grace to be fully understood in their true meaning (God's promise to redeem and save his creatures). This grace was not provided by philosophical knowledge or by man's will to comply with civic morals, but by the Gospel alone. According to Melanchthon, philosophy taught a type of knowledge that was most necessary for man's mortal life and yet incapable of providing any understanding of Christian salvation.

In sum, philosophy obtained a new position in the context of Lutheran learning, insofar as it was conceived as awaiting faith in the Christian salvation to be illuminated in its true meaning.

Besides the preceding two reasons, there is a third one why Melanchthon's new understanding of philosophy as the law of God is important for the present thesis. Melanchthon's ideas about God's law and Gospel had indeed a huge impact on the way in which he (and his followers, as I shall show) started to look at the natural world, including man's body and soul.

A fair amount of studies has been devoted to Melanchthon's attempt to harmonise the study of natural philosophy with his newly reached understanding

154 See: *supra*, 62.

of God's law and Gospel.[155] Notably, Kusukawa explained on different occasions how Melanchthon devised a system of natural philosophy, in which astrology and anatomy would show even to the heathen that nature consisted in an orderly structure.[156] This recognition of an order in the natural world would indicate the presence of a divine architect – Melanchthon used to call this knowledge '*agnitio Dei*'.[157]

Even more importantly, Kusukawa argues, Melanchthon's conception of moral philosophy as it surfaces in the above oration *De discrimine Evangelii et philosophiae* constitutes the main theme of Melanchthon's psychology. Because he conceived of moral philosophy as a set of laws arranged by God in man's mind, Melanchthon thought that psychology could and should demonstrate man's possession of innate notions of morals – notably, these notions included civil obedience. According to Kusukawa, especially Melanchthon's *Commentarius de anima* of 1540 was principally about the law of God. Melanchthon, by writing a book about the soul, was disciplining the Evangelic camp and demonstrating that civil obedience was essential to the Lutheran faith.[158]

In this thesis I will recognise the importance of Melanchthon's efforts to fight against civil disobedience for the way he conceived of man's soul. What is more, I will have occasion to notice that his belief that man had innate knowledge of moral principles (the law of God) became accepted by some of his followers as well. Yet, as I shall show, there is also another way in which Melanchthon's conception of God's

---

155 Besides by Kusukawa, the way in which Melanchthon balanced natural philosophy and theology in the light of his conception of God's law and Gospel has been taken into consideration by: Vivian Nutton, "The Anatomy of the Soul in Early Renaissance Medicine", in Dunstan, Gordon Reginald (ed), *The Human Embryo: Aristotle and the Arabic and European Traditions* (Exeter 1990), 136–157; Dino Bellucci, *Science de la nature et Réformation. La physique au service de la Réforme dans l'enseignement de Philippe Mélanchthon* (Rome 1998), 129–168, *passim*.

156 For the case of astrology, see: Sachiko Kusukawa, "Aspectio divinorum operum. Melanchthon and astrology for Lutheran medics", in Ole Grell and A.R. Cunningham, eds., *Medicine and the Reformation* (London, 1993), 33–56. A recent attempt to criticise Kusukawa's views on the relationship between Melanchthon's use of astrology and his Lutheran faith has been made by Gábor Almási, "Rethinking Sixteenth-Century 'Lutheran Astronomy'", *Intellectual History Review* 24:1, 5–20.

157 For the Christian, or even Pauline connotation of Melanchthon's use of '*agnitio*', see: Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy*, 95.

158 Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy*, 100: «Melanchthon was deeply worried about civil disobedience when he began to work on the philosophy of the soul. It is indeed this issue that his *Commentarius de anima* ultimately addressed».

law and Gospel impacted on his psychology as well as on most works on the soul written by his followers.

There is a sense in which Melanchthon's understanding of law and Gospel determined – I shall argue – his philosophical explanation of the relationship between man's body and soul. This aspect has not been emphasised by Kusukawa or by most studies devoted to Melanchthon's psychology.

At the end of the previous section of this introduction, I explained that Luther, Melanchthon, and Melanchthon's followers all appear to agree on the fact that human nature is about the body as much as it is about the soul. I also underlined, however, that a difference between Luther's and Melanchthon's theologies exists as for the way in which the two reformers looked at the unity obtaining between body and soul. Both Luther and Melanchthon thought that the body and the soul of man were indissolubly united with each other, and that their unity was the main character of the Christian history of fall and grace. Nevertheless, Melanchthon and some of his followers differed from Luther in that they believed that the unity between body and soul was one obtaining between two different substances. This difference between Luther and Melanchthon can be better understood in the light of their respective conceptions of God's law and Gospel.

In effect, just as law and Gospel differ from each other, so also man's body and soul split up in Melanchthon's psychology. Melanchthon's conception of the two words of God appears to reverberate in his works about the soul, in the sense of a twofold epistemology: because in our fallen state we know the world either through the law or through the Gospel, this has to apply to human nature as well. This point will be illustrated on several occasions in the following chapters. Here, I shall briefly describe the way in which Melanchthon's conception of law, Gospel, and of the postlapsarian limits of man's reason played out in his and some of his followers' psychologies.

As we have seen, according to Melanchthon, the fact that God's law and philosophy coincide implies that philosophy can indeed provide true knowledge of the natural and moral orders as they are devised by God. But the fact that this knowledge is restricted to the law of God and does not stretch to the Gospel also implies very precise limits for philosophy. These limits are the very boundaries of human reason in its fallen state. But if original sin affects man in such a way that he is incapable of knowing his origin and destiny without the Christian faith, what can he know about his soul?

In the preface to his *Commentarius de anima*, Melanchthon clearly delineates the way in which the study of the soul fits in his scheme about law and Gospel:

> If the soul had kept that light and harmony which are bestowed upon it in its creation by divine providence, there would be less need for other learned men, and it would examine its nature by its own sharpness of vision. However, now that – like some outstanding picture by Apelles bespattered with mud – it lies in the body, buried in hideous darkness, there is the greatest need for knowledge that should bring it forth and put it in our view. […] But there remain other schools for us, my Hieronymus, in which we can again philosophise about the soul together, when we enjoy the eternal fellowship of Christ and of that venerable assembly of the angels, prophets and Apostles, as well as of the other faithful. There we will not ask Democritus if the soul is made of atoms, or Aristotle if it is a complete reality (*entelecheia*), but the Architect Himself will show us the nature of the soul, at the same time the Archetype and the copy – that is, He will show us His nature, of which He willed the human being to be the image.[159]

Had it retained its pristine state, the soul would intuitively know its own nature. Because of original sin, however, the soul can only obtain some residual knowledge of itself and it needs philosophy to do so. What Melanchthon is effectively saying here is, on the one hand, that the very study of the soul he is going to present in his *Commentarius* is made necessary as an effect of the original sin. On the other hand, he is warning the reader about three points that will determine the meaning of the study of psychology. First, psychology will not provide any complete knowledge of the soul's nature. Second, complete knowledge of the soul's nature will be possible only in the afterlife, when the essence of the soul will be showed to us directly by God. Third, by affirming this second point, Melanchthon is implicitly saying that

159 English translation in: Kusukawa, ed., *Philip Melanchthon. Orations*, 146, 151. Latin in: Philip Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima*, Officina Petri Seitz (Wittenberg, 1540), 6, 12–13: «Si [anima] retinuisset eam lucem ac harmoniam, quae in conditione ei divinitus attribuita est, minus esset opus aliis doctoribus, suam ipsa naturam sua acie introspexisset. Nunc vero postquam velut excellens aliqua Apellis tabula coeno conspersa iacet in corpore, tetra caligine obruta, maxime opus est doctrina, quae proferat eam, et in conspectum ponat. […] Restant autem nobis aliae Scholae, mi Hieronyme, in quibus iterum de anima philosophabimur una cum fruemur aeterna consuetudine Christi et illius augusti coetus Angelorum, Prophetarum ac Apostolorum et caeterorum piorum. Hic non quaeremus a Democrito an sit ex atomis anima; nec ab Aristotele an sit *ἐντελέχεια*; sed architectus ipse monstrabit nobis naturam animae et simul archetypum et exemplaruam videlicet naturam ostendet, cuius effigem esse humanam mentem voluit».

there is an afterlife; this means that he is going to devote a book about the soul by *assuming* (and not in order to demonstrate) that the soul is immortal.[160] But how does Melanchthon know that the human soul is immortal? Is this part of the residual knowledge about the soul that is still attainable by man's fallen reason? If man cannot know the essence of the soul, what can we expect from a book on psychology?

As we know from Melanchthon's 1527 oration on the difference between philosophy and the Gospel, philosophy – besides containing the art of rhetoric and the study of ethics – is mainly about physics. Therefore philosophical knowledge can only explain the soul from the point of view of physics. As I shall show in this thesis, Melanchthon realised this scope by treating the soul – especially the vegetative and sensitive parts of the soul – by looking at its embodied acts, as they could be described through human anatomy. Of course, Melanchthon was well aware of the fact that human anatomy could not possibly teach anything about the immortal intellective soul of man; and neither should it. In fact, again in the above mentioned 1527 oration we are told that eternal life is the promise of the Gospel, about which human reason knows nothing. It is through faith that Melanchthon knows about the immortality of the soul, and only for this reason can he state that the soul is immortal at the very onset of his 1540 *Commentarius de anima*. It is for the same reason that never in the *Commentarius* (or in its 1552 revised version, the *Liber de anima*) does Melanchthon treat the intellective soul of man from a philosophical point of view. Man's '*spiritus intelligens*' ('intelligent spirit', as Melanchthon defines man's intellective soul), in these books, is always defined and described solely on scriptural basis.

Now, most studies about Melanchthon interpret this twofold epistemology (physical arguments for the lower souls and scriptural argument for the intellective soul) as follows. Melanchthon's natural-philosophical treatment of the soul ought to be taken merely in the sense of a list of opinions about the soul, as they are found in learned and authoritative medical and philosophical treatises. On the other hand, Melanchthon's own view is provided only on the basis of the Scriptures. On this reading, Melanchthon's use of Aristotle, Galen, Cicero, Vesalius, and other sources needs to be understood only as the didactic effort of someone who meant to provide the Lutheran students with information about the most important views available about the soul. But because Melanchthon's psychology was intended indeed as a

160 Melanchthon's strategy to state (as opposed to demonstrate) the immortality of the soul in the beginning of his *Commentarius de anima* has been noticed by Gabor, *The Doctrine of the Soul's Immortality in Sixteenth-Century German Lutheran Theology*, 95.

textbook for Lutherans, its genuine conception of man's soul boils down to what Melanchthon knew, as it were, *sola fide*: the soul is an intelligent and immortal spirit.

In this thesis I shall argue against this interpretation and in favour of the following one. Melanchthon's new understanding of Luther's teaching on law and Gospel determines an epistemological tension in Melanchthon's psychology, whereby the soul is treated both from a philosophical and from a theological point of view. But this epistemological distinction – I shall maintain – results in an ontological split-up between man's intellective soul, on the one hand, and his vegetative and sensitive powers, on the other. Melanchthon leans towards looking at them as two different substances and he relies on the authority of William Ockham for this position..[161] Furthermore, because Melanchthon makes the lower powers of the soul coincide with the activity of the body's organs, his distinction between two souls in man amounts to a distinction between body and soul, in terms of two different substances. To sum up, I contend that Melanchthon's conception of law and Gospel played out in his works on the soul in the sense of a bipartite anthropology that understands the unity between man's body and soul as one, *pace* Luther, obtaining between two different substances.

This aspect surfaces even more clearly in the works about the soul written by authors who followed in the footsteps of Melanchthon. In this thesis, particular attention shall be devoted to Caspar Peucer, Gregor Horst, Rudolph Snellius, and Otto Casmann. All of these authors wrote books about the soul that elected Melanchthon's psychology as their preferred textbook to examine the human soul. Of course, this does not mean that these authors adhered to the entirety of Melanchthon's teaching. As a matter of fact, they rather drew on Melanchthon's teaching to come up with their own views about the human nature. Yet, I think that the most evident heritage of Melanchthon's psychology in their work amounts to this: Peucer, Horst, and even more eloquently Snellius and Casmann endorsed Melanchthon's view that the intellective soul of man is an immortal and intelligent spirit, which is completely different from man's body. As a result, these authors devised treatises about the soul that were in fact books divided into an anatomical description of the human body and a treatment of man's spirit. This tendency became so predominant that Otto Casmann divided his treatment of human nature into two different books: one devoted to the arrangement and workings of the human body, the other devoted to man's *spiritus*. Melanchthon's division between law and Gospel resulted in the

161 A similar interpretation has been put forward by Dino Bellucci; see: *infra*, 'Chapter 2', 92, fn. 211.

production of a new type of anthropology, not any longer one that looked at man as a rational animal, in the Aristotelian sense but one that conceived of man as a divinely arranged unity between a body (of which human reason had knowledge) and an immortal spirit (as it was taught by the Gospel).

But how could Melanchthon and Casmann treat body and soul apart from each other and still see them as forming an indissoluble unity? Was it not true, after all, what Luther had said, that man was about the flesh as much as he was about the spirit? Moreover, was it not true that the term 'spirit' according to the medical tradition meant something bodily (e.g., the humours of the body) and at the same time something divine according to the Christian faith?

This thesis will address these tensions. However, I think that my answers to the above questions are more easily understood against the background of two further theological points. In my opinion, indeed, Melanchthon's views about justification and Christology determined to a significant extent his choice to look at man's soul as 'intelligent spirit' and the way in which he and his followers (particularly Casmann) believed that two substances, flesh and spirit, could form one indissoluble unity. Let us move on then to the last part of this overview of the key theological conceptions that, to my mind, determined the way in which psychology was studied at sixteenth-century Wittenberg and elsewhere in Northern Europe, where Melanchthon's teaching was heard. Let us turn to some relevant aspects of Luther's and Melanchthon's ideas about justification and Christology.

1.4.3. *Justification and the Soul*

Justification and Christology are probably some of the most difficult theological subjects present in Luther's and Melanchthon's theological works. To make matters worse, the two reformers spoke about these ideas on several occasions during the course of their lives and their opinions underwent changes over time. Here, however, I do not claim to provide a proper account of Luther's and Melanchthon's ideas on justification and Christology. Rather, I shall emphasise some aspects of these theological points that seem to be relevant when it comes to understanding some theories about man's soul and body. More specifically, in the following chapters I shall stress a nexus between the following ideas. First, in some of the texts I shall examine (especially Melanchthon's and Casmann's books about the soul), there appears to be a connection between Christological theories regarding the union between two natures in Christ and philosophical theories about the soul-body relationship in human beings. Second, some of Melanchthon's uses of the term '*spiritus*' are in

my opinion better understood against the background of his theory of justification as the renewal of man's affects through the action of the Holy Spirit. I will address the first point (on the connection between Christology and psychology) in the next section of this introductory essay. Before that, let us examine some aspects of Melanchthon's theory of justification that are helpful in understanding his idea of '*spiritus*'.

Melanchthon's definition of man's intellective soul as '*spiritus intelligens*' met with mixed reactions on the part of his contemporaries and has intrigued modern scholars as well. Notably, scholarship has shed light on Melanchthon's ambiguous use of the term '*spiritus*' to define a set of very different items: the medical bodily spirits, the intellective soul, and the third person of the divine Trinity. Even more importantly, scholars have put emphasis on one theory proposed by Melanchthon in his *Liber de anima*, according to which the Holy Spirit can literally get mixed with man's bodily spirits. Whilst some scholars – particularly Daniel P. Walker – have understood this point as a sign of Melanchthon's alleged 'materialistic interpretation' of the Christian divinity, here I shall propose an alternative reading. Melanchthon's admittedly odd view, according to which the Holy Spirit can interact with man's spirits has nothing to do with materialism (whatever materialism might mean) but is rather part of Melanchthon's understanding of justification by faith alone. Let us turn then to a brief overview of Melanchthon's conception of justification. This will enable us to adequately understand aspects of Melanchthon's usage of '*spiritus*' that were discussed by his contemporaries as much as by ours.

Similarly to the cases of grace, law, and Gospel, the relevant aspects of Melanchthon's conception of justification are better understood when seen in comparison to Luther's own theology. As recent scholarship – especially Olli-Pekka Vainio – has pointed out, the main difference between Luther and Melanchthon is the following. Luther thought that being justified through faith amounted to actual participation in Christ on the part of the Christian believer. Melanchthon on the other hand thought that justification consisted in a renewal of the powers of man's soul.[162] On Vainio account, Luther devised a theory of justification by faith alone that pivoted on Christology and which amounted, roughly speaking, to the following idea. God's incarnation results in the personal union of two natures (one human and the other

162 Olli-Pekka Vainio, *Justification and Participation in Christ. The Development of the Lutheran Doctrine of Justification from Luther to the Formula of Concord (1580)* (Leiden 2008), 63–64.

divine) in Christ. This union consists in an exchange of attributes (*communicatio idiomatum*), through which the divinity takes on the sins of the human nature and all men literally participate in Christ.[163] The believer, according to Luther, is justified not by his works or by redirecting his soul to Christ as an object, but by his faith in Christ, through which Christ becomes the form of the believer.[164]

Interestingly enough, Melanchthon did not quite believe the same and yet he had to balance his opinion with Luther's. The way in which he did it is, in my opinion, of great importance when it comes to understanding Melanchthon's ideas about '*spiritus*'.

According to Melanchthon, the affects (*affectus*) of the soul – especially the will (*voluntas*) – are the central protagonists of human sin and salvation. As Melanchthon explained in his 1521 *Loci communes*, man's fallen will is not free, but dominated by mutually contrasting affects.[165] Because of this, man is incapable of attaining justi-

163 Olli-Pekka Vainio, *Justification and Participation in Christ*, 22. Vainio refers to the following passage in Luther's 1531 commentaries to *Galatians*: «Ista est iucundissima omnium doctrinarum et consolationis plenissima quae docet habere nos hanc ineffabilem et inaestimabilem misericordiam et charitatem Dei, scilicet: cum videret misericors Pater per legem nos opprimi et sub maledicto teneri nec ulla re nos posse ab eo liberari, quod miserit in mundum filium suum in quem omnia omnium peccata coniecit et dixit ad eum: Tu sis Petrus ille negator, Paulus ille persecutor, blasphemus et violentus, David ille adulter, peccator ille qui comedit pomum in Paradiso, Latro ille in Cruce; in summa, tu sis omnium hominum persona qui feceris omnium hominum peccata, tu ergo cogita, ut solvas et pro eis satisfacias. Ibi Lex venit et dicit: Invenio illum peccatorem suscipientem omnium hominum peccata in se et nullum praeterea peccatum video nisi in illo, Ergo moriatur in cruce. Atque ita invadit eum et occidit. Hoc facto totus mundus purgatus et expiatus est ab omniubus peccatis. Ergo etiam liberatus a morte et omnibus malis. Sublatis vero peccato et morte per unum illum hominem Deus nihil aliud videret amplius in toto mundo, praesertim si crederet, quam meram purgationem et iustitiam. Et si quae peccati reliquiae remanerent, tamen prae illo Sole, Christo, Deus eas non cerneret» (WA 40, I, 437–438).

164 Olli-Pekka Vainio, *Justification and Participation in Christ*, 32–33: «According to Luther, when the human intellect focuses on Christ in the Gospel, it apprehends and owns Christ. Hence, Christ is made the form of the human intellect. In faith, the believer not only possesses the intelligible species of Christ, but Christ himself. The believer is not only transformed into the natural likeness of Christ, but Christ himself is present in him or her. Based on this, justification does not consist of redirection of the human faculties of the soul, gone astray because of sin. Christ himself must become the Life of the sinner; the apprehended Christ has taken over the human being and he now becomes the new will of the sinner».

165 StA, II, 1, 27: «Contra interni affectus non sunt in potestate nostra. Experientia enim usuque comperimus non posse voluntatem sua sponte ponere amorem, odium aut similes affectus,

fication by means of good deeds. On the contrary, his works can only be righteous once he is justified by God. Justification – Melanchthon surely agrees with Luther – is in turn dependant on faith alone. Faith, however, has a further prerequisite: the renewal of the human soul's affects on the part of the Holy Spirit.[166]

Melanchthon's complex doctrine would deserve a more detailed and technical explanation. Here it is sufficient to notice the way in which it differs from Luther's: whilst Luther based his theory of justification on the exchange of attributes between the two natures of Christ, Melanchthon looked at justification as the consequence of a renewal of the powers of man's soul on the part of the Holy Spirit.

This point is of particular importance, because it came under attack from the theologian Andreas Osiander (1498–1552). The way in which Melanchthon responded to the so-called 'Osiandrian Controversy' – I argue – is central to the views about '*spiritus*' expressed in his *Liber de anima*.

In 1550, Osiander challenged Melanchthon's views on justification by means of a disputation (*Disputatio de justificatione*) held in Königsberg. As he thought to stand in defence of Luther's genuine doctrine, Osiander accused Melanchthon of having removed the idea of presence, or 'indwelling', from Luther's theory of justification. Osiander, indeed, saw in Christ's actual presence in the believer the central point of justification.[167] Whilst he was busy drafting the *Liber de anima*, Melanchthon also published a response to Osiander's attack: *Antwort auff das Buch Hernn Andreae Osiandri* (1552). In this response, Melanchthon finds a compromise position between his initial views and Osiander's emphasis on 'indwelling'. According to Melanchthon, justification by faith is still a renewal of the powers of the soul on the part of the Holy Spirit. But now he thinks that through this renewal God simultaneously makes the heart of the believer his dwelling place.[168]

Whilst Melanchthon's solution to the 'Osiandrian Controversy' would of course deserve a more detailed account, its emphasis on justification as the renewal of the

---

sed affectus affectu vincitur, ut, quia laesus es ab eo, quem amabas, amare desinis. Nam te ardentius quam quemvis alium amas».

166 Olli-Pekka Vainio, *Justification and Participation in Christ*, 66–67.

167 Olli-Pekka Vainio, *Justification and Participation in Christ*, 95–97.

168 StA, VI, 458: «Welches alles muss also verstanden werden, das wir vergebung der sünden haben, und angenem sind vor Gott durch den verdienst Christi, so wir mit warhafftingem glauben den Hernn Christum annemen und gleuben, das uns gnädig sein wölle, und ist zugleich war, das als denn Gott in uns wohnet, so wir durch diesen trost aus rechter angst erret werden». About this passage, see: Olli-Pekka Vainio, *Justification and Participation in Christ*, 81–83.

soul and the presence of God in man's heart should be kept in mind. This point will be particularly helpful in order to understand Melanchthon's theory about the interaction between the human and the divine spirits. In this thesis, I shall argue that the views expressed in Melanchthon's *Liber de anima* on this interaction must not be understood as Melanchthon's attempt to embody the Christian divinity, but rather as part of his conception of justification, as I have just explained it.

To understand this point will also enable us to look at Melanchthon as one important protagonist of the age of confessionalisation who, by means of psychology, tried to teach to his Wittenberg students his own Lutheran doctrines. It is no coincidence, as it will emerge from the third chapter of this thesis, that some of Melanchthon's followers – especially Otto Casmann – accepted Melanchthon's definition of the soul as '*spiritus intelligens*' because they considered it to be consistent with the Christian doctrine.

Now, there is yet another occasion on which theories about the soul treated by this thesis appear to be interwoven with reformation theology. This appears to be the case, when one looks at the books on the soul written by Casmann and Melanchthon and the way in which they conceived of Christology as a model for their accounts of human nature. In order to better understand this discussion let us briefly turn to a short overview of the Christological aspects that will turn out to be more relevant for the psychological theories considered in the present work.

1.4.4. *Christology and Man's Soul and Body*

Ever since the Council of Chalcedon (451), Christology addressed the figure of Jesus according to his divine and his human nature.[169] In the wake of the reformation,

169 That Jesus Christ consisted of two natures was indeed the conclusion reached by the Council of Chalcedon, which reads as follows: «Sequentes igitur sanctos Patres, unum eundemque confiteri Filium Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum consonanter omnes docemus, eundem perfectum in deitate, eundem perfectum in humanitate, Deum vere et hominem vere, eundem ex anima rationali et corpore, consubstantialem Patri secundum deitatem et consubstantialem nobis eundem secundum humanitatem, 'per omnia nobis similem absque peccato' (cf. Hebr 4, 15); ante saecula quidem de Patre genitum secundum deitatem, in novissimis autem diebus eundem propter nos et propter nostram salutem ex Maria virgine Dei genetrice secundum humanitatem. […] Unum eundemque Christum Filium Dominum unigenitum, in duabus naturis inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter agnoscendum, nusquam sublata differentia naturarum propter unitionem magisque salva proprietate utriusque naturae, et in unam personam atque subsistentiam concurrente, non in duas personas partitum sive divi-

however, Christology took on a particular meaning, as it became instrumental in the reformers' endeavour to devise a doctrine of the Eucharist alternative to that belonging to the Roman Church, the so-called theory of 'transubstantiation'.[170]

In effect, especially in his *De captivitate babylonica ecclesiae* (1520), Luther marshalled several arguments against the theory of transubstantiation, which the Council of Trent (1545–1563), as a reaction, would reaffirm some years later.[171] According to the theory of transubstantiation, a change took place in the consecrated bread and wine, whereby the substance of the bread genuinely became the substance of the body of Christ, whilst the species of the bread and wine (taste, smell, ect.) stayed the same. According to Luther, this theory lacked any Scriptural basis and was packed with the allegedly nonsensical Aristotelian jargon of 'substance' and 'accident'.[172] Nevertheless, Luther agreed with the Catholic Church that the body of Christ was truly present in the Eucharist; a view which, in his anti-transubstantiation scheme, was in need of a new explanation.

---

sum, sed unum et eundem Filium unigenitum Deum Verbum Dominum Jesum Christum: sicut ante Prophetae de eo et ipse nos Jesus Christus erudivit, et Patrum nobis symbolum tradidit» (Heinrich Denzinger and Adolf Schönmetzer, *Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum* (Freiburg 1991), 301–302). An English translation of this text is found in: Richard Pierce and Michael Gaddis, eds., *The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon* (Liverpool 2005), 59.

170 As Paul Bakker has explained, Christology had been used in medieval sacramental theology by John of Paris († 1306). See: Paul J.J.M. Bakker, *La raison et le miracle. Les doctrines eucharestiques (c. 1250–c. 1400). Contribution à l'étude des rapports entre philosophie et théologie*. 2 vols., PhD thesis (Radboud University Nijmegen 1990), 253–269. For philosophical theories of the Eucharist in the Middle Ages, also see: Paul J.J.M. Bakker, "Aristotelian Metaphysics and Eucharistic Theology: John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen on the Ontological Status of Accidental Being", in Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen and Jack Zupko, eds., *The Metaphysics and Natural Theology of John Buridan* (Leiden 2001), 247–264.

171 Heinrich Denzinger and Adolf Schönmetzer, *Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus ridei et morum* (Freiburg 1991), 530, 534: «Per consacrationem panis et vini conversionem fieri totius substantiae panis in substantiam corporis Christi Domini nostri. [...] Quae conversion convenienter et proprie a sancta catholica Ecclesia transsubstantiatio est appellata. [...] Si quis dixerit, in sacrosanto Eucharestiae sacramento remanere substantiam panis et vini una cum corpore et sanguine Domini nostri Iesu Christi, negaveritque mirabilem illam et singularem conversionem [...] quam quidam conversionem catholica Ecclesia aptissime transsubstantiationem appellat: anathema sit».

172 See: WA 6, 508.

Luther did find a new way to account for the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, when he based his new doctrine on the same idea of '*communicatio idiomatum*' that we have seen as playing a key role in Luther's theory of justification. Because of the exchange of attributes happening between the two natures of Christ, upon Ascension, the human nature of Christ takes on the attributes of the divine nature. As a consequence of this, Christ's body becomes divine and capable of ubiquity. It is thanks to this ubiquity that the body of Christ can be really present in the Eucharist.

Interestingly enough, some aspects of Luther's doctrine had an impact on sixteenth-century natural philosophy. For instance, because Luther's theory involved statements about the concepts of 'substance' and 'ubiquity', it caused the emergence of new ways of looking at important at traditional concepts, such as 'place', 'space', 'body', and 'matter', amongst natural philosophers who worked in the reformed theological framework.[173]

What is more, Luther's doctrine also impacted on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century metaphysics, after it had to tackle criticisms coming from the very Protestant camp. In fact, Luther's theory was challenged by the Swiss reformers Ulrich Zwingli (1484–1531) and Theodore Beza (1519–1605), who held a symbolic interpretation of the Eucharist. On such interpretation, it was false that the two natures of Christ could swop properties, hence that the body of Christ could be ubiquitous. Instead, Beza maintained, Christ's (human) body was circumscribed in space, and therefore the presence of Christ in the Eucharist was only a 'sign' of his body and blood.

Luther's theory of the '*communicatio idiomatum*' and of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist called for a defence. Importantly, this defence resulted in philosophical disputes. This use of philosophy in Christological and sacramental disputes bears witness to the recovery of Aristotelian metaphysics, which had hitherto endured harsh criticisms on the part of most Lutherans.[174]

Now, whilst scholarship has focused on the interactions between Protestant Christological/sacramental theology and the transformation of early-modern phys-

---

173 On this point see: Cees Leijenhorst and Christoph Lüthy, "The Erosion of Aristotelianism. Confessional Physics in Early Modern Germany and the Dutch Republic", in Cees Leijenhorst, Christoph Lüthy, Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, eds., *The Dynamics of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century* (Leiden 2002), 375–411.

174 On this point, see: Sachiko Kusukawa, "Lutheran Uses of Aristotle: a Comparison between Jacob Schegk and Philip Melanchthon", in Constance Blackwell and Sachiko Kusukawa, *Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Conversations with Aristotle* (Aldershot 1999), 180–182.

ics and metaphysics, the influence of Lutheran Christology on sixteenth-century psychology seems to have been largely neglected. This thesis will point to cases in which theories about the soul-body relationship were developed in close connection with doctrines about the union of two natures in Christ. In these cases, the Aristotelian hylomorphic scheme of matter and form seems to be replaced by a Christological framework, in which Christ becomes, so to speak, the ontological archetype for the soul-body relationship in man. In order to better grasp this point, let us briefly look at some relevant aspects of Christology, which this thesis will show to be relevant for psychology in the age of confessionalisation.

When one looks at the development of Christology in sixteenth-century Reformation, one may notice the existence of a third way between Luther's unionist doctrine of the '*communicatio idiomatum*' and Beza's disjunctivist idea that the properties of Christ's two natures were not communicable. Philip Melanchthon provided the alternative, which implied important doctrinal, methodological, and lexical consequences in psychology. Notably, Melanchthon's Christology seems to offer some answer to one of the questions that emerged from the above discussion about Lutheran notions of law and Gospel. As I pointed out in conclusion of that discussion, Melanchthon's understanding of law and Gospel determined an important change at the heart of Lutheran anthropology. Whilst Luther's *Disputatio de homine* had insisted on the indissoluble unity between flesh and spirit in man (as they were both the subject of sin and grace), Melanchthon looked at the human nature as a type of unity holding between two different substances. As a consequence, flesh and spirit parted company in Melanchthon's and some of his followers' anthropologies. But how could they believe this and at the same time affirm that human nature (the subject of sin and grace) was an indissoluble unity of body and soul?

I think the answer to this question lies in Melanchthon's conception of the two natures of Christ and the way in which he made Christology a viable model for examining the nature of man. Melanchthon presented his Christology mainly in his commentary on *Colossians* and in his expert opinion during the Eucharistic controversy of Bremen.[175] In his *Enarratio Epistolae Pauli ad Colossenses*, he puts forward a view that seems closer to Beza's than to Luther's Christology: according to Melanchthon, Christ's ascension to heaven has to be interpreted literally as meaning that Christ's body ascends to a physical place.[176] As Joar Haga pointed out, Melanchthon's opin-

175 Heinz Scheible, "Melanchthon, Philip (1497–1560)", in Horst Robert Balz, Gerhard Krause, Siegfried M. Schwertner, eds., *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, 36 Vols., (Berlin 1977–2007), 22, 384.

176 Philip Melanchthon, *Enarratio Epistolae Pauli ad Colossenses praelecta anno* MDLVI *a Philippo*

ion filled with joy the reformer Peter Vermigli (1499–1562), who wrote to John Calvin (1509–1564):

> I read fragments of his [Melanchthon's] new interpretation of the *Letter to the Colossians*, in which he writes in an orthodox way about the human nature of Christ and he affirms that it [the human nature of Christ] is truly and properly in heaven. Moreover, he claims with Augustine, that, on account of the body, it [the human nature of Christ] occupies a certain place; and by the expression 'in heaven' he seeks no allegory. On this basis, the error of the ubiquitarians is clearly shattered.[177]

Had Vermigli read Melanchthon's text more carefully, he would probably have tempered his enthusiasm, for Melanchthon was not trying to refute the 'ubiquitarians'. He was rather trying to reconcile his understanding of the ascended human nature of Christ as bound to a physical heaven with the real presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist. He did so, albeit somewhat uneasily, as follows. According to Melanchthon, Christ is indeed in a physical place (heaven), yet he could be everywhere, if he so wished. As observed by Haga, Melanchthon conceives of the ubiquity of Christ's body not as a property of the ascended body, but rather as a voluntary action.[178] But how is this voluntary action possible at all? Does Melanchthon's theory not involve a split-up between the heaven-bound body and the divine part of Christ?

Melanthone (Wittenberg 1559), H3[r] (italics mine): «Si Christus est in vobis, corpus mortuum est propter peccatum, spiritus autem vita est propter iusticiam. Hic multae insignes materiae continentur, declaration articulorum symboli: 'ascendit in coelos, sedet ad dextram Dei patris &c.' Item quae sint proprietates glorificati corporis. Item quomodo dicatur 'Christus est in vobis, Christus est vita vestra', ac primum de dicto 'ascendit in coelum'; quomodo haec congruent? [...] Respondeo. In symbolo intelligatur dictum ut sonat litera, et de corpore et de corporali locatione. Ascendit, scilicet, corporali et physica locatione, in coelum, id est, in locum coelestem, ubicunque est; *quia hic non sunt fingendae allegoriae*».

177 CR 44, 586: «Fragmenta quaedam legi novae interpretationis eius Epistolam ad Colossienses in quibus de natura Christi humana orthodoxe admodum scribit; eamque in coelo vere ac proprie affirmat esse, atque cum Augustino propter corporis modum certum locum habere contendit, nec allegoriam in coeli vocabulo quaerit. Unde ubiquistarum error aperte convellitur». About these lines, see: Joar Haga, *Was There a Lutheran Metaphysics? The Interpretation of Communicatio Idiomatum in Early Modern Lutheranism* (Göttingen 2012), 91.

178 Joar Haga, *Was There a Lutheran Metaphysics?*, 95. On the affinity between Melanchthon's and the Swiss reformers' Christological and sacramental theologies, see: Wim Janse, "Wittenberg Calvinizans: The Involvement of Melanchthon, Peucer, and Eber in the Bremen Sacramentar-

According to Haga, the answers to these questions lie in Melanchthon's fresh understanding of the '*communicatio idiomatum*', which is also the most interesting point for the present study: «here a crucial element in Melanchthon's interpretation of '*communicatio idiomatum*' can be observed: it is not possible to apply all the divine features to the humanity of Christ, the divine features should rather be applied solely to the whole person».[179] It is because Christ's ascended body is part of the whole person of Christ that it has a share in divinity. According to Melanchthon, then, Christ's flesh and spirit are not united by an exchange of properties but by their union in one single person, which is both human and divine.

Most interestingly, Melanchthon thinks the pivot around which this union happens is the same in the case of Christ's two natures and in the case of man's body and soul. In commenting on *Colossians 2.9* ("for in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily"), Melanchthon explains that God is present in the world in four manners. In the first manner, God is present in the sense of the preservation of all substances (*praesentia universalis*). In the second manner, God is in the believers by vivifying them for eternal life (*praesentia specialis*). In the third manner, God causes the renewal of the saints in this life (also *praesentia specialis*). Finally, in the fourth manner, God is present in Christ. Melanchthon describes this presence as follows:

> The fourth manner of presence is the personal union; that is, that through which the second person of the divinity took on a human nature; not simply inseparably, but even as though it were one complete *ὑφιστάμενον* with that human nature; and the when the divine *λόγος* properly takes up a human nature, as in all the other men the union between soul and body is one complete *ὑφιστάμενον*.[180]

In this very rich passage, Melanchthon's new take on the '*communicatio idiomatum*' is defending a certain disjunction between the divine logos and the flesh, whilst at the

---

ian Controversy, 1560", in Wilhelm Neuser and Herman Silderhuis, eds., *Ordentlich und fruchtbar: Festschrift für Willem van 't Spijker* (Leiden 1997), 53–67.

179 Joar Haga, *Was There a Lutheran Metaphysics?*, 98.

180 «Quartus modus praesentiae est unio personalis, qua scilicet secunda persona divinitatis assumsit humanam naturam, non solum inseparabiliter, sed ita, ut sit unum completum *ὑφιστάμενον* illa natura humana, et *λόγος* assumens humanam naturam propemodum, ut in caeteris hominibus copulatione animae et corporis fit unum completum *ὑφιστάμενον*» (CR 15, 1253).

same time keeping them together as one single entity, or *ὑφιστάμενον*. But, what is even more interesting for the present discussion, Melanchthon is saying that there is a structural similarity between the personal union of two natures in Christ and the soul-body relationship in man.

This part of Melanchthon's Christology will be of much importance when reading this thesis. In fact, in this study I will try to show the following two things. First, Melanchthon's idea of *ὑφιστάμενον* enables him to look at man as the union of two substances (the body and soul, or intelligent spirit), which, whilst being radically different from each other, are indissolubly united to form the subject of sin and divine grace: the whole human nature. Second, by establishing a structural relationship between the Christology and anthropology, Melanchthon provided a new method, as well as a new jargon, to consider the soul-body relationship in man.[181]

In the present study I shall refer to this new framework as 'Christologising of psychology' and I shall argue that this transformation lies at the basis of a new type of anthropology. Especially in the case of Melanchthon's follower, Otto Casmann, this type of anthropology stops looking at the body and soul of man in the Aristotelian fashion of matter and form and conceives of them as two difference substances forming, indeed, a *ὑφιστάμενον*. This type of anthropology has been shown to be all the more important, because it became accepted even beyond the disciplinary borders of reformed psychology, as well as beyond the temporal boundaries of the age of confessionalisation.[182]

1.5. Overview of the Chapters of This Thesis

The following chapters of this thesis were written independently of each other, as articles. 'Chapters 5' has already been published and 'Chapter 4' has been accepted

181 To the best of my knowledge, Melanchthon does not provide a definition of the term *ὑφιστάμενον*. However, the same term was used by two of the authors whose works I shall discuss in the following chapters: Bruno Seidel and Otto Casmann. In a way different from Melanchthon, they did supply a definition of '*ὑφιστάμενον*', by which they mean – roughly speaking – 'hypostases', or 'substance'. For more details, see: *infra*, 'Chapter 4', 133–140 and 'Chapter 6', 174. On Casmann's use of the term see: Salatowsky, De Anima. *Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, 302, fn. 81, Vidal, *The Sciences of the Soul*, 55.

182 See: Simone De Angelis, *Anthropologien. Genese und Konfiguration einer ‚Wissenschaft vom Menschen' in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Berlin 2010); Paul Mengal, *La naissance de la psychologie*, 223–256.

for publication. 'Chapter 3' has been submitted for publication in a collected volume. 'Chapter 2' and 'Chapter 6' will be submitted to scientific journals in the near future.[183]

Because these chapters were originally conceived as separate articles, they contain some overlaps. I have tried my best to eliminate all repetitions in the final redaction of this thesis, provided that the internal coherence of each chapter not be altered.

'Chapter 2' addresses the diffusion a new question in sixteenth-century works on the soul, namely, "whether the soul is best defined as perfection (*ἐντελέχεια*) or as continuous motion (*ἐνδελέχεια*)". In this chapter, I shall show that this question originated from a humanist debate during the Italian *Quattrocento* and that in its original set-up it regarded mainly the philological accuracy of Cicero's opinion, according to which Aristotle's *De anima* referred to the soul as *ἐνδελέχεια* (and not as customarily thought, as *ἐντελέχεια*). Subsequently, I shall show that Philip Melanchthon's works on the soul addressed this question in a way that emphasised its philosophical aspects, viz., the alternative between defining the soul as a perfection or rather as a bodily movement. I shall explain that Cicero's reading of Aristotle's *De anima* was accepted by Melanchthon, at least as far as man's vegetative and sensitive souls were concerned. I shall claim that Melanchthon did so in a way to fit, or even to convey, his Lutheran conception of the entirety of human nature as the subject of divine grace, as well as his distinction between God's law and Gospel. I shall then look at the impact that Melanchthon's treatment of the question "whether the soul is *ἐντελέχεια* or *ἐνδελέχεια*" had on some of his contemporaries. By doing this, I will argue that, in the wake of Melanchthon's work, this originally humanist dispute on the two alternative definitions of the soul transformed into a choice between Melanchthon's Lutheran anthropology and a more traditional way of conceiving of the soul.

'Chapter 3' is meant to give a more complete picture of Melanchthon's and some of his followers' anthropologies. In fact, Melanchthon and those who subscribed to his anthropology thought that man's vegetative and sensitive souls should be defined as *ἐνδελέχεια*, or continuous movement of the body. But how did they conceive of man's higher powers, viz., intellect and will? In this chapter, on the one

183 'Chapter 5' has been published as Davide Cellamare "Anatomy and the Body in Renaissance Protestant Psychology", *Early Science and Medicine* 19.4 (2014), 341–364. 'Chapter 4' is forthcoming as Davide Cellamare, "Renaissance Psychology. Francisco Vallés (1524–1592) and Otto Casmann (1562–1607) on Animal and Human Souls", in R. Lo Presti and S. Buchenau, eds., *Animal Minds in Early Modern Philosophy and Medicine* (Pittsburgh 2015).

hand, I shall show that Melanchthon and some of his followers thought that man's intellect and will should be defined as '*spiritus intelligens*' (or intelligent spirit). On the other hand, I will point to the fact Melanchthon's use of '*spiritus*' is surrounded with ambiguity, as he uses the term '*spiritus*' to refer to an array of different entities, such as: man's higher soul, man's bodily spirits, as well as the Holy Spirit. In this chapter I shall first present Melanchthon's different and tangled-up uses of '*spiritus*'; second, I shall point to the way in which he conceives of the interaction between these different spirits that inhabit his world. I shall argue that Melanchthon's definition of man's higher soul as spirit, as well as the interaction between it, the bodily spirits, and the Holy Spirit are part Melanchthon's understanding of justification by faith alone. Authors who accepted Melanchthon's view on 'spiritus' – I shall also point out – did so because they considered it more in harmony with their understanding of the Holy Scriptures.

'Chapter 4' looks at the way in which one among those who endorsed Melanchthon's notion of 'spiritus intelligens', Otto Casmann, tried further to determine this notion. In this chapter, I shall argue that according to Casmann, 'spiritus intelligens' is the notion that defines man in his specificity. Casmann's position surface in his critique of some psychological views by the Spanish physician Franciscus Vallesius. For this reason, I shall first look at Vallesius' views on the difference between animal and human soul. Subsequently, I shall examine Casmann's counterarguments against Vallesius. I shall claim that Casmann's criticism of Vallesius depends on his endorsement of Melanchthon's definition of the soul as 'spiritus intelligens', as well as on Melanchthon's and Casmann's own Christological views.

Whilst these first chapters examine their conceptions of the soul as *ἐνδελέχεια* and '*spiritus*', 'Chapter 5' takes into exam the way in which Melanchthon, his followers, and his foes conceived at the human body. In this chapter, I shall explain that Melanchthon and his followers looked at the human body by introducing large anatomical discussions in their books about the soul. I shall show that they tried to harmonise an essentially teleological account of the body and its workings with mechanist metaphors. On the one hand, they looked at the human body as teleologically devised for the sake of the soul's operations; on the other hand, they thought that the body could be more easily understood when considered as a machine, just like clocks and *automata*. In this chapter, moreover, I shall first demonstrate that Melanchthon's introduction of anatomy in his books about the soul was motivated by his specific understanding of the Lutheran faith; second, that Melanchthon's Catholic contemporaries were generally less keen on using anatomy in the science of the soul. Lastly, I shall claim that these confessional reasons notwithstanding,

Melanchthon's set-up of psychology as a discipline encompassing human anatomy was later accepted across different confessional contexts or even independently of denominational issues.

'Chapter 6' addresses one last case in which the influence of Melanchthon's psychology on his students and followers is visible: the case of disputes on the origin of the human soul. In this chapter, I shall take into exam the way in which Melanchthon, some of his students, as well as other Lutherans conceived of the origin of the human soul. By doing this, I shall also question a popular scholarly view, according to which most Lutherans thought that God did not create the intellective souls anew and *ex nihilo* in each human being, but rather only in the first man, Adam, and left to natural procreation the task of transmitting the intellective soul from parents to offspring. In this chapter I shall demonstrate that the discussions of sixteenth-century Lutherans about the origin of the soul enjoyed much less consensus than has so far been thought. However, one group of sixteenth-century Lutherans, who followed Melanchthon's teaching more closely, shared the view that questions concerning the origin of man's soul go beyond human natural understanding. By addressing Lutheran discussions on the origin of the human soul, this chapter will also put forward some ideas about the formation of Lutheran confessional identity in connection with sixteenth-century discussions about the soul.

CHAPTER 2

'Whether the Soul is *ἐντελέχεια* or *ἐνδελέχεια*'. Humanist Psychology at Renaissance Universities in Germany and the Low Countries

2.0. Introduction

Psychology during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance amounted, in most cases, to commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*, or to other types of written production (e.g. treatises, questions, and handbooks) that drew on this great book as their preferred platform to consider the principal subject of any psychological investigation: the soul. At the very onset of the *De anima*, Aristotle raises two very essential problems with which the medieval and Renaissance tradition of books on the soul had to deal. When introducing the soul as the main subject of the *De anima*, Aristotle writes:

> Our aim is to grasp and understand, first its essential nature, and secondly its properties. [...] To attain any knowledge about the soul is one of the most difficult things in the world. As the form of question which here presents itself, viz., the question 'What is it?', recurs in other fields, it might be supposed that there was some single method of inquiry applicable to all objects whose essential nature we are endeavouring to ascertain. [...] But if there is no such single and general method for solving the question of essence, our task becomes still more difficult; in the case of each different subject we shall have to determine the appropriate process of investigation. If to this there be a clear answer, e.g., that the process is demonstration or division, or some other known method, many difficulties hand hesitations still beset us – with what fact shall we begin the enquiry?[1]

According to Aristotle, the very first points that psychology had to take into account were the definition of the soul and the method one had to follow in order to suc-

1 Aristotle, *De anima*, I. 1, 402a7–22.

cessfully determine what the soul was. Whilst virtually all medieval commentators sought to answer these questions, the problems of determining the essence of the soul and the method for attaining such knowledge took on an interesting meaning in the Renaissance. New theological and philosophical concerns that a definition of the soul was altogether impossible to obtain were combined with the eclectic use of a variety of methods and types of knowledge – medicine, theology, and philosophy – that Renaissance authors employed to study the soul. This is particularly true in the case of psychological works produced at northern European universities, where a renewed interest in medicine, together with humanist learning and the process of confessionalisation, arguably played an important role.[2] This interplay of methods and disciplines involved in the task of defining the soul is nicely illustrated by the diffusion of one psychological question at northern European universities in the Renaissance, namely the question "whether the soul is best defined as perfection (*ἐντελέχεια*) or as continuous motion (*ἐνδελέχεια*)".

In fact, the question at issue was in its initial character a distinctly humanist controversy between John Argyropulos (1415–1487) and Angelo Politian (1454–1494), and it concerned the philological accuracy of Cicero's view, according to which Aristotle had defined the soul as *ἐνδελέχεια* (and not, as customarily accepted, as *ἐντελέχεια*). Philosophical implications were already visible in these early stages of the debate. However, the dispute on Cicero's use of *ἐνδελέχεια* acquired a fully-grown doctrinal significance when it obtained a systematic place in commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima* produced in Renaissance Germany and the Low Countries.

Between the beginning of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century, the question whether the soul is *ἐντελέχεια* or *ἐνδελέχεια* was treated in a remarkable number of works on the soul, written by intellectuals working in northern Europe. For instance, the theme is extensively developed by Jan Ludovicus Vives (Bruges), Julius Caesar Scaliger (Agen), Conrad Gesner (Zürich), Philip Melanchthon (Wittenberg), Veit Amerbach (Ingolstadt), Otto Casmann (Steinfurt), Rudolph Snellius (Leiden), and Libertus Fromondus (Leuven). Although the discussion appears to have been very popular with Renaissance commentators on Aristotle's *De*

2 By "confessionalisation" I mean the process through which Christianity developed into three internally coherent and externally exclusive groups (Lutherans, Catholics, and Calvinists), and which led these groups to issue official statements of doctrine. This process involved social disciplining and the constitution of clerical and political institutions, as intertwined with the formation of religious ideologies and of belief systems. For a more extended discussion of this theme, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 55–59.

anima, scholars have hitherto devoted nearly no work to this aspect of Renaissance psychology.[3]

As a case study in this development, this chapter will focus on Melanchthon's *Commentarius de anima*. It will show that the dispute, which stems from the context of the Italian *Quattrocento*, was treated by Melanchthon in a way that served the purposes of his own Lutheran conception of the soul. Melanchthon's endorsement of Cicero's definition of the soul as *ἐνδελέχεια*, or "continuous motion", nicely fits his Lutheran idea that the entirety of the human nature (soul and body) is the subject of grace, as well as his understanding of the relationship between God's law and Gospel. Moreover, by means of a few examples in the reception of Melanchthon's work in northern Europe, this chapter will show that the humanist dispute became fashionable when Melanchthon's view was accepted by a number of Protestant authors and rejected by Catholic professors, who defended a more traditional conception of the soul. By doing this, the present chapter will show that although the authors I will take into consideration all show a keen interest in a humanistic approach to Aristotle's *De anima*, their concerns are ultimately linked to theological and – certainly in the case of Melanchthon – confessional scopes.

2.1. The Humanist Dispute and Philip Melanchthon's *Commentarius De anima*

Before becoming a disputed question in the Renaissance *scientia de anima*, the discussion on whether the soul is *ἐντελέχεια* or *ἐνδελέχεια* had intrigued several fifteenth-century humanist authors. Eugenio Garin provides us with the only account of the dispute of which I am aware. He correctly reports that the dispute started as a controversy between Argyropulos and Politian over the following passage from Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* I, X:

3 Vives' and Gesner's discussions may be found in: *Ioannis Ludovici Vivis Valentini De anima et vita libri tres. Eiusdem argumenti Viti Amerbachii de Anima Libri IIII. Philippi Melanthonis Liber unus. His accedit nunc primum Conradi Gesneri De anima liber, sententiosa brevitate, velutique per tabulas et aphorismos magna ex parte conscriptus, philosophiae, rei medicae ac philologiae studiosis accommodatus; in quo de qualitatibus, saporibus, odoribus, sonis, et coloribus copiose accurateque tractatur* (Zurich 1563), 48, 730. Reference to the discussions of the other authors I mentioned will be provided further on in this chapter.

> Aristotle, [a man] superior to all others in genius and industry – Plato excepted –, having embraced these four known kinds of principles, from which all things originate, believes that there is a certain fifth nature, from which the mind [*mens*] is; [...] he adds a fifth kind, which lacks a name, and thus he calls the soul [*animus*] by the new name ἐνδελέχεια, as it were a continued and perennial motion.[4]

According to Cicero, Aristotle defines the soul as "endelechy", which has to be rendered as "continuous and perennial motion". Argyropulos questioned the truthfulness of Cicero's reading of Aristotle. In fact, the Greek humanist contended that Cicero had mistakenly ascribed to Aristotle a term and a view that rather belonged to Plato's *Timaeus*.[5] Argyropulos' criticism was rejected by the Italian humanist Politian, according to whom Cicero's interpretation was based on a lost Aristotelian text and was accordingly a legitimate one.[6]

In the wake of the polemic between Argyropulos and Politian, several other authors began to take a stand in the debate. For instance, Hermolaus Barbarus argued that, whilst Cicero's interpretation of Aristotle was essentially correct, the spelling *ἐντελέχεια* had to be favoured; this, because the letter δ changes into τ in Attic Greek.

Interestingly enough, what appears to be an exclusively philological dispute quickly became a genuine philosophical problem, in the sixteenth century. This emerges, for example, from Guillame Budé's *De asse et partibus* (1551), in which Cicero's view is rejected on the following grounds. Independently of whether it was philologically accurate, Cicero's rendering of *ἐνδελέχεια* as "continuous motion" fails to do justice to Aristotle's conception of the soul as something static, or *perfectio*.[7] This

---

4 A.E. Douglas, ed., Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, I (Warminster 1985), 32: «Aristoteles longe omnibus – Platonem semper excipio – praestans et ingenio et diligentia, cum quatuor nota illa genera principiorum est complexus, e quibus omnia orerentur, quintam quandam naturam censet esse, e quia sit mens; [...] quantum genus adhibet vacans nomine et sic ipsum animum ἐνδελέχειαν appellat novo nomine quasi quandam continuatam motionem et perennem».

5 *Angeli Politiani Opera, Apud Nicolaum Episcopium Iuniorem* (Basel 1564), 224.

6 *Angeli Politiani Opera*, 227: «Quid autem prohibet, quo minus Cicero ipse videre matricem quoque librorum Aristotelis, qui fuerint ipsius aetate publicati, si non incorruptam, certe (sicut diximus) conscribellatam potuerit?».

7 *Gulielmi Budaei Parisiensis, De asse et partibus eius*, Apud Sebastianum Gryphium (Paris 1551), 38: «Quare liquido (ut arbitror) constat verba illa Ciceronis de anima humano non esse consentanea cum entelechia Aristotelis».

opinion will be espoused by Francisco Suárez, in his *De anima*, published posthumously in 1621. According to Suárez, Budé correctly sees that Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* fails to understand the essence of Aristotle's definition of the soul.[8]

It is this philosophical aspect of the humanist discussion that drew the attention of sixteenth-century northern European commentators on Aristotle's *De anima*. In that intellectual milieu, however, what was at stake is not only a philosophical interpretation of Aristotle's definition of the soul, but rather the choice between two divergent conceptions of the human being and of its study, more precisely between the type of anthropology resulting from the Scholastic synthesis and the Lutheran type of anthropology proposed by Melanchthon's *Commentarius de anima*, to which we now turn.

In the case of Melanchthon, Cicero's interpretation of Aristotle does not appear to be the cause of certain philosophical implications. Rather, it seems to play the role of an erudite corroboration of the philosophical account of the soul developed by Melanchthon. In fact, his treatment of Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* has to be read against the background of the main views about the soul proposed in the *Commentarius*. The opening section of the book – "quid continet haec pars philosophiae cui titulus est de anima" – provides us with a first appraisal of the ideas that mould Melanchthon's psychology, as well as his endorsement of Cicero's use of *ἐνδελέχεια*. The text reads as follows:

> There is no more eminent, more erudite or more pleasant part of Physics than these disputations on the soul. For although the essence of the soul cannot be sufficiently grasped, nevertheless its actions show the way to the knowledge of it. Thus, we will have to discuss the actions, the powers are distinguished and while the organs will be described, by which, at the same time, the whole nature of the body is to be explained. Therefore, this part [of Physics] has to encompass not only the soul, but also the whole nature of man.[9]

8 Francisco Suárez, *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima*, edited by Salvador Castellote, Vol. 1 (Madrid 1978), 70: «Ex quibus patet recte interpretari nomen "entélecheia" per actum et formam, quod in Physicis annotavimus. Unde interpretatio Ciceronis non est ad rem, contra quem optime disserit Budaeus, lib. 1 De Asse».

9 Philip Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima*, 1[v]: «Nec vero locupletior, nec eruditior, nec dulcior ulla pars est Physices quam hae disputationes de anima. Etsi enim substantia animae non satis perspici potest, tamen viam ad eius agnitionem monstrant actiones. Itaque quum de actionibus dicendum erit, potentiae seu vires discernentur, describentur organa qua in re simul tota corporis

Contrary to most medieval commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*, Melanchthon's *Commentarius* has the human nature as its subject matter. Virtually all ancient and medieval commentators had looked at the soul as the principle of life and vital operations, which even plants and beasts partook in. According to them the human rational soul was only the most complex manifestation of life within the realm of animate beings. Melanchthon, on the other hand, looks at the soul as one of the two parts (the body being the other) composing the human being. Furthermore, he states that we are unable to fathom the essence of the soul in our fallen state, and that for this reason we can only know the way in which man's soul acts. The knowledge of these actions, in its turn, requires the description of the whole human body, which is supplied by Galenic and Vesalian anatomies.[10]

By looking at these initial statements it should already be clear that Melanchthon's work is quite different from Aristotle's *De anima*, in both its structure and contents. In effect, although Melanchthon entitles his book *Commentarius de anima*, he explicitly states his intention to diverge from Aristotle in all cases in which the latter's views are inconsistent with Christian theology.[11] In so doing, he aims to put forward a fresh account of the soul, consisting in a Christian anthropology based, to some extent, on Aristotle and on anatomical knowledge.

The result of this endeavour is a work that Melanchthon himself is not satisfied with. In the preface to the *Commentarius*, he refers to it as an hodgepodge and a disorderly lucubration, which he decided to publish nonetheless, simply to pass on rightful and useful ideas and to encourage the youth to examine such a crucial aspect of natural philosophy as the science of the soul.[12] As I will have occasion to high-

---

ac praecipue humani natura explicanda est. Itaque, haec pars non solum de anima, sed etiam de tota natura hominis inscribi debebat».

10 Melanchthon relied on Galen's *On the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato* for the anatomical account of man's body presented in the *Commentarius* (1540). About Melanchthon's use of Galen, see: Jürgen Helm, "Die Galenrezeption in Philipp Melanchthons *De anima* (1540/1552)", *Medizinhistorisches Journal*, 31, H. 4/4 (1966), 298–321. Instead, the revised edition of the book (the *Liber de anima* of 1553) uses Vesalian anatomy. About this, see: Vivian Nutton, "The Anatomy of the Soul in Early Renaissance Medicine", 146 and Sachiko Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy*, 75–123.

11 Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima*, α5^{v}.

12 Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima*, α5^{v}, α8^{r} «Cum igitur invitanda sit adolescentia ad doctrinam de Anima, fui hortator D. Iacobo Milichio, ut hic praelegeret cum alias partes physices, tum hanc quoque; et communicates operis sylvulam collegimus, quam nunc edidimus, neququam expolitam ut vellem, scis enim haec tempora turbulent mihi non concedere ocium ad

light, Melanchthon's treatment of the soul is indeed not always straightforward. It presents many views of other authors, though without being clear in all cases about which of those are to be accepted and which are not. Moreover, because the *Commentarius* is a natural-philosophical work in view of a Christian type of anthropology, it looks at the soul from both a philosophical and a theological perspective. However the relation between those two angles, as well as their mutual coherence do not surface unequivocally in the text. According to Vivian Nutton, the unsatisfactory results achieved by Melanchthon's work must be ascribed to the difficulty involved in trying to define what the soul is and in harmonising Scriptures, philosophy, and anatomy.[13] Nevertheless, I propose, it is precisely by looking at these scopes, which animate the *Commentarius*, that one might be able to identify the coherence of its views, including its positive judgement of Cicero's use of *ἐνδελέχεια*.

In fact, Melanchthon's theories on the soul are better understood against the background of his broader ideas on the relation between philosophy and the Christian faith. As we have already seen, a pronounced refusal of scholastic philosophy had accompanied Luther's reform, which Melanchthon wholeheartedly embraced. Yet, during the twenties and thirties of the sixteenth century, Melanchthon was faced with problems within the Evangelical camp that lead him to reconsider Luther's views. Hence, to look at the teaching of part of the Aristotelian corpus as instrumental in conducting church disputes in an orderly manner, as well as in pursuing the confessionalisation of Saxony. More specifically, Melanchthon fiercely opposed claims for civil disobedience defended by the Anabaptists and the Zwinglians. He traced their views back to a lack of erudition in matters of theology. As a result of this, Melanchthon sought to restore civil obedience within the Protestant lands by devising a system of education in which rhetoric, physiology and ethics would show the Law of God, i.e., the fact that God has bestowed innate knowledge of civic morals on human beings. According to Melanchthon, the teaching of philosophy would provide the basis to show that civil obedience was divinely ordained and that its notion was found amongst the innate ideas of civic morals, with which the human mind was endowed.[14]

---

haec studia colenda. Extant autem multi libelli, hoc argumento, mediocriter scripti; quare fortassis reprehendetnt nostrum consilium nonnulli, quod hanc inconditam farraginem edidimus; sed opinor etiam novis scriptis accedenda esse studia iuventutis. [...] Etsi autem ne mihi quidem haec tumultuaria lucubratio ubique, satisfacit, tamen, recata et utilia tradere conati sumus».

13 Vivian Nutton, "The Anatomy of the Soul in Early Renaissance Medicine", 147.

14 The term 'Anabaptist' is in fact Melanchthon's own coinage to refer to a group of radical

Surely, Melanchthon's political agenda was a Lutheran one, in that he did not judge that rhetoric, physiology and ethics could supply exhaustive knowledge of reality. The study of these matters is most helpful during our mortal and civic life, for it ensures that human reason apprehends the law of God. However, the will of the Creator to forgive his creatures, the immortal nature of their souls, and the promise of the eternal life, fall by no means within the scope of philosophical knowledge. Instead, these matters are the business of the Gospel and can be known solely by means of the Scriptures and the faith in Christ.[15] As Sachiko Kusukawa has demonstrated, this clear-cut distinction between philosophy and the Gospel is reflected in Melanchthon's use of natural philosophy in the *Commentarius*. This work uses Aristotle's *De anima*, as well as other philosophical sources, such as works by Galen and Cicero, only insofar as a rational grasp of the human nature is concerned. Instead, all points concerning the soul that are relevant to theological matters (e.g., the spiritual nature of the soul, its free will, and its immortality) are treated by Melanchthon on a strictly scriptural basis. By combining natural philosophy and Christian ideas, Melanchthon puts forward a psychological work, in which the soul is shown to possess innate knowledge of good and evil actions. This knowledge, in its turn, forms the philosophical justification of his claim for civil obedience.[16]

---

reformers whom – he alleged – supported the unorthodox idea of adult baptism. For more details about this point, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1'. 67.

15 Melanchthon eloquently expressed these views in his 1527 oration 'De discrimine Evangelii et philosophiae'. About this oration, as well as the relationship between Melanchthon's strive for social disciplining in Saxony and his ideas on God's law and Gospel, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 64–74.

16 In the final pages of the *Commentarius*, Melanchthon departs from the common Aristotelian doctrine that nothing that is in the intellect was not formerly in the senses and argues for innate ideas of mathematical and moral entities: «ut speculative principia, ita practica certa et firma sunt; sed practica facilius labefieri sinimus, propter voluntatis nostrae infirmitatem ac mobilitatem. Certa est et firma sententia. Adulterium est turpe. Sed non tam firmiter eam amplectimur, ut hanc, bis 4 sunt 8. Re ipsa tamen certitudo similis est; non quia foris evidentia movet oculos, sed quia et haec sententia divinitus insita est menti. Itaque nos sequemur Pauli sententiam de hac controversia, qui testatur divinitus insitas esse mentibus has notitias, quod sit Deus, quod Deo sit obediendum. Item discrimen honestorum et turpium, seu leges naturae» (Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima*, 210r). Sachiko Kusukawa has extensively treated Melanchthon's conception of natural philosophy, as well as the relation between this theme, his claim for civil obedience, and his works on the soul; see Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy*, 75–123. Kusukawa also studied the use of Melanchthon's belief in innate ideas made by Rudolph Snellius and other Philippo-Ramist authors, in order to

Interestingly enough, Sachiko Kusukawa has also shown that Melanchthon's political agenda required a theory of the Lutheran man and that this task, in its turn, is reflected by the structure and contents of the *Commentarius de anima*. In fact, according to Kusukawa, Melanchthon's choice to treat the whole human nature (rather than on the soul considered to be the Aristotelian principle of life), as well as his downplaying of the capability of the fallen man to fathom the essence of the soul, depend on his Lutheran conception of man, which characterises the *Praeceptor*'s philosophical project. The subject of the *Commentarius*, man's body and soul, corresponds to what Luther had considered to be the subject of grace: the entirety of man's fallen nature.[17] Furthermore, Melanchthon believes that the inclusion of the anatomical study of the body in the science of the soul plays a double role with regard to our knowledge of the natural world. On the one hand, it enables us to gain knowledge of the operations of human beings, in default of an essential account of their souls. On the other hand, the anatomical study of the mechanisms of the body reveals the orderly structure of nature and the divine law governing it.

In what follows I shall use this reading of Melanchthon to explain his view that, from a philosophical point of view, the soul is *ἐνδελέχεια*. I shall argue, on the one hand, that Melanchthon's approval of Cicero's notion of *ἐνδελέχεια* reflects the goal of devising a type of psychology that, by considering the entirety of the human nature, would also provide an intellectual backing for the enforcement of social discipline. On the other hand, I will emphasise that, despite the fact that Melanchthon's conception of the soul as *ἐνδελέχεια* was part and parcel of his aim to study the entirety of human nature, the result of this project involved a split-up between man's body and soul. In fact, Melanchthon's intention to work in the abovementioned framework of the Lutheran concept of grace was carried out according to his understanding of the difference between philosophy and theology, which Melanchthon, as we shall see, treated in terms of the difference between God's law and Gospel. But such difference determined a disjunction between body and soul in Melanchthon's anthropology. Melanchthon's idea of *ἐνδελέχεια* plays an impor-

---

anchor the method of dialectics to certain knowledge. See: Sachiko Kusukawa, "Between the *De anima* and Dialectics: a Prolegomenon to Philippo-Ramism". On the theme of moral psychology at sixteenth-century Wittenberg and in the work of Melanchthon, see: Pekka Kärkkäinen, "Synderesis in Late Medieval Philosophy and the Wittenberg Reformers", *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 20:5 (2012), 881–901.

17 I have extensively discussed this point; see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 61–64.

tant role in this transformation.[18] Let us proceed in order, then, and let us turn to Melanchthon's interpretation of Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*.

Melanchthon's endorsement of Cicero's take on *ἐνδελέχεια* seems to reflect primarily the *Commentarius*' dissatisfaction with Aristotle's definition of the soul. In fact, the term *ἐνδελέχεια* first occurs in Melanchthon's commentary in connection with the following criticism of the Aristotelian definition of the soul:

> The soul is the first actuality of the physical organic body having life potentially. And he adds another [definition]: the soul is the first principle through which we live, sense, move and understand. The latter definition describes the soul only from its effects, but it does not determine which thing that principle of life and movement is. The former definition, whilst it is not taken a posteriori, is nonetheless obscure, for it seems to be a nominal definition rather than a real definition. In fact, when he said 'it is the first actuality', with what confusion and darkness does he obfuscate the eyes?[19]

According to Melanchthon's analysis, Aristotle's two definitions of the soul are both insufficient, for the two following reasons. Aristotle's conception of the soul as the principle of life, sensation, motion, and intellection only supplies an account of the soul *a posteriori*. Moreover, Aristotle's *a priori* definition of the soul as the first actuality of an organic body possessing life potentially is unclear In fact, it uses the term "first actuality" (*actus primus*), which Melanchthon deems unclear and capable to provide us, at most, with a nominal definition. According to Melanchthon, Aristotle fails to determine what *thing* the soul is.

Melanchthon's ensuing effort to put forward a clearer account of the soul consists of an explanation of the expression "first actuality". It is in the context of his discussion of this expression that Melanchthon resorts to the Greek word *ἐνδελέχεια*, which he defines in the following passage:

---

18 On Melanchthon's understanding of the difference between law and Gospel, as well as on the impact this distinction had on his psychology, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 64–74.

19 Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima*, 7^{v}: «Anima est actus primus corporis physici organici, potentia vitam habentis. Addit et alteram, anima est principium quo vivimus, sentimus, movemur et intelligimus primo. Posterior definitio tantum ab effectibus describit animam, sed qua res sit illud vitae et motus principium non dicit. Et prior definitio etsi non est a posteriori sumpta, tamen admodum obscura est, ut videri possit quaedam definitio nominis potius quam rei. Nam cum ait 'est actus primus', quas tenebras, quam caliginem offundit oculis?».

> This I say so that it can be understood more easily what he calls 'actuality' or (to use the Greek term) 'endelechy'. Now, when you hear someone speaking of the soul of an ox or a tree, surely you do not think of a nature that originates from somewhere else and that is separable from the body or anything other than the very form or life of the ox or the tree. [...] The soul is endelechy, i.e., the agitation or the life itself of the physical body. [...] That endelechy or agitation is the δύναμις that supplies the vital operations. In fact, 'life' here (i.e. in the definition of the soul DC) means those very operations concomitant with the soul. And if you ask 'what is the soul of the ox?' he (i.e. Aristotle DC) replies: it is precisely that agitation through which the ox lives, or life itself.[20]

The Greek word '*ἐνδελέχεια*' means agitation and, according to Melanchthon, better expresses the sense of the Aristotelian definition of the soul than the traditional rendering 'entelechy'. In fact, because Aristotle looked at the soul as a principle encompassing not only the human soul, but also the soul of animals and plants he could not conceive of the soul as something disembodied or essentially different from the life or agitation of the body. Now, that the soul is *ἐνδελέχεια* means just this: the soul is not a perfect being, but the movement towards it. This movement coincides with the life or the operations themselves of the animate being. This point is presented only as a way to make it clearer what the soul is according to Aristotle. However, the identification of the Aristotelian soul with the life and operations of the body itself appears to reflect Melanchthon's own view. It nicely fits his attempt to determine what thing the soul is, as well as the intentions stated in the opening chapter of the *Commentarius*, namely to put forward an *operational* – as opposed to an *essential* – account of the soul. What is more, both Melanchthon's friends and his foes did not look at his identification of soul and life as merely an interpretation of Aristotle. In fact, this identification between soul and life was the main point of divergence between those amongst Melanchthon's contemporaries who criticised his endorsement of Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* and the ones who defended Melanchthon's

---

20 Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima*, 7^{r}–8^{v}: «Id eo dico, ut facilius quid actum seu ut Graeca voce potius utamur, Endelechiam vocet intelligi possit. Nam cum bovis aut fruticis animam nominari audis, certe non intelligis naturam aliunde ortam, separabilem a corpore, aut aliud quam ipsam bovis aut fruticis formam aut vitam. [...] Anima est endelechia, id est, agitatio seu vita ipsa corporis physici. [...] Illa endelechia, seu agitatio est δύναμις quae parit operationes vitales. Nam, vita significat hic ipsas operationes comitantes animam. Si quaeras quid est anima bovis? Respondet, est illa ipsa agitatio, qua bos vivit, seu ipsa vita».

anthropology. Melanchthon's allies tended to lean towards looking at the soul as identical with the operations of the bodily organs, whereas his adversaries based their criticism on their reading of Aristotle's definition of the soul in terms of the *principle* of life, rather than life itself. I will return to this point later, when I will illustrate a sample of criticisms against Melanchthon, produced at the Catholic university of Ingolstadt.[21]

After having defined the soul in terms of its operations or as agitation of the body, Melanchthon strives to determine what *thing* this "agitation" is. For this reason he uses Galen's conception of the soul as either the temperament of the body or the bodily spirit. In an effort to ground the soul in the human body, Melanchthon puts forward a definition of the soul based on Cicero's interpretation of Aristotle, as well as on Galenic anatomy: the soul is *ἐνδελέχεια*, i.e., a continuous movement concomitant with certain parts of the body or with its spirits and temperaments.

The following section of the *Commentarius* confirms this definition of the soul by addressing the philological aspects related to the humanist dispute triggered by Argyropulos and Politian; and this, according to Melanchthon, for the didactic purpose of enabling the youth to grasp Aristotle's definition of the soul better.[22] However, Melanchthon does not dwell too long on this discussion and states that a terminological analysis is not his main intention: *ego quidem non rixor de vocabulo*.[23] What really counts for him is not the word '*ἐνδελέχεια*' and its etymology, but its usage. According to Melanchthon, Cicero recognises two points. First, he sees that at

21 It is worth pointing out that Melanchthon recognises that his identification of soul and life might be taken as implying that soul is an accidental property of the body; a thesis that would be patently against the opinion of Aristotle. According to Melanchthon, however, this is not quite the case: «Aristoteles ipse diluit hanc obiectionem; inquit enim, duplicem esse *ἐνδελέχειαμ*, alteram substantialem, alteram accidentalem. Substantialis est ipsa animati talis existentia seu vita, quae actione ciet. Nam in viventibus formas voluit *ἐνδελέχειας* vocare, ut significaret eas dissimiles esse formis inanimatorum. Vita enim est continuata quaedam agitatio; talis non est forma lapidis. Est igitur anima, substantialis quaedam *ἐνδελέχεια*, non accidentalis» (Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima*, 14^{v}–15^{r}). Although Melanchthon maintains that the *ἐνδελέχεια* is a substantial form, his view appears to differ from the Aristotelian one on another important aspect: whilst being a substantial form, Melanchthon's soul is not the principle of the vital operations of the body, but its agitation or its very life.

22 «Sed quoniam et de vocabulo endelechia litigatur, et Cicero a multis reprehenditur, qui vertit continuatam et perennem motionem, adiiciam quaedam de interpretatione vocabuli [...] ut Aristotelis sententia iuvenibus fiat illustrior» Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima*, 11.

23 Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima*, 13^{r}.

the time Aristotle wrote his *De anima*, the term '*ἐνδελέχεια*' was taken as meaning "continuous motion". Second, Cicero rightly observes that Aristotle used an already existing term to express the idea of the soul as motion or life of the body. As it emerges from the following passage, Melanchthon concludes that Cicero's interpretation of Aristotle must be accepted on philosophical grounds:

> As a matter of fact, those who rebuke Cicero and contend that he has not quite understood the opinion of Aristotle, are, in my judgment, rather mistaken and turn by far aside from the opinion of Aristotle. For this reason then they erroneously translate the term as 'inner perfection', for they think that here the rational soul is being defined, as though it occupied a certain place inside the body, as the captain sits in a certain place on the ship, viz., at the helm. Therefore, they imagine that 'endelechy' means an equipping and perfecting nature inside the body. But, as mentioned, Aristotle believes something very different, and he does not discuss merely the soul of man, but also those of plants and beasts. And what else is the soul in these (plants and beasts) but their very life and agitation?[24]

Cicero correctly understands that Aristotle does not look at the soul as a perfection or a being of its own, and that he does not conceive of the soul-body relation as that obtaining between a sailor and his ship. Far from it, Aristotle's soul is the agitation concomitant with the bodies of all animate beings, or their very life.

It might already be clear at this stage that Melanchthon finds in Cicero an authoritative ally in his attempt to interpret Aristotle in such a way as to determine what *thing* the soul is. Cicero's *ἐνδελέχεια* and Galen's psychology corroborate Melanchthon's view: the soul is a continuous agitation concomitant with the temperaments of the body. In order to better understand this point and to show the reasons motivating Melanchthon's embodied conception of the soul, we need to look

24 Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima*, 11^{v}–11^{r}: «Ego vero eos qui flagellant Ciceronem ac putant Aristotelis sententiam non satis assecutum esse, falli ipsos potius iudico, ac procul ab Aristotelis sententia deerrare. Ideo enim malunt verti interiorem perfectionem, quia cogitant hic rationalem animam definiri, quae intus in corpore locum aliquem teneat, veluti gubernator in navi sedet certo loco, videlicet ad gubernaculum. Ideo imaginantur endelechiam significare naturam intus perficientem et ornantem corpus. At Aristoteles, ut dictum est, longe aliud sentit, nec tantum de homine quaerit, sed etiam de plantis et pecudibus, in quibus quid est anima nisi ipsa vita seu agitatio?»

at the section of the *Commentarius* entitled "what can be said about man's soul from a religious point of view (*pie*)".[25]

In this section Melanchthon changes his viewpoint: he stops looking at the soul from the perspective of natural philosophy and he limits his observation of the soul to its rational part, which he defines solely on scriptural bases, as follows:

> The rational soul is an intelligent spirit, which is the other part of the substance of man; and it does not perish when it leaves the body, but it is immortal. This definition is not based on physical argument; instead it is taken from the Scriptures.[26]

In contrast to his natural philosophical definition of the lower parts of the soul as an embodied *ἐνδελέχεια*, Melanchthon denies that a definition of the rational soul can be obtained by man's natural understanding. As a consequence, he uses the Scriptures to ground his conception of the higher powers of the soul (intellect and will) as an immortal intelligent spirit.[27] This is consistent with the methodological premises of Melanchthon's natural philosophy. As mentioned earlier, Melanchthon denies that philosophy can deal with anything exceeding the limits of rhetoric, physiology, and civic morals. The task of defining the soul as an incorporeal and immortal nature does indeed fall outside the scope of our natural consideration of the world and is rather to be accomplished by means of theological knowledge based on the Gospel.

---

25 Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima*, 15^{r}.

26 Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima*, 15^{v}: «Anima rationalis est spiritus intelligens, qui est altera pars substantiae hominis nec extinguitur cum a corpore discessit, sed immortalis est. Haec definitio non habet physicas rationes, sed sumpta est ex sacris literis».

27 Interestingly enough, Melanchthon utilises the same term "*spiritus*" to indicate the intelligent spirit of man (which is immaterial and immortal), as well as the Galenic animal and vital spirits (i.e., the vegetative and sensitive soul l or *ἐνδελέχεια*). In the *Liber de anima* of 1553, Melanchthon employs the term to refer also to the Holy Ghost and proposes that the latter may interact with the bodily spirits (see CR XIII, 88 f.) This aspect of Melanchthon's work has already been pointed out by Daniel P. Walker, "Medical Spirits and God and the Soul", in Marta Fattori and Massimo Bianchi, eds., *Spiritus. IV Colloquio Internazionale Roma, 7–9 gennaio 1983* (Rome, 1984), 223–244, 228; Daniel P. Walker, "The Astral Body in Renaissance Medicine", *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 21 (1958), 119–133; Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy*, 120. On Melanchthon's varied usage of the notion of "spirit" and his ideas about the interaction between bodily spirits, the Holy Ghost, and the stars, see 'Chapter 3' of this thesis.

Unfortunately, the *Commentarius* fails to explain how the natural philosophical and the scriptural points of view can be reconciled. One may very well argue that the shift presented in the *Commentarius*, from a philosophical to a scriptural account of the soul, corresponds to Melanchthon's intention of replacing Aristotle's *ἐνδελέχεια* with the Christian conception of the soul, or *spiritus*. This argument may even be back by recalling Melanchthon's intention to diverge from the views of Aristotle that are at odds with the Christian doctrine. However, I do not think this reading of Melanchthon's text is correct. Instead, I suggest, the consistency of Melanchthon's views appear to lie elsewhere. According to him, '*ἐνδελέχεια*' and '*spiritus*' are not two mutually exclusive ways of looking at the soul. The following part of Melanchthon's discussion in the *Commentarius* sheds some light on this point. Immediately after defining the rational soul as intelligent spirit, Melanchthon discusses whether such spirit forms an entity of a single nature with the sensitive and vegetative parts of the soul, or rather if these are different souls coexisting in each man.[28] Melanchthon's solution reads as follows:

> The opinion is generally accepted that there is only one soul in man. But if we say that only the vegetative and the sensitive souls are ἐνδελέχεια – i.e., agitations of certain parts of the body or the temperaments – whereas the rational soul is the spirit, it will not be absurd to say that there are three soul in man. [...] Ockham, one of the sharpest amongst recent authors, defends that the rational and the sensitive souls in man are really distinct from each other and puts forth many arguments in favour of his opinion. [...] But we do not wish to dwell much longer on such discussions; suffice it to suggest that this can be said probably and without absurdity.[29]

28 Melanchthon ascribes the second view to Plato, Aristotle and Galen: «An una sit tantum hominis anima, videlicet rationalis, continens simul vires aliarum animarum, videlicet sentientis et vegetativae. An vero sint distinctae animae in homine, vegetativa, sentiens, et rationalis, sicut Plato, Aristoteles, et Galenus loquuntur» (Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima*, 15^{v}).

29 Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima*, 16^{r}: «Vulgo recepta est sententia, unam tantum in homine Animam esse; sed si dicimus Vegetativam et Sentientem tantum ἐνδελεχείας esse, hoc est, agitationes certarum partium Corporis, seu temperamenta, Rationalem vero Animam spiritum esse; non erit absurdum dicere tres esse Animas in homine. [...] Unus ex recentioribus, homo acutissimus, Occam defendit re ipsa distinctas in homine Anima esse, Rationalem et Sentientem et colligit multa argumenta huius suae sententiae [...]. Sed nos has disputationes prolixius agitare nolumus; satis est admonere quid probabiliter et non absurde dici possit».

To the best of my knowledge, this passage is largely neglected in the scholarly studies on Melanchthon's psychology.[30] Nevertheless, it provides us with some important information regarding the notion of the soul presented in the *Commentarius*. As it emerges from the last quotation, Melanchthon does not conceive of the difference between *ἐνδελέχεια* and *spiritus* only in epistemological terms. Not only do the two definitions of the soul correspond to two types of knowledge (whereby the soul is defined as *ἐνδελέχεια* by the natural philosopher and as *spiritus* by the theologian) but they also appear to refer to two different natures. According to Melanchthon, the term '*ἐνδελέχεια*' applies strictly to the vegetative and sensitive parts of the soul, which are agitations of the organs or the temperaments of the body. Instead the rational soul is an incorporeal and immortal spirit. The two souls are ontologically distinct from each other, in the way described by William of Ockham.[31]

Melanchthon proposes this conclusion *probabiliter*. In fact, his commitment to treat these matters from a scriptural point of view keeps him from resolving the issue philosophically. However, the idea that man possesses two different types of soul is reiterated by Melanchthon on scriptural grounds. He does so in the context of the question whether the rational soul is generated *ex traduce* (by means of the *ratio seminalis*, present in the parents' seed) or rather created *ex nihilo* by God in each individual.

As I will show in more detail, in the last chapter of this thesis, Melanchthon's *Commentarius* favours the second answer on a scriptural basis.[32] In fact, the Christian doctrine teaches that God infuses the rational soul in each individual, once the body is sufficiently developed according to its shape and limbs. Such an individual is one that is already capable of the corporeal actions supplied by the vegetative and sensitive souls. The latter, in turn, are defined by Melanchthon as *ἐνδελέχεια*, or as agitations, life, and motion of the body. Therefore, also from this point of view,

30 An exception to this scholarly trend may be found in: Dino Bellucci, *Science de la nature et Réformation*, 335–344.

31 Melanchthon probably refers to Ockham's *Quodlibet* II, q. 10 (= *Opera Theologica* 9), 156–161. In the *Liber de anima* of 1552, Melanchthon leaves out the reference to Ockham; nonetheless, he maintains the same position as in the *Commentarius* of 1540: the *spiritus* and the *ἐνδελέχεία* are probably different from each other (CR XIII, 17). For an account of Ockham's discussion of the soul, see: Dominik Perler, "Ockham über die Seele und ihre Teile", *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 77. 2 (2010), 313–350.

32 See, *infra*, 'Chapter 6', 164–165.

Melanchthon appears to point to a real difference between the parts of the soul he calls *ἐνδελέχεια* and the rational soul, which he defines as *spiritus*.

Melanchthon's choice to treat the rational soul from a scriptural point of view is consistent with his premises regarding the relationship between the law and the Gospel of God: the nature and destiny of the rational soul is not the business of natural philosophy but is taught by the Gospel. The downside of this type of discourse, however, is that the *Commentarius* appears to leave us without precise answers to some relevant philosophical questions. Notably, what type of relationship is there between the lower and the higher souls? Is the link between the *spiritus* and the human body of a hylomorphic type, or is the Aristotelian framework of actuality and potentiality to be abandoned altogether?

As I will show in the fourth chapter of this thesis, a tentative answer to these questions can be found in Melanchthon's Christology. For in the context of his discussion of Christ's human and divine natures, Melanchthon suggests that there is a parallel between the ontological constitution of the two natures of Christ and the relationship between man's body and soul. As I shall show, Melanchthon seems to suggest that Aristotle's hylomorphic account of the soul-body relationship may be replaced by the Christological notion of hypostasis, intended as the personal union obtaining between two natures.[33]

For the moment, suffice it to notice the following point. The remarks on Melanchthon's theological and political agenda made in the beginning of this section might help make sense of Melanchthon's choices in the *Commentarius*, most specifically of his adopting Cicero's interpretation of Aristotle's *De anima*.

As a Lutheran text on human nature, Melanchthon's *Commentarius* is committed to two important ideas. First, our fallen state hinders us from acquiring true knowledge of the soul. Second, not just the rational soul, but the entirety of human nature is the subject of grace. Accordingly, Melanchthon's endeavour to develop a Lutheran conception of man leads him to consider both man's soul and its body and to do so on the basis of the Christian doctrine. At the same time, as a man engaged in devising a system of education in view of certain specific political objectives (particularly that of reinforcing civil obedience amongst the Evangelicals), Melanchthon has to make his ideas intelligible to a broad audience. For this reason, he needs to provide his anthropology with a sound philosophical backing.

---

33 About this point, see: *infra*, 'Chapter 4', 138–139. For a more detailed account of Melanchthon's Christology, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 77–82.

I think that these needs form the background against which Melanchthon's bipartite account of the soul may be adequately understood. On the one hand, Melanchthon's definition of the lower powers of man's soul as motions of the body enables him to make room for a philosophical treatment of the soul in the scheme of his Lutheran anthropology. By looking at the Aristotelian soul in the terms proposed by Cicero, Melanchthon tries to firmly ground the soul in the human body; this, in a way to put forward an operational account of the soul based on the (Galenic) anatomical description of the mechanisms of the body.[34] On the other hand, Melanchthon relies on what the Christian faith teaches about the rational soul and defines it as an intelligent and immortal spirit, provided with innate knowledge of civic morals. This spirit is a nature that radically differs from the operations of the body.

In sum, Melanchthon's endorsement of Cicero's use of *ἐνδελέχεια* is part of an attempt to embody the lower powers of the soul. This also enables Melanchthon to ascribe a two-fold task to the science of the soul: the anatomical description of the operations of the body, and a Christian account of the human spirit, as the latter is described by the Gospel. On the one hand, Melanchthon's conception of philosophy as the law of God makes it possible to harmonise an anatomical description of the vegetative and sensitive operations of the soul with a Christian study of man's intellective soul, or spirit. In this scheme, the human bodily acts and the human spirit together form the entirety of the human nature: the Lutheran subject of grace. On the other hand, however, because from a philosophical point of view, Melanchthon's conflates the lower powers of the soul with the movement of body (or *ἐνδελέχεια*), and because his Christian account of man's higher soul as spiritus intelligens makes this spiritus differ substantially from man's body; for all these reasons, Melanchthon's anthropology is characterised by a disjunction between man's body and his spirit.

2.2. The Reception of Melanchthon's View in Renaissance Northern Europe

In Melanchthon's *Commentarius de anima*, the philosophical aspects of the debate concerning the term *ἐνδελέχεια* became more emphasised, vis-à-vis the predilection

34 Melanchthon appears to combine Galen's teleological anatomy with a seemingly mechanist conception of the human body. About this, see: *infra*, 'Chapter 5', 143–150, 157–159.

for the philological side of the dispute that had characterised the polemic between Argyropulos, Politian and other outstanding humanists. The approval of Cicero's use of *ἐνδελέχεια* on the part of Melanchthon seems to be an important ingredient of his broader project to provide Lutheran anthropology with a sound philosophical backing.

At the same time, the specific way in which Melanchthon discusses the term *ἐνδελέχεια* seems to play an important role in the diffusion and systematisation of the polemic on Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* within the *De anima* tradition in northern Europe. In that context, the alternative between *ἐντελέχεια* and *ἐνδελέχεια* does not only amount to a choice between two philosophical conceptions of the soul. Even more importantly, it seems to coincide with a choice between Melanchthon's type of Lutheran anthropology and a more traditional conception of the human being. This surfaces, for instance, in Veit Amerbach's *Quatuor libri de anima*, printed in Strasbourg, in 1542.

Amerbach's text was produced at Wittenberg, though it was deliberately composed as a criticism of Melanchthon's *Commentarius*. As a matter of fact, Amerbach published it in the wake of a row with Melanchthon and in concomitance with his leaving Wittenberg for Ingolstadt (where he succeeded Johannes Eck), hence the Lutheran for the Catholic faith.[35] In fact, the discussion between Amerbach and Melanchthon appears to have centred on the Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith, the authority of the Pope, and to some extent on the science of the soul. Whilst no document signed by Amerbach appears to be extant, his difference with Melanchthon can be gathered indirectly from the latter's correspondence. On 19 November 1543, Melanchthon writes in reply to Amerbach's doubts concerning the doctrine of justification by faith alone and reiterates that the remission of sins is made possible only by faith, whereas it has nothing to do with either our merit or the free will.[36] The following day, Melanchthon writes a letter to the

35 On 10 November 1543, Melanchthon writes to Camerarius: «Vitum Amerbachium scito ab Academia Bavarica conductum esse» (CR V, 231). Amerbach's moving to Ingolstadt angered Luther, who on 9 February 1544 writes to the theologian Anton Lauterbach: «Nosti ex nobis exisse, qui non fuit ex nobis, M. Vitum Amerbachium Ingolstadiam, ut succedat Eccio, blasphematurus nostrum verbum forte magis quam ille fecit» (CR V, 231). The row that culminated in Amerbach's decision to leave Wittenberg may be dated back to 1537, when during his lecture on the *Physica*, Amerbach slandered Melanchthon. About this, see: Walter Friedensburg, *Geschichte der Universität Wittenberg* (Halle a. S. 1917), 226; Sachiko Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy*, 109.

36 In Melanchthon's own words: «Dicimus: fide, quae est assensus et in voluntate motus, clamans Abba Pater, accipi remissionem peccatorum; nec divelli ab ea dilectio ac spes possunt. Sed *sola*

Saxon chancellor Gregorius Pontanus, in which Amerbach's argument is summarised as follows:

> Mr Veit Amerbach wrote to me, only about the two parts regarding justification and the leadership of the Pope. He is dissatisfied with the particle 'alone' [in 'by faith alone', or *sola fide*] and argues that 'by faith' means only the knowledge and not the trust in the mercy. Moreover, Veit is moved by this argument concerning all things that are discussed between us and the Catholics: "it is impossible that the Church is wrong about justification, the Mass, the vows, and so many things. Everybody always thought differently from the Lutherans. Therefore, the Lutheran opinion is new, alien to the Church, and to be rejected".[37]

Amerbach reportedly thinks the Catholic Church cannot possibly be wrong on so many issues, such as the vows, the Mass, and the doctrine of justification; whereas, the Lutheran views – especially the theory of salvation by faith alone – are novel, unusual, and thus to be rejected. But these were not the only issues that made the continuation of Amerbach's appointment at Wittenberg problematic. In fact, his teaching on the soul also seems to have exacerbated his links with Melanchthon and the university. This emerges from the *Annales* of the life of Melanchthon, in which Amerbach is reported as having started a quarrel with Melanchthon in October 1543, which concerned the science of the soul.[38] Amerbach's *De anima* was met with much

---

scludit nostrum meritum, et significatur, propter Christum accipi remissionem peccatorum. [...] fide, id est, fiducia misericordiae propter filium Dei promissa donatur reconciliatio. De hac non dicit Thomas aut similes. Nec pertinent haec ad quaestionem de libero arbitrio; ut vides, ad vera consolationem pertinent» (CR V, 231–232). To the best of my knowledge, the original letter by Amerbach to Melanchthon is not extant or not printed; in fact, the editor of Melanchthon's correspondence writes: «intelligitur Amerbachium ad Melanthonem scripsisse» (CR V, 231, fn.).

37 CR V, 233: «Ad me scripsit Magister Vitus Amerbachius, tantum de duobus articulis, de iustificatione, et de primate Pontificis. De iustificatione displacet ei particula sola, et disputat fide significare tantum notitiam, non fiduciam misericordiae [...] Movetur autem Vitus hoc argumento de omnibus materiis, quae inter nos et Pontificos agitantur. Impossibile est totam Ecclesiam de tantis rebus, de iustificatione, de missa, de votis, errare. Semper omnes aliter senserunt, quam Lutherani. Ergo Lutherana sententia est nova, ignota Ecclesia, et reicienda».

38 «Oct. 22. 1543. Vitus Amerbachius Witebergae lites movet adversus Melanchthonem in doctrina de anima» (CR V, IX).

disapproval in Wittenberg, to the extent that its views were publically condemned on a flyleaf affixed in the Saxon town.[39] Unluckily, the document does not spell out the reasons motivating this disapprobation of Amerbach's psychology. Nor is the precise nature of the disagreement between Melanchthon and Amerbach clear. However, Amerbach's *Quatuor libri de anima* is certainly very different from Melanchthon's *Commentarius*, particularly with regard to the definition of the soul, which Amerbach treats in the first of the four books composing his *De anima*.

Interestingly enough, Amerbach devotes fifty-five pages of Book I to the discussion of the term *ἐντελέχεια*. His extensive analysis of the philological aspects related to the problem is intertwined with a refutation of Melanchthon, or as Amerbach more indirectly has it, a refutation of those who endorse Cicero's use of *ἐνδελέχεια* and state that Aristotle's account of the soul is merely the definition of a term.[40] From a philological point of view – Amerbach judges – Cicero's reading of *ἐντελέχεια* as *ἐνδελέχεια* (or continuous motion) is just inconsistent with Aristotle's thought as we know it. In fact, Amerbach leans towards tracing Cicero's reading back to the fact that the Latin author was probably in possession of a lost version of Aristotle's *De anima*.[41] From a philosophical point of view, Amerbach concludes:

> The term ἐντελέχεια means for the Greeks the same thing that the Latins call 'perfection'. For this reason, this word has to be spelled by τ and not by δ. In fact, I understand Aristotle as seeing a difference between the soul and life, and [as holding] that the soul is the first actuality and life the second. Moreover, this is what Aristotle says against Plato, that the soul does not move, but it is the principle and the cause of movement; namely, a

39 The flyleaf reads as follows: «constat aliquos veterum philosophorum ad insaniam versos, quos imitatus Amerbachius pro philosophari debacchari incoepit, inque convitia prolapsus pro scientia de anima docet inania, quae confixerat somnia. Rogetis dominum, ut redeat vir ad animum, et rixis bonorum non ita remoretur studium, cuius loco si alium instituerit, facerit studiosis quam gratissimum» (Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, O. III. 4., f. 120^{v}; this note can also be found in: CR V, 231).

40 Veit Amerbach, *Quatuor libri de anima*, 42.

41 «Ciceronem aut lapsum esse memoria, quod hominibus facile accidit (non enim Deus fuit) et Aristoteli tribuisse, quod fuerit tribuendum Platoni, et Platoni, quod fuerit tribuendum Aristoteli, aut aliud habuisse opus Aristotelis, quam nostrum est, ex quo illa sumpserit, ut quidam suspicantur. Quanquam in re tanta non puto hunc virum fuisse tam varium et incostantem, ut sibi esset plane contrarius» (Veit Amerbach, *Quatuor libri de anima*, 63–63).

> certain power and force of life, not life itself, or what produces movement and sensation in the organic body, not the movement and sensation themselves.[42]

Contrary to Melanchthon, Amerbach contends that the soul is a *perfectio*, namely the principle of man's life and operations, and not the life or the operations themselves. Amerbach's rejection of Melanchthon's position revolves around this point: looking at the soul as *ἐνδελέχεια* amounts to a confusion between the source of life and life itself, viz., between the soul and its operations. But precisely because the soul is the principle of life and movement and not life and movement themselves, Amerbach concludes, the soul is not *ἐνδελέχεια*, nor does this term reflect Aristotle's own definition of the soul. Therefore, and in a way different from Wittenberg teaching, Amerbach develops his commentary along the lines of the questions traditionally debated within the science of the soul. What is more, he shows no interest in the anatomical description of the human body.[43] This is all the more important, considering that Amerbach's *Quatuor libri de anima* seems to have influenced the teaching on the soul at Ingolstadt until well into the second half of the sixteenth century. This is nicely illustrated by two books produced at Ingolstadt: Christoph Viepekhius' *Assertiones de anima* (1568) and Albert Hunger's *Adversus veteres et novos errores de anima conclusionum centuria* (1575). The first book rejects Galen's view of the soul as the harmony of the temperaments and states that the soul is not the life of the body, but the substance thanks to which the body lives.[44] As mentioned in the preceding section of this chapter, this point involved the most important difference between northern European critics of Melanchthon's anthropology and its advocates. Albert Hunger reiterates the same idea, in open opposition to Melanchthon:

---

42 AD 1542, 36, 37, 41: «Vox *ἐντελέχεια* significat Grecis idem quod Latinis habens perfectionem. […] Propterea haec dictio scribenda est per τ non per δ. […] Ita enim ego Aristotelem intelligo ut faciam differentiam inter animam et vitam, sitque anima primus actus, secundus vita. Atque hoc est quod contra Platonem dicit Aristoteles, animam non moveri, sed principium et causam esse motus, hoc est, potentiam et vim quandam vitae, non ipsam vitam, aut id quod efficit in corpore organico motum et sensum, non ipsum motum et sensum».

43 The remaining three books of Amerbach's *De anima* respectively address the different powers of the soul (book II), the intellect and the will (book III), some topics from the *Parva Naturalia* (book IV).

44 *Assertiones de Anima*, Nobilis, et Ingenui Iuvenis ac Eruditi Philosophiae Studiosi, D. Christophori Viepekhii (Ingolstadt 1568), XXXV–XXVII.

> When this little grammarian, Melanchthon, who is hardly versed in the writings of Cicero, as well as in the weightier and more solid philosophy of Aristotle and the other ancients, follows him [Cicero], he [Melanchton] too falls into error. He translates 'entelechy' by 'continuous agitation, life and substantial movement'. As though for Aristotle there was no cause of the continuous agitation and no soul of the life, and in fact no cause; [or as though] cause and effect, the principle and what derives from the principle were the same thing.[45]

Hunger's book was signed by both the dean of the faculty of philosophy, Wolfgang Zettel, and the dean of the faculty of theology, Rudolph Clencke. By backing the contents of the book, Clencke also stated that the theses held by Hunger expressed Catholic orthodoxy.[46] The case of Albert Hunger's book is thus particularly relevant. By endorsing what had formerly been Amerbach's criticism of Melanchthon's definition of the soul, it also states the official position on the topic held at the Catholic university of Ingolstadt.

At the time when the Ingolstadt science of the soul developed in opposition to Melanchthon, the latter's views were being systematised at Wittenberg and subsequently spread across Germany and the Low Countries.[47] For instance, Melanchthon's analysis of the term *ἐνδελέχεια* was accepted in two important texts, produced respectively at Stainfurt and Leiden: Otto Casmann's *Psychologia anthropologica* (1594) and Rudolph Snellius's *In Melanchthonis de anima, vel potius de hominis physiologia, libellum, commentationes utilissima* (1596). More precisely, Casmann's endorsement of Melanchthon's views stems from an argument against Julius Caesar Scaliger's definition of the soul, in the latter's well-known *Exotericae Exercitationes*. In that work,

---

45 Albert Hunger, *Adversus veteres et novos errores de anima conclusionum centuria* (Ingolstadt 1575), XXXIII: «Quem cum sequatur Grammaticulus ille Melanthon, in Ciceronis scriptis utcunque, in graviori et solidiori Aristotelis veterumque aliorum Philosophia perparum versatus, pariter et ipse labitur. Vertit is entelechiam assiduam agitationem, vitam et motum substantialem. Quasi apud Aristotele, aut non sit caussa agitationis assiduae, vitaeque anima, aut siquidem caussa, idem sint caussa et effectus, principium, et quod a principio manat». Albert Hunger's 1575 polemical work also targeted other aspects of Luther's and Melanchthon's views about the soul, as it will emerge in further in this thesis. See: *infra*, 'Chapter 6', 162.

46 Albert Hunger, *Adversus veteres et novos errores de anima conclusionum centuria*, back page.

47 On the systematisation of anatomy in Wittenberg treatises on the soul see Jürgen Helm, "Protestant and Catholic Medicine in Sixteenth Century? The Case of Ingolstadt Anatomy", 83–96.

Scaliger ridicules Melanchthon's psychology and defines the soul as *ἐντελέχεια*.[48] Otto Casmann, in turn, accuses Scaliger of being inconsistent with the Scriptures and for the same reason favours Melanchthon's conception of the soul as *spiritus*.[49] Rudolph Snellius also agrees with Melanchthon's definition of the soul and looks at *ἐνδελέχεια* as a genus capable of encompassing two terms: substantial motion (the soul) and accidental motion (the operations of the soul).[50]

Both Casmann and Snellius espouse Melanchthon's conception of the science of the soul as the study of the entire human nature (man's spirit and body). Snellius looks at his own *De anima* as a treatise on what he calls 'human physiology'. Casmann even redefines the study of the soul as part of a new discipline, anthropology, consisting of psychology and human anatomy. In the cases of Amerbach, Viepekhius, and Hunger, on the one hand, and of Casmann and Snellius, on the other, the negative or positive assessment of Cicero's use of *ἐνδελέχεια* coincides with the refusal or acceptance of Melanchthon's use of anatomy in the science of the soul, as well as with his Lutheran conception of man.

2.3. Conclusions

The humanist dispute over "whether the soul is *ἐντελέχεια* or *ἐνδελέχεια*" was mainly of a philological nature. However, some philosophical consequences were already made visible as the dispute developed in fifteenth-century Italy. Already in that context, the two alternative spellings corresponded to two diverging interpretations of Aristotle's conception of the soul. In fact, the spelling *ἐντελέχεια* was ren-

48 In *Exotericae Exercitationes* 307, 49, Scaliger speaks of Melanchthon's definition of the soul in the following way: «Omnino vero causia digna, aut vomere definitio animae rationalis, quam talem affert. Spiritus intelligens. Videtur haec e culina quapiam monachali simul cum fumo, aut nidore erupisse in oculos nostrorum deambulatorum» (Iulii Caesaris Scaligeri. *Exotericarum Exercitationum Liber XV. De subtilitate ad Hiarronymum Cardanum* (Paris 1557), 421[r]). Scaliger's Exercitationes and his conception of the soul have been carefully studied by Kuni Sakamoto, *Julius Caesar Scaliger, Renaissance Reformer of Aristotelianism: A Study of* Exotericae Exercitationes (Leiden, forthcoming).

49 Otto Casmann, *Psychologia anthropologica*, 60. For more information about Casmann's intellectual biography and his relationship with Ramism, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 17–20. On Casmann's conception of the soul, see: *infra*, 'Chapter 4', 137–140. On the debate between Scaliger and Casmann regarding Melanchthon's definition of the soul, see: *infra*, 'Chapter 3', 108, *passim*.

50 Rudolph Snellius, *In Phil. Melanchthonis de anima*, 35.

dered by the Latin *perfectio*, which conveyed the idea of a static form. The alternative term, *ἐνδελέχεια*, was taken as meaning "continuous agitation or motion", as suggested by Cicero. These philosophical consequences became more emphasised when Melanchthon made them the central point of the discussion. Indeed, he used Cicero's interpretation in the context of his redefinition of psychology as the study of the (Lutheran) human nature in its fallen state. The discussion of the soul as a *perfectio* or motion appears to have become increasingly popular in the course of the sixteenth century. This happened when a number of reformed authors accepted Cicero's use of *ἐνδελέχεια* in the way proposed by Melanchthon, and when (predominantly) Catholic professors sought to reject this view. In this manner, the debate was systematised within treatises on the soul produced in Germany and the Low Countries. It mushroomed into many texts, at least until the first half of the seventeenth century, when we find it treated again, for instance, at Leuven, in Libertus Fromondus' *Philosophia Christiana De anima* (1649).[51]

Interestingly enough, after the humanist dispute over Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* was appropriated by Melanchthon, it stopped coinciding with an exclusively philological disagreement. Instead, it grew into a doctrinal problem, which was systematically treated in the Renaissance science of the soul. The Renaissance debate on Cicero's use of *ἐνδελέχεια* is an example of the continuity between humanist, philosophical, and theological discussions, in sixteenth-century northern Europe. On the one hand, it shows that humanist polemics could be full of doctrinal implications. On the other hand, it helps us better appreciate the impact of sixteenth-century confessionalisation on the diffusion of humanist culture in Renaissance northern Europe.[52] More specifically, all the authors that I have discussed in this chapter were humanist, in both their approach and their philological skills in reading Aristotle and Cicero's works about the soul. Melanchthon and his followers, Amerbach and the Ingolstadt Jesuits, were all interested in recovering the true meaning of Aristotle's *De anima*, and they sought to do it by engaging in subtle philological discussions. Yet, the differences between Melanchthon and Amerbach do not seem to have focused on reading Cicero for the sake of philological accuracy. What was at stake all along in their humanist debate was their notion of man.[53] Amerbach defended a more clearly

51 Fromondus criticises Cicero's reading of Aristotle in: Libertus Fromondus, *Philosophiae christianae de anima libri quatuor* (Leuven 1649), 28–31.

52 About the confessionalisation of humanism in Reformation Germany, see: Erika Rummel, *The Confessionalization of Humanism in Reformation Germany* (Oxford 2000).

53 Charlotte Methuen offers a different perspective on Melanchthon's general attitude, whereby

Aristotelian conception of man, as one living substance informed by the intellective soul. Melanchthon, on his part, thought that man was a compound of two substances, the body and the spirit, which together formed the subject of divine grace. By showing this, Melanchthon also sought to show that God had provided man's spirit with an innate ability to tell the right from wrong. Melanchthon's anthropology was for this reason part and parcel of his confessionalising efforts to disciplining the reformers in the direction of civil obedience.

Whilst authors who defended Melanchthon's reading of Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* embraced this type of anthropology, those who opposed it – as the Ingolstadt Jesuits – were primarily interested in rejecting not just Melanchthon's definition of the soul, but with it also his Lutheran conception of man.

---

the impact of Melanchthon's humanist interest in Hellenism on his way of looking at physics and psychology is more emphasised than in the present study. See: Charlotte Methuen, *Science and Theology in the Reformation. Studies in Theological Interpretation and Astronomical Observation in Sixteenth-Century Germany* (London 2008), 95–99.

CHAPTER 3

Too Many Meanings for One Word. The Notion of '*Spiritus*' in the Work of Philip Melanchthon

3.0. Introduction

In the preceding chapter we have seen that Melanchthon's way of looking at the soul was at the basis of a new type of anthropology, whereby man was considered to be composed of two parts: a body and an intelligent spirit. According to Melanchthon and some of his followers, the human body also encompassed the vegetative and sensitive operations of man, or *ἐνδελέχεια*. But how did they conceive of the other part of man, namely the intelligent spirit?

This chapter is devoted to Melanchthon's conception of '*spiritus*' and to the debate it triggered amongst some of his contemporaries. More specifically, I shall address the varied usage of the notion of 'spirit' in the work of Melanchthon, as well as the theological and medical aspects that his idea of 'spirit' involves. My aim is to show that Melanchthon conceived of 'spirit' as both the bodily spirits (responsible for important biological and psychological activities of living beings) and the intellective soul, created by God in his image and likeness and provided by him with innate notions of civic morals (what Melanchthon calls the 'law of God'). Moreover, I shall point out that in the revised edition of his book on the soul, the *Liber de anima*, Melanchthon also used 'spirit' in a way that was not present in his *Commentarius de anima*, namely, to refer to the third person of the Divine Trinity: the Holy Spirit.

First, I shall provide a schematic account of the different significations that the notion of 'spirit' acquires in the work of Melanchthon, as well as of their mutual interaction. Second, I shall show that the interplay between the different kinds of spirits that fill Melanchthon's natural philosophy involves an important practical dimension. More in particular, it is at the core of Melanchthon's ideas on the medical cure of the body and the virtuous direction of human nature and society. Third, I will demonstrate that the interaction between man's and God's spirit presented by Melanchthon is an important part of Melanchthon's views about of justification by faith alone as they developed in the period during which he worked on his *Liber de anima*.

On the one hand, this chapter will focus on an important aspect of Melanchthon's psychology and natural philosophy, which drew the attention of some of his contemporaries and followers. On the other hand, it will shed light on Melanchthon's use of philosophical and medical ideas in his understanding of one central point of the Lutheran faith: the doctrine of justification *sola fide*.

3.1. A World Full of Spirits

Towards the end of the sixteenth century, Melanchthon's natural philosophy – and in particular his psychology – had become popular with many philosophers and physicians working in northern Europe. Especially Melanchthon's definition of the soul as 'intelligent spirit' (*spiritus intelligens*) was vastly debated within the field of psychology.[1] For instance, Otto Casmann (1562–1607) defends it in his popular *Psychologia anthropologica* (1595) against criticisms put forward by Julius Caesar Scaliger. The latter's doubts amount to the idea that spirit – as opposed to the more customary 'entelechy' or 'first actuality' – is too murky a term, when it comes to defining the soul. In fact, as Scaliger explains in his widely read *Exotericae Exercitationes*, '*spiritus*' has acquired too many meanings in the course of the history and prevalently that of a corporeal item, corresponding to either air or blood. As such, it is at odds with the immortal nature that surely has to be granted to the human soul.[2] Casmann

1 On the reception of Melanchthon's psychology in renaissance northern Europe see: Simone De Angelis, *Anthropologien*, 54–63; 'Chapter 5' of this thesis.

2 In *Exotericae Exercitationes* 307, 49, Scaliger criticises Melanchthon's idea that *spiritus intelligens* is a term more suitable than *ἐντελέχεια*, for defining the human soul: «Dolebas te nescire quid esset entelechia, etsi mox aiebas esse vocabulum sumptum ex usu populari. Multo difficilior cognitu spiritus est. Ex M. Tullio, animae vocabulo aerem designari, etiam declamatores sciunt. Item spiritum. Inde spirare, agitare aerem pulmonibus. Quare apud Latinos erit anima istius definitionis: ventus intelligens aut aer intelligens. Apud medicos pars sangiunis tenuissima, spiritus est. Liber Aristotelis De Spiritu deiecit nos amplius septies de spe interpretationis, propter perplexissimas difficultates. Omnino *πνευμα* nihil aliud quam flatum significant. Et Hippocrates *φύσα* multis in locis idem quod πνευμα nostrum est. Quod tamen et aliud significat unde male sit aequivocae definitioni. Putabat se in popularibus versari libris ut obtrudere posse speraret spiritum pro forma substantiali animantium. Nugatoriam vero subtexuit explicationem. Voco, inquit, spiritum substantiam spiritualem. Perinde ac si quis dicat: substantia est ens substantiale. Spiritus vero Latinis et Graecis omnibus, philosophis, medicis, oratoribus, corpus est; id est materia et forma» (Julius Caesar Scaliger, *Exotericarum Exercitationum*, 421[r]). Scaliger's objections to Melanchthon's conception

rebuts Scaliger's criticism, by arguing that it is irrelevant vis-à-vis the definition proposed by Melanchthon: it is true that '*spiritus*' has been used in various manners, but Melanchthon clearly looks at it in Christian terms, as a spiritual and intelligent substance.[3]

Casmann makes a fair point: in the *Liber de anima* (1552), Melanchthon explains that the human soul, or intelligent spirit, is an incorporeal and immortal substance. However, Scaliger's criticism points to a confusion that in fact surfaces in the work of Melanchthon and of which the latter himself appears to be well aware. In the section of his *Loci Praecipui Theologici* devoted to the Holy Spirit, Melanchthon indeed recognises some fear that different understandings of the notion of spirit might get mixed up:

> The word 'spirit' generally means agitation or an agitating nature or force, and the variety [of its meanings] must be observed in the writings of the prophets and apostles; and all their sayings in which the term 'spirit' is found are not to be hastily mixed. Many times they mean wind, frequently the life of man, or the created movements and impetuses – the good as much as the bad ones – of men. Here, they denote a spiritual essence, i.e., a living, intelligent, incorporeal, and active essence.[4]

---

of the soul also regarded the latter's use of *ἐνδελέχεια*, as I explained above. See: *supra*, 'Chapter 2', 103–104.

3 Casmann reacts to Scaliger in the section of his book entitled "An hominis animam recte et perspicue dicatur spiritus, pro Melanchthone contra Scaligerum". There, he argues as follows: «vocabulum polysemon reddit aequivocam definitionem. At spiritus est vocabulum multae significationis. Ideoque, inquit Scaliger, multo difficilior spiritus cognitu. Si igitur anima est spiritus, apud Latinos erit anima istius definitionis ventus intelligens, aut aer intelligens. Apud Medicos, pars sanguinis tenuissima. Resp. Propositio vera est, nisi vocabuli polysemi significatio certa determinatione designetur, ita ut vel antecedat vocis usurpandae explicatio, vel usu omnibus in ea usurpatione innotuerit. […] Neque sequitur: anima est spiritus intelligens, ergo est aer vel ventus intelligens. At, inquit, sequitur quia spiritus ventum et aerem etiam notat. Sophisticum est. Non enim nomine spiritus, cum dicatur de anima, omnia intelligendi veniunt quae quavis significatione designat, sed certa significationis specie limitatur» (*Psychologia anthropologica*, 61–62, 63).

4 Philip Melanchthon, *Loci Praecipui Theologici*, in CR XXI, 629–630: «Nomen spiritus in genere significant agitationem aut naturam, seu vim agitantem et observanda est varietas in ipsis scriptis Propheticis et Apostolicis nec temere omnia dicta miscenda sunt, in quibus reperitur vocabulum spritus. Saepe significant ventos saepe vitam hominis, saepe motus seu impetus hominum creatos,

Spirit might mean 'agitation' or 'movement', or a 'nature in motion'; it can also refer to a wind or breathe-like item, the very life of man, as well as to his good and evil impulses. Luckily enough, the reader of the *Loci Praecipui Theologici* is warned that, in that particular context, '*spiritus*' exclusively indicates the Holy Spirit. Less fortunate is the reader of the *Liber de anima*. In effect, Melanchthon uses all of the listed meanings of spirit in his work on the soul and even looks in wonder at the way they interact, as yet another sign of the orderly structure of nature, the work of God. This is epitomised by the concluding lines of the section that the *Liber de anima* devotes to the discussion *De spiritibus*:

> Galen says about man's soul that these spirits are either the soul or the immediate instrument of the soul. Which is certainly true; and by their light, [the spirits] excel the light of the Sun and all the stars. And what is even more marvellous, in pious men the divine spirit itself is mixed with these very spirits and makes them brighter with divine light, so that their knowledge of God be clearer, their ascent [to him] more resolute, and their strivings towards God more ardent. Conversely, when the devils occupy the hearts, by their blowing they trouble the spirits in the heart and brain, impede judgments, and cause manifest madness and propel the heart and the other limbs to the cruellest movements; as when Medea killed her children and Judas killed himself.[5]

In this remarkable passage, Melanchthon sketches a notion of '*spiritus*' that stands right at the heart of the interplay between body and soul, as well as between the animate creatures and the superior forces influencing the flow of human affairs. Here, Melanchthon draws on the well known passage found in Galen's *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, in which the bodily spirits are associated with the astral body

---

tum bonos, tum malos. Hic significant essentiam spiritualem; id est, vivam, intelligentem, incorpoream, efficacem».

5 CR XIII, 88–89: «Galenus inquit de anima hominis hos spiritus aut animam esse, aut immediatum instrumentum animae. Quod certe verum est, et sua luce superant solis at omnium stellarum lucem. Et quod mirabilius est, iis ipsis spiritibus in hominibus piis miscetur ipse divinus spiritus, et efficit magis fulgentes divina luce, ut agnitio Dei sit illustrior et adsensio firmior, et motus sint ardentiores erga Deum. Encontra ubi diaboli occupant corda, suo adflatu turbant spiritus in corde et in cerebro, impediunt iudicia, et manifestos furores efficient et impellunt corda et alia membra ad crudelissimos motus; ut Medea interficit natos, Iudas sibi ipsi consciscit mortem».

and said to be either the soul or its first instrument in the interaction with the bodies.[6] What is more, Melanchthon seems to see some affinity between the bodily spirits, the spirit of God, and that of the devil in such a way that all these can interact and get mixed with each other. The communication between these spirits prompts humans to good and bad actions and the presence of the Holy Spirit and the devil's spirit in our heart and brain might make us either recognise the Christian God more easily or lead us to madness and dysfunctions of our thinking.[7]

But how is this interaction made possible? In what does it consist exactly, and to what extent can human beings control so as to influence their lives for the good? In order to answer these questions, let us first look at the different notions of '*spiritus*' considered by Melanchthon, more specifically at the way he conceives of the particular workings of the human and divine spirits.

3.2. The Human Soul: The Intelligent Spirit and the Bodily Spirits

The two most important ways in which Melanchthon uses the notion of '*spiritus*' are found in his *Liber de anima* and are both related to his definition of the human soul. In order to better grasp what Melanchthon means by '*spiritus*' in that context, it is helpful to reiterate some fundamental ideas we examined in the preceding chapter of this study and expand those.

---

6 Galen writes: «At si de animae substantia pronunciare oportet, alterum necessario dicetur, aut hanc esse veluti lucidum et aethereum corpus affirmandum, in quam sententiam vel inviti ex consecutione Stoici et Aristoteles perveniunt; aut ipsam incorpoream esse substantiam, primumque ipsius vehiculum hoc corpus, quo ceu medio cum reliquis corporibus communionem suscipit» (Karl Gottlob Kühn, ed., *Galeni Opera Omnia* (Leipzig 1823), v, 643).

7 Daniel P. Walker is to the best of my knowledge the first who ever looked at the affinity between the human spirits and those of God and the devil in Melanchthon's *Liber de anima*. See: Daniel P. Walker, "Medical Spirits and God and the Soul", 223–244. The idea of '*spiritus*' plays a central role in the works of two authors who worked approximately in the same age as Melanchthon's: Jean Fernel and Daniel Sennert. On this, see: Hiro Hirai, *Medical Humanism and Natural Philosophy. Renaissance Debates on Matter, Life and the Soul* (Leiden 2011), 46–79, 151–172. On early-modern theories of '*spiritus*' and its relation to notions of the divinity also see: Guido Giglioni, "Spiritus Plasticus Between Pneumatology and Embryology (A Note about Comenius' Concept of Spirit)", *Studia Comeniana et Historica*, 24 (1994), 83–89. An extensive analyses of the varied and overlapping notions of '*spiritus*' in the medieval tradition and their transmission to the Renaissance is found in James J. Bono, "Medical Spirits and the Medieval Language of Life", *Traditio*, 40 (1984), 91–130.

The *Liber de anima* is in fact the revised edition of Melanchthon's *Commentarius de anima*, first published in 1540. As we know from our discussion about Melanchthon's definition of the soul, both of these books lie at the heart of his plan to give the Lutheran faith some robust philosophical support; for the same reason, the *Liber de anima* is beyond any doubt a Christian, or better still a Lutheran, work on the human soul.

As such, Melanchthon's *Liber de anima* is committed to one important Lutheran idea: our fallen state hinders us from obtaining any precise knowledge of the substance of the human soul. All we can say with certainty about the rational soul of man corresponds to what the Holy Scriptures teach about it. It is at this point of Melanchthon's discourse that the notion of '*spiritus*' comes into play. In effect, given said premises about the intellectual limits of man in his fallen state, Melanchthon defines the soul from a Christian point of view as '*spiritus intelligens*', or intelligent spirit.[8]

'*Spiritus*', according to Melanchthon, is first and foremost a term drawn from the Scriptures and not from natural philosophy. It stands for one of the two parts of the human being (the intellective soul), the body being the other one. '*Spiritus*' is the intelligent part of man, it is different from the body, and does not perish with it. Later in the *Liber de anima*, the '*spiritus intelligens*' is shown to have two faculties: intellect and will. It thus governs specific human activities, such as knowing (particulars and universals) and judging. Even more importantly, Melanchthon thinks that the Christian teaching – instead of Aristotle's philosophy – has to be followed, for it correctly shows that the intelligent spirit of man possesses innate knowledge of the presence of a God, as well as of his law: the distinction between good and bad.[9] '*Spiritus*' – as Casmann points out in his discussion with Scaliger – is indeed the term used by Melanchthon to characterise the soul from a Christian point of view. However, things are more complicated than this and a closer look at the *Liber de anima*

8 See: *supra*, 'Chapter 2', 96.

9 CR XIII, 137–138, 142: «Etsi penetrari acie humanae mentis rerum natura non potest, tamen vult Deus eam ab hominibus aspici, ut in ea consideremus testimonia de ipso, quae ostendunt et esse Deum, et quails sit. [...] Sicut autem homo conditus est, ut in eo luceat notitia Dei, et ut ei Deus communicet suam sapientiam et bonitatem, ita mentem humanam voluit evidentissimum de ipso testimonium esse. Cui et insita est lux, qua esse Deum agnoscimus, et insitae sunt noticiae discernentes honesta et turpia. [...] [Intellectus] est potentia cognoscens, recordans, iudicans, et ratiocinans singularia et universalia, habens insitas quasdam notitias nobiscum nascentes, seu principia magnarum artium, habens et actum reflexum, quo suas actions cernit et iudicat, et errata emendare potest».

shows that Melanchthon considers '*spiritus*' also in another sense that is strikingly different from the Christian one.

As I pointed out earlier, Melanchthon was pursuing an essentially Lutheran study of the soul; at the same time, this was but a part of his bigger plan to provide his theology with some rational backing. Accordingly, he sought to accompany his Christian definition of the soul with some, albeit tentative, philosophical understanding of it. In Melanchthon's opinion there is virtually nothing that natural philosophy can say about the essence of the soul. Nevertheless, he explains, one could study its most evident features, i.e., its operations. The operations of the soul, in their turn, can only be known by means of anatomical knowledge; namely, by looking at the arrangement and workings of the 'machines' of the bodily organs, through which the functions of the soul are carried out.[10]

In an effort to achieve a philosophical explanation of the soul, Melanchthon seeks to ground it in the human body. It is within this discussion that he uses the term '*spiritus*' again. In fact, as we have seen in the second chapter of this thesis, ever since his *Commentarius* of 1540, Melanchthon was not happy with the traditional Aristotelian definition of the soul as the first actuality of a living body possessing life potentially, for it did not make it clear what that 'first actuality' might be. To this interpretation of Aristotle's *De anima*, Melanchthon preferred Cicero's view of the soul as *ἐνδελέχεια*. At the same time he tries to be even more specific as to what this agitation exactly is. For this reason he has recourse to Galen's account of the soul:

> Most prudently among all speaks Galen, who does not hesitate to affirm about the nutritive and sensitive soul that it is either the natural and the vital spirits or the temperament [of the body]. But about the rational soul, he says that he does not pronounce himself on whether the intellect is some other incorporeal and separable nature, or rather a corporeal one. Whereas [he says] that the animal spirit is either that very rational soul or its immediate instrument.[11]

---

10 A more detailed explanation of Melanchthon's use of anatomy can be found in 'Chapter 5' of this thesis. More specifically, about Melanchthon's use of the idea of 'machine' to describe man's body and its workings as they are described through anatomical knowledge, see: *infra*, 'Chapter 5', 147, *passim*.

11 CR XIII, 10: «Verecundissime omnium Galenus loquitur, qui de anima nutritiva et sensitiva non dubitat adfirmare, esse eas aut spiritus naturales et vitales, aut crasin. Sed de rationali dicit se non adfirmare an λογιστικόν sit alia natura incorporea et separabilis, an vero sit natura

According to Melanchthon, Galen thought that the vegetative and sensitive operations of the soul conflated into the natural and the vital spirits in the animate bodies whereas the rational soul was either the animal spirit or used it as its first instrument.[12] By means of this interpretation of Galen's notion of the soul, as well as by using Cicero's reading of Aristotle, Melanchthon reaches a philosophical account of the human soul grounded in the body: the soul is the very life or movement of the body, which either coincides with the bodily spirits or is something concomitant to them.

'*Spiritus*', therefore, is not only the immaterial and rational soul of man, as it is suggested by the Scriptures; it is also the item that comes closest to our natural understanding of the soul. On this account, the soul is nothing but what Melanchthon calls *ἐνδελέχεια*.

On the one hand, Melanchthon's diverse use of '*spiritus*' might look confusing. After all, he uses the same term to describe both an immaterial and intelligent substance and an embodied movement of certain parts of the human body. On the other hand, one has to keep in mind the two following points. First, the two meanings of '*spiritus*' also correspond to an epistemological distinction: the intelligent spirit is what we know about the soul solely on scriptural grounds whereas the bodily spirits are the corporeal item that accounts for the soul from a natural-philosophical standpoint. Second, as I have shown in the preceding chapter, Melanchthon's understanding of the difference between God's law and Gospel impacted on his psychology, in the sense of a disjunction between the bodily and the spiritual parts of man. In effect, already in his 1540 *Commentarius de anima*, Melanchthon had suggested that man's lower soul, or *ἐνδελέχεια*, was substantially different from man's intellective soul, for the latter was incorporeal whilst the former was part of man's body. In the *Liber de anima*, Melanchthon reiterates this point and we are told that the two types of spirit he mentions, the *spiritus intelligens* and the *ἐνδελέχεια*, might correspond to

---

corporea. Sed spiritum animalem aut esse, illam ipsam animam rationalem, aut proximum eius organon».

12 Interestingly enough, a modern scholar, Abraham P. Bos, has held an interpretation of Aristotle's definition of the soul that comes very close to Melanchthon's. According to Bos, the 'organic body' mentioned by Aristotle in *De anima* II. 1 needs not be understood in terms of 'a body equipped with organs'. Rather, Bos argues, the body Aristotle thinks of is an *instrumental* body, or the instrument of the soul. According to Bos, this instrumental body coincides with 'pneuma' or 'spirit'. Bos' long and detailed argument can be found in Abraham P. Bos, *The Soul and its Instrumental Body. A Reinterpretation of Aristotle's Philosophy of Living Nature* (Leiden 2003).

two distinct souls in the human being.[13] At this stage, one may very well wonder whether this double use of 'spirit' might not indicate Melanchthon's wish to find an item ('spirit' indeed) capable of bridging the gap between man's higher and lower powers. However, it should be clear by now, Melanchthon's psychology goes more in the direction of a disjunction between the human body (and bodily soul) and the '*spiritus intelligens*'. Melanchthon's 'spirit' is not a bridge between man's two parts, but a term that Melanchthon uses equivocally to refer both to man's *spiritus intelligens* and to the lower soul conceived as *ἐνδελεχεία* or the bodily spirits.

But if the embodied soul of man, or *ἐνδελεχεία*, corresponds to the bodily spirits (or their movement), what exactly are these spirits?

3.3. Bodily Spirits Between God, the Evil Spirits, and the Stars

The *Liber de anima* devotes a specific section to the description of the bodily spirits. From there we gather a picture of them that is very different from that of the immaterial '*spiritus intelligens*', provided with innate knowledge of the law of God. The bodily spirits are corporeal and volatile entities. They appear to be subject to many and various influences, which determine the inclinations and behaviour of human beings. This aspect is particularly interesting, because it will enable us to observe a practical dimension involved in Melanchthon's notion of '*spiritus*': the bodily spirits will turn out to play a central role in the health of the body and in the virtuous direction of the soul and the human affairs. Melanchthon defines the bodily spirits as follows:

> The spirit is a subtle vapour concocted from the blood, by virtue of the heart, and kindled, just as if it were a flame, which performs different actions in different limbs. Although the source of the spirits is only one, they change

13 CR XIII, 17: «Sed haec sententia recepta est. In homine esse animam unam, videlicet spiraculum illud, simul vehens lucem divinam, et adferens vitam partibus omnibus congruentem. Non pugno de hac sententia, nec tamen absurdam esse iudico opinionem supra recitatam, eorum qui dicunt, animam sentientem et vegetatricem esse vel *χρᾶσιν* vel *ἐνδελέχεια*, vel animas distinctas ab illo spiraculo, in quo est intelligentia et electio». In the *Commentarius de anima* of 1540, Melanchthon had inclined even more strongly towards the idea of multiple souls in each man and he had praised William Ockham for this idea. About this, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 2', 97.

> according to the place [they occupy]; and when they change [places], they carry out different actions.[14]

'*Spiritus*' is a subtle vapour concocted from the blood by the power of the heart. It is a corporeal item, though not quite, for it stems out of the most refined blood and is a flame-like thing, capable of performing different actions in different parts of the body. More exactly, Melanchthon distinguishes between two types of actions, corresponding to an equal number of spirits:

> There are two types of spirit. The vital spirit is a flame that originates from the finest blood in the heart, conveys vital heat to the other limbs, and imparts to them the force to exercise the actions that are carried out in virtue of the vital heat. With respect to this meaning of the term, it was said earlier that the arteries are arranged for this purpose, so that they transmit this spirit to the other limbs. The animal spirit is the part, belonging to the same kind of spirit as those originating in the heart, that is transmitted to the brain, where it is made brighter in virtue of the brain and well-suited to its temperament, and [it is] infused into the nerves, as if [it were] light, in order to propel them to the actions of sensation and locomotion. Although others discuss whence this spirit is brought forth, it is reasonable that it originates from the vital spirit, as Galen says in the seventh book of *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*: *Οὕτω τὸ ψυχικὸ πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ ζωτικοῦ κατειργασθέντος ἐπὶ πλέον ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν*. And it is manifest that the spirit becomes better in the brain when the temperament of the heart is good and when the heart is not troubled by rage or sadness.[15]

---

14 CR XIII, 88: «Spiritus est subtilis vapor ex sanguine coctus virtute cordis, ac incensus, ut sit velut flammula, quae in diversis membris dissimiles habet actiones. Quanquam enim unus est fons spirituum, tamen locis mutantur, et mutati dissimiles habent actiones».

15 CR XIII, 88: «Sunt autem species duae. Spiritus vitalis est flammula ex purissimo sanguine in corde nata, calorem vitalem devehens ad coetera membra, et impertiens eis vim exercendi actiones, quas calore vitali efficiunt. Ad hunc usum supra dictum est arterias esse conditas, ut hunc spiritum in omnia membra transvehant. Spiritus animalis est ex eodem genere spirituum, qui nati sunt in corde, pars, transmissa ad cerebrum, ubi virtute cerebri fit lucidior, et conveniens temperamento cerebri, et in nervos infusa velut lumen, ut eos impellat, et actiones sensuum et motum localem cieat. Etsi enim alii disputant unde generetur hic spiritus, tamen consentaneum est, oriri eum a vitali spiritu, ut Galenus inquit libro septimo de dogmatum Hippocratis et Platonis consensu: *Οὕτω τὸ ψυχικὸν πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ ζωτικοῦ κατειργασθέντος ἐπὶ*

The first spirit present in animate bodies is the 'vital spirit' (*spiritus vitalis*), which is a flame originating from the finest blood in the heart. It plays a very important role in living creatures, because by travelling through the arteries, it transmits vital heat from the heart to all the other limbs, so as to provide these with the force necessary to carry out their actions. The second type of spirit is called 'animal spirit' (*spiritus animalis*). The animal spirit also originates from the heart, though it is specifically assigned to the brain and made well suited to its temperament. If there were no animal spirit, animals and men would not be able to perform some of their most fundamental operations at all. In effect, the animal spirit shines more brightly in the brain and flows through the nerves of the body, as though it were some kind of light. As such, it propels the nerves to the actions of locomotion and sensation. Moreover, Melanchthon ascribes this view to Galen, the spirit in the brain is better when the temperament of the heart is good, for instance when the heart is not troubled by rage or sadness. Therefore, the animal spirit originates from the vital one, and both spirits bear a special relation to the temperaments of the bodily organs and the mood of the heart.[16]

Interestingly enough, according to Melanchthon, the lower soul of man – or *ἐνδελέχεία* – corresponds to these bodily spirits:

> Now, let the erudite ones consider this wondrous work of God in man. Particular actions are carried out through the vital and animal spirits, the preservation of life, nutrition, and generation; and besides these, sensation, movement, reasoning, and the moods in our heart. For this reason, some said that the soul was these spirits or vital and animals flames.[17]

πλέον ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν. Et manifestum est, spiritum fieri meliorem in cerebro, quando bonum est cordis temperamentum, et quando cor non turbatum est ira et moestitia».

16 A few lines further in the text, Melanchthon also points out that traditionally another type of spirit is believed to exist; that is, the natural spirit, present in the liver, where it has to warm up the blood. However, Melanchthon thinks that this function may well be performed by the vital spirit and that therefore there is no need for a separate natural spirit: «Quidam addiderunt tertiam speciem, videlicet spiritum naturalem in epate, qui ibi fovet sanguine, et in sanguine halitus excitat. Sed commodious est dicere vitalem spiritum a corde etiam ad epar transvehi, qui calorem vivificum epatis adiuvat in generatione sanguinis. Est enim cor fons vitae».

17 CR XIII, 88: «Iam cogitent studiosi hoc mirandum Dei opus in homine. Spiritu vitali et animali actiones praecipuae efficiuntur, vitae conservatio, nutritio, generatio, deinde sensus, motus, cogitatio, adfectus in corde. Ideo aliqui dixerunt, animam esse hos spiritus seu flam-

The bodily spirits are so remarkable that their functioning shows that man is the orderly work of God. They preserve life and are linked to nourishment, generation, sensation, motion, reasoning and moods in our hearts. Yet, their divine origin notwithstanding, the bodily spirits appear to be much less stable than the '*spiritus intelligens*': the latter has innate and clear notions of what is good and what is not, whereas the former spirits are subject to heart moods, such as rage and sadness, as well as to all sorts of other influences, as we are about to see.

As I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, Melanchthon concludes the section of the *Liber de anima* devoted to the bodily spirits by hinting at their capability of mixing with the spirit of God and with the devils' spirits. The devils, Melanchthon explains, can occupy our hearts and interfere with the spirits in our body. By doing so they can impede judgment, produce madness, and drive us to the cruellest movements, as when Judas killed himself upon betraying Christ. In contrast, the vital and animal spirits in pious men (i.e., men who have accepted the Christian faith) are rendered brighter by the action of the Holy Spirit in their bodies. But how are these external influences on the bodily spirits even possible? Moreover, if the spirits of the devils can drive us to madness, is there any way we can cure it? Do we have any influence at all on these interactions?

In what follows, I shall show that Melanchthon's theological conception of justification by faith alone (or *sola fide*) is the key to understanding his ideas about the interaction between the natural and the supernatural spirits. Moreover, I shall explain that Melanchthon looked at the Christian faith and at prayer as the way to influence said interaction for the good.

Unfortunately, the *Liber de anima* does not elaborate on the details of the interplay between the movements of the soul and the divine and evil forces. Nonetheless, we can obtain some more information about the relationship between the various kinds of spirits that fill Melanchthon's world, by looking at some of his other writings.

In the second book of his 1549 *Initia doctrinae physicae*, he writes a section entitled *De reductione eventuum ad Deum et ad bonos aut malos spiritus*. There, Melanchthon sets

---

mulas vitales et animales». The 'aliqui dixerunt' in this quote might make one think that Melanchthon is distancing himself from those who conflate the soul with the bodily spirits. However, I hope my analysis of Melanchthon's work, in this and in the previous chapter of this thesis, sufficiently shows the following point: both in the *Commentarius* and in the *Liber de anima*, Melanchthon agrees that – at least the vegetative and sensitive souls – are either the movement of the bodily spirits, or the bodily spirits themselves.

out to determine which events in the sublunary world can be attributed to the direct work of God and which instead have to be traced back to other causes.

There are indeed events that cannot be ascribed to the natural order, in such a way that their causes may be exhibited:

> But there are many other events that are to be assigned to the divine providence; for they do not proceed from that order, in a way that the secondary causes that primarily govern the event may be exhibited. As for instance, when Moses was preserved when cast away at sea. [...] And the greatest part of the saddest events in the whole human kind originates primarily from the devil, who strengthens madness among the impious. [...] And that such madness originates from the devil is certain, for whichever nature, insofar as it is guided by its natural light and disposition, seeks its preservation and loves its fellows. But the devil destroys that light and those dispositions, as it is written: "he holds the minds of the impious captive". And about Judas it is said: "Satan entered into him".[18]

Melanchthon considers the biblical episode of Moses' crossing the Red Sea to be God's immediate doing. At the same time, he also thinks that the devil too can act directly on us and penetrate into our heart, as in the case of Judas' suicide. And yet, there are events in human life that do not depend on the direct intervention of God and the evil spirits.

We have already noticed that Melanchthon links important aspects of human life to the bodily spirits. These can determine our mood, as well as the (pious or cruel) movements of our soul. But the good or bad disposition of the bodily spirits, in its turn, has been shown to depend on the temperaments of the heart and the brain: the more serene our heart, the better the spirit in our brain. Interestingly enough, according to Melanchthon, this is not the end of the story. His discussion of the

18 Philip Melanchthon, *Initia doctrinae physicae*, in CR XIII, 322–323: «Sed alii multi eventus sunt, quos ad providentiam divinam referri necesse est, qui non eo ordine fiunt, ut causae secundae, quae principaliter gubernent eventum, monstrari possint. Ut cum Moises servatur in aquam abiectus [...] Et magna pars tristissimorum eventuum, in toto genere humano, principaliter oritur a Diabolo, qui furores in Impiis confirmat [...] Hos furores a Diabolo oriri certum est, quia quaelibet natura, donec naturali luce et adfectu regitur, sui conservationem adpetit, et amat cognatos. Sed hanc lucem, et hos adfectus extinguit Diabolus, ut scriptum est: tenere eum captivas mentes impiorum. Et de Iuda dicitur: intravit in eum Satanas».

good and bad spirits in the *Initia doctrinae physicae* continues with a section on *De temperamentis et stellis*. Here, Melanchthon links the action of the temperaments to that of the stars, by means of some illustrative example:

> It is true then that the temperaments are governed and changed by the position of the stars. For this reason I connected both causes here. [...] Marquees Iohannes Albertus, Archbishop of Magdeburg, has the Moon in Aries, in the sixth house, which refers to health. And the Moon is besieged by Mars, which is itself in Aries, as well as by Saturn, which is in Taurus. And the Sun and Mercury are in opposition. These are manifest signs of constant ferocity of sickness. Nor are only the signs of health evident in the stars, but also [those] of the successful and unsuccessful inclinations in the arts or in other actions that are common to the nature of man, as in pursuing the peaks of the honours, doing battle, and in the dangers of life.[19]

This passage gives us a clearer idea of how the temperaments are affected by the position of the stars and the extent to which their joint action is relevant in matters of the health of our bodies and souls. Melanchthon refers to a horoscope regarding the Archbishop of Magdeburg, who has the Moon in Aries, in the sixth house; this has to do with health. But the Moon is besieged by Mars, which is itself in Aries, and by Saturn, which is in Taurus. Given this constellation, and that the Sun and Mercury are in opposition, it is manifest that the archbishop is subject to fierce sickness. But the stars not only determine our health, they also play a role in human actions, such as in our successes and failures, as well as in political conditions and dangers.

These observations are the basis of Melanchthon's defence of the utility of astrology. If it is true that the action of the stars on sublunary bodies – including ours – is a determining factor in matters of the health of the body and in the inclinations of the soul, then astrology is of the utmost importance when it comes to the care of

19 CR XIII, 324–325: «Verum est autem, stellarum positu gubernari et variari temperamenta. Ideo coniunxi hoc loco utranque causam. [...] Marchio Iohannes Albertus Archepiscopus Magdeburgensis Lunam habet in Ariete in domo sexta, quae valetudini significat. Et circumsessa est Luna a Marte, qui et ipse in Ariete est, et a Saturno, qui est in Tauro. Et oppositi sunt Sol et Mercurius. Hae sunt manifestae significationes assiduae sevitiae morborum. Nec tantum valetudinis signa sunt illustria in stellis, sed etiam inclinationum foelicium aut infoelicium in artibus, aut aliis actionibus quae naturae hominum familiares sunt, ut in adsequendis fastigiis honorum, in praeliando, in periculis vitae».

both. This is nicely illustrated by some lines in Melanchthon's oration *The Dignity of Astrology* (1535):

> But let us look at the individual morals. If one understands the inclinations of one's nature, he can nourish and strengthen the good ones and avoid the vices by diligence and reason. In fact, what Ptolemy says is true; namely, that the wise soul assists the activity of the heaven, just as the good farmer in ploughing and cleansing assists nature. This is evident in the care for health, in choosing a type of life or study, and in undertaking business that is either fit or unfit for one's talent.[20]

To recapitulate, Melanchthon believes that there are mainly two types of spirit in human beings. Man has an immaterial intelligent spirit, which is responsible for higher forms of theoretical and practical thinking (i.e. intellect and will), and is endowed with knowledge of what is good and what is bad. But each human being is also provided with a lower form of spirit, which is made out of the finest blood and linked to fundamental life functions, such as nourishment and generation. Given their affinity with the temperaments of the heart and the brain, the bodily spirits are linked to our moods and inclinations and therefore influence our will and behaviour. What is more, the bodily spirits and the temperaments are subject to the influence of divine and evil forces, as well as to the action of the stars. In fact, these considerations caused Melanchthon to believe that astrology was an important art vis-à-vis the care of man's bodily health and vicissitudes. In this respect, other scholars – prominently Sachiko Kusukawa – have stressed the importance of medical astrology in Melanchthon's thought.[21] Here, in addition to this, I would like to draw

20 Philip Melanchthon, *Dignitas astrologiae*, in CR XI, 266: «Sed videamus privates mores. Si quis naturae suae inclinationem intelligit, alere bona et confirmare, et vitare vitia diligentia ac ratione potest. Verum est enim quod ait Ptolomaeus. Sapiens anima adiuvat coelestem operationem, quaemadmodum optimus agricola arando expurgandoque adiuvat naturam. Hoc late patet in cura valetudinis, in diligendo genere vitae, studii, in suspiciendis negotiis vel aptis vel abhorrentibus ab ingenio».

21 Kusukawa has shown that Melanchthon looked at astrology as inseparable from astronomy and as one important way in which man could recognise the presence of a divine mind governing the universe according to a providential plan. For reference to Kusukawa's work on Melanchthon's astrological thought, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 70, fn. 154. On the impact of astrology on renaissance medical theories, see: Hiro Hirai, "The New Astral Medicine", in Brendan Dooley, ed., *A Companion to Astrology in the Renaissance* (Leiden 2014), 267–286.

attention to another aspect of Melanchthon's ideas on the relationship between the natural order, the bodily spirits, and their right disposition. More specifically, I would like to return to the initial questions mentioned in this chapter, regarding the interplay between the bodily spirits, the devil, and the Holy Spirit, as well as our power to influence their interaction.

In effect, on the one hand, the medical and astrological consideration of the affinity between the stars and our bodies can help us determine the best cures for our health and the optimal ways of going along our business in society and politics. On the other hand, the question arises how, in Melanchthon's opinion, we are to deal with the presence of the spirits of God and the devil in our brain and heart. By providing an answer to this question we will also be able to better understand Melanchthon's ideas about the presence of the Holy Spirit in human beings, as they seem to form an important part of his theology of justification by faith alone.

In the section of Melanchthon's *Initia doctrinae physicae* devoted to the bodily temperaments and the stars, we are presented with a clearer, somewhat hierarchical scheme of the relationship between God, the stars, and the inclinations of our soul:

> And God must not be removed from the direction of the stars; but truly it must be stated that God regulates many of the inclinations proceeding from the stars; and He must be invoked in order that He assist the good [inclinations] and curb the bad ones. In fact, we do not believe this saying was in vain: "how much more will the heavenly Father bestow the Holy Spirit upon those who ask for it?" (cf. Mt 7, 11).[22]

According to Melanchthon, the stars can determine the inclinations of our temperaments and spirits. Therefore, the acute medic (*sagax medicus*), one possessing knowledge of both medicine and astrology, can show the natural causes of certain human events and accordingly devise cures and methods to avoid those that might cause harm.[23] Yet, one should not look at these natural causes as an order independent of

---

22 CR XIII, 325: «Nec Deus removendus est a gubernatione propter astra, sed vere statuendum multas inclinationes ab astris ortas Deum moderari et orandum ut bonas iuvet et reprimat malas. Non enim frustra dictum putemus: quanto magis Pater coelestis dabit Spiritum Sanctum petentibus».

23 In conclusion of his discussion on the temperaments and the stars, Melanchthon elaborates on the usefulness of astrology for the cure of our bodies and the handling of our good and bad inclinations. In that context, he writes: «Fatum nec ignis nec ferreus murus arcere potest,

God. Quite the contrary: God regulates the inclinations of the soul by means of the stars. It is for this reason that we need to invoke him to bestow the Holy Spirit upon us and in this way facilitate the good inclinations of our spirits and curb the bad ones. Therefore, prayer – I would like to suggest – plays a crucial role in Melanchthon's conception of the interaction between the human temperaments and spirits, on the one hand, and the divine and celestial influences to which they are subject, on the other.

In fact, Melanchthon's mention of prayer is not limited to the passage just quoted. Nor does it appear to be merely a rhetorical interlude on the part of one who, after all, was pursuing a Christian type of natural philosophy. Similar remarks are found at least twice in the *Liber de anima*. For instance, in conclusion of the anatomical section on the temperaments, Melanchthon writes:

> But there exists a great difference between species, such that the temperaments in the individual bodies differ [from each other] in consideration of the different natures of the parents and the different mixtures (i.e. positions) of the stars. And the consideration of these differences appears to be necessary for the medics. The same consideration also helps to uphold the sanity in the public life, to rule morals, and to be cautious in private matters. The diligence is most necessary to avoid the monstrous, arrogant, malevolent, and treacherous natures. Moreover, given that we notice in ourselves how much we are prone to vices, let us work in order to curb and destroy those inclinations by vigilance and training. Let us behold that help must be asked from the Son of God, so that He curb and shutter our vicious impulses; for it is written: "how much more will your heavenly Father bestow the Holy Spirit upon those who ask for it?" (cf. Mt 7, 11).[24]

---

ut Carthaginenses non possunt impedire quo minus Imperio potiatur urbs Roma. Tamen, particulares eventus multi et prospici et bonae inclinationes iuvari et malae reprimi possunt, ut sagax medicus corpora praemunire potest contra certos morbos, qui ea invasuri essent, nisi arcerentur. Ita cum videmus ad quae vitia proni sumus, propter stellas aut temperamenta maiore vigilantia regendi sunt mores ne malae inclinationes vincant. Et cum ex hac ipsa doctrina discamus, Deum causam esse praecipuam liberrime caeteras moderantem; ab ipso etiam regi nos petamus» (CR XIII, 328).

24 CR XIII, 87: «Sed omnium specierum magna varietas est, ut in singulis corporibus temperamenta propter diversas parentum naturas, et diversas stellarum commixtiones different. Ac medicis necessariam esse considerationem harum dissimilitudinum constat. Prodest autem

Here, Melanchthon stresses that different temperaments of our body depend on the diverse nature of our parents as well as on the influence of the stars. On this basis, he explains, medics should consider such differences so as to promote good health and morals. At the same time, however, Melanchthon draws the attention of the reader to the fallen nature of human beings and to their ensuing drift to vices and evil inclinations. As a consequence of this, he deems it necessary for the medical handling of the bodily temperaments to be complemented with the help of the Christian Trinity: the Son of God has to be invoked to plead with the Father, so that the Holy Spirit may control the vicious urges of our temperaments.

Interestingly enough, the theme of prayer surfaces again at the end of Melanchthon's discussion *De spiritibus* that I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. There, Melanchthon describes the bodily spirits as a subtle vapour originating from the most refined blood in our heart. These spirits coincide with the corporeal soul of man and his fundamental vital operations. Melanchthon looks at these operations against the background of a wondrous world full of spirits, in which the vital and animal spirits in our body can get mixed with the spirit of God and the spirits of the devils. In this way, they either shine more brightly or are led to cruelty and madness. Melanchthon ends this discussion by an exhortation to the virtuous direction of the human nature by means of prayer:

> Let us observe and rule our nature and behold that our spirits ought to be the dwelling of the Holy Spirit; and let us pray the Son of God, so that He expel the devils from us and infuse the divine spirit into our spirits.[25]

Prayer appears necessary in guiding our nature, for however subject to the evil influences and keen on vices, our bodily spirits can be ruled by the action of the Holy

---

et in communi vita ad tuendam valetudinem, ad regendos mores, ad circumspectionem in familiaritatibus. Omnino necessaria diligentia est vitare monstrosas, superbas, malevolas et perfidiosas naturas. Praeterea cum animadvertimus in nobis ipsis, ad quae vitia proniores simus, vigilantia et adsuefactione eas inclinations frenare, et extinguere annitamur. Sciamus etiam a filio Dei petendum esse auxilium, ut viciosos impetus in nobis reprimat et frangat, sicut scriptum est: quanto magis Pater vester coelestis dabit Spiritum Sanctum petentibus?».

25 CR XIII, 89: «Aspiciamus igitur naturam nostram, et diligenter eam regamus, et scimus, oportere spiritus nostros esse domicilium Spiritus sancti, et oremus filium Dei, ut ipse depellat a nobis diabolos, et spiritum divinum in nostros spiritus transfundat».

Spirit on them. It is no coincidence, then, that later in the text of the *Liber de anima*, we are told that the trust in God's presence and help is the most effective medication and that our cure lies with him:

> Certainly, then, it happens that very many men decline in health and die from sadness, for man's heart, which is the seat of the affects, hardens and the spirits are brought forth weaker and they enfeeble all the other powers. For this reason Hippocrates says: "hypochondria, painful disease". Indeed, to rest with trust in the divine presence and help is the most effective of medicaments, just as it is said: "your cure lies with God and he himself nurtures you".[26]

This point is of particular importance, because it may help us understand Melanchthon's rather unique idea, according to which the Holy Spirit can get mixed with man's bodily spirits. On the one hand, I have shown that Melanchthon thought that invoking the presence of God in man was essential to ruling one's soul for the good. On the other hand, one might wonder why Melanchthon emphasised so much that taking care of the soul amounted to the actual presence of something as immaterial as the Holy Spirit in the very body of man.

Daniel P. Walker has attempted to answer this question in his 1983 article "Medical Spirits and God and the Soul". According to Walker, Melanchthon's theory is part of a broader history of overlaps between different significations of the term 'spirit' – a history, in Walker's opinion, that brought about «theologically unorthodox conceptions of God». On Walker's account, Melanchthon was meaning to say that there was a congruity between the Holy Spirit and the bodily spirits, such that man's spirits became as spiritual as the soul and the Holy Spirit became «quasi-corporeal». According to Walker, Melanchthon brings the two types of spirit so close together that the result is a «sensualist conception» of the Christian divinity.[27]

---

26 CR XIII, 95: «Certo est autem, valde multos homines tantum moestitia contabescere et interire, quia cor, quod sedes est adfectuum, torrefit, et spiritus gignuntur debiliores et languefiunt omnes aliae vires. Ideo Hippocrates inquit: *φροντὶς, χαλεπὴ νόσος*. Medicatio autem omnium efficacissima est, fiducia praesentiae et auxilii divini acquiescere, et a Deo petere et expectare vel liberationem vel mitigationem, iuxta dictum: iacta in Deum curam tuam et ipse te enutriet».

27 Daniel P. Walker, "Medical Spirits and God and the Soul", 223–231.

Also Kusukawa has written that «Melanchthon began to see the Holy Spirit as a physical reality» and that his theory about the mingling of man's spirits with the spirit of God «seems to signify what Melanchthon wanted to see all along in the human body, namely the presence of the power of God».[28]

In my opinion, the idea of God's presence in man was indeed essential to Melanchthon's thought. However, it had very little to do with looking at the Holy Spirit as a physical reality or with any sensualist or unorthodox conception of God. On the contrary, Melanchthon's theory was a very important part of his attempt to establish a new orthodoxy and one, in fact, in which God's presence in the world could be safeguarded without making the divinity too worldly.

I think it is no coincidence that Melanchthon refers to the presence of the Holy Spirit in "pious" men and that he exhorts his readers to pray, so that man's spirits became the "dwelling" of the Holy Spirit. A closer look at what Melanchthon exactly understands by the terms "pious" and "dwelling" will enable us to adequately interpret the overlap of spirits in the *Liber de anima*.

Interestingly enough, around the same time when he wrote the *Liber de anima*, Melanchthon was also busy with the so-called 'Osiandrian controversy': a dispute with the theologian Andreas Osiander, which led Melanchthon to make some changes to his conception of justification by faith alone. At the heart of these changes was the idea of "dwelling".

In his *Loci communes* of 1521, Melanchthon had embraced Luther's idea that man was incapable of attaining salvation by means of good works. Since the original sin had effectively weakened the affects of the soul, especially man's will was no longer free. But whilst Luther thought that participation in Christ by faith was the only way in which man could be justified, Melanchthon was of a different opinion. According to Melanchthon, justification *sola fide* meant the renewal of the powers of the soul (especially the will) that had been damaged by the original sin. The pious man was for Melanchthon a man whose soul was renewed by Christ.

Now, Osiander considered Melanchthon's doctrine to be unorthodox, for it allegedly removed Luther's idea of the presence of Christ in the believer from the notion of justification. In 1552, as he was publishing his *Liber de anima*, Melanchthon also produced a written reply to Osiander, which sought to balance the latter's criticism with the views expressed in the 1521 *Loci communes*. In his *Antwort* to Osiander, Melanchthon reiterated that pious men were not men in which Christ was present

28 Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy*, 120.

but rather men whose souls had been renewed by the Holy Spirit. Yet by means of this renewal, Melanchthon now thinks, God made the pious men's hearts his 'dwelling place'.[29]

Melanchthon's fresh understanding of justification *sola fide* involved much psychology: it was based on an understanding of original sin pivoting on the weakening of man's will, as well as on God's renewal of and dwelling in man's soul. It is no surprise, then, that Melanchthon's *Liber de anima* looked at the Holy Spirit as effectively interacting with man's spirits and as present in man's heart: these spirits were central to man's will and behaviour and the part of the justified men in which God was present. As I hope should be clear by now, Melanchthon did not look at these ideas in terms of a 'sensualist interpretation' of the Christian divinity, nor did he want to conceive of the Holy Spirit as a physical reality. On the contrary, the *Liber de anima*'s unusual theories were only the philosophical underpinning of Melanchthon's efforts to balance his notion of justification as a renewal of the soul with Luther's emphasis on the real presence of God in the Christian believer.

It is for these reasons that Melanchthon thought that the best cure for man's sinful soul (viz., a soul dominated by the affects of the bodily spirits) was to invoke God, so that he may make the human soul the dwelling place of the Holy Spirit. In the years of the *Liber de anima*, Melanchthon had come to understand the presence of the Holy Spirit in men as the way in which God renewed, hence justified, the souls of those who had faith. In this sense, the interaction between the Holy Spirit and man's soul as described in the *Liber de anima* was part of Melanchthon's theology of justification.

3.4. Conclusions

Melanchthon used the notion of 'spirit' in many and sometimes overlapping ways. This varied usage was discussed by some of his contemporaries who studied topics concerning the soul. Some of them, like Otto Casmann, tried to downplay the problems connected with its multi-faceted nature and instead preferred to emphasise the Christian connotation of Melanchthon's notion of '*spiritus*'. As such, '*spiritus*' was taken to be an intelligent, immaterial, and immortal nature, provided with innate

29 For more details regarding Melanchthon's and Luther's theories of justification, as well as the 'Osiandrian controversy', see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 74–77.

ideas of civic morals.[30] Others, like Julius Caesar Scaliger, pointed to the ambiguity involved in the idea of '*spiritus*', its sensualist implications, hence its unsuitability as a definition of the human soul.

In effect, Melanchthon appears to use '*spiritus*' to define both the immaterial and the corporeal souls of man. That 'spiritus' was applied by Melanchthon to both of these souls does not mean that he came to see them as one single entity. On the contrary, it means that Melanchthon used 'spiritus' in an equivocal way, to indicate two completely different souls. What is more, he employed the same term to refer to the Christian divinity, as well as to the evil spirits, or devils. Melanchthon's natural philosophy was not only a world full of spirits, but in fact the stage on which these characters interacted. The present chapter further develops the idea that has been presented by other scholars, according to which Melanchthon's conception of the human soul involved an essentially practical dimension. Historians – chiefly Sachiko Kusukawa – have demonstrated that Melanchthon's main scope in writing his *De anima* was to show that human beings were endowed with an intelligent spirit, which had innate knowledge of God's Law.

By looking at Melanchthon's varied understanding of 'spirit' however, one may better grasp the way in which Melanchthon looks at the dynamics underling man's interaction with the world and with himself. On the one hand, the soul knows the law of God; on the other hand, human nature bears the effects of the fall. According to Melanchthon, man is provided with bodily spirits that govern fundamental life functions (such as, generation, growth, and sensation) and are linked to practical dimensions of human nature and society. Because the spirits and the temperaments of the human body – together with the influence of the stars – determine the good or bad state of the human body, as well as the moods and inclinations of the soul, they are relevant to man's health, behaviour, and morals. Especially in consideration of his fallen nature, man is likely to go along the negative inclinations of the bodily spirits and to undergo the influence of those belonging to the devil.

Nevertheless, human beings are also provided with an intelligent spirit, capable of devising methods for healing the body and to tell the difference between good and evildoings. The human soul – or at least the soul of those who have accepted the Christian faith – is also able to interact with the spirit of God and to invoke him in

30 Casmann endorses Melanchthon's conception of innate ideas in the human soul, in his discussion "An pervulgatum hoc Aristotelis 'nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu' sit vero de omni". See Casmann, *Psychologia anthropologica*, 122–125.

such a way that the action of the Holy Spirit may promote man's pious inclinations and curb the bad ones.

When one looks at Melanchthon's *Liber de anima*, one may very well agree with Scaliger that the notion of '*spiritus*' emerging from that book is quite tangled-up. But true as this may be, a broader look at Melanchthon's understanding of '*spiritus*' may prove Scaliger's critic Casmann right: Melanchthon looked at '*spiritus*' essentially as a Christian way to look at man's soul. Melanchthon's notion of '*spiritus*' was an integral part of Melanchthon's effort to define the soul from a Christian point of view. But his notion of '*spiritus*' was also central to Melanchthon's understanding of a very central point for the Lutheran faith: the doctrine of justification *sola fide*.

In the following chapter of this thesis, I shall show how Otto Casmann relied on Melanchthon's understanding of '*spiritus*' in discussing another psychological question: the difference between the human and the animal souls. By doing this, I shall also show that the theological dimension of Melanchthon's and Casmann's conflicting ideas about '*spiritus*' also involved the way in which these men thought there was a parallel between man's body and '*spiritus*', on the one hand, and Christ's human and divine nature, on the other hand.

CHAPTER 4

Franciscus Vallesius and Otto Casmann on Animal and Human Souls

4.0. Introduction

Philip Melanchthon's psychology dealt with the entirety of human nature, i.e., with man's body and soul. In doing this, Melanchthon was following Martin Luther, who had stated that a truly Christian understanding of man was as much about the body as it was about the soul. Man as a whole, Luther had said in his 1536 *Disputatio de homine*, was not just an '*animal rationale*' (a rational animal), but was more adequately understood as the subject of sin and grace. As a consequence of this, Luther explained, body and soul should not be considered apart from each other, but they had to be taken together as forming the subject of Christian anthropology.[1] Melanchthon accepted this idea and developed it in his *Commentarius de anima* and *Liber de anima*. Yet, he did it in his own way.

According to Melanchthon, the Christian subject of sin and grace was indeed the whole man. But the whole man was composed of two radically different parts: a body and an intelligent spirit. As we have seen, it was this version of Luther's ideas that Melanchthon taught to his Wittenberg students. But thanks to the diffusion of Melanchthon's psychology at other reformed universities, the type of anthropology I have described so far became popular with some of his contemporaries, such as Otto Casmann, to whom this chapter will devote special attention.

Here, I shall examine the way in which Casmann looked at what was specifically human, or in other words, what made man differ from all other animals. Far from arbitrary, this issue appears to involve a question that one might quite logically ask when looking at the notion of '*spiritus*', which both Melanchthon and Casmann put at the centre of their psychologies. In effect, this notion involved some major points of divergence from the Aristotelian hylomorphic way of looking at the soul. Most medieval and Renaissance authors who worked in the Aristotelian framework looked

1 On Luther's anthropology and on Melanchthon's reliance on it, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 61–64 and 'Chapter 2', 89, *passim*.

at the soul as "the form of an organic body possessing life potentially". Part of this conception was the idea that man differed specifically from all other animate beings due to his unique possession of one higher power of the soul: the intellect. Now, Luther's and Melanchthon's dissatisfaction with the idea of '*animal rationale*', as well as with Aristotle's definition of the soul resulted in confining the role of being the form of the body to a movement of the bodily spirits, or *ἐνδελέχεια*. At the same time, Melanchthon thought that the notion of '*spiritus intelligens*' was a better (that is, Christian) way of defining man's soul.

Otto Casmann accepted Melanchthon's views because he considered them to be more in consonance with the teaching of Christian theology. But in which terms did he look at the specificity of human beings now that he favoured the idea of '*spiritus intelligens*' over that of '*anima rationalis*'? As I shall explain in this present chapter, Casmann proposed a new way to consider human life. But because he did so most elaborately in his comparative analysis of the souls of men and 'brute animals', this chapter shall examine the question "whether *bruta* possess reason". More in particular, Casmann developed his ideas in the course of his criticism of the Spanish physician Franciscus Vallesius, who in his *Sacra Philosophia* (1582) had defended the view that animals were provided with some form of reason. In his *Psychologia anthropologica* (1594), Casmann defended the rival position on the basis of a direct attack on Vallesius's argumentation.[2]

The discussion between Vallesius and Casmann will enable us to understand the way in which Melanchthon's and Casmann's shared idea of '*spiritus*' also involved a new way of considering human beings and their place in the created world. More precisely, I shall show that, on the one hand, the differences between Vallesius and Casmann were to a significant extent occasioned by the increasing use of ancient and contemporary medical sources in their psychological studies. On the other hand, I shall point out that the way in which Casmann handled issues concerning animal and human souls brought man into a particular relationship with the Christian divinity, whereby Christology – instead of Aristotelian biology – became the model for defining what was specifically human. Let us turn then to the discussion between

2 In the texts I examine, Vallesius and Casmann use a variety of different terms to refer, broadly speaking, to a power of the soul higher than sensation. Those are, for instance: 'intelligence' (*intelligentia*), 'understanding' (*intellectus*), 'reason' (*ratio*), and 'mind' (*mens*). However, Vallesius and Casmann appear to mostly call this power 'reason'. Therefore, and for the sake of simplicity, I will use the term reason (and the related expressions: rational/rationality) throughout my study, in order to indicate the power of the soul debated by Vallesius and Casmann.

Vallesius and Casmann on animal and human souls. Because much of Casmann's argument is a direct criticism of Vallesius' ideas, let us start by presenting the latter's argument in favour of brute animals' reason.

4.1. Franciscus Vallesius: Animal Reason and 'Reason' as an Analogical Term

Vallesius' discussion of human and animal reason is found in his *Sacra Philosophia*, which was first published in 1582. It is not surprising that Vallesius wanted to dedicate the book to the then King of Spain, Philip II. In fact, at the time Vallesius drafted that work, he had already been working as physician to the Royal Court of Spain for ten years.

Before accepting this prestigious position, Vallesius had been professor of medicine at Alcalá, where he published widely in the fields of natural philosophy, medicine and anatomy. His academic production mainly consists of commentaries on medical texts by Hippocrates and Galen. For this reason, scholars have considered his work to be an example of "Galenist Hippocratism".[3] Although it is not my purpose to assess the historical accuracy of this label for the case of Vallesius, it is quite evident that ancient medical knowledge represents his main intellectual source. As I will show, part of Vallesius' reliance on the work of Hippocrates also surfaces in Vallesius' argumentation in favour of the reason of lower animals, to which we now turn.

Vallesius' comparative study of animal and human souls is part of the bigger objective that lies at the heart of the *Sacra Philosophia*, namely to conduct a rational study of those teachings in the Holy Scriptures that are relevant to physics. The ninety one chapters composing the text consist of the author's commentary on an equal number of passages taken from the Bible. Instead of proceeding thematically, Vallesius' *Sacra Philosophia* follows the order of the books in the Old and New Testaments. Vallesius' discussion hence goes from the *Book of Genesis* to *Maccabees*, and then from *Mathew* to the *Book of Revelation*. Vallesius' discussion of the souls of animals and men stems from several passages in the *Sacra Philosophia* that take their start from *Job*, 38.36 (according to the Latin text of the Vulgate): «who placed wisdom

3 About this, see José M.L. Piñero and Francisco Calero, *Las "Controversias" (1556)*, 3–10. An extensive list of medical and philosophical publications by Vallesius is found in Marcial Solana, *Historia de la filosofía española*, 299–307. For more information about Vallesius' intellectual biographies, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 21–23.

into the inward parts of man, and who gave intelligence to rooster?» (*Quis posuit in visceribus hominis sapientiam, vel quis dedit gallo intelligentiam?*).

Vallesius takes this passage quite literally, as stating the two following ideas. On the one hand – Vallesius explains – the scriptural verse hints at the metaphysical dependence of all creatures on God. On the other hand, it seems to suggest that roosters, and hence all animals, are provided with some form of reason. On the basis of this interpretation, Vallesius produces a philosophical argumentation in favour of reason in lower animals, aiming to show exactly what animal reason is. This discussion proposed in the *Sacra Philosophia* can be divided into two parts. The first appears to be mostly based on the authority of an alleged Hippocratic conception of the relation between animal sensation and reason. The second part is grounded in the observation of animal behaviour.

The strategy adopted by Vallesius to develop his first argument consists in handling the question of the reason of animals as one concerning the relation between reason and sensation in general. Seemingly drawing on Plutarch's *De sollertia animalium*, Vallesius writes that ancient philosophers who recognised that all animals partook in reason relied on a theory proposed by Strato of Lampsacus, 'in some book' (*libellum quendam*). According to Strato's view, all sensations involve reason.[4] By look-

4 A passage at the beginning of the discussion in the *Sacra Philosophia* suggests that Plutarch's text is Vallesius' source of information about the different positions taken by ancient authors in the debate over animal reason: «De qua quaestione Plutarchus libello de animalium industria optime mihi videtur disputasse» (Vallesius, *De Sacra Philosophia*, 273). Vallesius seems to refer to a passage in Plutarch's *De sollertia animalium*, the English translation of which goes as follows: «There is, in fact, a work of Strato, the natural philosopher, which proves that it is impossible to have sensation at all without some action of the intelligence. Often, it is true, whilst we are busy reading, the letters may fall on our eyes, or words may fall on our ears, which escape our attention since our minds are intent on other things; but later the mind recovers, shifts its course, and follows up every detail that had been neglected; and this is the meaning of the saying 'mind has sight and mind has hearing; everything else is deaf and blind', indication that the impact on eyes and ears brings no perception if the understanding is not present» (Harold Cherniss and William C. Helmbold, eds., Plutarch, *De sollertia animalium*, Harvard, 1957, 131–132). The passage in Greek can be found in Gregorius N. Bernardakis, ed., Plutarch, *Moralia* (Leipzig 1895). Plutarch appears to refer to fragment 112 by Strato of Lampsacus (335c.–269c. BC), in Fritz Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles* (Basel 1978), V, 34. As Robert Sharples pointed out, Strato explains the activities of the soul by the idea of *pneuma* or spirit. The spirit extends throughout the body from the head. Because Strato was influenced by contemporary anatomical and medical views, he observed that the functions of the nerves always involve psychic spirit extending from the brain. From this, Strato gathered that all sensation involves reasoning (Robert W. Sharples, "The Peripatetic School", in David Furley, *From Aristotle to*

ing at this ancient debate, Vallesius argues that the relationship between sensation and reason seems to be what really is at stake in the question concerning the soul of brute animals. Consequently, in order to establish whether animals have a share in reason, one has to ascertain whether or not the absence of reason might impede sensation to come about at all.[5] According to Vallesius, sensation cannot exist without the joint action of reason, on the following grounds:

> Now, it seems that the mind cannot be separated from sense; for, as Hippocrates states, those who do not feel pain when some part of the body aches, in them the mind becomes ill. Therefore, given that when the mind becomes ill and insane, so that it is not attentive to the organs of sensation, and although the cause of pain approaches, it is not sensed, then even less any other thing can be sensed of those which stimulate the senses less vigorously, unless mind is present. We also experience this in ourselves. In fact, when we are more intent on thinking of something, many things occur to the eyes and ears that we do not see or hear. Therefore, if those animated beings that are provided with the mind do not sense when the mind does not attend, much less can those that lack the mind altogether. For this reason, if those that lack the mind cannot sense, they cannot have sensation either. Therefore, sensation cannot be without the mind.[6]

The first claim expressed in the quote – that the *mens*, or reason, is inseparable from the sensitive operations of the soul – resembles the view found in Aristotle's *De anima*,

---

Augustine: Routledge *History of Philosophy*, Volume 2 (London 2003), 162–163). For the debate on animal minds in Antiquity, see: Richard Sorabji, *Animal Minds and Human Morals. The Origins of the Western Debate* (Worcester 1993).

5 Vallesius, *De Sacra Philosophia*, 274: «Itaque, huc controversia vertitur an possit esse sensus sine mente».

6 Vallesius, *De Sacra Philosophia*, 274: «Videtur autem non posse mens separari a sensu, quandoquidem, ut Hippocrates dicit, qui parte aliqua corporis dolentes dolorem non sentiunt, iis mens aegrotat. Si igitur cum mens aegrotat alienataque est, ita ut sensuum organis intenta non sit, etiamsi dolendi accedat causa, non sentitur, multo minus sentiri possit res ulla alia earum quae minus violenter sensum pulsant, nisi adsit mens, quod etiam in nobis ipsis experimur. Nam, cum re aliqua attentius cogitamus, plurima obversantur ob oculos et aures quae neque videmus neque audimus. Si igitur animantia mente praedita, cum mens non attendit, non sentiunt, multo minus sentire possent quae penitus essent amentia. Quod si amentia sentire non possunt, neque sensum possunt habere. Non potest igitur sensus esse sine mente».

according to which higher vital functions necessarily involve the lower ones.[7] But what Vallesius proposes is in fact a reversal of the order of vital functions described by Aristotle. In Aristotle's opinion, the mind cannot operate without sensation, whereas in Vallesius' view the vector of the relation between those two powers of the soul goes also in the inverse direction: sensation occurs only in the presence of reason. Vallesius argues in this manner by endorsing a conception that he ascribes to Hippocrates. Unfortunately, he does not provide any reference to Hippocrates's work; yet, I was able to trace the passage mentioned by the Spanish physician back to Hippocrates's *Aphorisms*.[8] Following this view, some form of 'rational' attention is needed for sensation in general to come about.[9] According to Vallesius, Hippocrates makes this point by looking at the dysfunctional behaviour presented by animals that do not feel pain, even though a part of their body does ache. The ancient physician, Vallesius explains, ascribes this anomaly to a disease of the *mens* (*mens aegrotat*), more exactly to the fact that an ill *mens* is not capable of attending to the operations of the sense organs. Therefore, some animals may fail to feel pain, even though something painful affects their body, because their *mens* (due to some form of illness) fails to be attentive to the information conveyed by the sense organs.

Now, Vallesius draws on this Hippocratic view for proposing his own solution to the sense-reason problem. In fact, if Hippocrates is right in saying that even animals provided with *mens*, or reason, fail to have sensation in the absence of 'rational' attention, how would it be possible for animals lacking reason altogether to have sensation at all? This analysis leaves us with only two possible scenarios: either we deny that animals have sensation or we grant their soul some form of higher mental activity. Vallesius rules out the first possibility on observational grounds. As a matter of fact, we observe animals reacting to images and sounds (e.g., a flock of sheep running away upon being scared by a noise). Therefore, they must be provided with sensation. On this basis, Vallesius concludes that animals are provided with some, if minimal, level of reason, consisting in the attention required for the sensitive operations to go through.

---

7 Aristotle, *De anima* II. 1, 413a21–b10.

8 The Greek text by Hippocrates can be found in Emile Littré, ed., *Œuvres Complètes d'Hippocrate* (Paris 1884), IV, 471; Galenus, "Hippocratis Aphorismi, et Galeni in eos Commentarii", in C.G. Kühn, ed., *Claudii Galenii Opera Omnia* (Hildesheim 1965), 460.

9 On early-modern psychological theories of attention, see: Cees Leijenhorst, "Attention Please! Theories of Selective Attention in Late Aristotelian and Early Modern Philosophy", in Paul J.J.M. Bakker and Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, eds., *Mind, Cognition and Representation*, 205–230.

Interestingly, attending to sense operations is not the only 'rational' feature that Vallesius attributes to animals, as he makes clear in the second part of his argumentation in favour of the rationality of the *bruta*:

> Moreover, to do something well or badly pertains to one and the same faculty. In fact, it is not the case that one sees badly through his ears, or hears badly through his eyes. Instead, seeing is either way of the eyes, and hearing of the ears. Therefore, becoming crazy or going insane belongs to the same [faculty] that knows and that reasons properly. Now, it seems that animals are sometimes deceived, which in fact makes the art of hunting very enjoyable, for although it is inflicted on them in several different ways, they use many stratagems to avoid the traps. Sometimes they also seem to become insane, for instance monkeys that are swept away by intoxication, and many other diseases, such as rabies or hydrophobia, which especially dogs – but also horses, oxen, donkeys and camels – usually suffer from, and which physicians attribute to some types of madness. Thus, if animals can be delirious, they can also reason. In fact, delirium is a damage of reason.[10]

The observation of their behaviour does not only show that animals can feel pain, see colours, and hear sounds, but it also presents us with cases of animals suffering from diseases that physicians trace back to some form of madness. This is the case, for instance, of intoxicated monkeys, and of dogs, horses and camels suffering from hydrophobia. According to Vallesius, such dysfunctional behaviour (and more in general any improper way of operating) needs to be explained in terms of the malfunctioning of an underlying faculty. In effect, the operation of seeing might or might not be performed properly, but either way of functioning pertains to one and the same faculty (sight, in this case, embodied in the eyes). Therefore, madness,

10 Vallesius, *De Sacra Philosophia*, 275: «Praeterea, ad eandem facultatem pertinent bene et male aliquid facere. Non enim evenit male videre auribus, aut male audire oculis, sed utcumque videre oculorum est, et audire aurium. Igitur desipere, aut insanire, eiusdem est cuius sapere et bene ratiocinari. [...] Videntur autem bruta nonnunquam decipi, quod quidem facit artem venandi iucundissimam, quia multis modis illis imponitur, etiamsi non paucis illa utantur stratagematis ad vitandum insidias. Videntur etiam aliquando insanire, nam simiae ebrietate corripiuntur, et ut alios morbos quam plurimos, ita hydrophobiam, seu rabiem pati solent canes maxime, sed et equus, bos, et asinus, et camelus, quem morbum medici ponunt in maniae generibus. Si igitur bruta possunt delirare, possint et ratiocinari. Nam delirium laesio rationis est».

which corresponds to an improper way of reasoning, can only occur in animals provided with the ability of reasoning. On this basis, the capability of reasoning, either sanely or insanely, must be grounded in the same underlying faculty: reason. Incidentally, it should be pointed out that the *Sacra Philosophia* is not entirely consistent in its explanation of madness and sanity. As I will show later, when discussing Otto Casmann's counterarguments to Vallesius, the former cites passages from the latter's text, in which phenomena of insanity are traced back to the internal senses and not to the higher power of reason. For the moment, suffice it to know that Vallesius, who is convinced that insanity in general occurs only in animals provided with a *mens*, concludes that animals must have some form of reason.[11]

Although Vallesius openly assigns the power of reason to animals, he never pushes his argument so far as to assimilate it to the human *mens*. This seems to surface in the following passage from the *Sacra Philosophia*:

> Yet, it results from many arguments that this reason of the animals is largely different from the human mind; and it does not merely differ in terms of more and less, but in terms of the very being of reason. This is why the terms 'reason' and 'rational' are to be predicated of both [animals and men] not univocally but analogically.[12]

Vallesius appears to soften his initial claim that all animals have reason. In fact, he points out that reason in humans and animals differs essentially. Thus he contends that "reason" and "rationality" are analogical terms and can only be predicated analogically of men and animals. Vallesius does not elaborate further on the nature of the analogy he proposes nor does he provide us with a definition of animal reason. Instead, he offers a comparative sketch of the operations that men and animals can perform. First of all, animals and men differ with respect to the objects and modes of their reasoning:

> First, in fact, because the human mind is by nature and *per se* made to think in

11 «Certe rationem aliquam esse brutis, negare non possumus citra proterviam» (Vallesius, *De Sacra Philosophia*, 275).

12 Vallesius, *De Sacra Philosophia*, 276: «multis tamen constat argumentis, hanc brutorum rationem longe diversam esse ab humana mente, neque maioris vel minoris solum ratione differre, sed ipso rationis esse, atque ita ut rationis et rationalis nomen de utrisque non univoce dicatur sed analogice».

> an absolute sense and of anything. [...] On the contrary, none of the brutes has been made to reason unless with respect to certain specific things, namely, by virtue of some natural instinct. Therefore, man is rational in an absolute sense, animals always with respect to something, hence not in an absolute sense, but in some way and by virtue of some analogy.[13]

Strictly speaking, only men possess the faculty of reasoning. In other words, human beings alone are capable of thinking of everything and freely (e.g., this or that given man is fully equipped to become, to his liking, a mathematician as much as a theologian). Animals appear to be able to form concepts as well, but only a very limited set of concepts, mostly related to essential life functions (e.g., foreseeing dangerous situations, or supplying the means necessary to realise their happiness). The performance of these functions, on the part of the animals, does not issue from acts of deliberate thought but is the fruit of natural instinct. In this respect, Vallesius argues, animals are like men deprived of free will.[14]

Another relevant feature of the reason of *bruta* is its corruptibility. Eternal and incorporeal items do not fall within the scope of what animals are capable of dealing with. Accordingly, their reason cannot reach the level of separation needed to gain immortality.[15] Because they cannot form concepts of incorporeal things, and because they do not have free will (on which moral virtue in general depends), they are not capable of wisdom (*sapientia*) either.

In consonance with the scriptural verse (*Job*, 38.36) that triggers Vallesius' discus-

---

13 Vallesius, *De Sacra Philosophia*, 276: «Primum quidem, quia mens humana, natura sua et ex sese nata est ratiocinari simpliciter et circa quidvis. [...] Brutorum [...] vero nullum ratiocinari natum est, nisi circa quiddam, quo scilicet naturali quodam instinctu. [...] Igitur homo simpliciter rationalis est, brutorum quocunque circa quidpiam, quapropter non simpliciter sed quodam modo et analogia quadam».

14 Vallesius, *De Sacra Philosophia*, 277: «qui ab homine tollit liberum arbitrium, nihil aliud quam beluam ipsum facit».

15 Vallesius, *De Sacra Philosophia*, 277: «Praeterea, nihil eorum de quibus ratiocinatur aliorum animalium ullum est incorporeum aut aeternum, sed omnia sensibilia et caduca: nam de quaerendo victu, de innuendo coitu, de nutrienda, et conservanda prole, de fugiendo dolore, de vita valetudineque tuenda, de corporis, vero. Et divinis, aut immortalitate, nulla illis subest cogitatio. [...] Quapropter ignorantissimi sunt qui timent, si sensum cum quadam ratione brutis tribuant, ne illa donent immortalitatem, et qui, quia bruta ratione quadam pollent, vocent in discrimen humanae mentis immortalitatem. Non enim quia ratiocinantur utcumque immortales esse homines cognoseuntur, sed quia incorporeis, aeternis et divinis».

sion in the *Sacra Philosophia*, roosters may possess reason, but only men have wisdom. In fact, it is the possession of *sapientia*, not that of reason, which distinguishes men from animals:

> Man's specific difference is to be capable of wisdom [*sapientia*]; and since it is necessary that wisdom be combined with real virtue, and this (real virtue) with the fear of God, *Ecclesiastes*, in the conclusive words of its discourse, most rightly defines man by saying: "fear God and observe His commandments, for the whole man is this"; which is to say the same as: this is man. Therefore man is the animal capable of true wisdom, which consists in the fear of God and His commandments and in the meditation of Him. How much closer does this distinctive difference 'being capable of wisdom' come to the essence of man than the distinctive difference 'rational', and likewise 'understanding', about which we indicated elsewhere that all animals are rational in some way and about certain things, and that they have some kind of understanding, whereas they are in no way capable of wisdom. Therefore, man is called the 'animal capable of wisdom' with much less ambiguity than the 'rational animal'.[16]

To sum up, Vallesius draws on Hippocrates to claim that a well-functioning *mens*, or reason, is needed in order for sensation to occur in animate beings. On this basis, the Spanish physician claims that animals experiencing sensation must also possess some form of reason. More exactly, they must be provided with the attention needed for sensation to come about. Animals other than men might suffer from diseases pertaining to the faculty of reason (e.g. hydrophobia), though normally they are able to use that faculty so as to provide the means necessary for their own survival as well as for the protection of their progeny. The reason of animals differs from that

16 Vallesius, *De Sacra Philosophia*, 215 (italics mine): «Differentia propria hominis est sapientiae esse capacem; atque quoniam sapientia cum vera virtute coniuncta necessario est et haec cum Dei timore, omnium optime definivit hominem Ecclesiastes in verbis ultimis suae concionis, dicens: Deum time et mandata eius serva, hoc est enim omnis homo; quod nihil aliud est dictu quam homo. Homo enim est animal capax sapientiae verae, quae in timore Dei et legis eius meditatione consistit. Quanto autem proprius accedat ad hominis essentiam differentia haec quam rationale, inde intelligens, quod ut alibi indicavimus, bruta omnia rationabilia etiam quodammodo et circa quaedam sunt, et intelligentiam quandam habent; sapientiae vero nullatenus sunt capacia. Itaque, *hominem esse animal sapientiae capax multo cum minori ambiguitate dicitur quam animal rationale*».

of men in that it is not capable of free choice and of considering immaterial concepts. As a result, animals are not immortal or capable of *sapientia* – the latter falling within the capability of human beings alone. These features seem to mark a significant difference between human beings and other animals. Nonetheless, Vallesius prefers to emphasise their similarities and to endorse an analogical conception of reason.

The *Sacra Philosophia* went through many editions, and provoked criticisms within the Catholic Church. In fact, the book was prohibited in Rome in 1603.[17] Although the book does not seem to have received much attention within recent scholarship, it must have been rather popular among Vallesius' contemporaries. Certainly, it was read by Otto Casmann, whose discussion "*an ratio sit brutis communis ac propterea non propria hominis forma*" – a direct attack on Vallesius' views – we are now able to address. Whilst Vallesius draws on (his particular interpretation of) ancient medical knowledge to develop his arguments, the discussion on the soul of *bruta* undergoes an interesting theological, more specifically Christological twist in Casmann's *Psychologia*, to which we now turn.

4.2. Otto Casmann and the Christologising of Psychology

As we have seen in the previous chapters, Casmann draws on Melanchthon's books on the soul for the view that the subject matter of psychology is the whole nature of man. He suggests the name '*anthropologia*' for the study of what he describes as the essential union of the two natures of man: the spiritual nature, which is the subject of the part of anthropology called *psychologia*, and the corporeal one, which

17 The *Sacra Philosophia* appeared in Turin in 1587; it was then published three times in Lyon (1588, 1592, 1595) and reprinted in 1602 in Frankfurt am Main. The *Sacra Philosophia* came under scrutiny of the Congregation for the Index in 1597. In 1599 a *censura* was commissioned to Luis Ystella and Vincenzo Bonincontro. The book was prohibited by the Master of the Sacred Palace in 1603 with the clause "donec corrigatur". The Congregation criticised Vallesius for interpreting the divine spirit in terms of fire animating the primordial waters, for proposing naturalistic explanations of miraculous events, as well as for defending the rationality of brute animals. On this case of censorship, together with the edition of the documents produced by the Congregation, see Ugo Baldini and Leen Spruit, eds., *Catholic Church and Modern Science. Documents from the Archives of the Roman Congregation of the Holy Office and the Index* (Rome 2009), Vol. 1, 2435–2446.

is the subject of anatomy, and which Casmann addresses in a separate book: the *Secunda pars anthropologiae, hoc est fabrica humani corporis* (published in 1596).[18] As I have already argued, Casmann prefers Melanchthon's definition of the human soul (as 'intelligent spirit') over Aristotle's, because he deems the former more in keeping with Christian theology.[19] Casmann also refers to the '*spiritus intelligens*' as '*anima logica*', or logical soul. According to Casmann, the logical soul is not the form of the body, which rather has its own corporeal form:

> Just as the form is, so is the informed thing. In fact, the thing acquires both its essence and its name by virtue of the form. Now, the soul is an immortal spirit. Therefore, if the soul were the form of the body, the body would be spiritual and immortal. Therefore, we conclude that the soul [*animus*] is not the form of the body, nor may it be rightly said to be so.[20]

Instead, the human soul is a substance of its own, which is immortal and accounts for man's intellect, will and language.[21] Further in his text, Casmann also denies that the logical soul be the form of man taken as a hylomorphic composite. I will return to this point later, when I will also show that Casmann's comparative analysis of humans and animals is to a significant extent determined by his rejection of the Aristotelian-hylomorphic account of man, as well as by his particular conception of the relationship between man's essence and the double nature of Christ. Before getting to this point, let us first look at Casmann's reaction to Vallesius' arguments in favour of reason in brute animals.

---

18 Otto Casmann, *Psychologia anthropologica*, 1. On Casmann reorganisation of psychology, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 5', 155–157. On Casmann's anthropology, see Uwe Kordes, "Otho Casmanns Anthropologie (1549/96)", 195–210; Simone de Angelis, *Anthropologien*, 198–203.

19 Philip Melanchthon's *De anima* had defined the soul as follows: «Anima rationalis est spiritus intelligens, nec extinguitur cum a corpore discessit, sed immortalis est. Haec definitio non habet physicae rationes, sed sumpta est ex Sacris literis» (Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima*, 15^{v}).

20 Otto Casmann, *Psychologia anthropologica*, 5: «qualis forma, talis res formata. Res enim per formam et essentiam et nomen acquirit. At animus est spiritus immortalis. Si igitur animus corporis forma, corpus fuerit spirituale et immortale. Concludimus itaque animum corporis formam non esse, nec recte dici».

21 Otto Casmann, *Psychologia anthropologica*, 89: «logica itaque animae facultas est rationis vel orationis. Ratio hoc loc est vis animae qua intelligimus et volumus».

Casmann's discussion "an ratio sit brutis communis" is structured in a fairly scholastic manner. It is divided into two parts: the first part presents the arguments in favour of animals' reason, the second the arguments *contra*, which express Casmann's own view. Like Vallesius, Casmann traces the debate on the soul of animals back to Plutarch's *De sollertia animalium* and suggests that among ancient authors only Cicero had held that animals were gifted with reason. As for the discussion among his contemporaries, Casmann states:

> In our own time, Franciscus Vallesius, in his *Sacra Philosophia*, denies that the difference between animals and man consists in the difference between rational and irrational. All animals, he states, are rational beings and are provided with intelligence.[22]

Therefore, in order to refute the claim that *bruta* are rational beings, Casmann develops counterarguments against the view proposed by Vallesius.

To start with, Casmann argues, Vallesius' interpretation of *Job, 38.36* is erroneous. For, contrary to what Vallesius claims, the Hebrew version of that scriptural verse has no mention of roosters (or of any other animal), and it speaks of reason and wisdom only insofar as men are concerned.[23] What is more, not only does Vallesius fail to read the Bible correctly, but he also makes similar mistakes in reading his ancient medical sources. According to Casmann, Vallesius' reading of Hippocrates is both incorrect and philosophically unsound. As I have pointed out before, according to Vallesius, Hippocrates thinks that sensation in general needs a fully functioning mind (*mens*) to come about. In order for an animal to have sensation, some form of attention on the part of reason is needed. Now, in Casmann's opinion, this is not the genuine view of Hippocrates:

> I consider that Hippocrates in the quoted passage spoke of men, so that it [the *mens*] is not of all animals, but of men alone. [...] Goclenius says that, in the relevant passage, the Greek does not read *νοῦς* but *γνώμη*, with which term

22 Casmann, *Psychologia*, 9: «Nostra aetate, Franciscus Vallesius, in Sacra sua Philosophia, negare videtur rationale et irrationale esse differentiam bruti et hominis. Omnia bruta affirmans esse rationalia et intelligentia praedita».

23 Casmann, *Psychologia*, 14: «Fallitur cum Vallesio prava versione quisquis ita legendum existimaverit. Veritas enim Hebraea sic habet: quis indidit praecordiis sapientiam, aut quis dedit menti intelligentiam. Nulla hic mentio galli. Hominis et mentis tota est».

> Hippocrates does not mean reason but common sense, or the judgment concerning sensation, which belongs to the interior sense that is called 'common sense'. Which opinion is very plausible.[24]

According to Casmann, the view of the relation between attention and sensation that Vallesius ascribes to Hippocrates has nothing to do with animals. Moreover, there are good reasons for doubting that Vallesius' interpretation of Hippocrates' view applies to human beings either. In fact, Casmann prefers the interpretation of the Hippocratic text proposed by his mentor Rudolph Goclenius. According to this reading, Hippocrates indeed claims that sensation in general requires some form of attention to come about. But Goclenius – followed by Casmann – argues that the Greek text mentions the common sense and not the *mens*, or reason, as the soul's faculty supposed to attend the operations of the sense organ in the process of sensing.[25] In sum, Casmann claims that Vallesius' interpretation of Hippocrates is mistaken. According to Casmann, a correct reading of Hippocrates' Greek text suggests the two following conclusions. First, the ancient physician makes no mention of the souls of animals in the passage considered by Vallesius. Second, Hippocrates claims that only the internal senses (more precisely, the common sense), and not any operation of *mens*, are needed for sensation to occur in man's soul.[26]

---

24 Casmann, *Psychologia*, 15: «Hippocratem citato in loco de hominibus loqui arbitror, ita ut generalis illa non sit animalium, sed hominum duntaxat. […] Goclenius in contextu, inquit, Greco est non *νοῦς* sed *γνώμη*; qua voce Hippocrates hic intelligit non rationem, sed sensum communem, vel judicium de sensatione, quod sensus interioris est, qui communis dicitur. Quae sententia valde probabilis est».

25 Casmann refers to Goclenius' commentary on Scaliger's *Exotericae Exercitationes* 307, 5. In his *Adversaria ad Exotericas aliquot Iulius Caesaris Scaligeri*, Goclenius writes: «Hippocrates quidem in Aphorism., ait: qui aliqua parte corporis dolent, et dolorem tamen non sentient, iis γνώμη laborat; sed γνώμη non recte redditum est ab interprete Mens. Γνώμη enim ibi non significant animam ipsam seu mentem, sed iudicium de sensatione, quod est sensus intimi, quem communem dicimus, qui sentit et discernit, quid exteriores sensus patiantur et percipiant» (Rudolph Goclenius, *Adversaria Ad Exotericas exercitationes*, 52).

26 A long history of discussions about the internal senses had traditionally considered them as faculties or operations of the soul that human beings had in common with lower animals. For some background on medieval theories of the internal senses, see: Harry Austryn Wolfson, "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts", *The Harvard Theological Review* 28.2 (1935), 69–133; Dag Nikolaus Hasse, "The Soul's Faculties" in Robert Pasnau and Christina van Dyke, eds., *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, 2 Vols. (Cambridge 2009), I, 305–319.

Furthermore, Casmann objects to the logical validity of Vallesius' argument based on attention. In fact, Casmann argues, Vallesius implies that animals have reason on the assumption that some rational attention is needed for sensation to occur. But this is a *petitio principii*, because the very idea that the attention at issue has to be ascribed to rational operations (instead of sensitive ones) is precisely what needs to be proved.[27] Therefore, Casmann does not seem to attack Vallesius' idea that, both in men and in animals, sensation is accompanied by some level of attention. He only points out that the power of the soul carrying out this task is not reason, but the common sense.

Casmann's criticism of Vallesius' argument based on madness is close to this point. As we have seen, according to Vallesius, the observation of animal life suffices to show that animals, as much as men, suffer from various forms of dysfunctional behaviour, such as hydrophobia – both being phenomena, Vallesius claims, that physicians explained in terms of insanity. Now, Vallesius believes that the fact that animals sometimes go insane suggests that they can reason, because insanity is the contrary of reason and occurs only in rational beings. In this case, it is not too difficult for Casmann to counter Vallesius. He does so by literally quoting a passage from the *Sacra Philosophia* in which madness is explained on the level of the internal senses:

> To this argument of Vallesius' I reply with Vallesius' own words, from the *Sacra Philosophia*, p. 433: "it is far from being the case that, since these beasts can become insane, they must have a mind similar to the human one. In fact, not even men become insane according to that mind that distinguishes them from the animals; rather, according to the internal senses, which they [men] have in common with them [animals], the imagination and the sensitive capacity, which many call 'cogitative' or 'estimative'. Now, given that diseases of delirium and melancholy are corporeal affections, they cannot *per*

27 Casmann, *Psychologia*, 16: «Argumenti vis est in contrariorum pari oppositione. Animantia tum non sentiunt cum mens non attendit; ergo animantia tum sentiunt quando mens attendit et vi consequentis, omnis sensio est cum attentione mentis coniuncta. Hic autem quemadmodum oppositio de homine intellecta designat animam et mentem humanam; ita accepta de bestiis significat brutorum animam, quae est definitore Vallesio actus corporum senguine viventium. Atque ut differ attentio bruti et hominis, ita et anima utriusque. Neque hinc statim paritas et identitas animae utriusque efficitur. Quod si vero per ventem hic denotat intellectum bestialem, petit principium».

> *se* harm anything but the corporeal faculties. The lesion only affects the mind accidentally [*per accidens*], because the ἐνεργείας are hindered, and because in so far as [the mind] is in the body, it uses the senses".[28]

According to Casmann, Vallesius makes contradictory statements. In fact, on the one hand he claims that animals suffering from madness must also have reason. On the other hand, he admits that phenomena of insanity (such as madness and depression) are corporeal dysfunctions; hence, they cannot affect reason, which is immaterial. Vallesius himself affirms that those pathologies need to be explained on the level of the internal senses (more specifically, cogitation and estimation). Casmann is happy to agree on this point, which also proves Vallesius to be inconsistent.

Also in this case, Casmann recognises that animals act in the way observed by Vallesius, but disagrees on the explanation of their behaviour proposed by the Spanish physician. According to Casmann, animals can indeed become insane, but dysfunctions on the level of the internal senses suffice as an explanatory cause of those biological phenomena.

To sum up, Casmann disagrees with Vallesius on two points. First, he rejects the interpretation of the scriptural and medical sources used by the Spanish physician to argue for the rationality of animals. Second, he doubts the philosophical legitimacy of Vallesius' choice to ascribe forms of rationality to animals: to Casmann's mind, even the most complex forms of animal life (men excepted) can be explained in terms of external and internal senses, and without the need for rational operations.

But if one looks more closely at Casmann's text, one can observe that his rejection of animal reason does not depend only on his being at variance with Vallesius' argumentation. In fact, the very fundamentals of Casmann's psychology seem to mark in principle an irreconcilable gap between human beings and other animals.

---

28 Casmann, *Psychologia*, 17: «Respondeo verbis Vallesii ad hoc Vallesianum argumentum, ex pag. 433. Sacrae philos. Longe abest ut, quia delirare possunt, istae belvae habent mentem humanae similem. Nam ne homines quidem delirant secundum eam mentem, quae illos separat a brutis, sed secundum internos sensus, quos cum illis habent communes, imaginationem et sensitivam, quam nonnulli vocant cogitativam et aestimativam. Nam cum phrenitis et melancholia morbi sint corporales affectiones, non possunt per se laedere nisi facultates corporales. Mentem vero laesio non attingit, nisi ex accidenti, et ratione energeias impeditae, quia dum in corpore est sensibus utitur». The passage to which Casmann refers is found in Vallesius, *De Sacra Philosophia*, 278.

Casmann's *Psychologia* puts forward a conception of the soul according to which reason is part and parcel of what Casmann calls the 'logical soul' (*anima logica*). This *anima logica* is as different as it can get from the soul of brute animals. The latter is a corporeal form that supplies animals with life and basic vital operations; the former is neither a corporeal form nor the form of the human body.

In fact, as we have already observed, because the 'logical soul' is immaterial, it cannot be the formal principle of the body, which has a (corporeal) form of its own. Accordingly, human beings are composed of two different natures: a corporeal and a spiritual one, the latter being the logical soul.

Interestingly enough, not only does Casmann deny that the logical soul is the form of the human body; he also thinks that from one perspective the logical soul is not the form of man altogether. On the one hand, Casmann recognises that the logical soul may be considered as the item marking the difference between human beings and brute animals. One the other hand, he thinks that the possession of the logical soul does not sufficiently define what a human being is. But in which sense exactly? Is there anything else that makes man differ from all other creatures?

The key to understanding this point is what I would like to call Casmann's 'Christologising' of anthropology. In Casmann's opinion, the two forms composing human nature do not bear a hylomorphic relationship to each other, but a hypostatic one. This point clearly emerges from the following passage:

> If the rational soul is the form that gives man his being, then the omnipotent divine nature in Christ will also be the complete form that gives Christ his being. The same relation obtains between peers. But both Christ and man equally consist in two natures and in the union of those in one hypostasis. However, one cannot safely dare to state that God's omnipotent nature be the complete form of Christ Immanuel. For both the nature of humanity and that of divinity, in a personal union, combine to bring about the theandric (so to say) form of Christ. Establish therefore that according to my opinion man's form is placed in that union of the soul with man's body in one hypostasis.[29]

29 Casmann, *Psychologia*, 7–8: «Si anima rationalis est forma hominis dans suum esse, omnipotens etiam divina natura in Christo erit forma completa Christo […] suum dans esse. Parium enim par ratio est. In duabus autem diversis naturis et earum in unam hypostasin unione

The compound substance that we call "man" mirrors the nature of Christ, who is composed of a human and a divine nature. Therefore, human nature cannot be looked at simply in terms of rationality. In fact, the possession of rationality on the part of men does not mirror the complexity of human beings, just as Christ's divine nature does not account for the entire nature of Christ. The very notion of God's incarnation implies that Christ possesses two natures: a divine and a human one, which are joined together in a hypostatic union. Casmann appears to interpret God's incarnation in the sense that Christ's nature must somehow reflect the nature of man (and man is made in the image of God). Accordingly, man's nature (which is the subject of anthropology) must be explained in the same way as Christ's. Just as Christ is composed of a human and a divine nature, human beings in general are composed of a bodily and a spiritual nature. And just as Christ's nature lies precisely in the unity of both natures in one subject (or hypostasis) so the human nature lies in the unity of the bodily and the spiritual nature in one subject, i.e., in terms of a hypostatic union of two natures: a corporeal one (which is the subject matter of anatomy) and a spiritual one (which is the *anima logica*, studied by psychology).

Casmann's view is quite uncommon, as far as the sixteenth century is concerned. However, it had one very important precedent in Melanchthon's Christology. In his commentary on *Colossians* 2.9, Melanchthon had explained that the way in which God was present in Christ was the union of two natures in one person, in the way of a hypostasis. Moreover, Melanchthon claimed that the same type of union holds between the soul and the body of each human being.[30]

Melanchthon's view attracted as much enthusiasm on the part of his Calvinist contemporaries as it provoked criticisms from some Lutherans. In effect, as I explained more extensively in the first chapter, Melanchthon's views were expressed in the context of his own interpretation of a Christological doctrine that was central to the Lutheran conception of the Eucharist: the doctrine of the '*communicatio idiomatum*', or the exchange of properties between Christ's two natures. For Luther, the fact that divine properties were transferred to the human nature of Christ was

---

pariter Christus [...] et homo [...] conveniunt. At vero omnipotentem Dei naturam esse Christi Immanuelis [...] formam plenam, confidenter asseverare non ausim, cum ad formam hanc Christi Theandricam (ut ita dicam) tam ratio humanitatis, quam divinitatis in unione personali concurrat. Satuis itaque foret mea sic ferente opinione, formam hominis in unione illa animae et corporis humani in unam hypostasin statuere».

30 About this, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 81–82.

the prerequisite for Christ's body to be ubiquitous, hence present in the Eucharist. Melanchthon, however, held that the '*communicatio idiomatum*' happened on the level of the whole person of Christ, rather than between his two natures. Some of Melanchthon's Calvinist colleagues denied that Christ's body took on divine properties and that it was really present in the Eucharist. For this reason they thought that Melanchthon's theory was friendly to theirs, which earned to Melanchthon allegations of crypto-Calvinism from some Lutherans.[31]

Now, whilst Casmann was himself a figure in between Lutheranism and Calvinism, I have not been able to determine whether he too saw in Melanchthon an ally in matters of sacramental theology.[32] What I can say with certainty is that he followed Melanchthon in psychology (he accepted Melanchthon's conception of the soul as '*spiritus intelligens*') and that, like Melanchthon, Casmann thought that Christology could provide anthropology with a helpful model to describe the nature of man. Both for Melanchthon and for Casmann, the hypostatic relationship between the two natures of Christ served as a parallel to describe the spirit-body relationship in men.

Casmann, one may think, went even further than Melanchthon, for not only did he devise a psychology consistent with his Christology (as Melanchthon also did), but he brought the two disciplines together into his anthropology. Moreover, Casmann thought that the concept of 'hypostasis' could replace those of 'matter' and 'form' in interpreting the link between man's spirit and body. Casmann's Christologising of anthropology ensures that the soul-body relation be interpreted in a hypostatic – and not in a hylomorphic – fashion. In Casmann's opinion, the hypostatic union of a spiritual and a corporeal nature constitutes the distinctive feature of man.

But, I argue, for precisely the same reason, the problem of animal rationality is to be dismissed *a priori* in the case of Casmann's anthropology. In fact, to Casmann's mind there is little difference between asking whether animals have reason and the other absurd question whether animals reflect the nature of Christ. This point can be made on the basis of the two following passages from Casmann's text:

---

31 Luther and Melanchthon were not the first to draw on Christology for issues concerning the Eucharist. For medieval uses of Christological arguments in matters of sacramental theology, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 78, fn. 168.

32 About Casmann's fuzzy confessional affiliation, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 17–18.

> We accord that animals have a soul, but not a spirit, that is, the logical and eternal spiritual essence, that subsists *per se*. Neither is there a proper hypostatic union between the body and the soul of animals, for it [the hypostatic union] obtains between the different natures, corporeal and spiritual. But the soul of animals, springing from the body, is immersed in the body. It is not a spirit properly speaking, but something corporeal, springing from the body and not *per se* subsisting, but perishing in and with the body.[33]

> The mind or intelligence is of those who are created in God's image and likeness. But intellect and reason are in the soul by virtue of the divine image. From which it is also understood why only those [things] that consist in a spiritual essence, *per se* subsisting and immortal, are provided with it [the mind]. Now, as the Holy Scripture affirms, men are made in God's image and likeness, not any animals.[34]

In conclusion, Casmann's comparative analysis of human and animal souls denies animals to be endowed with reason. On the one hand, this conclusion follows from Casmann's criticism of Vallesius' interpretation of the observable animal behaviour. On the other hand, the view espoused by Casmann depends on his Christologising of anthropology: reason cannot considered apart from the logical soul, which is characterised by its likeness to Christ's divine nature, as explained above. Therefore, if animals were to be granted rationality, two absurd conclusions would follow: first, the nature of *bruta* would be similar to the nature of Christ, in that it would consist of a hypostatic union of two natures, a bodily and a spiritual one. Second, if animals were provided with reason, they would be created in God's image and likeness just as man is.

---

33 Casmann, *Psychologia*, 8: «Animam habere bruta concedimus, sed non spiritum seu essentiam spiritualem, logicam, aeternam et per se subsistentem; neque unio hypostatica proprie est in brutorum corpore et anima; siquidem est diversarum naturarum, corporeae et spiritualis. At anima brutorum e corpore orta in corpus immersa est; non quidem proprie spiritus, sed corporeum quid e corpore ortum, non per se subsistens. Sed in corpore et cum corpore evanescens».

34 Casmann, *Psychologia*, 11: «Eorum mens et intelligentia est, qui sunt ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei creati. Intellectus enim et ratio vi imaginis divinae inest animae. […] Unde etiam videre est ratione illa tantum praedita esse quae spirituali essentia, per se subsistenti et immortali constat. Atqui attestantibus sacris literis, homines ad similitudinem et imaginem Dei sunt conditi, non vero bruta ulla».

4.3. Conclusions

The debate between Casmann and Vallesius concerning human and animal reason appears to be triggered, at least in part, by their rediscovery of ancient philosophical and medical knowledge. In fact, both Vallesius and Casmann seem to base their discussion on an already existing debate, found in Plutarch's *De sollertia animalium*, as well as on an aphorism by Hippocrates.

Besides the interest in ancient sources, the analyses proposed by Vallesius and Casmann show that both the observation (and interpretation) of animal behaviour and concerns connected to a Christian interpretation of what is characteristically human played a role in the formulation of sixteenth-century conceptions of animal and human reason. The observation of the behaviour of animals and men testifies to the fact that the external senses alone are not a sufficient explanatory tool when it comes to understanding animal and human sensation. Casmann and Vallesius agreed on this. But Vallesius claimed that sensation and insanity of animals needed to be accompanied by some form of rational attention, and by at least a minimal level of rationality. Casmann, instead, concluded that it was enough to look at the operations of the internal senses (especially, cogitation and estimation) to account for animal sensation and insanity. Vallesius' strategy is to ascribe '*ratio*' to both men and animals and then to work out a differentiated notion of '*ratio*' in order to distinguish between men and animals. Casmann follows another strategy. He uses a univocal notion of '*ratio*' proper to human beings and he attributes the (quasi) intelligent behaviour of animals to higher forms of sensation (hence to another part of the soul).

Casmann and Vallesius appear to agree on another point: while reason was one important feature of man, it was not really what made man differ from all other animals. In fact, both Casmann and Vallesius addressed the problems of animals' reason in Christian texts (albeit of different denomination) and they quite consistently believed that man should be defined by his relationship to the Christian divinity. The Catholic Vallesius established this relationship by arguing that man was defined by 'wisdom'. He eloquently summed up this 'wisdom' by referring to a passage in *Ecclesiastes*: "fear God and observe His commandments, for the whole man is this". Interestingly enough, for the very reason that man was defined by his relation to God, Vallesius thought that it was not too problematic if man had some of his higher faculties in common with the lower animals. Therefore, Vallesius wanted to grant brute animals some level of rationality.

The Protestant Casmann also thought that man was defined by his link with God. He defended his views on the basis of the Lutheran conception of the soul

derived from Melanchthon. According to Melanchthon, Holy Scriptures (and not rational arguments) showed that the human soul was a spiritual and immortal substance. Whilst Melanchthon called this substance '*spiritus intelligens*', Casmann referred to it as '*anima logica*'. But Casmann agreed with Melanchthon on one very crucial point: the same relationship holding between the two natures of Christ should also hold between man's '*anima logica*' and man's body. Both Melanchthon and Casmann called this relationship 'hypostasis'. Casmann considered this hypostasis between body and spirit to be the distinguishing feature of man. It was because of this that Casmann disagreed with Vallesius on ascribing reason to brute animals. According to Casmann, reason was part and parcel of the hypostasis that holds together man's body and spirit and made man be in God's, or better still, in Christ's image. Certainly, Casmann also thought that brute animals differed from men because they lacked rational thinking. But this was important insofar as it showed that the nature of brute animals did not enjoy the type of special relationship with Christ that defined human beings in their uniqueness.

CHAPTER 5

Anatomy and the Body in Renaissance Protestant Psychology

5.0. Introduction

In the previous chapters, we have seen that Melanchthon and some of his followers considered human nature to consist in two parts, a spirit as well as a body that encompassed certain parts of the soul. Until now, I have focused my discussion on the way in which these authors understood the spiritual part of man and the embodied operations of the soul. But what about the body itself? Which place did it occupy in the treatises about the soul that have been hitherto examined? Even more importantly, what was the body like in Melanchthon's and his followers' psychologies? As I have already mentioned, works on the soul written by, among others, Melanchthon, Casmann, and Snellius assigned to the discipline of anatomy the task of describing the human body. It is therefore by looking more closely at the way in which these authors utilised anatomical knowledge that we will be able to observe the place and nature of the human body in their works about the soul.

In this chapter I shall first show that the inclusion of anatomy in some Renaissance treatises on psychology produced in Germany and the Low Countries was largely due to a new disciplinary organisation of the *scientia de anima* that was triggered by Philip Melanchthon. I shall then discuss a few examples of the diffusion of Melanchthon's views. Among these, I shall focus more extensively on Snellius *In Melanchthonis de anima* (1596). In my analysis of these works, I shall show that the inclusion of anatomy in the science of the soul is in some cases connected to the emergence of new notions of the human body whereby man's organs are conceived of as a machine.

In this chapter, I will also have the opportunity to address one scholarly debate that has attracted the attention of historians who have tried to look at the confessional aspects of sixteenth-century natural philosophy. In fact, in the wake of Sachiko Kusukawa's claim that the use of anatomy made by Melanchthon was essentially Lutheran, scholars have objected that Melanchthon's conception of anatomy – particularly his use of anatomy in the science of the soul – could be found in other

confessional contexts as well, and was therefore not specifically Lutheran.[1] Here, I shall argue that these two seemingly opposite interpretations of the use of anatomy in the sixteenth century might be harmonised. In my view, the use of anatomy made by Melanchthon was indeed Lutheran and it was part of a disciplinary reorganisation of psychology that was part of an effort of re-establishing social discipline within the Lutheran camp. Some of Melanchthon's followers received his conception of psychology and his use of anatomy in its Lutheran sense. However, Melanchthon's inclusion of anatomy in the science of the soul, as well as its ensuing notion of the human body, could be easily accepted by authors belonging to other confessions or beyond all confessional concernes altogether. Let us then proceed in the right order and go back to Melanchthon's psychology and its use of anatomical knowledge.

5.1. Melanchthon's Use of Anatomy and His Conception of the Body

At the time when Philip Melanchthon drafted his *Commentarius de anima* (1540), others – including Magnus Hundt (1449–1519) – had already noticed the importance of the knowledge of the body for the consideration of the soul.[2] But Melanchthon seems to differ from these former attempts in the philosophical and theological reasons that motivated his attention to anatomy and in the precise manner in which he considered anatomy to be relevant to the description of man's soul. Indeed, Melanchthon's conception of both the soul and the subject matter of psychology represents a shift-away from the main views on these issues that originated from the medieval tradition of commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*. It is in this context of the redefinition of psychology as a discipline that the study of the bodily organs, together with a new way of conceiving of the body itself, comes into play.

Let us start, then, by examining Melanchthon's own view on the subject matter of psychology. The definition of the subject matter of the *scientia de anima* had been disputed throughout the Middle Ages and, especially, during the Renaissance. The debate was occasioned by the well-known distinction made in Aristotle's *De anima* between affections of the soul *qua* soul and affections of the ensouled body.[3] Indeed, if there exist affections common to soul and body together (rather than to the soul itself), one might well argue that the science of the soul is the study of the whole

1 For the relevant bibliography regarding these claims, see further in this chapter.

2 On this point, see Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy*, 88.

3 Aristotle, *De anima*, I. 1, 402a5–9.

living being rather than that of the soul as such. Medieval authors distinguished between three ways of solving this issue: (a) the subject matter of psychology is the soul; (b) psychology addresses the ensouled body qua ensouled (*sub ratione animae*); (c) both answers are defensible. Importantly, one finds none of those positions in Melanchthon's work on the soul.[4]

Independently of which of the stances just listed they took, medieval authors looked at the soul not as something belonging to man alone, but as a principle of life common to all living beings. Moreover, even authors who stated that the *scientia de anima* had the ensouled body as its subject matter (e.g. Radulphus Brito) did not seem to pay much attention to physiological and anatomical aspects of the body. Bearing this Aristotelian discussion in mind, we can now better appreciate Melanchthon's rearrangement of the science of the soul.

As I have already argued, Melanchthon's psychology did not address the soul as a principle of life in all living beings. According to Melanchthon, the part of natural philosophy entitled '*scientia de anima*' had to address the human soul alone. Even more specifically, Melanchthon explained, «this part [of physics] has to encompass not only the soul, but also the whole nature of man».[5] In effect, Melanchthon looked at the soul insofar as psychology could inform the Lutheran youth about two things: first, about the fact that the whole human nature (both soul and body) had been affected by the original sin and was the receiver of divine grace; second, the consideration of the entirety of human nature had to demonstrate that God had endowed it with innate knowledge of right and wrong. The latter point was of the utmost importance for Melanchthon, because psychology provided the theoretical underpinning of the fact that civil obedience was innately known to man. Now, because the science of the soul had to consider man in his entirety, it should also provide knowledge of the human body. This is the first reason motivating Melanchthon's decision to include anatomy in his psychology.

---

4 For the distinction between three positions about the subject matter of psychology in the Middle Ages I rely on Sander W. de Boer, *The Science of the Soul*, 71–92. De Boer shows that medieval authors who considered the soul as the subject matter of the *scientia de anima* included Thomas Aquinas, John of Jandun, and John Buridan. Rudolp Brito can be counted among authors who rather thought that the ensouled body was the subject of the science of the soul. Whilst, de Boer argues, Nicole Oresme left the matter undecided. On medieval discussion regarding the subject matter of psychology, also see: Jack Zupko, "What Is the Science of the Soul? A Case Study in the Evolution of Late Medieval Natural Philosophy", *Synthese* 110 (1997), 303.

5 See: *supra*, 'Chapter 2', 107–108.

But such decision was fostered by yet another essential conviction connected to Melanchthon's Lutheran faith, with which we are by now familiar. Melanchthon indeed thought that only the actions and not the essence of the soul could be known. In a general sense this conception was not new or peculiar to Melanchthon's Lutheran affiliation. In effect, already Aristotle had affirmed in his *De anima* that knowledge of the soul's properties was instrumental in knowing the soul's essence; and many commentators followed suit.[6]

In the case of Melanchthon, however, the idea that the essence of the soul could not be fathomed took on a more specific meaning. As an irreparable effect of the original sin, man was not capable of knowing the soul in its true immortal essence, if not by means of the Christian Gospel. It was indeed thanks to his Christian faith that Melanchthon knew that the human soul was an immortal '*spiritus intelligens*'. Nevertheless, he had to give some philosophical explanation of what the soul might be. As we know from the preceding chapters, Melanchthon found this explanation in the idea of *ἐνδελέχεια* indicating that the lower parts of the soul (vegetative and sensitive) corresponded to the movement of the bodily spirits. Precisely from this philosophical perspective, Melanchthon thought that the lower and embodied parts of the soul could be known through their bodily operations. As Melanchthon explained: «although the essence of the soul cannot be sufficiently grasped, nevertheless the actions show the way to the knowledge of it».[7] It was the task of knowing these actions that made the use of anatomy even more needed.

Now, because Melanchthon defined the rational soul as 'intelligent spirit' and he reduced the Aristotelian form of the human body to the movements of the human bodily parts, he could look at the former on the basis of what the Gospel taught

6 Aristotle, *De anima*, I. 1, 402b17–25: «It seems not only useful for the discovery of the causes of the incidental properties of substances to be acquainted with the essential nature of those substances (as in mathematics it is useful for the understanding of the property of the equality of the interior angles of a triangle to two right angles to know the essential nature of the straight and the curved or of the line and the plane) but also conversely, for the knowledge of the essential nature of a substance is largely promoted by an acquaintance with its properties: for, when we are able to give an account conformable to experience of all or most of the properties of a substance, we shall be in the most favourable position to say something worth saying about the essential nature of that subject». The idea that the knowledge of the soul's properties was instrumental in knowing the essence of the soul was also common in the Middle Ages. On medieval discussions about this idea and some connected methodological issues in medieval texts about the soul, see: Sander de Boer, *The Science of the Soul*, 45–71.

7 See: *supra*, 'Chapter 2', 89.

about it (its essence and destiny as a spiritual nature created by God). By doing so, Melanchthon remained loyal to his Lutheran idea that the essence of man's soul was not knowable by means of the human natural understanding. At the same time, his identifying the lower powers of the soul with the movements of the body made the sensitive and vegetative functions of man available for a study based on anatomical knowledge.

A long and comprehensive anatomical account of the human body in fact forms a remarkable part of the two editions of Melanchthon's book on the soul. In the *Commentarius de anima* of 1540, Melanchthon adopted Galen's anatomy to describe the body from head to toe, and further by looking at its interior organs, humours, and spirits. When he became dissatisfied with the anatomical parts of his *Commentarius*, Melanchthon replaced Galenic anatomy by Vesalius' *Fabrica* in the *Liber de anima* of 1552. Vesalius' anatomy provided first-hand knowledge of the human body, because it was based on direct dissection of corpses. As Melanchthon kept abreast of the latest anatomical discoveries, his change in anatomical sources also entailed important new elements. For instance, as Vivian Nutton pointed out, it was thanks to his reading of the *Fabrica* that Melanchthon could now account for the correct shape of the liver and Vesalius teaching also lied behind Melanchthon's rejection of the presence in human beings of the so-called '*rete mirabile*' (viz., a network of blood vessels that Galen had described in pigs and oxen and then included into his system of brain function).[8] But even more than the details of Melanchthon's anatomical description of the body, it is important here to highlight the reasons why he followed Galen's and Vesalius' accounts of the body instead of the available Aristotelian ones and the way in which, as a consequence, he conceived of the soul's body. Let us start with the first point: why did Melanchthon choose Galen's and Vesalius' descriptions of the human body?

When Aristotle defines the soul as the form of an organic body, he does not think of the body as a corpse, because a dead body does not have life potentially. Only matter predisposed for receiving its actualising form is a potentially living

8 Vivian Nutton, "The Anatomy of the Soul in Early Renaissance Medicine", 149–150. Melanchthon's rejection of the rete mirabile in humans is found in CR XIII, 72: «Nominat Galenus contextum quendam arteriarum intra os basilare, substratum toti cerebro, πλέγμα δικτυοειδὲς, quod nuncuparunt Arabes rete mirabile. Sed in capite hominis hunc insignem contextum negant esse». Melanchthon refers to Galen's *De usu partium corporis humani*, I. IX, 4, in *Galeni Opera omnia*, III, 696. About this, also see: Filippo Melantone, *Libro dell'anima*, edited by Dino Bellucci (Turin 2009), 868–869.

body. In this sense, the soul is the form that efficiently provides a body with life. But in Aristotle's perspective, the soul as form is also the final cause of the body. This means that the soul is that for the sake of which the body is. Therefore, the organs of the body must be accounted for as instruments of the soul. They are to be described in a teleological manner, i.e., bodily organs are in such and such a way in view of specific operations of the soul.[9] As Robert Hankinson and Nancy Siraisi have shown, teleological conceptions are found in Galen's and Vesalius' anatomies too.[10] Nonetheless, those views differ from the Aristotelian ones in the following way. Aristotle's 'intrinsic' teleology looks at the body as driven by an inner natural principle to develop for the sake of the soul's operations. In contrast, Galenic and Vesalian anatomies tend to place that principle in an external, intelligent designer. Accordingly, every single part of the body is designed by a divine craftsman as the best instrument for carrying out the functions of the soul.

Now, by using Galen's and Vesalius' anatomies, Melanchthon also endorses their 'extrinsic teleology'. More accurately, it is because of the type of teleology that he found in Galen and Vesalius that Melanchthon loved their works so much, as we shall see. In 1540, Melanchthon drafted an oration about the life of Galen, in which the ancient physician is eloquently praised for the way in which he looked at the utility of anatomical knowledge:

> Since it [anatomy] puts before us this admirable structure of human parts, it teaches that this nature does not exist by chance, but that it is created by an eternal mind, which did not engage in the shaping of man for nothing, but to demonstrate that it cares for humankind. Therefore Galen said most wisely that the knowledge of anatomy is the beginning of theology, and the path to the knowledge of God.[11]

---

9 "It is manifest that the soul is also the final cause. For nature, like thought, always does whatever it does for the sake of something, which something is its end." (Aristotle, *De anima*, II.4, 415b15–21). On Aristotle's teleological account of the soul, see Mariska Leunissen, *Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle's Science of Nature* (Cambridge, 2010), 49–75.

10 Robert J. Hankinson, "Galen and the Best of All Possible Worlds", *The Classical Quarterly*. New Series, 39, 1 (1989), 206–227. And Nancy Siraisi, "Vesalius and the Reading of Galen's Teleology", *Renaissance Quarterly*, 50, No. 1 (1997), 1–37.

11 As translated by Kusukawa, *Melanchthon: Orations*, 218. Latin in CR XI, 501: «Denique cum hanc admirandam texturam humanorum membrorum proponit, docet hanc naturam non casu extitisse, sed ab aeterna quadam mente conditam esse, quae non frustra voluit esse

Galen's great intuition, Melanchthon explained in his oration, was that anatomy, by showing the admirable structure of the body would also invite one to observe that such a body could not exist by chance.[12] Melanchthon reiterated the same idea in his *Commentarius*, where human anatomy is presented as follows:

> Thus far, we described the parts, the humours, and the spirits of the human body. Such things need to be considered first and foremost in our bodies, for they are designed for necessary scopes and actions and are wonderfully made and arranged.[13]

The consideration of the parts and spirits of the human body shows the uses and actions for which they are shaped and artfully organised. Thus Melanchthon, while sharing with Aristotle a teleological reading of the human body, does not seem to assign its development to an inner force in the sense of Aristotelian hylomorphism. Instead, he considers the divine mind to be the source of the functional organisation of man's body.

> And since God alone applied so much skill in fashioning the human body, He certainly wished that his wondrous work be observed, so that we may understand that those machines so skillfully devised and arranged by no means came about by chance, but that there is an eternal architectonic mind.[14]

---

adeo occupata in formando homine, sed significare, sibi genus humanum curae esse. Itaque sapientissime Galenus inquit, doctrinam anatomicam initium esse Theologiae, et aditum ad agnitionem Dei».

12 This point has been made by Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy*, 102–104.

13 Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima*, 135^{v}: «Hactenus et membra humani corporis et humores et spiritus descripsimus. Haec enim praecipue consideranda sunt in nostris corporibus, quia ad necessarios usus atque actiones destinata sunt, et mira arte facta ac distributas».

14 *Commentarius de anima*, α3^{v}: «Et cum Deus tantum adhibuerit artis in fabricando humano corpore, voluit profecto tam mirum opus conspici, ut cogitaremus, tam artificiose fabricatas et distributas machinas nequaquam casu ortas esse sed esse mentem aeternam architectatricem». Melanchthon devoted his 1550 oration "On Anatomy" to this type of use involved in anatomical knowledge. In this oration, he wrote: «The very sight of the structure of many parts in us is the nurse of many virtues. And since the foremost virtue is the recognition of the Maker God, the assent to providence is much strengthened when we contemplate the wonderful skill in the entire construction of man. [...] Moreover, the individual parts of the body are so fittingly distributed by locations, and distinguished by material, shape and properties,

This passage is particularly significant, for the following two reasons. First, it confirms that Melanchthon saw in Galen's and Vesalius' anatomy a type of teleology that corroborated his faith in a divine architect. Second, the above lines are particularly telling for what concerns the specific way in which Melanchthon (and some of his followers) conceived of the body. In the above lines of the *Commentarius*, Melanchthon seems to harmonise the kind of teleology just described with the idea of a machine-like body. According to him, the human body is an extraordinary aggregate of machines, craftily arranged by God, so as to carry out the actions of human beings. The consideration of this beautiful anatomical make-up paves the way for the *agnitio Dei*. It is Galenic and Vesalian anatomies, and not Aristotle's natural philosophy, that help us reach the awareness that nature does not move according to fate or chance, but is governed by a divine design. In my opinion, it is exactly because Melanchthon moved the teleological principle of nature outside nature itself that he could look at the workings of the body as a machine and yet as one that was orchestrated by God according to certain final causes.

To be sure, I am not suggesting that Melanchthon endorsed a proper mechanistic account of the body and of the embodied parts of the soul. What I argue is that he could look at the body *as though it were* a machine, because its finalistic arrangement was governed by a supernatural and not by a natural principle. Moreover, Melanchthon used the idea of machine as a heuristic device, as it surfaces in a passage of his *Liber de anima*:

> In this doctrine, before we discuss the powers [of the soul], it is useful to look at man's body and to consider the different limbs and organs as though they were machines. In fact, just as once we have observed a millstone, or a cannon and a ball, as well as some gunpowder, we may more easily infer [their causes], so too, in our body, once the machines are demonstrated, we may more easily understand and judge about the powers.[15]

---

that we are shown clearly by their order and skill that this nature of things has by no means emerged by chance, but that there is a creating mind that wants evidence of itself to exist in human nature, and wants us to recognise and understand it. It is true that this entire beautiful machine of the world is a temple of God, and that the traces of the Architect are engraved in many parts of it, but even more so man is the temple of God, because the other bodies, being without a mind, do not recognise the skill and the Maker». (As translated in Sachiko Kusukawa, *Melanchthon: Orations*, 160; Latin text in CR XI, 941).

15 CR XIII, 20: «in hac doctrina, priusquam de potentiis dicemus, prodest aspicere corpus homi-

It is helpful to look at the body as if it were a machine for by looking at it in this fashion we may infer conclusions about the powers of its soul. As I have already explained, the knowledge of the soul obtained through the anatomical consideration of a machine-like body regarded only the lower soul of man, or *ἐνδελέχεια*; not the man's higher soul, or *spiritus intelligens*, which Melanchthon considered to be a spiritual substance altogether different from the body. In the following section of this chapter, I shall show that Melanchthon's use of the machine metaphor was pushed a bit further by some of the authors who used the *Commentarius* and the *Liber de anima* as their main sources for the study of the soul. For instance, according to the Dutchman Rudolph Snellius, the idea of 'machine' used by Melanchthon was not simply a metaphor but became the way in which the body should adequately be understood. Before moving on to the consideration of the reception of Melanchthon's ideas about anatomy, let us briefly summerise the main points made so far in this chapter.

Melanchthon's relative freedom from the scholastic tradition – along with his effort to reshape the Aristotelian *scientia de anima* in his own Lutheran fashion – contributed to bringing about new concepts, such as *spiritus intelligens*, and to encompassing anatomical knowledge within the *scientia de anima*. His new approach was motivated by theological reasons and moved the focus of psychology from the soul (or the ensouled body) to human nature. The latter was composed of two parts: a spiritual and a corporeal one. Hence the task of psychology was twofold: it studied the rational soul on a scriptural basis and it provided the anatomical description of the teleologically organised *machinae* of man's body.

As is well known, Melanchthon's works on the soul heavily influenced Renaissance Protestant teaching. Its claims became popular among Lutherans and Calvinists, and were read by Catholic authors too.[16] This does not mean, however, that the work of Melanchthon marks an irreparable breaking point in the *De anima* tradition. This is certainly not the case when one looks, for instance, at the Catholic University of Ingolstadt. Jürgen Helm has shown that the use of anatomy devised at Wittenberg was heard at Ingolstadt too, although "in its theological and philosophical background, Ingolstadt anatomy was far less uniform than anatomical education

---

nis, et diversa membra et organa quasi machinas considerare. Ut enim conspecta mola seu bombarda et globo, ac pulvere tormentario, facilius raciocinari causas possumus, ita in corpore nostro monstratis machinis, potentias facilius intelligere et indicare».

16 On the establishment of anatomical education at sixteenth-century Wittenberg, see Vivian Nutton, "Wittenberg Anatomy", 11–32.

at Wittenberg".[17] Helm also observes that the use of anatomy at Ingolstadt became more marginal after 1588, when the faculty of arts was formally transferred to the Society of Jesus. In effect, an important statement was contained in the Jesuit *Constitutiones* (1558), which forbade the study of medicine by the members of the order, because medical education was considered to be of little relevance to the main goal of all Jesuit learning: the knowledge and glory of God.[18] As Michael Edwards has recently shown, restrictions were placed more specifically on the extent to which anatomical material could inform lectures on the soul by members of the Society of Jesus. The Jesuit *Ratio Studiorum* (1591) stated that the teaching of the *scientia de anima* should not digress into anatomy and other issues that are the business of the doctors.[19] As I have pointed out in the first chapter of this thesis, Edwards notices that these official injunctions issued by the Jesuit order were seen as formative, rather than prescriptive, and that digressions and departures from them were possible, as it emerges from the works on the soul by important Jesuits, such as Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), Emanuel de Goes (1571–1593), and Roderigo de Arriaga (1592–1667).[20] At the same time, Edwards points out that although Jesuit authors cited anatomical authorities, they did not provide detailed anatomical descriptions of the bodily organs as Melanchthon and some of his followers did.[21] But a somewhat cautious use of anatomical knowledge was not peculiar to Jesuit authors alone. In effect, even commentaries produced by eminent figures in the Protestant world remained faith-

17 Jürgen Helm, "Protestant and Catholic Medicine in the Sixteenth Century? The Case of Ingolstadt Anatomy", *96*. About this, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 51–53.

18 Jürgen Helm, "Protestant and Catholic Medicine in the Sixteenth Century? The Case of Ingolstadt Anatomy", *92*. The Jesuit *Constitutiones* state: "Sic etiam quoniam artes, vel scientiae naturales ingenia disponunt ad theologiam, et ad perfectam cognitionem et usus illius inserviunt et per seipsas ad eundum finem juvant; qua diligentia par est, et per eruditos praeceptores, in omnibus sincere honorem et gloriam Dei quaerendo, tractentur. Medicinae, et Legum studium ut a nostro Instituto magis remotum in Universitatibus Societatis vel non tractabitur, vel saltem ipsa Societas per se oneris non suscipiet" (*Constitutiones Societatis Jesu Anno 1558* (Rome 1558), XII.3).

19 Michael Edwards, "Body, Soul and Anatomy in Late Aristotelian Psychology", *56*. Edwards refers to the following passage of the *Ratio Studiorum*: "In libro primo de anima veterum placita philosophorum summatim percenseantur. In secundo libro, expositis sensoriis, non digrediatur philosophus in anatomiam et caetera, quae medicorum sunt. Addat potius, si vacat, parva naturalia" (Ladislaus Lukacs, ed., *Monumenta Pedagogica Societatis Jesu* V (Rome, 1992), 280).

20 See: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 53.

21 Michael Edwards, "Body, Soul and Anatomy in Late Aristotelian Psychology", *65–66*.

ful to the traditional Aristotelian teaching on the soul and did not discuss human anatomy in the manner and to the extent proposed by Melanchthon. Very influential Lutherans such as Johann Ludwig Hawenreuter and Jacob Schegk – the latter in an anti-Ramist fashion – sought to encompass Lutheran teachings within distinctly Aristotelian commentaries on the soul.[22]

This heterogeneous landscape notwithstanding, many other Protestant professors followed Melanchthon more closely and contributed to the diffusion of his views on psychology and anatomy. Scholars have singled out Johannes Magus' *Anthropologia* (1603) as an example of the legacy of Melanchthon's work.[23] Here, I shall consider an earlier representative of that tradition, who has hitherto received relatively less attention: the Leiden professor of mathematics and natural philosophy Rudolph Snellius.

5.2. Rudolph Snell van Royen

Snellius' *In Melanchthonis de anima* (1596) constitutes an important case in the transmission of Melanchthon's treatises on the soul. It is indeed a book that further develops the major ideas on the soul launched by Melanchthon. Snellius reorganises and promotes Melanchthon's conception of the *scientia de anima* as the discipline that studies human nature and discusses the faculties of man's spirit, as well as the teleological account of man's body, by means of anatomical knowledge.

Snellius' work is a commentary on Melanchthon's *Liber de anima* that makes, however, a quite eclectic use of sources. In fact, Snellius seems to make Melanchthon's views on the subject matter of the science of the soul consistent with a more Aristotelian understanding of the place of psychology within the broader context of natural philosophy. What is more, Snellius looks at the articulation of psychology and the other disciplines as part of a bigger project which included some elements of

22 See Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy*, 108–114. On the medical aspects of Schegk's work, see: Hirai, *Medical Humanism and Natural Philosophy*, 80–103. For more details about Schegk's and Hawenreuter's comparatively conservative approach to psychology, as well as about their conceptions of the soul and its origin, see, *infra*, 'Chapter 6', 175–179. On Schegk's controversies with Petrus Ramus, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 26.

23 See Michael Edwards, "Suàrez in Late Scholastic Context", in Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund, eds., *The Philosophy of Francisco Suàrez* (New York, 2012), 30; Simone De Angelis, *Anthropologien*, 54–63.

Ramus' philosophy. In fact Snellius considered his psychology to be only one part of a project entitled *Snellio-Ramaeum philosophiae Syntagma* (1596).[24] Although Snellius' use of Ramus' doctrines could certainly be a topic of historical interest, determining the precise nature of Snellius' Ramism exceeds the scope of the present research. As I have explained in the first chapter of this thesis, I prefer not to box Snellius in the elusive categories of 'Ramist' and 'Ramism'. True, Snellius relied on Ramus' work on many occasions, he based the teaching of natural philosophy he gave in Leiden on the physics of the Ramist sympathiser Cornelius Valerius, and he included '*psychologia*' in his Snellio-Ramist project.[25] However, considering Snellius as a Ramist does not seem too helpful when it comes to understanding his *In Melanchthonis de anima*.

If one really wants to see a Ramist element in this book, one may find it in Snellius' use of dichotomies for the articulation of natural philosophy he presents in the *Prolegomenon* to *In Melanchthonis de anima*. But by using these dichotomies, Snellius delineates a philosophical project based on Aristotle's and Melanchthon's psychologies. For these reasons and without denying the presence of Ramus' philosophy in Snellius', I shall consider the latter's work on the soul mainly as an example of the diffusion of Melanchthon's ideas.

In the *Prolegomenon*, Snellius calls '*psychologia*' the last part of the physical study of compound bodies. From this point of view, Snellius' psychology echoes the Aristotelian consideration of the ensouled body (*corpus animatum*), which is common to men and animals.[26] But in Snellius' opinion, the study of the soul does not coincide with psychology, for the latter studies all ensouled bodies whereas the former has only man as its subject matter. From this point of view Snellius' work subscribes to Melanchthon's conception of the *scientia de anima* as the discipline that considers human nature as a whole – the Lutheran subject of grace. In fact, according to Snellius, Melanchthon's book is somewhat misleadingly entitled *On the soul*. This title, Snellius explains, is representative of the contents of the book only insofar as one considers the soul to be the most eminent part of man's nature.[27] But since the study of man's body is an integral part of it, Snellius suggests that the study of human nature should rather be called *De hominis physiologia* ('on man's physiology' or 'on

24 See: supra, 'chapter 1', 25n

25 On Snellius' relationship with Ramism, on his works and his intellectual biography, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 17–20.

26 Snellius, *In Melanchthonis de anima*, 4, appears to exclude plants from the realm of ensouled bodies: "animate deinde in bestias et hominem partiri solemus."

27 Snellius, *In Melanchthonis de anima*, 5.

man's nature'). Melanchthon's views on psychology and anatomy are thus pushed further by Snellius, to the extent that the *De anima* almost becomes a treatise on human physiology. Moreover, Snellius differs slightly from Melanchthon as for the reasons he gives for motivating the need of anatomical knowledge for the consideration of man. This emerges from the following passage:

> This book is about the soul, or better still, about man. For man, in fact, consists of two essential parts: the body and the soul. [...] Thus, this book was divided by us into two parts, according to the two parts of man, that is, into the body – with its parts, which are the instruments of the soul – and the soul itself, which is the pilot [*gubernatrix*] of the body and the parts of the body.[28]

As we have seen, there were several reasons why Melanchthon sought to include anatomy in the *scientia de anima*. For instance, he focused on man in his entirety; he considered the knowledge of the body as a means to understanding the actions of the soul; and importantly, he looked at the teleological organisation of the machines of the human body as the sign of the divine order in nature. Snellius accepted those reasons, but he emphasised even more strongly than Melanchthon had done that the bipartition of the *De anima* was motivated by the twofold nature of its subject. In the first chapter of this thesis I argued that a type of disjunctivist anthropology emerges from the work of Melanchthon, whereby an epistemological difference between knowledge of the Gospel and knowledge of the law of God results in a disjunction between body and soul, when applied to psychology.[29] Whilst this view only begins to surface in Melanchthon's work (he never seems to have spelled it out explicitly), it is presented in a clear-cut fashion by Rudolph Snellius.

Snellius too recognised the importance of knowing the body as the clearest sign of God's order. In fact, he believed that the body was corrupted less strongly than the soul after Adam's fall. However, Snellius' choice to include anatomy in his book on the soul seems to be motivated primarily by his looking at the book on the soul

---

28 Snellius, *In Melanchthonis de anima*, 4: "Hic libellus est de Anima vel potius de Homine; homo autem corpore et anima duabus partibus essentialibus constat. [...] Sit itaque hic liber bipartito a nobis distributus pro hominis duabus partibus, in corporis scilicet cum suis membris quae animae sunt organa, et animam ipsam, quae corporis eiusque membrorum est gubernatrix."

29 About this, as well as about the use of the term 'disjunctivist' in this thesis, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 48, 79.

as a study of the entirety of human nature. Man is composed of two essential parts. Therefore, the *De anima* has two tasks: it has to account for the faculties of the soul, which rules over the body, and to describe, in an anatomical fashion, the bodily organs, which are functionally arranged for the benefit of the soul.

As in the case of Melanchthon's *Commentarius*, anatomy and physiology cover the largest part of Snellius' work on the soul, which is in fact presented as the theoretical part of medicine:

> Medicine as a whole proceeds from here [from psychology], to the point that it may be considered almost as some sort of colony of this part [of philosophy, viz., psychology]. [...] Therefore the doctrine about man is necessary to the physician, because it is almost the foundation, or the basis and pivot of medicine.[30]

Despite the fact that they both praise anatomy, Snellius and Melanchthon differ from each other in the anatomical sources they use and even more importantly in the different roles they ascribe to anatomy. Whilst Melanchthon bases the anatomical part of the *Liber de anima* on Vesalius' *Fabrica*, Snellius introduces other anatomical sources in his book. Especially in his discussion '*de motibus cordis*', Snellius follows the *De re anatomica* (1559) by Realdo Colombo, whom Snellius praises for the discovery of the pulmonary circulation.[31] But the difference between Snellius' and Melanchthon's explanations of the human body also lies in the fact that Snellius puts less emphasis than Melanchthon had done on the vestigial role of the knowledge of the body's teleological arrangement as a path to the divine truth. Melanchthon stresses that if we look at the body as a machine, and if we grasp the functional organisation of its parts, we may recognise in it the divine order of nature. For instance, the anatomical description of the human heart that he presents in his *Liber de anima* ends as follows:

---

30 Snellius, *In Melanchthonis de anima*, 7: "Medicina tota hinc dependet, adeo ut quasi huius partis colonia quaedam videri possit [...] Itaque de homine doctrina medico est necessaria, ut quasi Medicinae fundamentum, basis ac fulcrum sit."

31 Realdo Colombo, *Realdi Colombi Cremonensis de re anatomica* (Venice 1559). See Snellius, *In Melanchthonis de anima*, 168. This difference in anatomical sources used by Snellius and Melanchthon has already been noticed by Sachiko Kusukawa, "The Natural Philosophy of Melanchthon and His Followers", in Luce Giard, ed., *Science et religion de Copernic à Gallilée (1540–1610)* (Rome, 1999), 451. Colombo (1515–1559) studied at Padua. He became a close friend of Vesalius', although the two eventually fell out. On these aspects and for a detailed account of Colombo's anatomical work, see: Cunningham, *The Anatomical Renaissance*, 143–166.

> We are stupefied, considering such wonderful variety in the works and plans of God, looking from without and through dense darkness; and we grieve that we cannot inspect nature deeply and see the causes. And yet, when we will at last discern the idea of nature in the divine mind, we will look at this whole machine as if from within and understand the plans of the Workman and the causes of all divine works. Now, by this incomplete consideration, we recognise God the architect and we should be inflamed with the desire for that perfect knowledge.[32]

This emphasis on the arrangement of the body as a vestige of the divine order of nature appears less evident in the case of Snellius. On the one hand, the latter praises the knowledge of the body as most valuable, because the body is a clear testimony of God and because the knowledge of the body's actions is the only means available to fallen men to obtain knowledge of the soul.[33] On the other hand, the Dutch philosopher suggests that the teleological design governing nature must be discovered in one important feature of man's soul. In fact, by following Melanchthon's discussion of the soul, Snellius accepts the *Praeceptor*'s view that man's rational soul is an immortal *spiritus intelligens* present in the human body. The human body, for Snellius, is not just any kind of body, but one provided with organs through which the soul may perform its actions. It is a tangible and observable body, comparable to the objects of mechanics (like clocks and automata).[34] In the case of Snellius, this comparison does not seem to involve only the heuristic value it had in Melanchthon's psychology, but is pushed a bit further. According to Snellius, it seems, the body actually works like a clock. Its functioning differs however from other physical bodies, like stones, because

---

32 CR XIII, 57: "Hanc mirificam operis varietatem, et haec Dei consilia, foris et per densam caliginem aspicientes, obstupescimus, ac dolemus, nos non penitus introspicere naturam, et causas videre posse. Sed tunc demum, cum idaeam naturae in mente divina cernemus, totam hanc machinam velut intus aspiciemus, et opificis consilia et causas omnium operum divinorum intelligemus. Nunc inchoata hac consideratione Deum architectum agnoscamus, et illius perfectae sapientiae desiderio accendamur."

33 Snellius appears as much attentive as Melanchthon to man's incapacity to gain thorough understanding of the soul in his fallen state. In default of that knowledge, the study of anatomy represents a medium to the description of the soul's actions. See, Snellius, *In Melanchthonis de anima*, 8.

34 On the changing use of the clock metaphor in early-modern psychology and physiology, see Hans-Peter Neumann, "Machina Machinarum. Die Uhr als Begriff und Metapher zwischen 1450–1750", *Early Science and Medicine*, 15 (2010), 122–191.

it is organic, a machine-like body provided with self-motion and instruments for the workings of the soul.[35]

Yet, there is something that the soul possesses and that is not dependent on the set-up of the body: the innate ideas of mathematics and ethics. Melanchthon had already accepted the existence of such innate ideas in the *Commentarius de anima* and in the *Liber de anima*, and through natural philosophy this view became a pivoting point of his confessional endeavor. Snellius draws on Melanchthon's conception and uses it as his own way towards the *agnitio Dei*, as follows:

> Melanchthon teaches – against the Epicureans, who contend that everything exists completely thanks to the fortuitous collision of atoms – that it is impossible, given natural arithmetic and the innate notions in the soul, that the soul is not created by God the designer, because notions of this sort are not from assembling atoms but are inserted into man by the designing God.[36]

The fact of us having innate ideas of mathematics proves what the Epicureans teach wrongly, namely that everything occurring in nature is the consequence of the fortuitous collision of atoms. Our spirit does not take on the *notitiae* of mathematics from the outside world, therefore certainly not via the action of atoms. Fate, in this way, is removed from nature, which is, on the contrary, arranged by a craftsman-like God. On the one hand, Snellius looks at man as a machine-like body. On the other hand, he makes it very clear that this machine-like organism cannot be reduced to matter alone, for it possesses a spirit created by God.

To sum up, Snellius endorses Melanchthon's idea that natural philosophy may let us recognise the teleological design governing nature. However, the two authors appear to differ on the following point. Melanchthon looks at anatomy as a medium to infer the divine order of nature from the teleological make-up of the human

---

35 Snellius compares the human body to a machine, and in fact to a clock, as follows: "intellige autem particulam physici corporis adiectam esse propter opera mechanica et fabrilia, cuiusmodi fuit horologium illud a Langravio Saxoni donatum, ubi etiam motus inerrant planetarum quod movebatur quidem sed appensis ponderibus aliisque libramentis" (Snellius, *In Melanchthonis de anima*, 46–47).

36 Snellius, *In Melanchthonis de anima*, 9: "docet ex insitis animo notitiis et naturali Arithmetica contra Epicureos qui omnia ex fortuito atomorum concursu casu omnia extitisse contendunt fieri non posse, quin animus a Deo architecto factus sit, nam huiusmodi notitiae non ex atomis confluentibus, sed a Deo architectante in hominem sunt transfusae."

body, whereas Snellius ascribes this role to the consideration of the human soul's possession of innate ideas. In Snellius' work, the use of anatomy in the science of the soul is retained, but its role of describing one part of human nature (viz., the body) is more emphasised than its function as a path to the awareness of the divinely designed order of nature, as it was repeatedly stressed by Melanchthon.

Moreover, what seems to characterise the work of Snellius is a more radical interpretation of Melanchthon's idea that the *De anima* was a study of the whole human nature. In Snellius' case, this idea amounts to an even clearer distinction between the two parts of man. Psychology is a physiology of man that addresses two different things: a spirit provided with innate notions of God, numbers and morals, as well as a clock-like machine.

A use of anatomy similar to that present in Snellius' work is apparent in other Renaissance and early modern texts, for instance in Otto Casmann's *Psychologia anthropologica* (1594), which whilst drawing on Melanchthon's psychology, attempted to give a new disciplinary position to Melanchthon's ideas. Indeed, Casmann, like Snellius, relies on Melanchthon's view that the subject matter of the *De anima* is man's complete nature. But contrary to Snellius, who argued that this discipline should be referred to as *On Man's Physiology*, instead of *On the Soul*, Casmann suggests the name *Anthropologia* for the inquiry into what he now characterises as the 'hypostatic union' of the two natures of man: the spiritual nature, which is the subject of the part of anthropology called *Psychologia*, and the corporeal one, which is in fact the subject of anatomy. To this second part of anthropology, Casmann devoted a separate treatise: *Secunda pars anthropologiae hoc est fabrica humani corporis* (published in 1596).[37] The new disciplinary set-up proposed by Casmann seems to fit his decision to replace a hylomorphic-Aristotelian notion of the union between man's body and soul with a model that combines Melanchthon's psychology with ideas drawing on Christology, most notably the idea 'hypostatic union'.

As I explained in the previous chapter, Casmann is critical of the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form of the body, and prefers Melanchthon's conception of the soul as *spiritus intelligens*, for its being consistent with Christian theology. According to Casmann, man's spirit is the *anima logica*. Contrary to what Aristotle and the Catholic Church teach, Luther's opinion must be followed, that the *anima logica* is neither the form of the body nor that of man.

37 "Anthropologia est doctrina humana naturae. Humana natura est geminae naturae mundanae, spiritualis et corporea in unum hyphistamenon unitae particeps essentia" (Otto Casmann, *Psychologia anthropologica*, 1).

Indeed, by modelling his psychology on Christology, Casmann reasons as follows: the Christian idea of God's incarnation must be taken literally as meaning that there is a parallel between the divine and human natures of Christ on the one hand, and the soul and the body of man, on the other. Therefore, if the soul were the form of the whole composite, Christ's divine nature would define his entire being (which is not the case). Melanchthon's *spiritus intelligens*, redefined in this fashion, is an immortal substance that provides man with understanding, will, and language.[38] The *anima logica* is inseparably united to man's body in the same way as Christ's divine nature is united to his human part, i.e., by means of a hypostatic union. The study of the spiritual substance partaking in man's hypostatic nature covers the first seven chapters of Casmann's *Psychologia*. The remaining twenty-three chapters of the book address themes stemming from Aristotle's *Parva naturalia*, and more in general consider the faculties that man shares with animals (*aloga*) and that are dependent on the body.[39] The latter, Casmann maintains, must not be considered to be mere flesh, but to be the corporeal part of the hypostatic union of which man consists. It is the seat of the soul and the instrument through which the actions of the soul are carried out. According to Casmann, however, the description of the teleological structure of the human bodily organs is accounted for by anatomy (*somatotomia*), to which he devotes the 1596 independent treatise the *Secunda pars anthropologiae*. In the case of Casmann, psychology and anatomy must be taken jointly as they together form the study of human nature, which, in its turn, provides the

38 According to Casmann, the faculty of language (*facultas sermocinatrix*) is in fact part and parcel of the *anima logica*, together with the intellect and the will. The faculty of language forms the words or symbols through which we signify things and distinguishes precisely between the different words it forms. Language, Casmann explains, might mean the utterances that we use and improve by means of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectics. As such, it is the result of human conventions and an operation belonging to both the soul and the body of man, because it is made possible by the soul's use of the body as an instrument. However, when taken as the faculty that forms symbols to interpret the souls' thoughts, language belongs to the *anima logica* as an innate power, and it marks the difference between human beings and brute animals (see Casmann, *Psychologia anthropologica*, 140–151).

39 The chapters 15–23 analyse topics related to *De sensu, sensili et sensione*, hence the external and internal senses. Chapters 8–14 focus on the formation and development of the foetus, on generation, growth, nutrition, and digestion. Chapters 24–30 deal with respiration, *de affectibus*, the locomotive faculty, and sleep (see Casmann, *Psychologia anthropologica*, 151–423).

physician with important bases for his discipline.[40] The pair psychology-anatomy, proposed by Melanchthon and Snellius, is maintained by Casmann, but formalised as a new discipline: anthropology. As this new discipline is divided into two different parts (psychology and anatomy), the disconnection between body and soul involved in Melanchthon's work and made clearer by Snellius becomes more radical: anthropology is a broad field of enquiry which encompasses the study of the body and that of the soul, whereas these two subjects are completely different from each other.[41]

5.3. Conclusion

The study of the human soul and of man's body have always been regarded as bearing a structural relation to each other. But sixteenth-century Protestant professors seem to have considered this nexus in a more specific way, as they included ancient and modern anatomical accounts of man's body in their treatises on the soul. This transformation within the Renaissance tradition of natural philosophy was to a large extent triggered by Melanchthon's treatises on the soul and then followed by, among others, Rudolph Snellius. Melanchthon sought to include anatomy within the science of the soul for the following main reasons. First, he ascribed a new subject matter to the *scientia de anima*: the human nature, which is composed of soul and body. Therefore, the need for a description of the corporeal part of man's nature drove Melanchthon to assign this task to (first) Galenic and (then) Vesalian anatomy.

---

40 In the preface to Casmann's *Psychologia anthropologica*, written by Rudolph Goclenius, the knowledge of man's body and soul is discussed with respect to its utility for the disciplines of law, ethics, theology, and medicine. According to Goclenius, the knowledge of the faculties of the soul is most helpful for the physician. Goclenius does not develop this point, but ascribes this view to the physician Jean Fernel. Goclenius might be referring to Fernel's *Universa Medicina* (1567), in which Fernel says that his enquiry as a physician does not deal with man's body alone, but with the entirety of the human nature, including the faculties of the soul. In the context of some preliminary explanations of the importance of the study of the faculties – rather than the essence – of the soul, Fernel states: "Facultates autem proximae et continentes operum sunt causae, quarum observationem atque cognitionem satis superque medico sufficere plerique censuerunt: in earum igitur investigationem nobis est diligentius incumbendum." (Jean Fernel, *Universa medicina* [Paris, 1567], in John M. Forester, ed., *The Physiologia of Jean Fernel* (Philadelphia, 2003), 312).

41 On Casmann's anthropology see De Angelis, *Anthropologien*, 198–203.

Second, he considered the anatomical knowledge of the body to be a means to understand the actions of the soul. Third, he believed that the study of the teleological make-up of man's body would work as a way to the *agnitio Dei*. In fact, he proposed that anatomy could look at man's body as an aggregate of machines, craftily organised to carry out specific operations. According to Melanchthon, the beauty and perfection emerging from this teleological account of man's body would show us the finalistic pattern and the divine order governing nature. Melanchthon's ideas are taken up almost literally in Snellius' work on the soul. Even more than Melanchthon, who had used mechanistic metaphors to describe man's body, Snellius thought that the body was a machine, just as clocks and automata. At the same time, however, he stressed the body's teleological functioning. Snellius' attention to anatomy goes as far as to suggest that the science of the soul can be better understood if taken as a treatise on human physiology. However, while Snellius accepts the fundamental role of anatomy in the consideration of the soul, he puts less emphasis on the vestigial value of the study of man's body than Melanchthon had done. In this way, the teleological account of human anatomy and the study of faculty-psychology came to be seen as parts of a single science of human nature. One of Snellius' contemporaries, Otto Casmann, renamed that science 'anthropology'.

Melanchthon, Snellius, and Casmann produced a change in the disciplinary organisation of the *scientia de anima*, which was connected to a new use of anatomy as well as to proto-mechanist accounts of man's body. They did this, as I hope to have made clear, also for reasons connected to their Christian Protestant faith, or at least to some important views regarding the nature of man that were first expressed by Luther. These views were then reformulated by Melanchthon in an effort of confessionalisation and later appropriated by Snellius and Casmann. Interestingly enough, the fact that the psychologies of Melanchthon, Snellius, and Casmann reflected central points of Luther's anthropology does not mean that the new way in which these authors looked at psychology had to stay a Protestant, or even more generally a Christian affair.

The disciplinary setting they devised and the belief it conveys that anatomy is essential for the study of the soul became widely accepted later on during the early modern period, and even beyond the *De anima* tradition as such. For instance, the *Anthropographia* (1618) of the anatomist Jean Riolan (the Younger) addresses the question *An animae consideratio ad Anatomen referri debeat*. Riolan's response echoes Melanchthon's idea that someone who is entirely oblivious to the nature of the body will not understand the nature of the soul. This view is mirrored in the organisation of psychology and anatomy (*somatologia*) in Riolan's own view:

> Some divide anthropology into psychology and somatology, because man is provided with two natures: one is material, the body, of course, and the other formal, namely the soul.[42]

Similar conceptions are found in Jacob de Back's *Dissertatio de corde*, published as an appendix to the 1660 Latin edition of William Harvey's *Exercitatio anatomica de cordis et sanguinis motu*.[43] The opening lines of the text discuss the subject of the *Dissertatio* against the background of a broader disciplinary organisation as follows:

> I call the general doctrine about man anthropology, the parts of which I set according to the following division: psychology, somatology, and hematology.[44]

Philip Melanchthon's teleological account of the human body and soul was reshaped in different ways by Snellius and Casmann and it was then retained by anatomists such as Riolan and De Back. Northern European professors of arts and medicine, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, sought to assign a clear role to

---

42 Jean Riolan the Younger, *Opera anatomica* (Paris, 1650), 37: "Quidam Anthropologiam dividunt in Psychologiam et Somatologiam; quia homo duabus naturis præditus est: una materiali, nempe Corpore, altera formali, scilicet Anima." The 'quidam' mentioned in the beginning of the quote might be Otto Casmann. In effect, Riolan's division of anthropology as a discipline that is split up across psychology and anatomy appears to mirror Casmann's views, both in its contents and terminology. However, one has to observe that Riolan uses the term '*somatologia*' for the study of man's body, whereas Casmann calls this discipline '*somatotomia*'. Casmann devoted a special book to the discipline he calls '*somatologia*'. In the initial pages of his *Somatologia physica generalis* (1598), Casmann presents the reader with a diagram, which explains that '*somatologia*' is the part of physics that treats the natural bodies in general, according to their essences (consisting of matter and form) and qualities (which are either manifest and tangible or occult). See: Otto Casmann, *Somatologia physica generalis* (Frankfurt, 1598), 1. Contrary to the broader scope of his *Somatologia*, Casmann's *Somatotomia* addresses the *fabrica* of the human body alone: it is the part of anthropology that studies only man's body and its parts.

43 De Back's and Riolan's statements on anthropology have already been noticed by Mengal, "La Constitution de la psychologie", 12. On De Back, see De Angelis, *Anthropologien*, 268–279.

44 Jacob de Back, *Dissertationes de corde*, in William Harvey, *Exercitationes anatomicae de motus cordis et sanguinis circulatione* (London, 1661), 296: "Generalem de homine doctrinam Anthropologiam voco, partes cujus statuo, secundum hanc divisionem, Psychologiam, Somatologiam et Hoematologiam."

anatomy as instrumental in considering the soul as part of the study of human beings. But the way in which they looked at the anatomical-psychological study of man could vary considerably. It could be depicted as a teleological account of man's nature that would exhibit the Christian (Protestant) order of nature. But it could also be described as the general doctrine of human being, which is in fact what happens in the Appendix to Harvey's work, one of the first mechanist accounts of blood circulation.

The way in which the use of anatomy in the context of anthropology shifted from Melanchthon's Christian psychology to later works on man's body and soul signals one very interesting aspect of psychology in the age of confessionalisation. Philosophical ideas were often an integral part of confessional efforts. For instance, Melanchthon's psychology was intended to make it clear what man was and how he should behave in society, from a Lutheran perspective. But the effects that confessional endevours, such as Melanchthon's, had on later science and philosophy could very well be trans- or non-denominational and more and more dissociated from the confessional debates. Whatever the confessional motivations of certain theories, at a certain point the scientific discourse seems to have become a motivating factor of its own.

Let us now turn to a discussion at which I have hinted several times in the preceding chapters, the discussion about the origin of the human soul. In what follows, I shall present some sixteenth-century controversies on human animation as another chapter in the history of psychology in the age of confessionalisation. As we shall see, determining the origin of the soul could become for some authors a matter of confessional orthodoxy and identity.

CHAPTER 6

The Origin of the Soul in Sixteenth-Century Lutheran Psychology

6.0. Introduction

In the present thesis, I have been trying to show that Melanchthon's psychology was part – and not a consequence – of his Lutheran faith: he did not attempt to write a psychological work consistent with given theological tenets, but rather looked at the two editions of his book on the soul as an integral part of his efforts of confessionalisation in Saxony. Moreover, I have emphasised several ways in which Melanchthon's psychology influenced many at Wittenberg and elsewhere in sixteenth-century northern Europe.

In the present chapter, I shall consider one last psychological discussion in which the influence of Melanchthon is quite visible: the discussion regarding the origin of the human soul. This topic appears all the more important, because it has attracted scholarly attention precisely for its alleged religious, more specifically confessional, implications. More precisely, according to some studies, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century discussions on the origin of man's soul present a very marked confessional divide between Lutherans on the one hand, and Catholics and Calvinists on the other.

In this chapter I shall look at discussions on the origin of the human soul in some sixteenth-century texts produced by Lutheran authors. On the one hand, I shall argue that many sixteenth-century Lutheran philosophers and physicians shared the view that the individual souls of men were not God's immediate doing. On the other hand, I will point to a more nuanced picture of the relationship between Lutheran theology and views concerning the origin of the soul. In fact, the theory according to which the intellective soul of man was generated *ex traduce* – i.e., transmitted from the parents to their offspring – became accepted by many Lutherans working at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century. However, this consensus seems to be less stable when one looks at some illustrative cases of early Lutheran books on the soul. In what follows, I shall first introduce the theme of the origin of the soul in sixteenth-century psychology. Second, I shall look at a number of texts that bear witness to the variety of ideas on this topic held within the Lutheran camp. Third, I shall demonstrate that some unity in such a variety of

opinions may well be found, which amounts to an echo of Melanchthon's message about the unknowability of the soul. At the end of this discussion, I will be able to give some indications concerning both the relationship between Lutheran theology and views on the origin of the soul, and the formation of a Lutheran confessional identity in relation to psychology.

6.1. The Problem of the Origin of the Human Soul in Sixteenth-Century Psychology

Discussions concerning animation appear to have mushroomed in sixteenth-century books on the soul. Medieval commentators of Aristotle's *De anima* had devoted much attention to the *moment* rather than the *mode* of animation of human beings. They disagreed about the question at what stage in the development of a human fetus God would infuse the intellective soul. On the other hand, they seem to have accepted quite unanimously that each individual intellective soul was the immediate work of God.[1] Renaissance discussions on animation – especially those produced at Protestant institutions – differed from the medieval ones in that they wondered whether God created the intellective soul *ex nihilo* only in the first created man, Adam, leaving to the natural process of procreation the task of transmitting both the body and the intellective soul from the parents to their offspring.

This problem gained relevance in the sixteenth century and was discussed by most northern European professors of arts and medicine who worked on the soul. The popularity of this debate is nicely illustrated by the 1590 publication of a book entitled *Psychologia*. As I mentioned earlier in this thesis, the *Psychologia* was a collection of contributions regarding human animation, by authors of diverse religious affiliation, and was edited by the influential Marburg professor Rudolph Goclenius.[2]

As Michael Stolberg pointed out, determining the origin of the human soul became "a major issue of interconfessional debate" at the turn of the seventeenth century. Stolberg links views of the origin of the soul as being either created *ex nihilo* ('creationism') or transmitted *ex traduce* ('traducianism') to different confessional backgrounds. More specifically, he argues that traducianism was the theory defended by most Lutherans and tries to account for the reasons that might

1 About medieval discussion concerning the origin of the soul, see: Leen Spruit, *The Origin of the Soul From Antiquity to the Early Modern Era*, 39–54.

2 See: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 17.

have motivated such a pattern. Most sixteenth-century Lutheran, Stolberg explains, accepted the doctrine of traducianism chiefly for the following reason: they struggled to square the doctrine of creationism with a reasonable account of the direct transmission of the original sin from Adam to the entire human kind. In effect, as I will point out in this chapter, sixteenth-century advocates of traducianism argued that the defenders of the creationist doctrine could not account for the transmission of original sin without admitting one of two unwanted consequences: either that an incorporeal form such as the intellective soul was acted upon by the body, or that God himself was responsible for the presence of original sin in all human beings.[3]

The fact that traducianism was the most commonly accepted view among Lutherans and that it was endorsed even by Martin Luther himself (albeit not publicly) also appears to surface in some Renaissance texts. One case in point is Albert Hunger's *Adversus veteres et novos errores de anima conclusionum centuria*. I have already mentioned this 1575 publication, because it contained an open attack on Melanchthon's *ἐνδελέχεια* doctrine.[4] The Jesuit Hunger devoted much of his career to writing polemical treatises against Lutherans and Lutheran theology; an endeavour that was epitomised in his 1582 book entitled *On the harmony and agreement between the theology of Luther and the philosophy of* Epicurus.[5] In his 1575 book on the soul, he rejected traducianism as being an opinion contrary to the Catholic faith and criticised Luther for having defended it.[6] His writing was published at the Jesuit university of Ingolstadt,

3 Michael Stolberg, "Particles of the Soul", 190–191. Similar statements about the confessional divide between Renaissance Lutherans, Catholics, and Calvinists who dealt with the origin of the soul are made by Joseph S. Freedman, *The Soul (anima) according to Clemens Timpler (1563/4–1624) and Some of his Central European Contemporaries*, 806–807. About Stolberg's and Freedman's claims, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 54–55.

4 See: *supra*, 'Chapter 2', 103.

5 Albert Hunger, *De homologia sive consensus concentuque theologiae Lutheri cum philosophia* Epicuri (Ingolstadt 1582).

6 Albert Hunger, *Adversus veteres et novos errores de anima*, D1v: «Intermortua fuerat iam olim penitus ista carnalis propagatio animae intellectivae et ecce nostris temporibus a carnali illo resuscitatur Luthero, qui tamen paucos adhuc reperit huiusmodi erroris sectatores. In assertionibus quibusdam circa annum Domini 1545 Wittebergae propositis in haec ille verba prorumpit: "quae D. Hieronymus adversus traducis propagationem affert nihil faciunt ad rem. Determinationes vero Papae et Synagogae suae pro exterminatione et execratione habendae sunt. Quia bestia indoctissima et venter surdus ad scripturam sacram est sicut asinus ad lyram". Peculiari aliquo Canone num expresse reprobata sit ista carnalis propagatio, non attinet cum Luthero disputare. Quam

where the Society of Jesus had succeeded in establishing the whole *Cursus philosophicus* in 1570. Hunger's text is particularly interesting, because, as we have already seen, it was signed by both the dean of the faculty of philosophy, Wolfgang Zettel, and the dean of the faculty of theology, Rudolph Clencke. The contents of the text were thus officially endorsed by Clencke, who stated that the theses held by Hunger reflected the teaching of the Catholic faith.

Not only Catholics, but also important exponents of the Lutheran reform appear to ascribe the doctrine of traducianism to Martin Luther and some of his followers. This emerges, for instance, from two texts, published at Wittenberg, to which I shall devote some attention in the present chapter: Bruno Seidel's *Commentarius de corpore animato* (1594) and Gregor Horst's *De natura humana* (1626). In the case of Bruno Seidel, Luther is reported as stating that the human soul may well originate *ex traduce*, although he did not wish to defend this opinion in public.[7] Horst's book also sheds some light on the confessional nature of Renaissance discussions on animation, as it supplies a list of contemporaries who held the two main views (creationism and traducianism) regarding the origin of the soul. Horst lists mainly authors of Catholic and Calvinist affiliation among the creationists: Peter Lombard (1096–1164) Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), Girolamo Fracastoro (1476–1553), Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484–1558), John Calvin (1509–1564), Levinus Lemnius (1505–1568), and Franciscus Toletus (1532–1596). Later in his discussion, Horst ascribes the theory of traducianism essentially to Lutheran authors, such as Martin Luther, Philip Melanchthon, Caspar Peucer, and Joahnn Ludwig Hawenreuter.

In what follows, I shall return to the discussions on the origin of the soul by focusing on some of the authors mentioned by Horst. For the moment, suffice it to say that the link, to which historians have pointed, between Catholic and Calvinist theology and creationism, on the one hand, and between Lutheran theology and traducianism, on the other, seems to have been known to early-modern academics as well. But if this observation is true, the question arises whether traducianism was directly implied by Lutheran theology. Did all Lutherans believe that the view

---

enim is factam existimat determinationem eam homo levissimus irridet, proprio iudicio condemnatus. Illud nobis satis esse potest, quod Leo X caeterique Concilii Lateranensis ultimi Patres, sive docentes, sive definientes, animam intellectivam non cum corpore transfundi, sed in corpus infundi, clare in Sessione octava professi sunt».

7 Seidel, *Commentarius de corpore animato*, 383: «Lutherus etiam dixisse fertur aliquando: 'quamvis fieri potest ut anima sit ex traduce, tamen publice hoc non affirmabo, sed privatim apud me retinebo'».

according to which the human soul is transmitted by means of the semen of the parents was the only opinion consistent with their conception of the transmission of original sin?

The examples of Horst and Seidel already hint at a less straightforward picture of the relationship between sixteenth-century discussions on animation and different theological affiliations. True, most of the traducianists listed by Horst were indeed Lutherans, whereas essentially all of those he counted among the creationists were either Catholic or Calvinist. However, one needs to balance this with the fact that Horst also mentions the Reformed clergyman and Cambridge physician Timothy Bright (1551–1615) among the traducianists or Bruno Seidel himself – a distinctly Lutheran author – as a defender of creationism. The case of Seidel is all the more interesting when one considers the nature of his reference to Martin Luther's defence of traducianism. Luther's alleged opinion had indeed been used at the Jesuit University of Ingolstadt to single out and reject traducianism as the philosophical opinion belonging to a rival confession, hence to confirm the Catholic adherence to creationism. But in the case of the Lutheran Seidel, Luther's tactful approach to the discussion on animation served the creationist cause: according to Seidel, if traducianism was to be accepted, Luther would have seen no problem with defending it outspokenly. On the one hand, Horst's and Seidel's books testify to a link between Lutheran theology and traducianism. On the other hand, they make it plausible to think that the diffusion of traducianism among sixteenth-century Lutherans was a more complex development than one might expect on the basis of the scholarship and the primary sources examined until this point. This idea will become clear by looking at a sample of Lutheran discussions on the origin of the soul, to which I will devote the rest of this chapter.

6.2. Philip Melanchthon and the Wittenberg Message on the Soul

The number of sixteenth-century books and authors that I mentioned bears witness to the vast popularity of the theme of human animation among sixteenth-century Lutherans. In effect, the texts I shall examine in the rest of my analysis constitute a case study of the disputes on the origin of the soul, which are found in many commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*, as well as in university textbooks and reports of a huge number of disputations produced in Northern Europe, between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Here, I shall look at the cases of very influential Lutheran professors of arts and medicine who appear to mirror two main trends in

Renaissance Lutheran psychology. In effect, the way in which Lutherans developed their study of nature and the soul responded in most instances to the need of founding an educational, philosophical, and political system serving the Protestant cause. In some cases, these intentions were pursued by a wide use of the Aristotelian natural philosophy. For Lutheran academics such as Jacob Schegk of Tübingen and the Strasbourg natural philosopher Johan Ludwig Hawenreuter, this amounted to the production of books on the soul that followed quite closely the structure and the questions addressed by medieval commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*. This aspect, as well as Schegk's and Hawenreuter's discussions of the soul will be taken into examination in the last part of this chapter. In other cases, Lutheran academics strove to balance philosophy and theology in such a way that Aristotle's natural philosophy would be one among many other rational tools used to strengthen – by no means to prove – the truth and practice of the Christian faith. These different ways of using philosophy in a Lutheran context were very relevant to the way in which Lutherans working at Wittenberg – the heart of Luther's reform – looked at the human soul and its origin. Their discussions followed in the footsteps of Philip Melanchthon's *De anima*, which is the first text I will examine.

It is worth considering both editions of Melanchthon's *De anima*, because they mark a shift in opinion on the part of their author. Melanchthon first addresses the problem of animation in his *Commentarius de anima* of 1540. As we have already seen, he does so right after having established that the intellective soul of man can only be defined on scriptural basis as a '*spiritus intelligens*'.[8] According to Melanchthon, not only do the Scriptures teach that the soul is an intelligent and immortal spirit; they also show where this spirit comes from. A few lines further in the *Commentarius*, Melanchthon states his opinion about the origin of man's rational soul:

> There is another major question regarding whence the souls originate. And this disputation is not new; but the old writers in the Church wonder whether the rational soul is *ex traduce*, as they would put it, i.e., whether it is propagated from the parents and it originates from the very nature of the seed. Some fanatics imagined that the souls were created all at the same time, in the beginning of the world and then sent into the bodies. This absurd opinion is to be dismissed. The other opinion is accepted and approved by all those who are godly, that the rational souls are divinely created, everyday

8 See: *supra*, 'Chapter 2', 96.

> anew, and infused into the bodies, when the limbs are already formed and arranged; that is, around the fortieth day, as we will say later with regard to the formation of the foetus. And it is undisputed that a spiritual nature cannot derive from a corporeal one. But the sensitive and vegetative souls are *ex traduce*; that is, they are propagated and derived from the nature of the seed, for their action is only organic, nor are they [the sensitive and vegetative souls] anything but the temperaments or *ἐνδελεχείας* – i.e., the agitations, life, or movement – of the organs.[9]

In the *Commentarius*, Melanchthon denies that we can know anything about the nature of the soul by means of our natural understanding. However, he affirms without hesitation that the Scriptures teach that every human soul is created anew by God, *ex nihilo*. But not all parts of man's soul come into being by an act of divine creation. For Melanchthon, the action of the lower souls of man is corporeal: the vegetative and sensitive souls are *ἐνδελέχείας*, movements concomitant with the spirits and temperaments of the body. Therefore, they may be propagated *ex traduce* from the seed of the parents. The human intelligent spirit, however, cannot derive from a corporeal nature and has to be infused directly by God in the human body, when the foetus is well formed (i.e., on the fortieth day after conception).

Interestingly enough, Melanchthon appears to have tempered his ideas during the years between the first and the second edition of his *De anima*. In effect, in the *Liber de anima* of 1552 he seems less reluctant to grant traducianism some degree of truth. At the same time, Melanchthon appears unwilling to express any decisive opinion on the matter and draws the attention of the reader to man's inability to know the nature of the soul in his post-lapsarian state. In the discussion on the origin of the soul presented in the *Liber de anima*, Melanchthon only mentions the

9 Philip Melanchthon, *Commentarius de anima*, 16^{v}–17^{v}: «Est et alia maior quaestio unde oriantur animae. Nec recens est haec disputatio, sed veteres ecclesiastici scriptores quaerunt an anima rationalis sit ex traduce, sic enim loquuntur, hoc est, an propagetur a parentibus et oriatur ex ipsa seminum natura. Quidam fanatici finxerunt ab initio mundi, simul creates esse animas, et postea mitti eas in corpora. Haec absurda opinio repudianda est. Caeterum sententia recepta est, et probata piis omnibus animas rationales divinitus tunc novas creari et inseri corporibus, cum membra iam formata seu figurata sunt, videlicet circiter diem quadragesimum, ut paulo post de formatione foetus dicemus. Et consentaneum est spiritualem naturam non oriri a corporali. Sed anima sentiens et vegetativa sunt ex traduce, hoc est propagantur et oriuntur ex natura seminum, harum enim actio nulla est nisi organica, nec ipsae aliud sunt nisi organorum aut temperamenta aut *ἐνδελέχείας*, id est agitationes seu vita seu motus».

main arguments put forward by the creationists and traducianists of his days, while he does not express himself in favour of either. However, Melanchthon values the fact that even those who believe that the soul is transmitted *ex traduce* and through the *vis seminalis* of the parents acknowledge that this process happens thanks to the concurring action of God, who sustains and fosters the forces operating in nature.[10] Melanchthon concludes his discussion by an advice to the youth: what really matters for a Christian understanding of the soul is to recognise that its ultimate cause is God. However, Melanchthon warns, whether God creates each soul anew or uses natural causes as an instrument remains beyond man's grasp.[11]

Melanchthon's account of the origin of the human soul appears to change, if slightly, during the years between 1540 and 1552. Both in the *Commentarius de anima* and in the *Liber de anima*, the Lutheran idea of the limits of man's intellect after the fall determines to a large extent Melanchthon's views on animation. In the *Commentarius*, this corresponds to the idea that the Holy Scriptures are man's only source of knowledge about the direct creation of his intellective soul by God. In the *Liber*, a comparatively stronger emphasis on the limits of man's ken leads Melanchthon to suspend the dispute: the Lutheran youth need to see that God is the source of our intellective souls; at the same time, they have to consider that the exact way in which God brings the intellective soul into being cannot be fully understood.

Melanchthon was a convincing teacher and his students were very good listeners. In fact, his Lutheran message regarding the limited knowledge possible for the human soul shaped the discussions on animation by some of the most important figures working at Wittenberg, in the years following Melanchthon's educational

10 Melanchthon does not seem to elaborate on the notion of 'seminal virtue', which as Melanchthon himself recognises is found in Augustine. See: Aurelius Augustinus, *Saint Augustin. La Genèse au littéral en douze livres (De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim)*, edited by Paul Agaësse and Amato Solignac (Bruges 1972), II, 15, 30. About Augustine's theory of 'seminal virtue', see: Jules M. Brady, "St. Augustine's Theory of Seminal Reasons", *The New Scholasticism* 38.2 (1964), 141–158. The idea of 'seminal virtue' has been carefully described by Hiro Hirai, *Le concept de semence dans les théories de la matière à la Renaissance, de Marsile Ficin à Pierre Gassendi* (Turnhout 2005).

11 CR, XIII, 18: «Sed hanc disputationem abrumpo, et iuniores moneo, ut discernant ea quae utqunque mentis humanae acie penetrari possunt, ab aliis, quae pervestigari non possunt. Simus hac sapientia contenti, quod vita, sensus, ratiocinatio et electio ostendunt, esse in nobis animas, et esse eis insitas notitias et alias ab ipso conditas esse». On the differences between Melanchthon's accounts of the origin of the human soul in the *Commentarius* and in the *Liber*, also see: Dino Bellucci, *Science de la nature et Réformation*, 338–344.

activity. These aspects emerge, for instance, from the work of Melanchthon's son in law and Wittenberg physician, Caspar Peucer.

6.3. Caspar Peucer and Gregor Horst: A Mysterious Form of Traducianism

Peucer's discussion about the origin of the human soul is found in his contribution to Goclenius' *Psychologia* and is entitled *De essentia, natura et ortu animi hominis commentatio*. Peucer introduces his argument by means of an exhortation to caution:

> It is a an obscure question, hard to disentangle and full of danger; for, in favour of whichever part something is argued, there follow absurdities, which either strike against the testimonies divinely revealed in the Holy Scriptures, or crush against the eternal order of nature.[12]

As I mentioned in the beginning of my discussion, some sixteenth-century authors looked unfavourably at the idea that God created each individual human soul *ex nihilo*, because they deemed this doctrine incapable of explaining the transmission of original sin in the human kind. Caspar Peucer belongs indeed to this group of authors. He explains that, if creationism were true, one should admit either that the immaterial intellective soul of man inherits the original sin by being acted upon by the body (which is a philosophical absurdity), or that God creates sinful souls (which is an impious conclusion).[13] This argument led some authors to believe

12 Rudolph Goclenius, *Psychologia*, 259: «Est quaestio obscura, explicatu difficilis et periculi plena, quod in quamcunque partem statuatur aliquid, sequuntur absurda, qua vel in Sacrae Scripturae divinitus patefacta testimonia impingunt, vel refrangunt ordini naturae perpetuo».

13 Goclenius, *Psychologia*, 260–261: «Si creat immediate Deus animas cum imponenda sunt in corpora, aut integras puras et impollutas creat, aut tales quales nunc sunt, id est sauciatas et contaminatas horribili labe vicii originalis. Si tales creat quales nunc sunt, est et illius peccati auctor et iudex iniustus, quod abiicit et condemnat animas immeritas propter labem a sese effectam atque inditam operi suo. Sed reclamat auctoritas testimoniorum divinorum et perpetuus religionis divinitus patefactae consensus, quae et testantur Deum nec velle, nec efficere, nec adiuvare, nec approbare, sed horribiliter et immutabiliter odisse et abominari peccata, etsi permittendo tolerat quousque et quamdiu vult. [...] A corporum sordibus nullum animabus nocumentum inferri nec labem imprimi posse manifestum est, quod nullo contectu coniunctae sunt corporibus physico vel mathematico, sed virtuali tantum (ut vocant) quo ut nobilius ac praestantius agens corpora complexa vegetant, agitant, motuque ac sensu

that traducianism was the only doctrine about animation capable of avoiding such unwanted implications. Peucer was concerned about this problem, but he sought to solve it without endorsing traducianism.

According to Peucer, creationism is to be rejected but the doctrine according to which human souls are propagated *ex traduce* by the seed of the parents is also problematic. In fact, Peucer explains, traducianism implies that something corporeal (the parents' seed) generates something incorporeal (the rational soul). What is more, even if one assumed that the semen responsible for the generation of the intellective soul were incorporeal, another philosophical absurdity would follow: the very fact that an incorporeal seed generates something else entails change, or better still, privation (*privatio*) in the seed. But privation, according to Peucer, is a change that is only possible in corporeal substances and on a material level. Therefore, an incorporeal seed is not capable of producing an incorporeal substance like the human intellective soul.[14]

As both creationism and the abovementioned forms of traducianism imply absurdities, Peucer opts for a third and somewhat uneasy solution:

> Man then consists of two parts – one spiritual and the other corporeal – propagated from the parents by means of a mode of generation which is divinely ordained and yet unknown to us; and they [the two parts of man] are connected and tied up with each other by wondrous laws.[15]

---

afficiunt et regunt. Ipsae tota natura diversae nihil repatiuntur, quod non ex cognata vel communi cum corporibus constant materia, sine qua non est mutua inter se actio ullarum rerum».

14 Goclenius, *Psychologia*, 262–263: «Quod igitur ex ea decidetur et derivabitur semen spirituale et quomodo cum solis illis quae corporea mole ac substantia constant, et materia elementari, cui privatio annexa est, hic modus competat?». Peucer bases his discussion on a conception that stems from Aristotelian natural philosophy, This is nicely illustrated by Jacqueline Hamesse, ed., *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval étude historique et édition critique* (Leuven 1972–1974), 168: «hyle, id est materia prima, maxime et proprie est subiectum generationis et corruptionis susceptibile, unde subiectum generationis et corruptionis est materia prima».

15 Goclenius, *Psychologia*, 265: «Constat homo itaque duabus partibus diversis spirituali et corporea propagatis ex parentibus divinitus instituto sed ignoto nobis generationis modo et mirandis legibus inter se copulatis ac devinctis». Before stating his position, Peucer admits that his position might be at odds with physical argument. However, he prefers to accept a theory that is more consistent with the Holy Scriptures: «Etsi autem plurima sequuntur absurda ex omnibus quae recitata sunt opinionibus, tamen praeferri caeteris illam quae minori cum periculo coniuncta est et quanquam offendit nostras ex natura depromptas et argumentis

According to Peucer, the human soul is propagated from the parents together with the body. But Peucer's view differs from the forms of traducianism dismissed by him, in that it recognises that the way in which the propagation of the souls from the parents comes about is for God to know and for us to wonder.

In a way similar to Melanchthon, and as a good Wittenberg professor, Peucer stresses that the human soul is a spiritual nature and that man's fallen understanding is limited in its knowledge of the soul. But this idea plays out in his work in one particular way: Peucer deems traducianism to be more probable than creationism, because it accounts better for the transmission of original sin. However, he thinks that knowledge of the exact nature of this wondrous transmission of the human soul is not obtainable.

Interestingly enough, this line of thought was not limited to the work of Caspar Peucer. Instead, it was followed by another product of Wittenberg education: Gregor Horst. In 1608, Horst was appointed chief physician at the University of Giessen. However, he had received his education at Wittenberg, and his 1626 book *De natura humana* clearly reflects the type of study of the human nature fashioned by Melanchthon's *De anima*. Like Melanchthon, Horst believed that the study of the human nature should include both man's soul and body. For this reason, *De natura humana* is divided into two parts: one treats the human soul and the other man's body, by means of the latest anatomical findings and – in a way different from Melanchthon – twenty-nine anatomical plates.[16] Not only the structure, but also the contents of *De natura humana* seem to be imbued with Melanchthon's message on the soul and its origin, as it appears from Horst's account of human animation, to which we now turn.

In the part of *De natura humana* devoted to the soul, Horst includes a section entitled *De animae rationalis origine et immortalitate*. Horst's discussion opens with a list of authors who held one of the two rivalling positions (creation *ex nihilo* or transmission *ex traduce*), which I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. According to

---

physicis nitentes cogitationes, tamen et a sacrarum testimoniis non dissentit et Deo laudem omnipotentiae tribuit convenientius est».

16 Gregor Horst describes his use of anatomy – which he divides into 'anatomia vitalis' and 'anatomia mortua' – in the preface to his *De natura humana*. There, he also attempt to reconcile Galenic and Paracelsian medicine, as well as their respective conceptions of disease (Gregor Horst, *De natura humana*, 1–31). The use of anatomical plates in Horst works has already been noticed by Michael Edwards, "Body, Soul and Anatomy in Late Aristotelian Psychology",40–41. For more details about Horst's book and intellectual biography, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 14–15.

Horst, leading figures, such as Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin, had held that the individual souls of human beings were created directly by God *ex nihilo*. Luther and Melanchthon, on the other hand, had taught that the intellective soul was infused by God only in Adam and that it was then transmitted, in its fallen state, by means of natural procreation. Although Horst counts Melanchthon among the traducianists, he does not overlook the *Praeceptor*'s warning regarding the limits of man's ken. On the contrary, after having weighed the main arguments put forward by both the traducianists and the creationists, Horst uses the advice to the youth that is found in Melanchthon's *Liber de anima* as the point of departure for his argumentation:

> Therefore, here we have to discuss soberly, for which reason Mr Philip concludes regarding this question: "but I stop with this disputation and exhort the youth to tell all the things that can be penetrated by the sharpness of the mind from those that cannot be fully explored".[17]

The production of the souls is most mysterious and all opinions about it are full of difficulties and danger. In a way similar to Caspar Peucer, Horst thinks that neither the direct creation of the soul nor its corporeal generation are viable solutions. A third position is to be espoused, which Horst bases on the views proposed by his uncle Jacob Horst of Helmstedt and an unspecified "man of great intelligence" with whom Gregor Horst tells to have studied medicine at Helmstedt (*sic*).[18] According to Jacob Horst – Gregor reports – the soul is transmitted *ex traduce*, albeit by means of a miraculous action performed by God. This happens chiefly thanks to the mother. In fact, when the embryo is sufficiently developed, according to its parts, the soul is transmitted, through the umbilical cord and together with the vital heat, from the soul of the mother to the offspring.[19] Now, Gregor Horst combines this position with

17 Gregor Horst, *De natura humana*, 480: «Hic ergo sobrie disserendum, unde Dn. Philippus ita hanc quaestionem concludit: "sed hanc disputationem abrumpo, et iuniores moneo, ut discernant ea quae utcunque mentis acie penetrari possunt ab iis quae pervestigari non possunt"». Horst refers to CR XIII, 18.

18 On Jakob Horst, see: Kathleen M. Crowther, *Adam and Eve in the Protestant Reformation* (Cambridge 2010), 143–146, *passim*. Tricia M. Ross (Duke University) has also devoted some attention to Jakob Horst, in an unpublished paper: "Jakob Horst and 'Von den wunderbarlichen Geheimnissen der Natur in des Menschen Leibe und Seel'". I would like to thank the author for allowing me to read a draft of this paper.

19 Gregor Horst, De natura humana 480–481: "Haec sententia, quam Vir Clariss. Dn. Iacobus

the view proposed during private disputations by one of his fellow medical students at Helmstedt. According to this anonymous fellow student, the only way to explain the propagation of original sin in mankind is to assume that the human soul is propagated as well. But since the incorporeal nature of the soul does not allow change and natural generation, the transmission of the soul has to take place contrary to the ordinary course of nature (*contra naturam*) and thanks to the cooperating action of God.[20]

Gregor Horst values both this opinion and that of his uncle Jacob Horst. When taken jointly, Gregor Horst explains, these opinions form the most plausible account of the origin of man's intellective soul:

> Between these two statements, we remain in the middle; for we do not ignore with how much difficulty the present question is surrounded. Yet, if we had to say from the heart what seems probable to us, we would not deny that both

---

Horstius Med. Doctor, Acad. Iuliae professor primarius, pia memoria, praeceptor ac patruus noster honorandus, iam senex 64 annorum fovebat et publicis lectionibus atque scriptis defendebat, ut patet lib. 3 operis germanici de occultis naturae ca. 11, cuius verba ex germanico ita vertuntur: 'quamvis olim cum publicis lectionibus ac disputationibus doctrina in Academiis proponerem, fere nihil certi de hac difficultate concludere potuerim magis etiam ad creationem animae inclinarim; nihilominus tamen post considerationem naturalium operationum in homine, et quorundam textuum S. Scripturae, postpositis duabus communibus sententiis, aliam forte novam et ut mihi videtur in veritate magis fundatam opinionem statuere coactus sum: nimirum, quod anima rationalis ordinatione et miraculosa operatione divina a parentibus et potissimum a matre, ex traduce, instar surculi ex trunco, non ex ipsius corpore, nec etiam ex corporeo semine, sed ex anima modo invisibili, tunc temporis, quando partes embryonis perfecte sunt conformatae et elaboratae, una cum spiritus vitali, qui partibus conformatis a corde matris peculiarem transitum in embryonem accipit, infantes propagetur'".

20 Gregor Horst, *De natura humana*, 480: «Vir quidam ingeniosissimus amicus noster fratris loco colendis, olim Iulia Academia mecum in palestra philosophica et medica laborans, modum propagationis hoc modo privatis lectionibus ac disputationibus declarare conabatur, cuis verba haec sunt: "cum naturaliter, hoc est, per generationem anima rationalis propagari nequeat, et nihilominus corrupta substantia (scilicet peccatum originale) potissimum in ipsa anima insideat, ideo dicamus Deum Opt. Max. Secundo creationis modo (quo aliquid ex praeexistenti quodam, sed contra naturam producitur) ex praeexistente anima parentum foetui novam increare, quae quia materiam ex Adamo habet, reatus est particeps, quia non simpliciter generatur, sed concurrente peculiari divina actione producitur, absurdas contradictionum implicationes effugit quae ex simplici generatione sequuntur"».



Gregor Horst, De natura humana, *Tabula X, 295. The plate illustrates the foetus on the fortieth day after conception and joined to the mother by the umbilical cord.*[21]

21 This picture is owned by the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek.

> opinions may be retained, if joined with each other; in a way that the soul be produced from the soul of the mother, as our lord and uncle thinks, and by means of a cooperating action, as the other sentence states. In fact, given that [the soul] cannot be produced by generation from the soul, it has to be added to the former sentence that a creation cooperates; and given that the rational soul is not present in actuality from the first moment of conception, it remains that the soul is created rather from the soul of the mother than by the father's; which by no means takes away the dignity from the father, for either soul – the father's as much as the mother's – is similar in essence and perfection.[22]

According to Gregor Horst, the human soul is transmitted, together with original sin, from the parents (and chiefly from the mother) to the offspring. But since incorporeal substances, such as the souls of the parents, cannot generate another incorporeal substance (because incorporeal substances do not undergo change), the propagation of the human soul has to happen by virtue of a divine action, the workings and nature of which remain invisible to us.

6.4. Bruno Seidel: A Lutheran in Defence of Creationism

Melanchthon's message concerning the intellectual limits of the fallen man was heard by another Lutheran, Bruno Seidel, although it led him to conclusions radically different from those reached by Caspar Peucer and Gregor Horst. Seidel studied arts at Wittenberg, under Philip Melanchthon, and medicine at Padua, under the anatomist Gabriele Falloppio. The teaching he received at Wittenberg and his interest in anatomy merged to form his work on the soul. In his 1594 *Commentarius de*

22 Gregor Horst, *De natura humana*, 482–483: «Has duas assertiones iam in medio relinquimus, siquidem non ignoramus quanta difficultate quaestio praesens involuta sit. Si tamen ex animo dicendum quid nobis probabile videatur, non negarem quod utraque opinio coniuncta retineri queat, ita ut anima ex anima matris, quod vult Dn. Patruus, concurrente creatione, quod vult altera sententia, producatur. Cum enimex anima per generationem non possit produci, ergo addendum in sententia priori quod creatio concurrat. Cumque in primo conceptionis momento non actu adsit anima rationalis, ergo superest quod potius ex matris quam ex patris anima creetur, ubi nihil decedit patris dignitati, quia utriusque anima tam materna quam paterna conveniunt essentia et perfectione».

corpore animato, he sets out to explain Aristotle's teaching on the animate body, on the basis of Melanchthon's *De anima*, as well as by using the most up-to-date anatomy of his time, namely that of Vesalius. The section of the book devoted to man's intelligent soul contains an extensive discussion of human animation.

According to Bruno Seidel, we cannot fathom the wonderful work of the intelligence and power of God in nature:

> We have to look in wonder and we cannot see deep within the work of the wisdom and power of God in creation.[23]

For this reason, the problem of the origin of the soul is most difficult and can only be solved by proposing the theory most consistent with the Scriptures. Interestingly enough, Seidel thinks that this theory is creationism.

In fact, Seidel sees a difference between the animation of plants and animals, on the one hand, and of human beings, on the other. There is no doubt, Seidel explains, that in both cases the souls are the work of God. However, God uses intermediary causes in the creation of the souls of plants and animals. Plants and animals possess a seminal virtue (*virtus seminalis*) or plastic faculty (*facultas plastica*). Seidel is very likely to have borrowed this latter notion from a text that I will analyse in the following section of this article: Jacob Schegk's embryological work *De plastica seminis facultate* (1580). In fact, as Hiro Hirai has shown, Schegk was the first to have applied the term 'plastic' to the notion of 'moulding faculty' (*dunamis diaplastike*), which was coined by Galen, in his *On the Formation of the Foetus*.[24] According to Seidel, this plastic faculty is an instrument of God, which is endowed with the power of generating the bodies of plants and animals, together with their parts and organs. The plastic faculty also draws their souls into actuality from the potentiality of the seed and blood of the parents.[25] This process is very different from the way in which the souls of men come into being. Seidel explains this in the following passage:

---

23 Bruno Seidel, *Commentarius de corpore animato*, 375: «Nos mirandum opus sapientiae et potentiae Dei in creatione non penitus perspicimus».

24 The notion of 'moulding faculty' was used first by Galen and in the Middle Ages as an explanation for the formation of the foetus and of natural things in general. About this notion, its redefinition as 'plastic faculty' by Schegk, and its popularity thereafter, see: Hiro Hirai, "The Invisible Hand of God in Seeds: Jacob Schegk's Theory of Plastic Faculty", in *Early Science and Medicine* 12 (2007), 377–404.

25 More precisely, Seidel thinks that God uses two types of intermediary natural causes in the production of the all entities belonging to the physical world. According to Seidel, the plastic

Others believe that the souls of individual men exist by means of God's creation, together with the organic body; so that God, by creating, infuses those [the souls] into the bodies and by infusing, He creates. This opinion is more true, as well as already accepted by many, and has to be approved. For, without doubt, the rational souls of men are neither the effect of the generative power nor the work of the secondary causes; and because they do not originate by propagation of the seed, i.e., *ex traduce*, nor are they brought into actuality by the power of matter; instead, they are introduced into it [matter] from outside by God, an existing craftsman, who creates those [souls] *ex nihilo* – without any natural agent – and in an hypostatic, corporeal, and essential manner [united] with the body. For, indeed he [God] infuses all the powers of the soul together at the same time of animation and conjunction of the soul with the body; in fact, he does not first insert the vegetative, then the sensitive and lastly the intelligent [power]; for, the essence of the soul is not divided according to any time or subject.[26]

---

faculty acts as the instrumental efficient cause in the generation of plants and brute animals; but there also exists a principal efficient cause in nature, which coincides with the celestial body (in the case of all natural things), or the body of the parents, in the case of animate bodies: «Quamquam autem dubium nullum est quod nequaquam excludenda sit Dei praesentia in formatione et vivificatione corporis cuiuscumque animatae et firmissime statuendum formationem ac vitam Dei opus etiam esse, tamen plantarum et brutorum animas Deus dat non immediate, sed adhibitis mediis ac naturalibus causis, nempe materia phyisica et efficient principali (qua generaliter est corpus caeleste concurrens ad omnium rerum generationes, specialiter vero corpus animatum parentum, vel plantarum a quibus semina, surculi, radices germinante diunamis praeditae sumuntur) et efficient instrumentali, quae est facultas spermatica et formatrix in seminibus» (Bruno Seidel, *Commentarius de corpore animato*, 371).

26 Bruno Seidel, *Commentarius de corpore animato*, 374: «Alii per creationem Dei existere animas hominum singulorum credunt, simul cum corporibus organicis, ita ut Deus creando infundat eas corporibus et infundendo creet; que est verior et iam a plerisque recepta et probanda sententia. Nempe quod animae rationales hominum non sint generativae potentiae effectus neque causarum naturalium opus, quodque propagatione seminis sive ex traduce non oriantur, neque ex potentia materiae educantur in actum; sed introducantur in eam extrinsecus, opifice existente et absque ullo agente naturali creante ex nihilo, atque hypostatice, corporaliter et essentialiter cum corporibus vivente illas Deo. Ita quidem, ut omnes animae potentias simul infundat eodem momento animationis atque unitionis animae cum coprore, non autem primum immittat vegetantem, post sentientem et ultimo intelligentem, cum animae essentia nullo tempore nulloque subiecto sit dividua».

Contrary to Melanchthon, who believed that each human being possesses two different souls (i.e., a lower soul, or *ἐνδελέχεια*, which was responsible for life and sensation and a higher soul, or intelligent spirit), Seidel thought that the powers of the human soul constituted one single essence; for this reason, they could not come into being at different stages. Neither is this single essence, or soul, brought into existence by secondary causes. Instead, the soul is created directly by God, together with the body, so that soul and body could form a 'hypostatic union'. We are already familiar with this notion, which we found in Melanchthon's Christology, as well as in Casmann's psychology. Both authors believed that idea of 'hypostasis' could show a parallel between the two natures of Christ, on the one hand, and man's body and soul, on the other.[27] Although it is perfectly reasonable to think that Seidel was aware of these parallels between Christology and anthropology, he does not refer directly to Melanchthon or Casmann. Moreover, the *Commentarius de corpore animato* does not seem to elaborate on the notion of 'hypostatic union'; nor does Seidel make any explicit statement as to why he thinks such union comes about in a 'corporeal manner' (*corporaliter*). However, Seidel appears to treat the notions of 'hypostasis' and '*ens*', or substance (the result of the union between form and matter), as synonyms.[28] Such hypostasis is produced when God infuses all the powers of the soul together in the human body.

Interestingly enough, a few lines further in Seidel's text, we are told that the opinion above is merely the most probable one. For as Martin Luther privately recognised, it would not be impossible for God to arrange nature in such a way that the soul could come into being *ex traduce*. However, Seidel explains, this is not what the Holy Scriptures teach, and it is for this reason that Luther never taught traducianism in public and that creationism is to be accepted.

To sum up, mainly two points were at the centre of sixteenth-century Lutheran authors' discussions about the origin of the human soul. One amounted to concerns about the transmission of original sin. The other regarded an account of genera-

27 See: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 77–82. and 'Chapter 4', 133–140.

28 For instance, when explaining why there is only one soul in each man, Seidel considers the 'hypostasis' to be the same as 'individual', or 'substance': «ex materia et forma consituitur ens et unum, sicut etiam ex corpore et anima, quemadmodum paulo ante fuit dictum. Unius igitur una tantum esse potest forma et anima. Nam si plures inessent animae in corpore, non unus, sed plures homines in uno corpore existerent, et nemo hominum esset unum individuum vel una hypostasis, sed triplex secundum triplicem animam» (Bruno Seidel, *Commentarius de corpore animato*, 335).

tion consistent with two philosophical ideas: first, an immaterial substance (the intellective soul in this specific case) cannot undergo change; second, an incorporeal substance cannot generate from a corporeal one, In the case of works on the soul produced at Wittenberg, this enquiry developed along the lines of Melanchthon's *De anima* and its warning that natural philosophy could look at the human soul and its origin only as from without. According to Melanchthon, only the Christian faith and the Gospel are able to inform the fallen man about the source and the destiny of his soul. Melanchthon's cautionary approach to the problem of animation was heard by his followers, but the way in which it played out in their works varied. In the cases of Caspar Peucer and Gregor Horst, the recognition of the fact that the origin of the soul was surrounded with mystery amounted to a theory of animation halfway between creationism and traducianism. According to them, the soul was transmitted from the parents to the offspring in a way that surpassed the laws of nature and the human grasp. Bruno Seidel's account of human animation was supported by a comparatively more robust natural-philosophical argumentation. Because the secondary causes and the physical virtues dispersed in nature cannot explain the production of the incorporeal soul of man, creationism is deemed more plausible. However, Seidel eventually accepted this opinion on the basis of what he considered to be the teaching of the Scriptures and of Luther himself.

Sixteenth-century discussions regarding human animation developed of course beyond the University of Wittenberg and drew the attention of commentators of Aristotle's *De anima* who worked at other Lutheran institutions. In what follows, I shall look at two such commentators – Jacob Schegk and Johann Ludwig Hawenreuter – and their respective views on the origin of the human soul.

6.5. Jacob Schegk and Johann Ludwig Hawenreuter: The Origin of the Soul in Lutheran Aristotelianism

The commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima* by Jacob Schegk and Johan Ludwig Hawenreuter seem to differ from books on the soul produced at Wittenberg both in their structure and in the extent to which they considered human natural understanding to be capable of grasping the essence of the soul. As I have illustrated, Melanchthon and his followers believed that knowledge of the essence of the soul was hidden from man in his fallen state. For this reason, they used Aristotle and the most up-to-date anatomical findings to provide an operational (as opposed to an essential) account of the soul. Their psychologies indeed included a discussion of

the human body and the lower (vegetative and sensitive) faculties of the soul, as well as an account of the intellective soul of man and its origin based on the teaching of the Christian Gospel. Their books on the soul consisted in fact of a description of the entirety of the human nature (rather than the soul alone), in its fallen state. As two committed Lutherans, Schegk and Hawenreuter also wrote philosophical accounts of the soul in view of the Christian truth. However, their books on the soul are not treatises on the fallen human nature and do not include a part on human anatomy. Instead, they relied on Aristotle's *De anima*, which defined the soul as the form of a body possessing life potentially. The comparatively larger use of Aristotle on the part of Schegk and Hawenreuter influences the way in which Schegk and Hawenreuter conceived of human animation. Their views about the origin of the soul are nonetheless to be understood against the background of their Christian (or Lutheran) faith, as we are about to see.

Jacob Schegk was a very influential philosopher and physician, who worked at Tübingen. He was a committed Lutheran, who contributed to the reintroduction of the Aristotelian *corpus* in Protestant schools, as well as to the debate about the personal union of the two natures of Christ, at the behest of Duke Christoph (in favour of the real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist).[29] In 1546, Schegk published a commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, which also contained a commentary on *De anima*. In effect, Schegk thought that the science of the soul belonged, at least in part, to physics. Insofar as the soul is conceived as a kind of corporeal substance, its study belongs to physics; on the other hand, as the incorporeal soul of man, it is considered by a higher science, i.e., theology (*theologia*), which studies the divine substances.[30] Schegk treats the origin of the soul in the last book of his *De anima*,

29 About this, see: Sachiko Kusukawa, "Lutheran Uses of Aristotle", 180–182.

30 Jacob Schegk, *In octo Physicorum*, 252: «Physicus certe unde et quemadmodum affectae et consitutae res moveantur investigat. Ita enim universa pro eo ut motus non sunt expertia cognoscit quare et formam, gratia cuius cietur quicquid in motu est, quo gignitur aliquid et causam unde excitat motus, et materiam quae subiecta est, et quam habilem esse atque idoneam propter certam speciem necesse est, ut particeps motionis esse queat. Quae omnia cum animali causa animae motionum insint et tribuantur, quis non videt hanc scientiam peculiarem esse ac propriam eius quem indagatorem naturae nominamus, aut physicum? Veruntamen non quaelibet anima hoc modo solet explicari. Quare non omnis de anima cognition ei concedenda nisi omnem philosophiam nominare physicen velimus, et non tantum eam quae rationes rerum et causas motionibus demonstrate. Mens certe ipsa nec idoneum corpus efficit ut moveatur, quam Aristotelis inquit, ne fingere quidam aut comminisci licet, quo pacto corpus informet. Sed enim nec movet ipsum quin plane omni causa motionis vacans, cui dubium sit

but his most complete account of animation is found in a separate treatise entitled *De plastica seminis facultate* (1580). As we have seen, this book was probably the source of Seidel's idea of 'plastic faculty'. In his embryological treatise, Schegk looks at the plastic faculty as the main responsible for the generation of plants and animals, as well as for their souls. As Hiro Hirai has pointed out, Schegk thought that the plastic faculty was the 'hand' of God, through which the Creator skilfully preserved the species.[31] But when it comes to the animation of human beings, Schegk explains, the plastic faculty is not all there is. At the end of the first book of the *De plastica seminis facultate*, Schegk addresses the creation of the human soul and states what follows:

> I believe that if the philosophers had recognised God the Creator, they would have agreed with us and would have said that the souls are not contained in the seed and in the seminal liquid of the male before they [the souls] inform the human bodies. For, by denying God the Creator, or rather by being ignorant of Him, they were clearly forced to admit that the human soul and the body were produced at the same time, by means of the spermatic *logos*; and that the human soul was not introduced from outside but drawn from the potentiality of matter.[32]

---

quin inter res etiam divinas ipsa numeretur? Reliques partes omnes motione definiuntur aliqua et perpessione, ut quae nutricatur corpus anima, item quae sentit, nec non quae in loco movet, quae quidem non dici mens debet, ut quidam arbitrantur, cum in loco progrediantur etiam quae rationis expertia sunt appetitu quodam, non ratione et mente excitata. Ex quo par est intelligi ad philosophiam superiorem, quam theologiam nominant, magis pertinere». It seems legitimate to think that here 'theologia' is the same as 'metaphysics'. In fact, earlier, on the same page, Schegk calls 'theologia' the knowledge of things divine or substances that are not mixed with the body. For more details and bibliography regarding Renaissance discussions on the disciplinary status of the science of the soul, see: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 38–41.

31 Hiro Hirai, "The Invisible Hand of God in Seeds: Jacob Schegk's Theory of Plastic Faculty", 386–388.

32 Jacob Schegk, *De plastica seminis facultate libri tres*, B7r: «Credo philosophos, si agnovissent Deum creatorem, nobiscum consensuros, et non prius animas, quam informent corpora humana, in semine ac genitali humore masculini sexus contineri dixissent. Nam creatorem Deum negantes, aut potius nescientes, cogerentur certe fateri: τῷ σμερματικῷ λόγῳ simul animam humanam, et corpus ipsi nasci, et non θύραθεν introduci, sed educi animam humanam de potentia materiae».

Like Bruno Seidel, Schegk thought that the human soul was created directly by God anew, in each individual. In contrast with the cautionary remarks we have observed in the works of other Lutherans, Schegk had no doubt that it was only by being ignorant of the existence of a Creator that one could deny the direct creation of the human souls by God. On the one hand, Schegk's theory of human animation resulted from his analysis of the nature and powers of the plastic faculty. On the other hand, his conclusions reflect the importance he ascribed to the Christian revelation. Schegk stressed this point in his *De anima* too, where he praised both Aristotle and Plato for having understood that the intellect of man was not drawn from the potentiality of matter, but was inserted in man's body from outside. However, Schegk stressed that Aristotle's and Plato's theories were still insufficient to explain the origin of the soul: according to them, if something was produced, it also changed and eventually ceased to exist. Therefore, in order to avoid this consequence, Plato and Aristotle mistakenly thought that the human soul was eternal (both *a parte post* and *a parte ante*). According to Schegk, it was only through the Christian faith that one could conceive of the soul as something that was both eternal *a parte post*, or immortal, and had a beginning, because its source was God, who created all things *ex nihilo*.[33]

The attempt to reconcile a rational understanding of the soul with Christian views regarding God's creation and the transmission of original sin also marks the case of the Lutheran Ludwig Hawenreuter, who taught medicine, metaphysics, and natural philosophy at Strasburg, from 1585 until his death in 1618. He certainly knew the work of Schegk through Andreas Planer, under whom Hawenreuter earned his doctorate from Tübingen.[34] Like Schegk, Hawenreuter wrote a commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* (1605), in which he argued that the science of the soul stood halfway between natural philosophy and a higher science. Insofar as the soul was taken to be the form of a living body, it was the business of the natural philosopher; but the consideration of the mind (*mens*) of human beings pertained to metaphysics.[35] To the intellective soul of man Hawenreuter devoted the third book of his *De anima*, where

33 Jacob Schegk, *In octo Physicorum*, 352.

34 See: *supra*, 'Chapter 1', 28.

35 Johann Ludwig Hawenreuter, *In Aristotelis De Animo et Parva Naturalia*, 3–4: «Deinde a subjecto horum librorum [of *De anima*] quod partim sub Physici, partim sub Metaphysici & primi Philosophi contemplationem cadit: quatenus mens corpus informat, & suas corpore operationes exercet, a Physico consideratur, quatenus autem separata, & a corpore seiuncta est, essentiam eam Metaphysicus perpendit».

he defended the doctrine of traducianism.[36] His view was known at least since 1590, when it was published in Rudolph Goclenius' *Psychologia*. In his analysis of human animation, Hawenreuter was mainly concerned with explaining the transmission of original sin. Like Peucer and Horst, Hawenreuter believed that creationism could not account for such transmission, without admitting either that the intellective soul could be acted upon by the body or that God was responsible for the presence of sin in each man.[37] This observation led Peucer and Horst to believe that the sinful human soul was transmitted from parents to offspring in a supernatural or miraculous way, which would remain unknown to the human understanding. In a way different from these authors, Hawenreuter opted for a rational understanding of the transmission of the soul, in terms of the natural dynamic of potentiality and actuality: the intellective soul of man is potentially in the seed of the parents and then brought into actuality when the foetus is sufficiently developed.[38] Of course, Hawenreuter did not think that the transmission of the soul lied entirely with a natural agent (the seed). Such natural process, he explains, would not be possible without God's command 'be fruitful and multiply'.[39] According to Hawenreuter, the words of *Genesis* 1,28 were constantly effective in the production of all natural things, including the human soul. This is not the only way, however, in which Hawenreuter saw the interaction between God's action and man's soul. In fact, he proposed a new solution to one of the central problems in the discussions among the authors I have so

36 According to Leen Spruit, *The Origin of the Soul From Antiquity to the Early Modern Era*, 86, Hawenreuter's traducianism drew the attention of the Roman Congregation for the Index.

37 Goclenius, *Psychologia*, 373: «Praeterea, cum peccatum propagator in hominibus, vel perfectus erit animus, qui cum corpore non generator, vel imperfectus et peccatis abnoxius. Si perfectus esse dicatur, et cum corpore coniunctus imperfectus fiery, a corpore patiatur necesse est, quod est absurdum. Si imperfectus et peccatis conteminatus, Deus auctor fit peccati, quod est blasphemum».

38 Goclenius, *Psychologia*, 371: «Principio ergo quaerimus de origine animi non omnis, sed intelligentis; nutrientem anim animum et sentientem una cum re animate nasci nemo dubitat, sed intelligente omnis est disputatio. Censemus autem di homo generetur quod simul ipsius animus generetur, et quod in semine hominis potestate insit animus et postea in actum traducatur. Quod secundo loco confirmamus auctoritate Aristotelis, qui, lib. 2. De gener. Animal. Cap. 3. Ubi ex professo de origine animi disserit, totam doctrinam concludit, quod dixerit, quomodo in foetu et semine insit animus et determinaverit potestate inesse, non actu».

39 Genesis 1,28 appears to have been very popular with Lutherans and used by them as a rhetorical tool to rebut the Catholic ideal of religious celibacy. About this see: Kathleen Crowther, "'Be Fruitful and Multiply': Genesis and Generation in Reformation Germany", *Renaissance Quarterly* 55.3 (2002), 904–935.

far analysed. They all were worried that thinking that the human soul was drawn from the potentiality of matter was inconsistent with the soul's incorporeality and immortality. According to Hawenreuter, this problem could be solved as follows:

> To the first argument it is replied that the soul can certainly be separated from the body and be without it; but this does not happen according to the nature of the soul created in the beginning by God, according to which the soul would never be separated from matter and the body. Rather, this disintegration [of the natural bond between body and soul] is the price of sin, as is said in Paul's letter *To the Romans*, 7.23.[40]

According to Hawenreuter, the soul is not separable from the body, insofar as it is in its natural state: no form in nature can exist without its matter. As a consequence of sin, however, the bond between the soul and its body has been destroyed and the soul can exist in an unnatural state of separation from the body. In the cases of Peucer and Horst, a supernatural and unknowable way of transmission of the soul was the only way to conceive of the transmission of original sin in mankind, while maintaining the natural incorporeality and immortality of the soul. Instead, on Hawenreuter's account, original sin is propagated through the natural process of transmission of the intellective soul, from man to man. What is beyond nature, Hawenreuter explained, is the fact that the intellective soul can exist without the body; this would not have been possible before the fall.

6.6. Conclusions

Lutheran professors of arts and medicine, who worked in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, considered nature and the soul to be God's doing. This idea was essential to Philip Melanchthon, who sponsored it through the creation of a new educational system at Wittenberg. According to Melanchthon, however, natural philosophy could only help man recognise the hand of a divine architect behind nature whereas the certainty about this truth could only be obtained by faith and trust in

40 Goclenius, *Psychologia*, 374: «Ad primum autem argumentum respondetur, posse quidem animum a materia et corpore separari et absque eo esse; sed id non fieri secundum naturam animi a principio a Deo creatam, secundum quam nunquam a materia et corpore animus fuisset separatus. Verum hanc dissolutionem esse stipendium peccati, ut D. Paulus ad Rom. 7., v. 23».

the teaching of the Christian Gospel. Also knowledge of the source and destiny of the human soul was to be found in the Scriptures. For Melanchthon, the soul was most assuredly made by God for an eternal life. But the exact way in which God brought about the individual souls of men remained hidden from the human understanding.

Such uncertainty about the precise origin of the soul shaped the discussions of most early-modern Lutherans and ensured that they could explore very diverse ways to conceive of human animation. According to Ludwig Hawenreuter, God devised and fostered nature, so that the human soul would come into being through the seed of the parents, as it happened to all other animate species. Jacob Schegk and Bruno Seidel thought it impossible for an incorporeal form like the human soul to be drawn from the potentiality of matter, that is, from the seed of the parents. Therefore, they thought that the individual souls of men were created directly by God *ex nihilo*. As they could see difficulties with both traducianism and creationism, Caspar Peucer and Gregor Horst opted for a third way: the soul was transmitted from the parents to their offspring, albeit in a wondrous way, which included the cooperation of God's action and surpassed the laws of natural generation.

The variety of theories presented by the authors I have taken into exam suggests that Lutherans were not expected to conform to one specific view about the origin of the soul. The very fathers of the Protestant reformation, Martin Luther and Philip Melanchthon, remained either silent or uncertain about the origin of man's soul. However, concerns about the transmission of original sin in mankind led many Lutherans to believe that Luther's and Melanchthon's caution also meant that the truth of creationism could be doubted. The idea that God created each individual soul anew and *ex nihilo* was deemed inconsistent with one fundamental conviction: after the fall, the human soul is irremediably sinful.

Lutheran theology, at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century, does not seem to have prescribed one single doctrine about the origin of the soul. However, traducianism became increasingly popular among Lutheran professors of arts and medicine at the time. German Catholics, such as the Ingolstadt Jesuits, issued official documents in which traducianism was singled out as the rival theory, which was defended by Luther, and creationism was considered to be defining of their religious camp. The extent to which Lutherans regarded themselves committed to traducianism is less clear and further study on the interplay between Lutheran theology and discussions on the origin of the soul seems to be promising, in at least two ways: it might help us understand the emergence of early-modern theories of animation and it might shed new light on the formation of a

Lutheran confessional identity at the turn of the seventeenth century. In the meantime, I would like to draw the following conclusions.

First, scholarly attempts to identify sixteenth-century traducianism as a distinctly Lutheran affair is helpful only to a certain extent. In fact, to the best of my knowledge and as I hope to have shown, traducianism was not implied by Lutheran theology.

Second and more in general, the idea of identifying rigid blocks, such that one can link specific philosophical opinions to determinate religious affiliations, might make us miss two important aspects involved in psychology in the age of confessionalisation and in the formation of different confessional identities. The case of sixteenth-century disputes on the origin of the soul shows, on the one hand, that the emergence of such identities was not necessarily a consequence of official statements of doctrine, but rather the result of the conflict between confessional camps. As official statements on the part of the Ingolstadt Jesuits were issued, which ascribed traducianism to Martin Luther, a specific theory concerning the origin of the human soul became more and more defining of the Lutheran camp. It seems then as if the formation of the Lutheran identity in this case was nurtured more by the Jesuits' opposition to the Lutherans than by official statements on the part of the Lutherans themselves. On the other hand, the very fact that the controversies about human animation contributed – in whatever way they did – to the emergence of denominational parties offers some further corroboration to the following idea: the discussions about the origin of the soul I examined in this study can be fruitfully considered as part, and not as a consequence, of the formation of intellectual groups of different confessional affiliation.

CHAPTER 7

Final Conclusions

7.0. Summary of the Research Conducted in This Thesis

In this thesis I have addressed the interaction between the transformations of psychology and the process of confessionalisation in the sixteenth century. My enquiry started by the observation that ideas regarding the soul also were part of Martin Luther's fierce attacks on the Roman papacy, as well as of his ensuing efforts to devise a new theology based on the notion of salvation by faith alone (or *sola fide*).

Salvation *sola fide* meant to Luther chiefly two things. First, that man's deeds were ineffective as for his salvation, which could instead be achieved through faith in Christ only. Second, that this faith in Christ could be obtained only by hearing the Gospel and the law of God as they were revealed in the Scriptures. As an immediate consequence of this belief, Luther began questioning the role of the Pope as an intermediary between God and man. In the opening section of this thesis I referred to Luther's mockery of everything papal, including important doctrines regarding the soul. As we have seen, especially in *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation* (1520), Luther ironically said that the Pope was free to decree that the soul was the form of the body and that philosophy could demonstrate the immortality of the intellective soul as much as he was free to say that he was the emperor of the world and God on earth.

As a result of Luther's satirising comments, I wondered in which way his ideas impacted on doctrines of the soul among authors who embraced the Lutheran faith. The two doctrines criticised by Luther in his *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation* were precisely the decisions made during the Council of Vienne (1311–1312) and the Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517). But – I asked in first part of the present work – did Luther and his followers limit their critics to these two doctrines?

Moreover, Luther's attacks on the Roman Church later resulted in the movement known as Reformation. This movement, in turn, triggered the process of confessionalisation: the transformation by which western Christianity became divided into three main confessional groups (Lutheranism, Catholicism, Calvinism) and many minor ones. But, how did this process interact with psychological doctrines about the human soul and the soul-body relationship that were of immediate theological

relevance? Did sixteenth-century confessionalisation give birth to something like a Lutheran way of looking at the soul, or to a Lutheran psychology?

In the preceding chapters I followed these research questions by looking mainly at one specific case of the development of psychology in the age of confessionalisation: the works on the soul produced by Philip Melanchthon and by several authors who embraced Melanchthon's new faith and considered his *Commentarius de anima* and *Liber de anima* as their preferred framework for the study of the soul. Furthermore, because many important ideas found in the works of these authors are the outcome of controversies, I have taken into account the relevant writings by some of Melanchthon's and his followers' foes.

Well then, what does the study conducted so far tell us about psychology in the age of confessionalisation? Did the psychological works written by Melanchthon and his followers result in something like a Lutheran way of looking at the soul? How did their psychologies interact with the emergence of Lutheran confessional identity?

In order to provide some answers to the main questions I asked in this thesis, let us first recapitulate the principal elements that emerged from the preceding chapters.

7.1. *ἐνδελέχεια* and the Attempt to Embody the Vegetative and Sensitive Souls

Some of the works on the soul I have considered in this research are characterised by an attempt to provide an operational account of the lower powers (vegetative and sensitive) of the human soul: an account of the soul that does not try to define the essence of the soul but rather the operations the soul performs in the human body.

True, this view can be found in several medieval commentators on Aristotle's *De anima*. After all, Aristotle himself had stated that in order to know what the soul is, one had to look at its properties. Yet, in the texts I examined, this view took on a new meaning, which I showed to be rooted in Philip Melanchthon's understanding of the relationship between knowledge obtained through God's Gospel and that obtained through philosophy. While Melanchthon agreed with Luther that the essence of the human soul in its immaterial and immortal nature could only be knowable through the Gospel, he thought that a philosophical understanding of some of the soul's operations was nonetheless possible, or even necessary. It is for this reason that Melanchthon and some of his followers strove to grasp the workings of the vegetative and sensitive souls in the human body.

Chiefly in Philip Melanchthon's books on the soul, but subsequently also in the psychologies written by Rudolph Snellius and Otto Casmann, this endeavour to embody the lower souls became interwoven with the diffusion of the concept of '*ἐνδελέχεια*', as a new way of looking at the corporeal soul of man.

To be precise, at the time Melanchthon worked on psychology, the term '*ἐνδελέχεια*' was all but new. Whether this term or rather the similar one '*ἐντελέχεια*' was the definition of the soul found in Aristotle's *De anima* had been a humanist discussion already in the Italian *Quattrocento*. In its humanist fashion, this discussion addressed the opinion expressed by Cicero, in his *Tusculan Disputations*, according to which Aristotle had defined the soul as *ἐνδελέχεια* or continuous agitation of the body. Outstanding humanists, such as Argyropulos and Politian, marshalled all their philological skills to determine whether Cicero's reading of Aristotle's *De anima* was correct. But when this discussion reached Melanchthon the choice between *ἐντελέχεια* or *ἐνδελέχεια* stopped being a philological one: in accepting Cicero's use of *ἐνδελέχεια* to define the soul as a movement of the body, Melanchthon said: *ego non rixor de vocabulo*.

Melanchthon's use of '*ἐνδελέχεια*' did not stem so much from a philological analysis of Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* vis-à-vis Aristotle's *De anima*. What Melanchthon was pursuing was a way of describing the vegetative and sensitive souls of man in terms of the actions they performed in the human body. As he was trying to harmonise Luther's idea that the soul's essence was unknowable with a philosophical account of the soul's operations, Melanchthon appropriated the humanist debate on Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* and gave it a doctrinal significance. The result was a philosophical account of the soul as *ἐνδελέχεια*, which, to Melanchthon meant a movement of the body or of the bodily spirits.

In the first chapter of this thesis, I showed that the diffusion of the debate on Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* in northern Europe was in many cases determined by Melanchthon's discussion in his *Commentarius* and *Liber de anima*. Some Protestant authors endorsed Cicero's use of '*ἐνδελέχεια*', whilst other authors, mainly Veit Amerbach and his Jesuit followers at Ingolstadt maintained that the soul was a *perfectio* or *ἐντελέχεια*. In both cases, however, the choice between the stand taken by these authors in the debate was not of a philological nature, but amounted to accepting or refusing Melanchthon's doctrine. This doctrine was the result of Melanchthon's attempt to make Luther's views on philosophy and the Gospel compatible with a philosophical account of the soul.

7.2. Spirits and the Spiritualising of the Human Soul

On the one hand, I have showed that Melanchthon thought that the lower soul of man (encompassing the vegetative and sensitive operations) corresponded to the bodily spirits or to an agitation or movement of the bodily spirits. On the other hand, I pointed to the fact that Melanchthon used the word 'spirit' in other contexts of his psychology and to indicate entities very different to the bodily spirits and their *ἐνδελέχεια*.

True, Melanchthon made room for a philosophical/operational account of the lower soul in the context of his Lutheran faith. However, he did not renounce to integrate this faith in his books on psychology. Melanchthon conveyed his Christian views about the soul through his *Commentarius* and *Liber de anima*. He did it by ascribing to human beings a higher soul that was altogether different from the bodily spirits. This higher soul – which included the operations of intellect and will – was provided with innate notions of civic morals, an idea that has been showed to have served Melanchthon's confessional efforts of disciplining the Lutherans in Saxony.

Therefore, Melanchthon used 'spirit' to refer to man's intellect and will too. For Melanchthon, these operations should not be ascribed to the bodily spirits or *ἐνδελέχεια*, but to an immaterial and immortal substance, which could only be grasped through the teaching of the Christian Scriptures. Melanchthon called this substance: *spiritus intelligens*.

What is more, Melanchthon also used 'spirit' in yet another way in his *Liber de anima*: spirit was also the Holy Spirit. To make matters worse, the *Liber de anima* explained that the interaction of all these (bodily, intelligent, and Holy) spirits was central to man's choices and behaviour in his mortal life. As I explained in the second chapter of this thesis, this(if awkward) interaction was part and parcel of Melanchthon's doctrine of salvation by faith alone, intended as the renewal of the soul on the part of the Holy Spirit and as the presence of the Holy Spirit itself in the soul of the believers.

Melanchthon's overlapping uses of '*spiritus*' made some of his adversaries – chiefly Julius Caesar Scaliger – worry that 'spirit' was either too vague a term or even a category dangerously lending itself to a materialistic interpretation of the soul, because it indicated an item too similar to the bodily spirits. Scaliger's criticism of Melanchthon's doctrine of the soul as '*spiritus*' was matched by as much appreciation on the part of some Protestant authors who drew on the Wittenberg reformer's psychology. Especially Melanchthon's followers Rudolph Snellius and Otto Casmann thought that, *pace* Scaliger, it was clear enough that the point Melanchthon wanted

to make in his books about the soul was the following one: man's higher soul is an immaterial spirit, a substance completely different to all things bodily, including the vegetative and sensitive souls.

I think Snellius and Casmann were in some respect right. What Melanchthon was trying to say, albeit uneasily, was that each human being had two souls: one, the *ἐνδελέχεια*, virtually corresponded to the bodily spirits; the other, the *spiritus intelligens*, was knowable only through the Scriptures and corresponded to an immaterial and immortal substance, provided with innate notions of morals. In Melanchthon's psychology, much effort in embodying the lower powers of the soul was balanced by a spiritualising of man's intellect and will. This spiritualising was both ontological (man's higher soul was in fact a spiritual substance) and epistemological (man's higher soul could not be known by means of human rational understanding).

Snellius and Casmann defended Melanchthon's views for many reasons. Importantly, they thought that Melanchthon's doctrine of the soul was preferable to Aristotle's and held water, despite Scaliger's criticisms, because it was more in keeping with their Christian faith. According to Snellius and Casmann, Melanchthon's psychology mirrored what the Holy Scriptures taught about the human soul, viz., that the soul was a spiritual and immortal substance. Especially Otto Casmann drew on Melanchthon's definition of the soul in a move that in my opinion pushed Melanchthon's spiritualising tendency even further.

7.3. The Christologising of the Human Soul

Otto Casmann devoted an entire section of his *Psychologia anthropologica* to rejecting Scaliger's criticism of Melanchthon's psychology, hence to defending the latter's conception of the soul as *spiritus intelligens*. Casmann also referred to the *spiritus intelligens* as *anima logica* and thought that this spiritual entity defined man and even more than the possession of rationality made human beings differ from lower animals. Casmann preferred to look at man as a being possessing a spirit (or *anima logica*) rather than rationality, because he thought that man had to be defined in his relationship to the Christian divinity.

In the third chapter of this thesis, I explained this point by taking into consideration Casmann's criticism of some views defended by the Spanish physician Franciscus Vallesius. According to Vallesius, lower animals shared with men the possession of some degrees of rationality. Casmann argued against this view. But whilst part of his criticism of Vallesius addressed specific points of the latter's arguments, Cas-

mann also based his counterarguments on deeper philosophical convictions. According to Casmann, animals could not be granted the same type of rational thinking possessed by men, because man's rational thinking implied the possession of a spirit or *anima logica*. This *anima logica*, in its turn, involved a determinate ontological set-up that Casmann based on Christology.

Philip Melanchthon had explained that Christ was composed of two natures united in one person and that these two natures formed a hypostasis, or hypostatical union. Melanchthon added to this that the same hypostatical relationship holding between Christ's two natures also existed between man's body and soul. As I pointed out in the sixth chapter of the present work, also Melanchthon's follower Bruno Seidel used the notion of hypostasis to identify the type of unity taking place between man's body and soul. But Casmann interpreted Melanchthon's conception in a very specific way. According to Casmann, the well-known Christian teaching that man was created in God's image and likeness had to be understood as follows: man's ontological structure has to mirror Christ's. For this reason man's possession of rationality did not identify the specificity of human beings as much as Christ's divine nature did not suffice to characterise the person of Christ as a whole. Therefore, according to Casmann, just as Christ's entire person had to be understood as a relationship between two natures, so the specificity of human beings had to be found in a hypostatic union between a body and a spirit, or *anima logica*. The difference between *anima logica* and a the rational soul (which *anima logica* nonetheless encompassed) is that the latter only indicated a biological difference between man and beasts. The former, instead, pointed to man's more profound ontological identity as a being created in God's image and likeness, which mirrored the nature of the second person of the Christian Trinity: Christ.

Casmann defended Melanchthon's notion of the soul as '*spiritus intelligens*', but I think he also brought Melanchthon's spiritualising views of man's higher soul to a different level. According to Casmann, that man was a spiritual being meant that man was defined by a relationship to the Christian divinity.

7.4. The Human Nature as the Subject Matter of the *De anima* and the Anatomical Knowledge of the Body. A New Project and Its Unintended Consequences

As I showed, especially in the fifth chapter of this thesis, a tendency to rearrange the mutual articulation of psychology and anthropology in the context of natu-

ral philosophy is perhaps the most shared element among the works I considered for the present research. Bruno Seidel, Gregor Horst, Rudolph Snellius, and Otto Casmann wrote books on the soul that drew on Melanchthon's psychology in several respect. Certainly, all of them agreed with Melanchthon on one specific point: the science of the soul should not address the soul as a general principal of life in plant, animals, and humans. The *scientia de anima* rather had to consider the soul as a special part of its enquiry, which more properly addressed the human nature as a whole.

As I have documented, Melanchthon's *Commentarius de anima* and *Liber de anima* differed from most of their medieval and contemporary books on the soul in that they assigned a new subject to the *scientia de anima*. According to Melanchthon, the book called *De anima* should address the entirety of human nature, which included both man's soul and man's body. Some of Melanchthon's followers at Wittenberg and elsewhere in Germany and the Low Countries followed suit.

This transformation can be captured already by looking at the titles and subtitles of their works. Bruno Seidel entitled his 1594 book on the soul *Commentarius de corpore animato ac potissimum quidem de corpore et anima hominis*. The subtitle of this work states that the *Commentarius* is meant to make Aristotle's teaching about the soul easier to understand, by integrating the doctrines of those who studied the *fabrica* of the human body (like Galen and Vesalius) as well as the ideas of some of Aristotle's commentators, chiefly Philip Melanchthon's. Two years later, the Dutch Rudolph Snellius also published a *In Melanchthonis de anima, vel potius de hominis physiologia libellum*, which title already suggests that Snellius looked at Melanchthon's *Liber de anima* as a book on the nature (*physiologia*) of man. Snellius better explains his intentions in the prolegomenon of his work on the soul: the *De anima* receives its name from the most noble part of man, viz., the soul. However, a more opportune name for the book traditionally called '*On the Soul*' should be '*On Human Physiology*'. As a consequence, Snellius also divided his book into two parts, as he believed that the entirety of the human nature consisted of a soul and of a body.

Even more radically than Seidel and Snellius, Gregor Horst and Otto Casmann included their psychologies in books that explicitly referred to the human nature in their titles. Horst used the teaching about the soul he had heard in Wittenberg to write a *De natura humana libri duo, quorum prior de corporis structura, posterior de anima tractat*. And Otto Casmann defended Melanchthon's doctrine of the soul in his *Psychologia anthropologica, sive anima humana doctrina*; a book which together with a separate treatise on the human body (the *Somatotomia*) should form a bigger science: *anthropologia*.

On the one hand, these authors further developed and gave a more systematic set-up to Melanchthon's own ideas regarding the science of the soul. On the other hand, Melanchthon's ideas were the result of his efforts to harmonise a traditional philosophical discipline, the science of the soul, with Luther's ideas of sin and grace. As I have showed, Luther believed that the soul and the body of man were both affected by the original sin and that both were also the subject of divine grace. Because of this, Luther deemed Aristotle's psychology inadequate to properly understand the soul's nature. As we have seen, Luther's *Disputatio de homine* rejected both the idea that the soul was the form of the body and the traditional conception of man as '*animal rationales*'. According to Luther, these notions grasped the human nature only in its mortal state. However, Luther explained, man should be understood from a Christian point of view. To Luther's mind, this meant essentially two things: man should be considered not primarily as a rational being, but as God's creature, that is, as the subject of sin and grace. As a consequence of this, Luther taught, an adequate consideration of man should be about the body as much as about the soul.

Philip Melanchthon sought to find a new balance between Luther's ideas and a philosophical account of the soul, which Melanchthon considered indispensable for the education of the Lutheran youth. In his *Commentarius de anima* and *Liber de anima*, Melanchthon conveyed Luther's teaching by addressing the entirety of man's nature, both the soul and the body. In the new shape it obtained at the hand of Melanchthon, Luther's emphasis on the entirety of man's nature was received by professors of arts and medicine such as Seidel, Horst, Snellius, and Casmann. In this sense, the transformation of the *scientia de anima* into a new discipline called *anthropologia* found its trigger in Luther's understanding of man from a Christian point of view.

But the shift of the subject matter of the *scientia de anima*, from the soul to the human nature, also implied two further elements of novelty: first, the introduction of anatomy in psychology; second and as a result of this change, the emergence of new ways of looking at the human body.

On the one hand, Melanchthon's use of anatomy in the science of the soul was motivated by his strive to study the vegetative and sensitive operations of man by looking at their workings in the bodily organs. For this reason, he, as well as Seidel, Horst, Snellius, and Casmann relied on the anatomical works of Galen and Vesalius. On the other hand, these authors considered human anatomy important for another very crucial reason. Precisely because their books addressed the human nature as a whole, they also included large sections devoted to an explanation of man's body based on the latest anatomical findings. But as they included material taken from the

works of Vesalius, Fabrici d'Acquapendente, and Realdo Colombo, the books on the soul I considered also proposed new ways of looking at the body. In the psychological works of Melanchthon, Seidel, Horst, Snellius, and Casmann, the human body was no longer considered in the Aristotelian sense, viz., as potentially living matter predisposed for the soul as its actualising form. The body we find in the works of these authors was of course conceived as the seat of the soul. Yet it could be considered independently of the soul and it amounted chiefly to an orderly arrangement of organs as they were discovered through dissection of cadavers. In some cases – most clearly in the works of Melanchthon and Snellius – the arrangement of the bodily organs was compared to mechanical devices, like windmills, clocks, and *automata*.

In the fifth chapter of this thesis I pointed to a further interesting element involved in the transformations of psychology I just summarised. On the one hand, the *scientia de anima* became anthropology, that is, a discipline that considered man to possess two natures: a soul or spirit (the subject of psychology) and a body (the subject of anatomy). This change in the renaissance science of the soul was triggered by Melanchthon's own interpretation and effort to enforce central points of his Lutheran faith. On the other hand, the disciplinary set-up resulting from Melanchthon's and his followers' endeavours, as well as their view of human nature as composed by two natures became ideas accepted across different confessions or even independently of religious motives. That man had two different parts (a spirit and a soul) and that the science that studied them, anthropology, was accordingly divided into two branches (psychology and anatomy), all this evolved into a standard disciplinary framework, independent of its initial religious or even denominational character.

7.5. The Soul and Its Controversial Origin

As I have explained throughout this thesis, Melanchthon and some of his Wittenberg and northern European followers insisted on two intertwined points: first, man's higher soul was a spiritual substance; second, this substance could not be known by the natural philosopher.

These two points implied that knowledge of the origin of the human spirit also remained hidden from man's natural understanding. Surely, Melanchthon pointed out, the most important task of natural philosophy is making man recognise – even from a rational point of view – that nature is the work of a divine architect. For this reason, natural philosophy could by no means doubt that man's soul was created by

God. What was impossible for natural philosophy, Melanchthon admonished, was obtaining precise knowledge of the mode of this creation. Did God create the human spirit anew in each individual, as 'creationism' taught? Or did he rather create it only in the first man, leaving its transmission to the process of natural procreation, as the theory of 'traducianism' proposed?

Notwithstanding his efforts to find a provisional answer in the Scriptures, Melanchthon concluded that man's natural understanding could not work out this long-vexed question once and for all. Melanchthon's message was so powerful at Wittenberg, that authors who followed his teaching opened their discussions on the origin of the soul by quoting Melanchthon's words regarding the unknowability of the soul's origin. In the works of Peucer, Seidel, and Horst, Melanchthon's admonishment that the youth should not enquire into things that only God can know played the role of a cautionary remark. Before making up their minds between creationism and traducianism they informed the reader that their answers would be as limited as man's natural understanding.

As I have showed in the sixth chapter of this thesis, Melanchthon's idea that the origin of the soul was unknowable did not only serve as a cautionary remark. Perhaps more importantly, it made possible for his Lutheran followers to defend a variety of different opinions on human animation. Melanchthon's students defended creationism, traducianism, or middle-ground positions between these two alternatives. Because Melanchthon and Luther too had been either unclear or silent about the origin of the soul, sixteenth-century Lutherans were not expected to conform to one specific doctrine. I demonstrated this by looking also at the works Lutherans who considered Aristotle's *De anima*, rather than Melanchthon's books on the soul, to be the ideal framework for their psychological works. But also in the case of these authors – particularly Jacob Schegk (a creationist) and Johannes Ludwig Hawenreuter (a traducianist) – their undoubted affiliation to the Lutheran faith did not imply any uniformity for what concerned their doctrines about human animation.

Despite the fact that Lutherans did not follow one specific doctrine regarding the origin of the soul, confessional controversies encouraged several Lutherans to take a clearer stance. In fact, Catholic authors (especially the Jesuit of Ingolstadt) began to condemn traducianism as the opinion defended by Luther. In the wake of these attacks and amidst growing concerns that creationism could not adequately explain the transmission of original sin through mankind, traducianism appears to have enjoyed increasing popularity among Lutherans, at the turn of the seventeenth century.

7.6. Psychology and Confessionalisation: A Conclusion

On the basis of the main points I just recapitulated, what conclusions can we draw about psychology in the age of confessionalisation?

Luther's reform initially implied a blanket rejection of all things Catholic and scholastic, including the decrees of the Council of Vienne and the Fifth Lutheran Council regarding the human soul. Luther ridiculed the idea that man's intellective soul was essentially and per se the form of the human body and the belief that the immortality of man's soul could be demonstrated philosophically. But did Luther's criticism result in a new way of looking at the soul on the part of those who endorsed his new Christian faith? As many professors of arts and medicine converted to Luther's reform, did they also devise something like a Lutheran doctrine of the soul? Or, did psychology contribute to shaping Lutheran theological doctrines? How did psychology and Lutheran theology interact with each other? And what does this interaction tell us about the more general relationship between psychology and the process of sixteenth-century confessionalisation?

Already by looking at the sixteenth-century discussions on the origin of the soul that I just recalled, one may very well incline towards thinking that Luther's attacks on scholastic doctrines of the soul did not result in a homogeneous Lutheran psychology. Lutherans were not expected to defend one specific doctrine of the soul's origin. In fact, it seems they were not expected to do psychology in one specific way at all.

For instance, Hawenreuter and Schegk – whose Lutheran affiliation is unquestionable – produced commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima* that resembled very little Melanchthon's *Commentarius* and *Liber de anima*. True, as two committed Lutherans, Hawenreuter and Schegk wrote works on the soul in view of what they believed was the Christian truth. However, they thought that the science of the soul was a discipline including natural philosophy and metaphysics and that its subject matter was the soul, which *pace* Luther they considered to be the form of the human body. To these observations, it may also be added that in the texts I examined I could find no case in which Lutheran authors explicitly referred to official confessions (as in, official statements of doctrine). From this perspective, it may be concluded that in the years between Luther's reform and the publication of Descartes' *Meditations of First Philosophy*, there never was one Lutheran psychology.

However, I think that there is a sense in which the categories of 'Lutheran' and 'confession' may fruitfully be used to understand the transformations of psychology I have described in the present work.

In effect, what I have been trying to suggest throughout this study is that Melanchthon and some of his followers wrote books on the soul that did share some common elements. What is more, I have tried to demonstrate that these elements, which roughly correspond to the views I summarised in this conclusive chapter, were in many respect connected to central points of Melanchthon's Lutheran faith.

As I have mentioned on many occasions in the course of the preceding chapters, the connection between Lutheran theology and psychological views taking place in the works of Melanchthon and his followers is not necessarily one of dependence of theories about the soul upon theological doctrines. Instead, what I tried to show all the way is that Melanchthon, Peucer, Seidel, Horst, Snellius, and Casmann, they all looked at psychology as a crucial part (and not as a logical/deductive consequence) of their new Christian faith. Moreover, I have tried to characterise this interplay between religion and psychology in the age of confessionalisation in at least two specific ways.

In a first way, as it emerges from the cases of Melanchthon's and his Wittenberg followers' works on the soul, psychology was used as a means to create Lutheran orthodoxy and to enforce it. These authors wrote books that by treating the soul also tried both to make specific theological points and to discipline university students in the direction of one specific understanding of the Christian faith. On the one hand, believing that the human soul had to be defined on Scriptural bases, as a *spiritus* endowed with innate ideas of civic morals, or stressing on all possible occasions how much the essence of the soul could not be known by man's natural understanding; all these doctrines never were requested by Lutheran theology. Not all Lutherans defended them and very probably, if one dug into additional sixteenth-century texts, the same views might be found in other confessional contexts. On the other hand, when Melanchthon and his followers maintained these ideas they did it to create something like a religious orthodoxy or as an important part of such effort.

In a second way, psychology was perhaps unintentionally the vehicle through which confessional identities could emerge or strengthen themselves. As it surfaces in the case of sixteenth-century controversies on the origin of the soul, the identification of traducianism with Luther and his followers served the Ingolstadt Jesuits' goal of distancing themselves from their contemporary Lutherans. In an us-and-them dynamic the Jesuits of Ingolstadt identified Catholicism with the creationist doctrine and blamed Lutherans for their alleged defence of traducianism. As for every action there is a reaction, concerns grew among Lutherans that Catholic creationism was inconsistent with a sound explanation of the original sin and its transmission. Whether the Ingolstadt Catholics were right in thinking that traducianism was the

Lutheran opinion is not too important. What counts is that through a controversy on psychology groups defined themselves and profiled others according to confession. Also in this second way, psychology was integral part of the formation of Lutheran orthodoxy.

To sum up, there never was a Lutheran psychology, either in the sense of one single way of doing psychology on the part of Lutheran authors, or in that of a set of theories about the soul logically derived from Lutheran theology. Instead, there was a Lutheran psychology meant as the effort to create one specific Christian orthodoxy by means of works on the soul and as the consolidation of a confessional identity through psychological controversies. From this point of view, psychology was a crucial part of the process of sixteenth-century confessionalisation.

The variety of ways in which psychology was done within single denominations (for instance, within Lutheranism) should not made us conclude that the categories of 'confession' and 'confessionalisation' are useless. On the contrary, precisely because, as I hope to have showed, psychology was an important part of the efforts and circumstances through which confessional orthodoxies emerged, the study of the way in which sixteenth-century authors used psychology in view of confessional purposes appears to be a vast field of further research. How did Lutherans who did not follow Melanchthon used psychology to promote their Christian faith? How did psychological controversies contribute to shaping streams within single confessions? How did discussions about the soul promote the formation of broader denominational identities?

Of course, religious and theological matters were not the only concerns of sixteenth-century authors who dealt with psychology. Nor should one reduce the complexity of sixteenth-century psychology to one historical factor alone. As I recalled in the introduction to this thesis, the huge amount of material about the soul produced in the sixteenth century is such that scholars are still far from knowing what to take in consideration when it comes to Renaissance psychology and how to go along a literary production in which it seems difficult to find any order. In this light, tracing the transformations of sixteenth-century psychology only to confessional controversies would be hasty, to say the least. Yet, I hope the case-studies I presented in this work can show that the vastness of the material regarding sixteenth-century discussions about the soul can fruitfully be considered from the point of view of psychology in the age of confessionalisation.

Bibliography

Biographical Works

Adam, Melchior, *Vitae germanorum medicorum* (Heidelberg 1620).

Berger-Levrault, Oscar, *Annales des professeurs des academies et universities alsaciennes 1523–1581* (Nancy 1892).

Bietenholz, Peter Gerhard, and Thomas Brian Deutscher, eds., *Contemporaries of Erasmus: A Biographical Register of the Renaissance and Reformation* (Toronto 1985–1987).

Freher, Paul, *Theatrum virorum eruditione clarorum* (Nürnberg 1688).

Lohr, Charles H., *Latin Aristotle Commentaries. II: Renaissance authors* (Firenze 1988).

Neue deutsche Biographie / herausgegeben von der Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin 1953–...).

Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek, 10 Vols. (Leiden 1911–1937).

Manuscripts

Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, O. III. 4.

Sources

Amerbach, Veit, *Quatuor libri de anima*, Apud Cratonem Mylium (Strassburg1542).

Aristotle, *De anima*, in Jonathan Barnes, ed., *The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation* (Princeton 1984), I, 641–692.

Aurelius Augustinus, *Sin Augustin. La Genèse au littéral en douze livres* (*De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim*), edited by Paul Agaësse and Amato Solignac (Bruges 1972).

Back, Jacob de, *Dissertationis de corde*, in William Harvey, *Exercitationes anatomicae de motus cordis et sanguinis circulatione* (London, 1661).

Budé, Guillame, *Gulielmi Budaei Parisiensis, De asse et partibus eius*, Apud Sebastianum Gryphium (Paris 1551).

Casmann, Otto, *Anti-Socinus. Tractatus ad diiudicandum controversiam theologicam quae iam inter orthodoxos et socinianos, de corpore doctrinae christianae pene universe, agitator apprime utilis* (Amberg 1612).

Casmann, Otto, *Angelographia seu commentationum disceptationumque physicarum prodromus problematicus de angelis seu creates spiritibus a corporum consortio abiunctis* (Frankfurt 1597).

Casmann, Otto, *Astrologia, chronographia et astromanteia* (Frankfurt 1599).

Casmann, Otto, *Biographia sive de vita hominis naturali, quam homo vi animae suae viventis et corpus suum animantis naturaliter vivit* (Frankfurt 1602).

Casmann, Otto, *Homo novus, das ist geistliche Anatomy oder Betrachtung deß Menschen*, in welcher, *allein auß Gottes Wort, die Vergleichung deß naturlichen Leibs unnd seiner Glidern, mit der Seel und ihren Kräfften erklärt wird …* (Bern 1606).

Casmann, Otto, *Logicae rameae et melanchthonianae collatio et exegesis: seorsum accesserunt eodem auctore ex logicis praeceptis practicae observationes, consilia et leges ad illorum lupraxian tradendam utiles* (Hanau 1599).

Casmann, Otto, *Philosophiae et christianae et verae adversus insanos hostium eius, et nonnullorum hierophantarum morsus et calumnias modesta assertio* (Frankfurt 1601).

Casmann, Otto, *Psychologia Anthropologica sive Animae Humanae Doctrina*, Apud Guilelmum Antonium, impensis Petri Fischeri (Hannau 1594).

Casmann, Otto, *Secunda pars anthropologiae; hoc est, fabrica humani corporis methodice descriptiva* (Hanau 1596).

Casmann, Otto, *Somatologia. Physica generalis seu commentationes disceptationumque physicarum syndromus problematicus. I. De naturalium corporum in genere essentia et qualitatibus physicis, tum manifestis tum occultis, quarum omnium methodicam adumbrationem in tabella exhibet versa pagina* (Frankfurt 1598).

Casmann, Otto, *Tutrpitudo omnium turpissima et nocentissima opprobrium christianorum. Exitum infidelium et laqueus carnalis securitatis incidendus describitur* (Frankfurt 1609).

Cicero, Marcus Tullius, *Tusculan Disputations*, edited by A.E. Douglas (Warminster 1985).

Colombo, Realdo, *Realdi Colombi Cremonensis de re anatomica* (Venice 1559).

Constitutiones Societatis Iesu Anno 1558 (Rome 1558).

Denzinger, Heinrich, and Adolf Schönmetzer, eds., *Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus ridei et morum* (Freiburg 1991).

Eck, Johannes, *Articuli 404 partim ad disputationes Lipsicam, Baden et Bernem attinentes, partim vero ex scriptis pacem ecclesiae parturbantium extractos, coram divo Caesare Carolo V* (Ingolstadt 1530).

Fernel, Jean, *Universa medicina* (Paris 1567), in John M. Forester, ed., *The Physiologia of Jean Fernel* (Philadelphia 2003).

Fromondus, Libertus, *Philosophiae christianae de anima libri quatuor* (Leuven 1649).

Galenus, Claudius, *Galeni Opera Omnia*, 22 vols., edited by Karl Gottlob Kühn (Leipzig 1823).

Goclenius, Rudolph, *Adversaria: ad Exotericas aliquot Juli Caesari Scaligeri acutissimi Philosophi Exercitationes* (Marburg 1594).

Goclenius, Rudolph, *Conciliator philosophicus* (Kassel 1609).

Goclenius, Rudolph, *Isagoge in Organum Aristotelis* (Frankfurt 1598).

Goclenius, Rudolph, *Isagoge in peripateticorum et scholasticorum prima philosophia* (Frankfurt 1598).

Goclenius, Rudolph, *Lexicon philosophicum, quo tanquam clave philosophiae fores aperiuntur* (Frankfurt 1613).

Goclenius, Rudolph, *Psychologia, hoc est de hominis perfectione, animo, et in primis ortu huius* (Marburg 1597).

Hamesse, Jacqueline, ed., *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval étude historique et édition critique* (Leuven 1972–1974).

Hawenreuter, Johannes Ludovicus, "Sitne animus nobis ingeneratus a Deo necne. Concluditur negate", in *Psychologia, hoc est de hominis perfectione, animo, et in primis ortu huius* (Marburg 1597).

Hawenreuter, Johannes Ludovicus, *Commentarii in libros VIII Physicorum* (Frankfurt 1604).

Hawenreuter, Johannes Ludovicus, *Commentarii in Meteorologicorum libros IV* (Frankfurt 1605).

Hawenreuter, Johannes Ludovicus, *Commentarius in libros Metaphysicorum VI priores* (Frankfurt 1604).

Hawenreuter, Johannes Ludovicus, *Disputatio de natura et essentia ratiocinationis, ex libro I Priorum Analyticorum* (Strassburg 1578).

Hawenreuter, Johannes Ludovicus, *Disputatio de natura logicae* (Strassburg 1591).

Hawenreuter, Johannes Ludovicus, *In Aristotelis philosophorum principis, De Animo et Parva Naturalia dictos libros* (Frankfurt 1605).

Hawenreuter, Johannes Ludovicus, *These de progressione demonstrationis ex libros I Posteriorum Analyticorum* (Strassburg 1585).

Hawenreuter, Johannes Ludovicus, *These dialecticae ex libro I sophisticarum reprhensione* (Strassburg 1588).

Hippocrates, *Œuvres Complètes d'Hippocrate*, edited by Emile Littré (Paris 1884).

Horst, Gregor, *De anatomia vitali et mortua* (Giessen 1612).

Horst, Gregor, *De natura humana libri duo, quorum prior de corporis structura, posterior de anima tractat. Ultimo elaborati commentariis aucti figurisque nobis anatomicis aere incisis exornati. Cum praefatione de anatomia vitali et mortua pro conciliatione Spagyricorum et Wittebergae* (Wittenberg 1626).

Hunger, Albert, *De homologia sive consensus concentuque theologiae Lutheri cum Philosophia Epicuri* (Ingolstadt 1582).

Hunger, Albert, *Adversus veteres et novos errores de anima conclusionum centuria* (Ingolstadt 1575).

Lorhard, Jakob, *Ogdoas scholastica continens diagraphen typicam artium grammatices (Latinae, Graecae, Logices, Rhetorices, Astronomices, Ethices, Physices, Metaphysices, seu Ontologiae)* (St. Gallen 1606).

Lukacs, Ladislaus, ed., *Monumenta Pedagogica Societatis Jesu* V (Rome 1992).

Luther, Martin, *Dr Martin Luthers Werke, kritische Gesamtausgabe*, 63 vols. (Weimar 1883–1987).

Melanchthon, Philip, *Commentarius de anima*, Officina Petri Seitz (Wittenberg, 1540).

Melanchthon, Philip, *Corpus Reformatorum Philippi Melanthonis opera quae supersunt omnia*, edited by Carolus G. Bretschneider and Heinrich E. Bindseil, 28 vols. (Halle, 1834–1852, Brunswick, 1853–1860).

Melanchthon, Philip, *Enarratio epistolae Pauli ad Colossenses praelecta anno MDLVI a Philippo Melanthone* (Wittenberg 1559).

Melanchthon, Philip, *Libro dell'anima*, edited by Dino Bellucci (Torino 2009).

Melanchthon, Philip, *Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl: Studienausgabe*, Robert Stupperich, ed., 5 vols (Gütersloh 1963).

Melanchthon, Philip, *Philip Melanchthon. Orations on Philosophy and Education*, Sachiko Kusukawa, ed. (Cambridge 1999).

Melanchthon, Philip, *Supplementa Melancthoniana. Werke Philip Melanchthons die im Corpus Reformatorum vermisst werden*. Hrsg., von der Melanchthon-Kommission des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte, Otto Costantin Clemen et al., eds. (Frankfurt 1968).

Peucer, Caspar, *Elementa doctrinae de circulis coelestibus et primo motu recognita et correcta* (Wittenberg 1553).

Peucer, Caspar, *Hypotheses orbium coelestium, quas appellant theoricas planetarum, congruentes cum tabulis Alphonsini et Copernici, seu etiam tabulis Prutenicis, in usum scholarum publicatae* (Strasbourg 1568).

Pierce, Richard, and Michael Gaddis, eds., *The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon* (Liverpool 2005).

Plutarch, *De sollertia animalium*, edited by Harold Cherniss and William C. Helmbold (Harvard 1957).

Plutarch, *Moralia*, edited by Gregorius N. Bernardakis (Leipzig 1895).

Politian, Angelo, *Angeli Politiani Opera*, Apud Nicolaum Episcopium Iuniorem (Basel 1553).

Pomponazzi, Pietro, *Expositio super primo et secundo* De partibus animalium, edited by Stefano Perfetti (Firenze 2004).

Ramus, Petrus, *Defensio pro Aristotele adversus Jacobus Scheccium (Lausanne 1571)*.

Richter, Aemelius Ludwig, and Emil Albert Friedberg, eds., *Corpus iuris canonici* (Graz 1959).

Riolan, Jean (the Younger), *Opera anatomica* (Paris, 1650).

Scaliger, Julius Caesar, *Exotericarum Exercitationum Liber XV, de subtilitate ad Hiraronymum Cardanum*, Ex Officina Typographica Michaelis Vascosani (Paris 1557).

Schegk, Jacob, *Anatome responsi Simonii* (Tübingen 1573).

Schegk, Jacob, *Antisimonius* (Tübingen 1573).

Schegk, Jacob, *Commentaria in IV libros Meteoron* (Basel 1550).

Schegk, Jacob, *Commentaria in Organi partum analyticam* (Tübingen 1570).

Schegk, Jacob, *Commentaria in VIII libros Topicorum Aristotelis* (Tübingen 1584).

Schegk, Jacob, *De demonstratione libri XV in II Posteriorum Analyticorum libros* (Basel 1564).

Schegk, Jacob, *De plastica seminis facultate libri tres* (Strasburg 1580).

Schegk, Jacob, *De principatu animae dialogus* (Tübingen 1542).

Schegk, Jacob, *De una persona et duabus naturis Christi sententia Jacob Schegkii D. medici et philosophi clarissimi, professionis Scholae Tubingensi ex fundamentis quidam Scripturae Sacrae, analysis autem philosophica et pie et erudite explicata* (Frankfurt 1565).

Schegk, Jacob, *Explicatio Analyticorum Posteriorum* (Tübingen 1560).

Schegk, Jacob, *Explicatio in II libros Primorum Analyticorum* (Tübingen 1565/7).

Schegk, Jacob, *Hyperaspistes responsi, ad quatuor epistolas Petri Rami contra se aeditas* (Tübingen 1570).

Schegk, Jacob, *In X libros Ethicorum annotationes* (Basel 1550).

Schegk, Jacob, *Prodromus antisimonii* (Tübingen 1571).

Seidel, Bruno, *Physica, cum supplement Rodolphi Goclenii* (Frankfurt 1596).

Simoni, Simone, *Antischegkianorum liber unus* (Basel 1570).

Snellius, Rudolph, *Commentarius doctissimus in Dialecticam Petri Rami, forma dialogi conscriptus, in quo artis praecepta cum exemplis analytice explicantur. Adiectae sunt ad finem utiles commonefactiones et regulae Rudolphi Goclenii de ratione disputandi* (Herborn 1587).

Snellius, Rudolph, *In Philippi Melanthonis De anima, vel potius de hominis physiologia libellum commentationes*, Ex Officina Typographica Ioannis Saurii, impensis haeredum Petri Fischeri (Frankfurt 1596).

Snellius, Rudolph, *In Physicam Cornelii Valerii annotations. Ad calcem adiectae sunt notae Rudolphi Goclenii ad ipsum Physicus contextum pertinantes; item Pneumatologia Snelii* (Frankfurt 1596).

Snellius, Rudolph, *Partitiones physicae method rameae legibus informatae; exceptae olim ex dictantis eius ore in Schola Marpurgensi, nunc primum in lucem editae* (Hanau 1594).

Snellius, Rudolph, *Snellio-Ramaeum philosophiae Syntagma, tomis aliquot separatis distinctum. Quibus cont., 1. Generale sincerioris philosophiae Ramaeae informationes, 2. Dialectica, 3. Rhetorica, 4. Arithmetica, 5. Geometria, 6. Sphaera, seu astronomia, 7. Physica, 8. Psychologia, 9. Ethica* (Frankfurt, 1596).

Suárez, Francisco, *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima*, edited by Salvador Castellote, Vol. 1 (Madrid 1978).

Taurellus, Nicolaus, *Alpes Caesae, hoc est, Andr. Caesalpini Itali monstrosa et superba dogmata, discussa et excussa a Nicolao Taurello* (Frankfurt 1597).

Thomas Aquinas, *In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio*, edited by Mariano Maggiolo (Turin 1954).

Timpler, Clemens, *Metaphysicae systemata methodicum* (Steinfurt 1604).

Valerius, Cornelius, *Physicae seu de natura philosophia institutio, perspicue et breviter explicata a Cornelio Valerio* (Antwerpen 1567).

Vallesius, Franciscus, *De Sacra Philosophia, sive De iis quae in Libris Sacris physice scripta sunt*, Editio Sexta, Ioannis Antonii Huguetan, et Marc. Ant. Ravaud, (Paris 1652).

Viepekhius, Christoph, *Assertiones de Anima* (Ingolstadt 1568).

Vives, Juan Luis, *Ioannis Ludovici Vivis Valentini De anima et vita libri tres. Eiusdem argumenti Viti Amerbachii de Anima Libri IIII. Philippi Melanthonis Liber unus. His accedit nunc primum Conradi Gesneri De anima liber, sententiosa brevitate, velutique per tabulas et aphorismos magna ex parte conscriptus, philosophiae, rei medicae ac philologiae sudiosis accommodatus; in quo de qualitatibus, saporibus, odoribus, sonis, et coloribus copiose accurateque tractatur* (Zurich 1563).

William Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, (= *Opera Theologica 9*), edited by Joseph C. Wey (St. Bonaventure/New York, 1980).

Zabarella, Jacopo, *Opera logica, editio tertia, pref. Ioannis Ludovici Hawenreuter* (Basle 1594).

Literature

Almási, Gábor, "Rethinking Sixteenth-Century 'Lutheran Astronomy'", *Intellectual History Review* 24:1, 5–20.

Althaus, Paul "Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele bei Luther", *Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie* 3 (1926), 725–734.

Arffman, Kaarlo, *The Lutheran Reform of Poor Relief: A Historical and Legal Viewpoint*, in Virpi Mäkinen, ed., *Lutheran Reform and the Law* (Leiden 2006).

Bak, Janos, *The German Peasant War of 1525* (London 1976).

Bakker, Paul J.J.M., "Aristotelian Metaphysics and Eucharistic Theology: John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen on the Ontological Status of Accidental Being", in Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen and Jack Zupko, eds., The Metaphysics and Natural Theology of John Buridan (Leiden 2001), 247–264.

Bakker, Paul J.J.M., "Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics or Something in Between? Agostino Nifo, Pietro Pomponazzi, and Marcantonio Genua on the Nature and Place of the Science of the Soul", in Paul J.J.M. Bakker and Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, eds., *Mind, Cognition and Representation. The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle's De anima* (Aldershot 2007), 151–177.

Bakker, Paul J.J.M., *La raison et le miracle. Les doctrines eucharestiques (c. 1250-c. 1400). Contribution à l'étude des rapports entre philosophie et théologie.* 2 vols., PhD thesis (Radboud University Nijmegen 1990).

Baldini, Ugo, and Leen Spruit, eds., *Catholic Church and Modern Science. Documents from the Archives of the Roman Congregation of the Holy Office and the Index* (Rome 2009).

Bayer, Oswald, "Freedom? The Anthropological Concepts in Luther and Melancthon Compared", *Harvard Theological Review* 91 (1998), 373–387.

Bellucci, Dino, *Science de la nature et Réformation. La physique au service de la Réforme dans l'enseignement de Philippe Mélanchthon* (Roma 1998).

Beyer, Michael, and Günter Wartenberg, eds., *Humanismus und Wittenberger Reformation. Festgabe anlässlich des 500. Geburtstages des Praeceptor Germaniae Philipp Melanchthon am 16. Februar 1997* (Leipzig 1996).

Blum, Paul Richard, *Philosophy of Religion in the Renaissance* (Surrey 2010).

Boer, Sander W. de, *The Science of the Soul. The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle's* De anima, *c. 1260–c. 1360* (Leiden 2013).

Boettcher, Susan R., "Confessionalization: Reformation, Religion, Absolutism, and Modernity", *History Compass* 2 (2004), 1–10.

Bono, James J., "Medical Spirits and the Medieval Language of Life", *Traditio* 40 (1984), 91–130.

Bos, Abraham P., *The Soul and its Instrumental Body. A Reinterpretation of Aristotle's Philosophy of Living Nature* (Leiden 2003).

Brady, Jules M., "St. Augustine's Theory of Seminal Reasons", *The New Scholasticism* 38.2 (1964), 141–158.

Brecht, Martin, *Martin Luther. Sein Weg zur Reformation 1483–1521* (Stuttgart 1981).

Cameron, Euan, "Philipp Melanchthon: Image and Substance." *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 48 (1997), 705–722.

Cappiello, Annalisa, *Il problema dell'immortalità dell'anima nella Scolastica rinascimentale del sec. XVI. Tommaso De Vio Gaetano, Bartolomeo Spina, Crisostomo Javelli*, PhD Thesis (Università di Bari 2013).

Carvalho, Mário S. de, "Between Rome and Coimbra: a Preliminary Survey of two Early Jesuit Psychologies (Bent Perera and the Coimbra Course)", *Quaestio*, 14 (2014), 91–110.

Casini, Lorenzo, "The Renaissance Debate on the Immortality of the Soul. Pietro Pomponazzi and the Plurality of Substantial Forms", in Paul J.J.M. Bakker and Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, eds., *Mind, Cognition and Representation. The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle's* De anima (Aldershot 2007), 127–150.

Céard, Jean, "Matérialisme et théorie de l'âme dans la pensée padouane: le *Traité de l'immortalité de l'âme* de Pomponazzi", *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger*, 171 (1981), 25–48.

Cellamare, Davide, "Anatomy and the Body in Renaissance Protestant Psychology" in *Early Science and Medicine* 19.4 (2014), 341–364.

Cellamare, Davide, "Renaissance Psychology. Francisco Vallés (1524–1592) and Otto Casmann (1562–1607) on Animal and Human Souls", in R. Lo Presti and S. Buchenau, eds., *Animal Minds in Early Modern Philosophy and Medicine*, forthcoming (Pittsburgh 2015).

Corazzon, Raul, "Jakob Lorhard (1561–1609): The Creator of the Term 'Ontologia' (1606)", website: www.ontology.co

Courtine, Jean-François, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique* (Paris 1990).

Crowther, Kathleen M., "'Be Fruitful and Multiply': Genesis and Generation in Reformation Germany", *Renaissance Quarterly* 55.3 (2002), 904–935.

Crowther, Kathleen M., *Adam and Eve in the Protestant Reformation* (Cambridge 2010).

Cunningham, Andrew, *The Anatomical Renaissance. The Resurrection of the Anatomical Projects of the Ancients* (Aldershot 1997).

De Angelis, Simone, *Anthropologien. Genese und Konfiguration einer 'Wissenschaft vom Menschen' in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Berlin 2010).

Des Chene, Dennis, *Life's Form. Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul* (Ithaca 2000).

Devaux, Michaël, and Marco Lamanna, "The Rise and early History of the Term Ontology (1606–1730)", *Quaestio* 9 (2009), 173–208.

Dingel, Irene, and Armin Kohnle, *Philipp Melanchthon: Lehrer Deutschlands, Reformator Europas* (Leipzig 2011).

Dingel, Irene, and Günther Wartenberg, eds., *Die Theologische Facultät Wittenberg 1502–1602* (Leipzig 2002).

Draper, John W., *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science* (New York 1875).

Duba, William, "The Souls After Vienne: Franciscan Theologians' Views on the Plurality of Forms and the Plurality of Souls, ca. 1315–1330", in Paul J.J.M. Bakker, Sander W. de Boer, and Cees Leijenhorst, eds., *Psychology and the Other Disciplines. A Case of Cross-Disciplinary Interaction (1250–1750)* (Leiden 2012), 171–272.

Edwards, Michael, "Body, Soul and Anatomy in Late Aristotelianism", in Gideon Manning, ed., *Form and Matter in Early modern Philosophy* (Leiden 2012), 33–75.

Edwards, Michael, "Suàrez in Late Scholastic Context", in Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund, eds., *The Philosophy of Francisco Suàrez* (New York, 2012), 25–37.

Esposito, Costantino, "Introduzione. Dalla storia della metafisica alla storia dell'ontologia" *Quaestio* 9 (2009), IX–XXXI.

Esposito, Costantino, "Le Disputationes Metaphysicae nella critica contemporanea" in Costantino Esposito, ed., *Francisco Suárez, Disputazioni Metafische* (Milano 2007), 747–812.

Feingold, Mordechai, Joseph S. Freedman and Wolfgang Rother, eds., *The Influence of Petrus Ramus* (Basel 2001).

Feldhay, Rivka, "Religion", in Kathrine Park and Lorraine Daston, eds., *The Cambridge History of Science, III* (Cambridge 2006), 725–755.

Frank, Günter, and Felid Mundt, eds., *Der Philosoph Melanchthon* (Berlin 2012).

Freedman, Joseph S., "The Diffusion of the Writings of Petrus Ramus in Central Europe, c. 1570–c. 1630", *Renaissance Quarterly* 46.1 (1993), 98–152.

Freedman, Joseph S., "The Godfather of Ontology? Clemens Timpler, "All that is intelligible", Academic Disciplines during the late 16th and early 17th Centuries, and Some Possible Ramifications for the Use of Ontology in our Time", *Quaestio* 9 (2009), 3–40

Freedman, Joseph S., *European Academic Philosophy in the late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries: The Life, Significance, and Philosophy of Clemens Timpler (1563/4–1624)*, 2 Vols. (Hildesheim 1988).

Freedman, Joseph S., *The Soul (anima) according to Clemens Timpler (1563/4–1624) and some of his central European Contemporaries*, in *Scientia et Artes. Die Vermittlung alten und neuen Wissens in Literatur, Kunst und Musik* (Wolfenbüttel 2004), *791–830*.

Friedensburg, Walter, *Geschichte der Universität Wittenberg* (Halle a. S. 1917).

Friesen, Abrahm, and Hans-Jürgen Goeritz, *Thomas Müntzer* (Darmstadt 1978).

Gabor, Ittzés, *'The Breath Returns to God Who gave It'. The Doctrine of the Soul's Immortality in Sixteenth-Century German Lutheran Theology*, PhD Thesis (Harvard 2008).

Garin, Eugenio, "*ἐνδελέχεια* e *ἐντελέχεια* nelle discussion umanistiche", *Atene et Roma*, 5 (1937), *177–187*

Giglioni, Guido, "Spiritus Plasticus Between Pneumatology and Embryology (A Note about Comenius' Concept of Spirit)", *Studia Comeniana et Historica*, 24 (1994), 83–89.

Gilson, Étienne, "Autour de Pomponazzi. Problématique de l'immortalité de l'âme en Italie au début du XVIe siècle", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, 28 (1961), 163–279.

Graybill, Gregory B., *Evangelical Free Will: Philipp Melanchthon's Doctrinal Journey on the Origins of Faith* (Oxford 2010).

Green, Lowell, "Melanchthon's Relation to Scholasticism", in Carl R. Trueman and R.S. Clark, eds., *Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment* (Carlisle 1999), *273–288*.

Hadot, Ilsetraut, "Simplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* (CAG XI): A methodological Study", *Mnemosyne*, 55 (2002), 159–199.

Haga, Joar, *Was There a Lutheran Metaphysics? The Interpretation of Communicatio Idiomatum in Early Modern Lutheranism* (Göttingen 2012).

Hankinson, Robert J., "Galen and the Best of All Possible Worlds", *The Classical Quarterly*. New Series, 39, 1 (1989), *206–227*.

Hasse, Dag Nikolaus, "The Soul's Faculties" in Robert Pasnau and Christina van Dyke, eds., *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, 2 Vols. (Cambridge 2009), I, *305–319*.

Headley, John M., Hans J. Hillerbrand and Anthony J. Papalas, eds., *Confessionalization in Europe 1555–1700* (Ashgate 2004).

Helm, Jürgen, "Die Galenrezeption in Philipp Melanchthons De anima (1540/1552)", *Medizinhistorisches Journal*, 31, H. 4/4 (1966), *298–321*.

Helm, Jürgen, "Protestant and Catholic Medicine in Sixteenth Century? The Case of Ingolstadt Anatomy", *Medical History* 45 (2001), *83–96*.

Hirai, Hiro, "The Invisible Hand of God in Seeds: Jacob Schegk's Theory of Plastic Faculty", in *Early Science and Medicine* 12 (2007), *377–404*.

Hirai, Hiro, "The New Astral Medicine", in Brendan Dooley, ed., *A Companion to Astrology in the Renaissance* (Leiden 2014), 267–286.

Hirai, Hiro, *Le concept de semence dans les théories de la matière à la Renaissance, de Marsile Ficin à Pierre Gassendi* (Turnhout 2005).

Hirai, Hiro, *Medical Humanism and Natural Philosophy. Renaissance Debates on Matter, Life and the Soul* (Leiden 2011).

Hotson, Howard, *Commonplace Learning. Ramism and its German Ramifications 1543–1630* (Oxford 2007), 95–96.

Janse, Wim, "Wittenberg Calvinizans: The Involvement of Melanchthon, Peucer, and Eber in the Bremen Sacramentarian Controversy, 1560", in Wilhelm Neuser and Herman Selderhuis, eds., *Ordentlich und Fruchtbar: Festschrift für Willem van 't Spijker* (Leiden 1997), 53–67.

Kaiser, Wolfram, and Arina Völker, *Ars medica Vitebergensis* (Halle 1980).

Kärkkäinen, Pekka, "Synderesis in Late Medieval Philosophy and the Wittenberg Reformers", *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 20:5 (2012), 881–901.

Kessler, Eckhard, "The Intellective Soul", in Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, Jill Kraye, eds., *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* (Cambridge 1988), 485–534.

Kolb, Robert, *Bound Choice, Election, and Wittenberg Theological Method: From Martin Luther to the Formula of Concord* (Grand Rapids 2005).

Kolb, Robert, Irene Dingel and L'ubomir Batka, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Martin Luther's Theology* (Oxford 2014).

Kolb, Robert, *Lutheran Ecclesiastical Culture, 1550–1675* (Leiden 2008); Steven E. Ozment, *The Age of Reform 1250–1550. An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe* (New Heaven 1980).

Kordes, Uwe, "Otho Casmanns Anthropologie (1549/96). Frömmigeit, Empirie und der Ramismus", in Martin Mulsow, ed., *Spätrenaissance-Philosophie in Deutschland 1570–1650. Entwürfe Zwischen Humanismus und Konfessionalisierung, okkulten Traditionen und Schulmetaphysik* (Tübingen 2009), 195–210.

Kraye, Jill, "The Immortality of the Soul in the Renaissance: Between Natural Philosophy and Theology", *Signatures*, 1 (2000), 2.1–2.24.

Kusukawa, Sachiko, "Aspectio Divinorum Operum. Melanchthon and Astrology for Lutheran Medics", in Ole Peter Grell and Andrew Cunningham, eds., *Medicine and the Reformation* (London 1993), 33–56.

Kusukawa, Sachiko, "Between the *De anima* and Dialectics. A prolegomenon to Philippo-Ramism", in Paul Richard Blum, ed., Sapientiam amemus. *Humanismus und Aristotelismus in der Renaissance. Festschrift für Eckhard Kessler zum 60. Geburtstag* (Munich 1999), 127–139.

Kusukawa, Sachiko, "Lutheran Uses of Aristotle: a Comparison between Jacob Schegk and Philip Melanchthon", in Constance Blackwell and Sachiko Kusukawa, *Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Conversations with Aristotle* (Aldershot 1999), 169–188.

Kusukawa, Sachiko, "Mediation of Zabarella in Northern Europe: the Preface of Johann Ludwig Hawenreuter", in Gregorio Piaia, ed., *La presenza dell' aristotelismo padovano nella filosofia della prima modernità* (Roma 2002) 199–213.

Kusukawa, Sachiko, "The Natural Philosophy of Melanchthon and His Followers", in Luce Giard, ed., *Science et religion de Copernic à Gallilée (1540–1610)* (Rome, 1999), 443–453.

Kusukawa, Sachiko, *Picturing the Book of Nature. Image, Text, and Argument in Sixteenth-Century Human Anatomy and Medical Botany* (Chicago 2012).

Kusukawa, Sachiko, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy. The Case of Philip Melanchthon* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995).

Lamanna, Marco, "On the early History of the Psychology", *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* 38 (2010), 291–314.

Lamanna, Marco, "Sulla prima occorrenza del termine 'Ontologia'. Una nota bibliografica", *Quaestio 6* (2006), 557–570.

Lamanna, Marco, *La nascita dell'ontologia nella metafisica di Rudolph Göckel (1547–1628)* (Hildesheim 2013).

Leijenhorst, Cees, "Attention Please! Theories of Selective Attention in Late Aristotelian and Early Modern Philosophy", in Paul J.J.M. Bakker and Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, eds., *Mind, Cognition and Representation*, 205–230.

Leijenhorst, Cees, "Suárez's on Self-Awareness", in Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund, eds., *The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez* (Oxford 2012), 137–153.

Leijenhorst, Cees, and Christoph Lüthy, "The Erosion of Aristotelianism. Confessional Physics in Early Modern Germany and the Dutch Republic", in Cees Leijenhorst, Christoph Lüthy, Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, eds., *The Dynamics of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century* (Leiden 2002), 375–411.

Leunissen, Mariska, *Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle's Science of Nature* (Cambridge, 2010).

Lindeberg, Carter, ed., *The European Reformations Sourcebook* (Oxford 2000).

Lohse, Bernhard, *Martin Luther's Theology. Its Historical and Systematic Development* (Minneapolis 1999).

Lüthy, Christoph, and William R. Newman, "Matter and Form: By Way of Preface", *Early Science and Medicine* 2 (1997), 215–226; Roger Ariew and Majorie Greene, "The Cartesian Destiny of Form and Matter", *Early Science and Medicine* 2 (1997), 300–325.

Lüthy, Christoph, *David Gorlaeus (1591–1612). An Enigmatic Figure in the History of Philosophy and Science* (Amsterdam 2012), 104–113.

Maclean, Ian, "Mediations of Zabarella in Northern Germany, 1586–1623", in Gregorio Piaia,

ed., *La presenza dell' aristotelismo padovano nella filosofia della prima modernità* (Roma 2002), 173–198.

Maclean, Ian, *Logic, Signs and nature in the Renaissance. The Case of Learned Medicine* (Cambridge 2007).

Mahoney, Edward P., "Agostino Nifo (ca. 1470–1538) on the *Scientia de Anima* as a 'Mathematical' or 'Middle' Science", in Reijo Työrinoja and Anja Inkeri Lehtinen, eds., *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy. Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy* (S.I.E.P.M.), Helsinki, 24–29 August 1987 (Helsinki 1990), III, 629–636.

Martin, Craig, "Vallés and the Renaissance Reinterpretation of Aristotle's Meteorologica IV as a Medical Text", *Early Science and Medicine* 7,1 (2002), 1–29.

Matz, Wolfgang, *Der befreite Mensch. Die Willenslehre in der Theologie Philipp Melanchthons* (Göttingen 2001).

McGrath, Alister E., *Luther's Theology of the Cross. Martin Luther's Theological Breakthrough* (Oxford 1985).

Mengal, Paul, *La naissance de la psychologie* (Paris 2005).

Methuen, Charlotte, *Science and Theology in the Reformation. Studies in Theological Interpretation and Astronomical Observation in Sixteenth-Century Germany* (London 2008).

Mueller, Ian, "Physics and Astronomy: Aristotle's Physics II.2 193b22–194a12", *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy*, 16 (2006), 175–206.

Müller, Nikolaus, *Die Wittenberger Bewegung, 1521 und 1522. Die Vorgänge in und um Wittenberg während Luthers Wartburgaufenthalt* (Leipzig 1911).

Neumann, Hans-Peter, "Machina Machinarum. Die Uhr als Begriff und Metapher zwischen 1450–1750", *Early Science and Medicine*, 15 (2010), 122–191.

Nutton, Vivian, "The Anatomy of the Soul in Early Renaissance Medicine", in Dunstan, Gordon Reginald (ed), *The Human Embryo: Aristotle and the Arabic and European Traditions* (Exeter 1990), 136–157.

Nutton, Vivian, "Wittenberg Anatomy", in Ole P. Grell and Andrew Cunningham, eds., *Medicine and the Reformation* (London 1993), 11–32.

Oberman, Heiko Augustinus, *Luther: Man between God and the Devil* (New Heaven 1989)

Ofelli, Siro, "Il pensiero del Concilio Lateranense V sulla dimostrabilità razionale dell'immortalità dell'anima umana", *Studia Patavina*, 1 (1954), 7–40.

Ong, Walter J., *Ramus. Method and the Decay of Dialogue* (Cambridge MA 1598).

Park, Kathrine, "The Organic Soul", in Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, Jill Kraye, eds., *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* (Cambridge 1988), 464–484.

Park, Kathrine, and Eckhard Kessler, "The Concept of Psychology", in Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, Jill Kraye, eds., *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* (Cambridge 1988), 453–463.

Perfetti, Stefano, "Three Different Ways of Interpreting Aristotle's *De partibus animalium*: Pietro Pomponazzi, Niccolò Leonico Tomeo and Agostino Nifo", in Carlos Steel and Guy Guldentops, eds., *Aristotle's Animals in the Middle Ages and Renaissance* (Leuven 1999), 297–316.

Perler, Dominik, "Ockham über die Seele und ihre Teile", *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales 77*. 2 (2010), 313–350.

Perler, Dominik, "What Are the Faculties of the Soul? Descartes and His Scholastic Background", in John Marenbon, ed., *Continuity and Innovation in Medieval and Modern Philosophy. Knowledge, Mind, and Language* (Croydon 2013), 9–38.

Perrone Compagni, Vittoria, "Introduzione", in Vittoria Perrone Compagni, eds., Pietro Pomponazzi, *Trattato sull'immortalità*, (Firenze 1999), V–CI.

Piñero, José M.L., and Francisco Calero, *Las "Controversias" (1556) de Francisco Valles y la Medicina Renacentista* (Madrid 1988).

Pitkin, Barbara, "The Protestant Zeno: Calvin and the Development of Melanchthon's Anthropology", *The Journal of Religion* 84.3 (2004), 345–378.

Po-chia Hsia, Ronnie, *Social Disciplines in the Reformation: Central Europe, 1550–1750* (London 1989).

Porro, Pasquale, "The (Im)passibility of the Soul: Theological Paradoxes at the End of the Thirteenth Century" in Russell L. Friedman and Jean-Michael Counet, eds., *Medieval Perspectives on Aristotle's De anima* (Leuven 2013), 39–62.

Price, Daniel, "The Origins of Lateran V's Apostolici Regiminis", *Annuarium historiae conciliorum*, 17 (1975), 464–472.

Reinhard, Wolfgang, "Reformation, Counter-Reformation, and the Early Modern State. A Reassessment", *The Catholic Historical Review* 75,3 (1989), 383–404.

Reinhard, Wolfgang, ed., *Die katholische Konfessionalisierung* (Gütersloh 1995).

Rozemond, Marleen, "Unity in the Multiplicity of Suárez's Soul", in Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund, eds., *The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez* (Oxford 2012), 154–172.

Rublack, Hans-Christoph, ed., *Die lutherische Konfessionalisierung in Deutschland* (Gütersloh 1992)

Rummel, Erika, *The Confessionalization of Humanism in Reformation Germany*, Oxford 2000.

Sakamoto, Kuni, *Julius Caesar Scaliger, Renaissance Reformer of Aristotelianism: A Study of* Exotericae Exercitationes (Leiden, forthcoming).

Salatowski, Sascha, De Anima. *Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (Amsterdam 2006).

Schackelford, Jole, *A Philosophical Path for Paracelsian Medicine. The Ideas, Intellectual Context, and Influence of Petrus Severinus: 1540–1602* (Copenhagen 2004).

Scheible, Heinz, *Melanchthon. Eine Biographie* (Munich 1977).

Scheible, Heinz, "Melanchthon, Philip (1497–1560)", in Horst Robert Balz, Gerhard Krause, Siegfried M. Schwertner, eds., *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, 36 Vols., (Berlin 1977–2007), XXII, 371–410.

Schilling, Heinz, "Confessional Europe: Bureaucrats, La Bonne Police, Civilizations", in *Handbook of European History 1400–1600: Late Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation*, 2 vols. (Leiden 1995), II, 641–681.

Schilling, Heinz, ed., *Die Reformierte Konfessionalisierung in Deutschland* (Gütersloh 1986).

Schilling, Johannes, and Bernd Moeller, *Luther-Rezeption: Kirchenhistorische Aufsätze Zur Reformationsgeschichte (Arbaiten Zur Religionspädagogik)* (Göttingen 2001).

Schindling, Anton, ed., *Die Territorien des Reichs im Zeitalter der Reformation und Konfessionalisierung*, 7 vols. (Münster 1089–1997).

Sharples, Robert W., "The Peripatetic School", in David Furley, *From Aristotle to Augustine: Routledge History of Philosophy*, Volume 2 (London 2003), 147–187.

Solana, Marcial, *Historia de la filosofía española* (Madrid 1941).

Sorabji, Richard, *Animal Minds and Human Morals. The Origins of the Western Debate* (Worcester 1993).

South, James B., "Singular and Universal in Suárez's Account of Cognition", *The Review of Metaphysics* 55.4 (2002), 785–823.

South, James B., "Suárez, Immortality, and the Soul's Dependence on the Body", in Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund, eds., *The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez* (Oxford 2012), 121–136.

Leen Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis, From Perception to Knowledge*, 2 vols. (Leiden 1995).

Spruit, Leen, *The Origin of the Soul From Antiquity to the Early Modern Era* (Lugano 2014).

Steel, Carlos, "The Author of the Commentary on the Soul", in Pamela Huby and Carlos Steel, transl., *Priscian, On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception with 'Simplicius', On Aristotle On the Soul 2.5–12* (London 1997), 105–140.

Steiger, Johann Anselm, *Fünf Zentralthemen der Theologie Luthers und seiner Erben: Communicatio, Figura, Imago, Maria, Exempla* (Leiden 2002).

Steinmetz, David Curtis, *Luther and Staupitz: An Essay in the Intellectual Origins of the Protestant Reformation* (Durham 1980).

Stolberg, Michael, "Particles of the Soul. The Medical and Lutheran Context of Daniel Sennert's Atomism", *Medicina nei Secoli* 15/2 (2003), 177–203.

Strauss, Gerald, *Luther's House of Learning. Indoctrination of the Young in the German Reformation* (Baltimore 1978).

Tanner, Norman P., and Giuseppe Alberigo, eds., *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils* (London 1990).

Vainio, Olli-Pekka, *Justification and Participation in Christ. The Development of the Lutheran Doctrine of Justification from Luther to the Formula of Concord (1580)* (Leiden 2008).

Verbeek, Theo, "Notes on Ramism in the Netherlands", in Mordechai Feingold, Joseph S. Freedman, Wolfgang Rother, eds., *The Influence of Petrus Ramus* (Basel 2001), 38–53.

Vidal, Fernando, *Les sciences de l'âme: XVIe–XVIIIe siècle* (Paris 2006).

Vidal, Fernando, *The Science of the Soul. The Early Modern Origins of Psychology* (Chicago 2011).

Walker, Daniel P., "Medical Spirits and God and the Soul", in Marta Fattori and Massimo Bianchi, eds., *Spiritus. IV Colloquio Internazionale Roma, 7–9 gennaio 1983* (Rome, 1984), 223–244.

Walker, Daniel P., "The Astral Body in Renaissance Medicine", *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 21 (1958), 119–133.

Wehrli, Fritz, *Die Schule des Aristoteles* (Basel 1978).

Wengert, Timothy J., and Patrick Graham, *Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560) and the Commentary* (Sheffield 1997).

Wengert, Timothy J., *Human Freedom, Christian Righteousness: Philip Melanchthon's Exegetical Dispute with Erasmus of Rotterdam* (New York 1998).

Westman, Robert S., "The Melanchthon Circle, Rheticus, and the Wittenberg Interpretation of the Copernican Theory", *Isis* 66.2 (1975), 164–193.

White, Andrew D., *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom* (New York 1896).

Whitford, David M., *Luther. A Guide for the Perplexed* (London 2011).

Williams, George Huntston, *The Radical Reformation* (Philadelphia 1975).

Wolfson, Harry Austryn, "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts", *The Harvard Theological Review* 28.2 (1935), 69–133.

Zupko, Jack, "What is the Science of the Soul? A Case Study in the Evolution of Late Medieval Natural Philosophy", *Synthese* 110 (1997), 297–334.

Samenvatting

Dit proefschrift bestudeert de interactie tussen psychologie en datgene wat doorgaans confessionalisering wordt genoemd. Hiermee bedoelen we het proces waardoor het West-Europese Christendom uiteenviel in drie grote stromingen: lutheranisme, katholicisme en calvinisme.

Historici van de filosofie en wetenschapshistorici besteden sinds enige tientallen jaren veel aandacht aan de verhouding tussen religie en wetenschap. Langzamerhand zijn historici opgehouden te geloven in de grote 19e-eeuwse verhalen over 'het conflict tussen religie en wetenschap' of 'de oorlog tussen wetenschap en religie'. Zo komen ze meer en meer tot de overtuiging dat de geschiedenis van filosofie en wetenschap enerzijds en de religiegeschiedenis anderzijds elkaar niet noodzakelijkerwijs hoeven uit te sluiten. Sinds deze benadering gangbaar is geworden, hebben wetenschappers in detail de vele wijzen bestudeerd waarop door de eeuwen heen een hele waaier van disciplines – waaronder metafysica, natuurwetenschap, astronomie, astrologie en geneeskunde – beïnvloed zijn door religieuze ideeën en vice versa. Interessant is daarbij dat de vraag welke transformaties de psychologie doormaakte in de tijd van de confessionalisering tot nu toe nauwelijks aan bod is gekomen. Dit ondanks het feit dat de psychologie zich bezighield met thema's die in het centrum stonden van de confessionele debatten die uiteindelijk leidden tot de scheiding tussen de drie genoemde stromingen. Het gaat hierbij om voor de hand liggende thema's zoals onsterfelijkheid, vrije wil, zonde en genade.

De geringe wetenschappelijke aandacht voor de interactie tussen psychologie en confessionalisering is des te meer verbazendwekkend gezien het volgende feit: een van de belangrijkste impulsen voor de 16e-eeuwse confessionalisering was Martin Luthers nieuwe begrip van het christelijke geloof. Luthers opvatting dat mensen alleen verlost kunnen worden door het geloof (*sola fide*) ging hand in hand met een zeer scherpe kritiek op sommige van de meest fundamentele ideeën van de kerk van Rome. De meeste van deze ideeën zijn direct gerelateerd aan de menselijke ziel. Om precies te zijn, Luther verwierp niet alleen het idee dat de ziel de vorm van het lichaam was (een doctrine die was vastgelegd in de constitutie *Fidei catholici* van het Concilie van Vienne [1311–1312]), maar hij bekritiseerde ook de tijdens het Vijfde Concilie van Lateranen (1512–1517) vastgelegde opvatting dat filosofie de onsterfelijkheid van de ziel zou moeten bewijzen (en daartoe dus ook in staat was).

Maar leidde Luthers kritiek tot een typisch lutheraans perspectief op de menselijke ziel? Ontwikkelden Luthers volgelingen een nieuwe benadering van de psycho-

logie? Waren de relatie tussen ziel en lichaam enerzijds en de (al dan niet-)bewijsbaarheid van de onsterfelijkheid van de ziel de enige twee psychologische issues waarover lutheranen en rooms-katholieken elkaar in de haren vlogen? In hoeverre had de 16e-eeuwse confessionalisering invloed op de psychologie? Kortom, hoe zag de psychologie er in de tijd van de confessionalisering eigenlijk uit?

Dit proefschrift is een poging tot een antwoord op deze vragen, die ondanks hun historische importantie te lang veronachtzaamd zijn. Ik concentreer me daarbij op een specifieke groep auteurs die hun ideeën in nauwe samenhang met Luther zelf ontwikkelden en die gemakkelijk onder een noemer te brengen zijn. Om precies te zijn, ik focus op de psychologie zoals die ontwikkeld werd door auteurs die zich lieten inspireren door de boeken over de ziel geschreven door Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560) – Luthers meest trouwe strijdmakker (aan de universiteit) in Wittenberg.

Dit proefschrift bestaat uit vijf casestudies die allen inzoomen op de interactie tussen de religieuze denkbeelden van deze auteurs en hun ideeën over de ziel zoals die te vinden zijn in hun commentaren op het werk van Melanchthon of in werken die anderszins door Melanchthon zijn beïnvloed.

In de eerste casestudy (hoofdstuk 2), laat ik zien dat Melanchthons interpetatie van Luthers opvattingen over de wijze waarop we kennis kunnen verwerven door de Schrift en door de filosofie een belangrijke ontwikkeling in de psychologie initieerden. Hoewel Melanchthon het met Luther eens was dat de essentie van de menselijke ziel gezien haar immateriële en onsterfelijke natuur alleen gekend kan worden middels de Schrift, verdedigde hij ook de opvatting dat niettemin een filosofisch begrip van sommige zielsfuncties mogelijk of zelfs noodzakelijk was. Dit denkbeeld resulteerde in een poging om tot een functionele beschrijving te komen van de lagere (vegetatieve en waarnemings-)vemogens van de ziel. Deze beschrijving poogt niet de essentie van de ziel te definiëren – hier volgt Melanchthon Luther – maar de functies te beschrijven die de ziel uitoefent in samenhang met het menselijke lichaam. Niet alleen bij Melanchthon maar ook in de werken van zijn volgers Rudolph Snellius en Otto Casmann ging deze poging gepaard met een discussie over het concept '*ἐνδελέχεια*', oftewel de continue beweging van de lichamelijke geesten, als een nieuwe manier van kijken naar het materiële karakter van de menselijke ziel.

In de tweede casestudy (hoofdstuk 3), zet ik uiteen dat Melanchthon bepaald niet huiverachtig was – *pace* Luther – om het geloof te integreren in zijn boeken over psychologie, die een filosofisch-functionele beschrijving van de lagere ziel ontwikkelen. Daarbij schreef Melanchthon aan de mens een hogere ziel toe die fundamenteel verschilt van de lichamelijke geesten. Melanchthon beschrijft deze hogere ziel als een immateriële en onsterfelijke *spiritus intelligens*. Deze *spiritus* was volgens

Melanchthon uitgerust met aangeboren kennis van de moraal, een opvatting die naar ik laat zien Melanchthon hielp om het lutheraanse kamp te disciplineren. Maar Melanchthon gebruikt het woord *spiritus* ook nog op een andere manier in zijn psychologie: de term *spiritus* refereert ook naar de Heilige Geest. Om alles nog veel verwarrender te maken, verdedigde Melanchthon ook de opvatting dat al deze 'geesten' (lichamelijk, immateriëel en de Heilige Geest) van cruciaal belang zijn voor het proces waarmee de mens belangrijke keuzes maakt in zijn aardse leven. In mijn analyse laat ik zien dat de interactie tussen al deze geesten een integraal bestanddeel is van Melanchthons doctrine van verlossing door het geloof alleen (*sola fide*), die door hem gezien wordt in termen van de vernieuwing van de menselijke ziel door inwerking van de Heilige Geest en in termen van de aanwezigheid van de Heilige Geest zelf in de ziel van de gelovigen.

In de derde casestudy (hoofdstuk 4) bestudeer ik de wijze waarop Melanchthons concept van *spiritus intelligens* werd gerecipieerd door Otto Casmann in de context van diens discussie met de Spaanse arts Franciscus Vallesius over de vraag of dieren ook over een vorm van rationaliteit beschikken. Ik beschrijf Casmanns transformatie van Melanchthons concept daarbij als een 'christologisering van de psychologie'. Casmann verdedigt Melanchthons concept van *spiritus intelligens* maar ondertussen radicaliseert hij deze ook. Volgens Casmann betekent het feit dat de mens een spiritueel wezen is dat de menselijke ontologische structuur een spiegeling moest zijn van de hypostatische unie van de twee naturen van Christus (menselijk én goddelijk).

In de vierde casestudy (hoofdstuk 5) onderzoek ik hoe Melanchthons poging om Luthers begrip van zonde en genade te verenigen met een filosofische doctrine over de ziel resulteerde in twee diepgaande transformaties die de psychologie van Melanchthon en zijn volgers significant doen verschillen van de meeste middeleeuwse en renaissance studies over de ziel. Aangezien Luther de opvatting huldigde dat zonde en genade zowel de geest als het lichaam van de mens betreffen, trok Melanchthon de conclusie dat een waarlijk christelijk begrip van de mens niet mag stilstaan bij alleen de ziel, maar ook kennis van het lichaam zou moeten omvatten. Op basis van deze doctrine transformeerden Melanchthon en zijn volgers het traditionele format van boeken over de ziel tot studies van de menselijke natuur in zijn geheel (geest én lichaam). Dit had als resultaat dat hun boeken voor een groot gedeelte bestonden uit beschrijvingen van het menselijk lichaam, geïnformeerd door up-to-date anatomische kennis. Als een tweede belangrijke transformatie die de psychologie van Melanchthon en zijn volgers doet verschillen van de meeste middeleeuwse en renaissance werken over de ziel bespreek ik het proces dat ertoe leidde

dat psychologie anthropologie werd, dat wil zeggen een discipline die de twee naturen van de mens bestudeert, lichaam (object van de anatomie) en geest (object van de psychologie). Hoewel deze transformatie direct het gevolg was van Melanchthons poging om lutheranisme en filosofie te verenigen, vond deze nieuwe taakomschrijving van de psychologie / anthropologie en de visie op de dubbele natuur van de mens die hierachter zat, ook ingang ver voorbij de confessionele grenzen en zelfs voorbij de limiet van het religieuze domein zelf.

In de vijfde casestudy (hoofdstuk *6*) ga ik in op de wijze waarop enerzijds Melanchthon en zijn volgelingen en anderijds andere lutheranen en rooms-katholieken traditionele vraagstukken (*quaestiones*) aangaande de oorsprong van de ziel behandelden: is de ziel door God *ex nihilo* geschapen (creationisme) of wordt de ziel gegenereerd door de ouders (*ex traduce*). Deze laatste positie wordt in de literatuur 'traducianisme' genoemd. In deze casestudy laat ik zien hoe Melanchthons overtuiging dat er geen filosofische kennis in de strikte zin mogelijk is van de essentie van de ziel ook een grote impact had op zijn behandeling van deze vraagstukken. Ondanks het feit dat Melanchthon grote moeite doet om een provisorisch antwoord te vinden in de Schrift, concludeert hij dat het natuurlijke verstand van de mens nooit een definitief antwoord zal kunnen vinden. Ik laat vervolgens zien dat Melanchthons voorzichtige benadering van het vraagstuk van de oorsprong van de ziel een heel interessante uitwerking kreeg in de teksten van auteurs die in zijn voetsporen werkten, zoals Bruno Seidel, Caspar Peucer en Gregor Horst. In hun teksten gaven Melanchthons voorzichtige opmerkingen aanleiding tot een grote variëteit van opvattingen over de oorsprong van de menselijke ziel. Melanchthons volgelingen verdedigden zowel creationisme als traducionisme, en allerlei middenposities tussen deze twee alternatieven. Omdat Melanchthon hetzij onduidelijk was hetzij zweeg over de oorsprong van de ziel, werd van 16e-eeuwse lutheranen niet verwacht dat ze zich aan een specifiek antwoord op deze vraag zouden houden.

Hiernaast kom ik in deze casestudy nog tot een andere conclusie die van belang is met betrekking tot de interactie tussen psychologie en confessionalisering in de 16e eeuw. Ondanks het feit dat lutheranen in het algemeen niet een specifieke doctrine aangaande de oorsprong van de ziel huldigden, werden sommige lutheraanse auteurs door confessionele uiteenzettingen met rooms-katholieken en calvinisten ertoe aangezet om een duidelijker standpunt te verwoorden. Zo kon het gebeuren dat rooms-katholieke auteurs (met name de Jezuïeten aan de universiteit van Ingolstadt) het traducianisme verwierpen als zijnde de opinie van Luther. Onder de invloed van deze aanvallen en dankzij de groeiende bezorgdheid dat het creationisme niet op een adequate manier de overdracht van de erfzonde zou kunnen verklaren, lijkt het erop

dat het traducianisme aan het begin van de 17e eeuw een steeds grotere populariteit genoot onder lutheranen.

Op basis van deze vijf casestudies kom ik tot de volgende conclusies. Het moge duidelijk zijn dat Luthers aanvallen op de scholastieke opvattingen over de ziel niet resulteerden in een homogene lutheraanse psychologie. Van lutheranen werd niet verwacht dat ze een specifieke opvatting over de oorsprong van de ziel verdedigden. Sterker nog, van lutheranen werd überhaupt niet verwacht dat ze op één bepaalde manier aan psychologie deden. Vanuit dit gezichtspunt kunnen we dus niet spreken over *de* lutheraanse psychologie, hoogstens van verschillende lutheraanse benaderingswijzen.

Aan de andere kant concludeer ik dat er twee manieren zijn waarop categorieën als 'lutheraans' en 'confessie' gebruikt kunnen worden om de transformaties binnen de psychologie te begrijpen die ik in deze dissertatie heb bestudeerd. Ten eerste, Melanchthon en zijn volgelingen deelden bepaalde gemeenschappelijke psychologische opvattingen die samenhangen met centrale elementen van Melanchthons theologie. Hoewel deze opvattingen niet werden voorgeschreven door de lutheraanse theologische orthodoxie, kunnen we wel zien dat Melanchthon en zijn volgers deze doctrines ontwikkelden in een poging om zoiets als een orthodoxie tot stand te brengen.

Ten tweede concludeer ik dat (wellicht niet intentioneel) de psychologie het vehikel was waarmee confessionele identiteiten konden worden gevormd en versterkt. Door controverses over filosofische visies op de ziel werden bepaalde psychologische ideeën karakteristiek voor specifieke confessionele groepen. De casus van 16e-eeuwse discussies over de oorsprong van de ziel vertoont een 'wij tegen hen'-dynamiek waarbij de Jezuïeten uit Ingolstadt het creationisme als de rooms-katholieke positie identificeerden en de lutheranen beschimpten om hun zogenaamde verdediging van het traducianisme. Met andere woorden, door controverses over psychologie profileerden religieuze groepen zich als een bepaalde confessie. Ook op deze tweede manier was psychologie een integraal onderdeel van de formatie van een lutheraanse orthodoxie.

Summary

In this thesis, I look at the way in which psychology interacted with the so-called process of confessionalisation, that is, the transformation through which Western European Christianity became divided into three main denominations: Lutheranism, Catholicism, and Calvinism.

Historians of philosophy and science over the last few decades have devoted much attention to the relationship between religion and science. Especially since nineteenth-century narratives of 'the conflict between religion and science' or 'the warfare of science and religion' stopped being the dominant historiographical paradigm, historians have looked more favourably at the idea that the history of philosophy and science and the history of religion are not necessarily two mutually contrasting affairs. As this new approach gained momentum, scholars have analysed the way in which a wide array of disciplines – such as, metaphysics, physics, astronomy, astrology, medicine, etc., – interacted with religious ideas through the centuries. Interestingly enough, the way in which psychology underwent multiple transformations in the age of confessionalisation has hitherto been neglected. This, despite the fact that, due to its obvious proximity to ideas of 'immortality', 'free will', 'sin', and 'grace', psychology dealt with subjects of central interest for the confessional controversies which led Western European Christianity to divide into (at least) three main groups.

The paucity of available scholarship on the interplay between psychology and confessionalisation is all the more surprising when one observes the following fact. One of the main triggers of sixteenth-century confessionalisation corresponds with Martin Luther's new understanding of the Christian faith. Luther's idea that human beings were saved through faith alone also involved a harsh criticism of some of the most fundamental ideas at the basis of the official theology of the Roman Church. Among the ideas that Luther attacked some concerned directly the human soul. Notably, Luther rejected that the human intellective soul was the form of the body (as had famously been declared in the constitution *Fidei catholicae* of the Council of Vienne [1311–1312]), and that philosophy could prove the immortality of the human soul (as instead was stated by the Fifth Lateran Council [1512–1517]).

But in the wake of Luther's criticism did there follow anything like a 'typically Lutheran way' of looking at the soul? Did Luther's followers develop a new way of doing psychology? Were the soul-body relationship and the philosophical demonstrability of the soul's immortality the only two points on which a good Lutheran

should part company with his fellow Catholics who wrote about psychology? Did the process of sixteenth-century confessionalisation affect psychology and if so, how exactly? In short, what was psychology like in the age of confessionalisation?

In this thesis I provide an answer to these questions, which despite their importance have been neglected for too long. I do so by considering one specific tradition, or group of authors, which developed in close connection with Luther's views and which lends itself to the identification of some common features. Therefore, I have focused on the way psychology developed at the hand of authors who looked at the books on the soul written by Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560) – the reformer and closest ally of Martin Luther at Wittenberg – as their preferred intellectual platform to deal with psychology.

I have conducted my study by means of five case studies in which these authors developed their ideas concerning the soul in connection with their religious views.

In the first case study (Chapter 2), I show that Melanchthon's fresh interpretation of Luther's teaching concerning knowledge obtained through God's Gospel and through philosophy involved an important development in psychology. Whilst Melanchthon agreed with Luther that the essence of the human soul in its immaterial and immortal nature could only be known through the Gospel, he thought that a philosophical understanding of some of the soul's operations was non only possible but even necessary. This idea resulted in an attempt to provide an operational account of the lower (vegetative and sensitive) powers of the human soul: an account of the soul that does not try to define the essence of the soul but rather the operations the soul performs in the human body. It is for this reason that Melanchthon and some of his followers strove to grasp the workings of the vegetative and sensitive souls in the human body. Chiefly in Philip Melanchthon's books on the soul, but subsequently also in the psychologies written by the Protestant Rudolph Snellius and Otto Casmann, this endeavour to embody the lower souls became interwoven with the diffusion of the concept of '*ἐνδελέχεια*', or continuous movement of the bodily spirits, as a new way of looking at the corporeal soul of man.

In the second case study (Chapter 3), I explain that, one the one hand, Melanchthon made room for a philosophical/operational account of the lower soul in the context of his Lutheran faith. On the other hand, he did not renounce to integrate this faith in his books on psychology. He did so by ascribing to human beings a higher soul that was altogether different from the bodily spirits. Melanchthon conceived of this higher soul as an immaterial and immortal substance called *spiritus intelligens*. This intelligent spirit was provided with innate knowledge of civic morals, an idea which I show to have served Melanchthon's efforts of disciplining the Lutheran

camp. What is more, Melanchthon also used 'spirit' in yet another way in his psychology: spirit was also the Holy Spirit. To make matters worse, Melanchthon explained that the interaction of all these (bodily, intelligent, and Holy) spirits was central to man's choices and behaviour in his mortal life. In my analysis, I argue that this interaction between spirits was part and parcel of Melanchthon's doctrine of salvation by faith alone, intended as the renewal of the soul on the part of the Holy Spirit and as the presence of the Holy Spirit itself in the soul of the believers.

In the third case study (Chapter 4), I show that Melanchthon's notion of *spiritus intelligens* was adopted by the Protestant Otto Casmann, in the context of a discussion with the Spanish physician Franciscus Vallesius, concerning the presence of reason in brute animals. By analysing this dispute, I also point to the fact that Melanchthon's notion of *spiritus intelligens* underwent a transformation at the hand of Casmann, which I call 'Christologising of psychology'. Casmann defended Melanchthon's notion of the soul as '*spiritus intelligens*', but I argue that he also brought Melanchthon's spiritualising views of man's higher soul to a different level. According to Casmann, the idea that man was a spiritual being means that man's ontological structure has to mirror the hypostatic unity of the two natures of Christ.

In the fourth case study (Chapter 5), I demonstrate that Melanchthon's attempt to balance Luther's understanding of sin and grace with a philosophical account of the soul resulted in two very profound transformations, which made Melanchthon's and his followers' psychologies differ from most medieval and Renaissance books on the soul. As Luther thought that sin and grace concerned both the soul and the body of man, Melanchthon considered that a properly Christian understanding of human beings could not regard the soul alone, but should also include knowledge of the body. For this reason, Melanchthon and those who followed his teaching remoulded their books about the soul into studies of the entirety of human nature (both the soul and the body). As a consequence of this they devoted large parts of their psychology to an account of the human body based on the latest anatomical knowledge available at the time. In the fifth chapter of this thesis I point to a further interesting element involved in the transformations of psychology. On the one hand, psychology became anthropology, which considered the two natures of man: a soul or spirit (the subject of psychology) and a body (the subject of anatomy). This change in the Renaissance science of the soul was triggered by Melanchthon's own interpretation and effort to enforce central points of his Lutheran faith. On the other hand, the new set-up of psychology resulting from Melanchthon's and his followers' endeavours, as well as their view of human nature as composed of two natures, became ideas accepted across different confessions or even independently of religious motives.

In the fifth case study (Chapter 6), I look at how Melanchthon and his followers, on the one hand, as well as other Lutherans and Catholics, on the other, treated traditional questions regarding the origin of the human soul: is the human soul created by God *ex nihilo* (creationism), or rather generated by the parents *ex traduce* (traducianism)? In this study I argue that Melanchthon's idea that philosophical knowledge of the soul's essence was not attainable impacted on his conception of the origin of the soul as follows. Notwithstanding his efforts to find a provisional answer in the Scriptures, Melanchthon concluded that man's natural understanding could not solve this question once and for all. In this thesis, I argue that Melanchthon's cautionary approach to the question of the origin of the soul played out in a very interesting manner in texts produced by authors who followed him, such as Bruno Seidel, Caspar Peucer, and Gregor Horst. In their cases, Melanchthon's idea that the origin of the soul was unknowable did not only serve as a cautionary remark. Perhaps more importantly, it made it possible for them to defend a variety of different opinions on human animation. Melanchthon's students defended creationism, traducianism, or middle-ground positions between these two alternatives. Because Melanchthon had been either unclear or silent about the origin of the soul, sixteenth-century Lutherans were not expected to conform to one specific doctrine. In this study, I also make another point, which is of particular interest for our understanding of the interaction between psychology and confessions in the sixteenth century. Despite the fact that Lutherans did not follow one specific doctrine regarding the origin of the soul, confessional controversies encouraged several Lutherans to take a clearer stance. In fact, Catholic authors (especially the Jesuits at the University of Ingolstadt) began to condemn traducianism as the opinion defended by Luther. In the wake of these attacks, and amidst growing concerns that creationism could not adequately explain the transmission of original sin through mankind, traducianism appears to have enjoyed increasing popularity among Lutherans, at the turn of the seventeenth century.

As the result of these five case studies I conclude what follows. As the dispute concerning the origin of the human soul shows, one may very well incline towards thinking that Luther's attacks on scholastic doctrines of the soul did not result in a homogeneous Lutheran psychology. Lutherans were not expected to defend one specific doctrine of the soul's origin. In fact, it seems they were not expected to do psychology in one specific way at all. From this point of view, there never was something like a Lutheran psychology.

On the other hand, I conclude that there are two ways in which categories such as 'Lutheran' and 'confession' may fruitfully be used to understand the transfor-

mations of psychology I have described in the present work. First, as it emerges from Melanchthon's and his followers' works on the soul, these authors did share common psychological views that pivoted on central points of Melanchthon's theology. These views were not implied or requested by Lutheran orthodoxy. Yet, when Melanchthon and his followers maintained their psychological ideas they did it so as to create something like a religious orthodoxy.

Second, psychology was (perhaps unintentionally) the vehicle through which confessional identities could emerge or strengthen themselves. Through controversies on philosophical views about the soul, psychological ideas became characteristic of specific confessional groups. The case of sixteenth-century discussions about the origin of the soul witnesses to a dynamic of 'us-and-them' whereby the Jesuits of Ingolstadt identified Catholicism with the creationist doctrine and blamed Lutherans for their alleged defence of traducianism. Through a controversy on psychology groups defined themselves and profiled others according to confession. Also in this second way, psychology was an integral part of the formation of Lutheran orthodoxy.

Biography

Davide Cellamare received his MA from the Università Aldo Moro di Bari (Italy) in 2009. In 2010 he joined the Center for the History of Philosophy and Science as a junior researcher. There he has been working on the interplay between sixteenth-century faculty-psychology and confessional controversies in early-modern northern Europe. This work resulted in his doctoral thesis: "Psychology in the Age of Confessionalisation. A Case Study on the Interaction between Psychology and Theology c. 1517–c. 1640".